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

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THE INTERNATIONAL
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OCTOBER, 1912.

THE DECLINE OF CULTURE.

E. BENJAMIN ANDREWS.

EVEN more than civilization in general, the special phase of it called culture has its ups and downs. The age of Pericles suffered sunset, being followed by many a far stretch of chiaroscuro before full day shone again. Mæcenas would have scoffed had a prophet told him that there were to succeed his Augustan time whole centuries during which hardly a scholar in Europe would be able to read Homer or Plato, and when even Vergil would be known to but few. Yet such centuries came.

We do not expect dark ages now. The causes which fogged the air after Rome's great days are nowhere discoverable at present,—no Goths, no Huns, no Tartars either, unless, as Charles H. Pearson seems to think possible, the Chinese march west. It is, however, a remark deserving serious consideration that after Athens and after Rome, when old-time culture,—philosophy, science, literature, the stage, art, discussion, criticism, skepticism, construction, satire, ethical hortation, and the Christian Gospel,—had done their utmost to improve men's minds, hearts, and lives, notwithstanding all, mental twilight fell upon European society, stayed long, sat grievously, and was brightened out into noon again only by centuries of painful toil at light-making.

A certain obscuration of real culture is again observable and we as yet by no means see its worst. "The measure

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of a nation's true success," says Lowell, "is the amount it has contributed to the truth, the moral energy and intellectual happiness, the spiritual hope and consolation of mankind." We of the United States cannot face this just criterion to-day so boldly as we could earlier. Our traffic in spirituals, never any too lively, has decreased. Our export of higher-life wares used to be greater than now. At date, we fear, the balance of the trade is against us.

Culture is the appreciation, not contemplative alone but active and efficient, of the non-economic values. It is not identical with virtue but involves that. It covers enlightenment, breadth, open-mindedness, chivalry, honor, generosity, magnanimity, justice, gentleness, devotion to principle, the courage of one's convictions, power to sustain, without courting it, loneliness, resisting popular clamors and mob movements whether plebeian or patrician. Your truly cultivated man will put on no airs, neither take off any. He is not afraid of that which is high nor ashamed of what is obscure, having opinions but not opinionated, firm without stubbornness, fine yet not effeminate, respectful to the past yet no slave of tradition. He loves and courts above all things Truth, and with that, if he can find it, he will stay, with that he will live and with that he will die, recking the minimum of what other men do or say. Faith is his, a view which bottoms reality in reason and spirit and equips righteousness with its everlasting yea.

Of this comprehensive quality our times, as compared with the not very remote past, display a lack. There is a falling off in men's desire to procure and promote the things of the mind, less thought than once of ideals, less enthusiasm for the true, the beautiful, and the good, less submission to these.

> In each soul is born the pleasure
> Of yearning onward, upward, and away,
> When o'er our heads, lost in the vaulted azure,
> The lark sends down his flickering lay.

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Nowadays we do not yearn onward much, or upward, or away. Such postures are not in favor with the Four Hundred.

Much genuine unselfishness remains, but there is a great deal more which exists solely on paper or in sentiment. If a fellow-citizen is caught red-handed in doing an act of considerable self-denial, men gape at him as a wonder, pitying, however, rather than admiring. He means well, they admit; he is a right good fellow, but a fool nevertheless. Recently, on a Chicago street, a gentleman said to his walking mate, who was from St. Louis: "Look, d'ye see that tall man with the long Roman nose and spectacles?" "Yes," said the other, "what about him?" "Why, that's Judge Peter S. Grosscup, who, on a salary of $6,000, refused an offer of a $100,000 salary as attorney for the Northern Securities Company." "By gad," said the St. Louis party, "he looks that way; doesn't insanity run in the family?"

Fiction abjures romantic effort and turns horribly to realism, partly dry moralizing, partly nauseous pornography. Plenty of verse is composed and marketed, but little of it is true poetry, still less of it spiritual poetry. Stocks, bonds, deals, puts, calls, promoting, Wall Street entire, repel and sicken the muses. All about us we witness contempt for the simple life. When Charles Wagner's book on that subject was translated, its ideas, which, noteworthily, we had to import from France as we do our finest silks and wines, struck most Americans as discoveries. We are busy getting our living, unaware, meantime, that "after a man gets his living he has got to live." Wealth is amassed as never before, vast amounts of which no doubt go for books, paintings, elegant houses, ornaments, and artists' work of all sorts; but how few, comparatively, of the purchasers buy or enjoy with any higher motive than pride! Rich oafs spend fortunes for rare editions or bindings, which with infinite gusto they invite you to survey, posing as great patrons of letters, it taking but a test question or two to lay bare their hypocrisy. In

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everything not allied with the winning of secular goods do we not to an unprecedented extent behold in men's characters and deeds distressing commonplace, a dead level, a stale uniformity?

Charles Wagner,—and we believe him,—says that we err in thinking of earlier ages as less mobile-minded than our own, in charging antique society with rigidity, monotony of thought and manners. Those ancient epochs which we love to represent as morbidly static, possessed a marvelous richness of thought, custom, and originality unknown at the present day. They had variety in uniformity; we have monotony in the midst of change. Our change means mostly the same thing over and over. Fashion was never so imperious as now.

In this age so rich in invention everything breeds uniformity. The ten thousand shapes which life and thought take on are propagated and impressed with astonishing rapidity. Science enables us to multiply infinitely all the things we invent and to throw them upon the market with cheapening profusion. Vulgarization debases all the arts. Is a masterpiece originated anywhere? Myriads of copies immediately flood the country. Opera airs the most beautiful pass forthwith to the hand-organ. In six weeks after a melody is first heard every one is singing and whistling it. So of all novelties in art or in social life. The city, possessing the engines of civilization, floods the country with its products, beating down and running out local peculiarities. Professor Royce rightly argues the mischief of this bleaching process, pointing out the incalculable benefit to our national character of local idiosyncracies. Let shallow people laugh at New England provincialism and berate the South for being solid. The wise rejoice that so much local apartness survives. Well may each remoter section of the country,—and without pharisaism,—rejoice in any traits it can claim as peculiarly its own, praying with unction daily: God, I thank thee that I am not as other sections are,—or even as great New York.

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Centralization annuls not only the baneful and narrow in particularism but, worse still, its sap and vigor. The ponderous paving rollers of industrialism, bureaucracy, and fashion pass over society, crushing out originality and flattening individuals into specimens. Local manners, costumes, provincial songs and idioms disappear. Railway lines, depots, hotels, and theatres resemble each other like brothers. Towns and villages, drained, debilitated, each shorn of its individuality, are but the feeble images of cities.

Where, asks Mr. Wagner, whose thought we have been tracing,—where in such a world, can character, originality, the will to strike into new paths, get foothold? How can anyone take on an individual physiognomy. You must imitate. You must wear the ruling style of hat and coat, and tie your cravat in the latest knot, or you are a boor. Individuals are no longer turned out, but human samples, —by the dozen, by the gross. The stereotyped eye-glass, cane, gait, handshake, salutation, suggest automatons. You look for some factory stamp upon the lot. Fashion determines manners and ideas in the same way. Ruts form and grow deeper and deeper. People come to prefer herd-life. Out of it they are lost. They no longer attach value save to things they have seen, heard, or tasted in common. "It was bad,—no one had it." "It was superb; they were tumbling over each other to get it." To many a man 'You're a liar' seems less an insult than 'You're queer.'

Industrialism involves another curse, the division of labor, as destructive of spiritual as it is creative of temporal wealth, and not confined any longer to mills and shops, but felt as well on 'Change, at the bar, in newspaper-making, and even in teaching. Everywhere specializing breeds pettiness, an arid mind, thinking with the spinal cord instead of the brain. Even this would not be so bad if the manikins realized that they were such, but they deem themselves men and sages. Forced to be narrow, people take their dwarf conceptions as the measure of total reality.

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It is doubtful whether what might be called the scientific mind is holding its own. Superstition not unlike belief in ghosts is still wide-spread and rank. Ideas of prayer as irrational as fetish worship have immense vogue among the people. The processes called divine healing, mental healing, faith cure, and so on, no doubt have some basis in recognized laws, but still a large part of the credence reposed in them is superstition pure and simple.

There is wide remission of enthusiasm for humanity. Few think it articulately; fewer avow it; but very many are in fact now cherishing a notion quite akin to that of slavery's advocates before the Civil War, that God has organized society aristocratically, the multitude being ordained to live ignorant, poor, in servitude to the elect. The victory of civilization, so many a contemporary argument implies, is to be judged by its consummate flower rather than by the number and distribution of its flowers, the state and fate of the common man being of little account if only wealth is adequate to the perfecting of culture in however few individuals. Our advanced communities now display a great deal less justice and fairness, man toward man, than was formerly seen. There is, indeed, less wrangling and objurgatory discussion than once. Even this, we fear, is mostly due to lack of frankness, not to a growing kindness of temper. Is not the same true touching the boasted tolerance of opinion observed on all hands? In private, men certainly storm against opponents with fearful rancor. Mark, too, the cold greed and rapacity with which business is carried on! Mercantile honor is not unknown, but it is relatively rarer than hitherto, less the rule. Promoting-deals, stock-manipulations, market-rigging, in intent and in effect every whit as bad as highway robbery, occur daily, evoking no protest save the bleating of shorn lambs.

While crimes of violence against person, and also crimes against property, in the way of large and open robbery, are growing less frequent,—partly because police service is better,—on the other hand, torts, crimes

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of cunning, secret vices, tricks, however immoral and cruel, that can be worked in accordance with law, and especially offenses against personal purity, are everywhere on the increase. Meantime it is not simply abstention from wrong that human beings need in order to live well. It is enthusiasm for righteousness; it is mighty self-denial and heroic sacrifice;—not innocence but nobility, not continuance upon present moral levels, but inspiration and power to soar to the heights; and it is clear that latter-day motives are less and less adequate for those attainments.

We have thus far been looking at the malaise outwardly. Let us now get down to diagnosis. The culture pyæmia in American society may be traced, in the main, to four great plexuses of influences: one, the country's astounding growth in wealth; a second, the spread of communistic socialism; a third, bad theory and practice in education; and a fourth, depressing views of the world, life, and man.

1. In the United States the conjunction of virile population with boundless natural resources has created wealth with a rapidity never before attained. Then, right in the midst of this incomparable development, Pelion upon Ossa, mankind reached the world's limit of free arable land. For the first time in history it became impossible to acquire fertile soil by merely traveling to it. As the population of the globe was meantime increasing by leaps and bounds, the disappearance of free arable forced a rise in the values of all agricultural land within reach of markets, giving to our wealth a new and incalculable accession, since our arable, all of it near centers of population, was at once vaster, richer and in better tilth than that of any other nation. Thus the principle of unearned increment has wrought with our energy and industry and with our country's native fecundity to pile up here, in a generation, riches past the wildest dreams of Crœsus.

A mighty despiritualizing factor is thus in play over and above men's natural love of gain and reënforcing

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that, a force not paralleled in any other land or at any earlier epoch in our own. Wealth-gaining is an obtrusive, all-engrossing phenomenon, over-shadowing all else,—massive, ubiquitous, obstreperous, never out of sight or out of mind. By its size it occludes the sun: the noise of it deafens reason's ear. We do not refer mainly to those professedly engaged in amassing riches; the frenzy spreads to all. Yon neighbor of mine has become rich; why should not I? Scholars, professors, the clergy, even saints courtesy to Mammon. Very rare is the man in any walk of life who is really contented with a decent plenty. If any perchance ask how much one must have to live comfortably, the chorus answers at once: "The utmost you can get." It was said by him of old time, "Life is more than meat"; the modern conviction would seem to be that life is identical with meat and the body with raiment.

2. Patriots are marking with interest the rapid multiplication of socialists. Our growing socialist vote is the one clear sign of momentous political change going on in America. Not the foreign-born alone poll it; not the illiterate only, but holders of diplomas, writers, thinkers. What is even more significant than socialists' numerical increase is the fact that your up-to-date socialist is a communist. There have always been communists, men who, conceiving wealth either as the sole good or as the necessary condition to all good, have urged the equal distribution of it among all the community's adults, disregarding both productive capacity and thrift. Of old, people of such a mind were not all socialists, but now to a man they are so and they probably form the great bulk of the socialist body in every country. There is, however, another class of socialists, sedate and studious citizens, who did not begin as communists: and the serious problem connected with recent socialist advance relates to these.

The first socialism announcing itself as a program for general society, to regulate production and not merely

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consumption, was to a great extent a rational effort to cure patent, apparently remediable social inequalities. Its purpose was not leveling, nor would it have resulted in leveling had it been put in execution. It did not ignore the native, indomitable differences between human individuals, but took account of these, proposing to turn them to better social uses than before. Partly not to offend their *confrères* who were communists, and still more, perhaps, because no workable plan other than equal distribution has been or can be found for artificially dividing a society's income, the kind of socialists who would have been glad not to do so bow to the communistic blast. No standard socialistic work, we think, any longer hesitates to admit that socialism, when fully launched, is going to mean out-and-out equality of income among all the adult members of society, from hod-carriers and stone-breakers up to the rarest artists, jurists, authors, and professional experts.

Intelligent socialists may think they see how this economic leveling can be made to consist with that rich diversity, manifoldness, and individualism in society to which we are accustomed. We cannot but believe that most of them, in adopting communism, inwardly consent to some measure of social leveling as well; but, even if they do not expect this, the vast majority of their followers not only expect it, but hope for it and are determined to have it. Diversity in economic condition and diversity in social condition involve each other. Socialist thinkers will have to admit this; less intelligent socialists enthusiastically recognize it already.

The socialism so rapidly growing is thus, in effect, a crusade against the highlands of men's life in the supposed interest of the bog. Ears are of course familiar with the shrieks of dissent from that conclusion, but it seems to us inevitable. The social homogeneity sure to follow the scheme if victorious would be coarse rather than fine; low, not high. Leveling would be mainly downward.

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It is less our business just now to show what must result from a real reign of socialism, than to indicate the mischief which socialist agitation has already done. Leveling purpose is this moment rife. By great caravans of more or less intelligent persons human weal is to-day apprehended as if wholly calculable in terms of food and clothing. Large wealth-making, however honest, is decried as criminal. Men would build forth the social body utterly without regard to heterogeneity, allowing no place for the genius, the artist, the dreamer, the mugwump, the rebel. The church in its worst days never meditated rendering life so insipid. Involved in the iron orderliness which socialism cannot but entail, any real man would cry out with Walt Whitman:

> O for something pernicious and dread,
> Something far away from a puny and pious life,
> Something unproved, something in a trance,
> Something escaped from the anchorage and driving free.

3. Culture is suffering from certain perversities in education. Bad and low ideals in education couple themselves with false and ignoble theories. Herbert Spencer would make all education turn on man's relation to nature, because, forsooth, man must ever live in, on, and with nature. Nay, critics reply, society is the great conception in education; we are closer to society than to nature. Yes, but each man's nearest environment is himself, a truth all but universally overlooked. Ethical training is neglected,—the creation of large, rich, rounded personalities, making life within oneself possible and good, and insuring rational happiness, in cases of advanced age, even when communion both with nature and society is at end. All of course recognize the place of nature study and of acquaintance with one's kind in duly rearing, furnishing and finishing personalities; but we insist on it as of sovereign importance that the human being himself be made and ceaselessly kept central in the educational process. Pestilential, too, is the cry for shorter courses,

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that young people may begin work earlier in life, earn more, and be surer of large families. There is no fear that our population will be too small, but much that it will be too mean. It is to be hoped that Mr. Roosevelt will soon amend his frequent plea for swelling the census by urging quality of population as more of a desideratum, thus undoing a little the incalculable evil his words have wrought among the poor and thoughtless.

One must deprecate the rage for exclusively modern studies. All that has been urged to the contrary notwithstanding, these branches are less cultivating than well-taught classical disciplines. Touching only the here and the now, they cannot broaden the mind or shift hither and thither the spirit's point of view as needs to be done to produce an education worthy the name. Moreover, they are nearly always pursued with a more or less utilitarian aim. It is the great merit of classical reading, on the other hand, that it promises you no bread or meat, while it thrusts you at once into a strange, far-away world, from almost every point of which you see each nearer thing in some instructive and valuable new light. What can one know of the world which modern studies make familiar unless one has some acquaintance with the antique!

America should heed Stanley Hall's and M. Lavisse's caution against excessive uniformity in educational system. Organization, methods, even standards, may have morbid similarity. Affiliation can easily be pressed too far. When one institution begins to ape another, even a better, be sure there is pus in its blood. A college, like a code of laws or a governmental constitution, is good and valuable, not mainly in proportion as it conforms to abstract educational theory, but mainly as it has grown up from and with the people for whom it exists.

University training is a rare boon; let all who can, take advantage of it. And you will rarely find anyone, however brilliant or well-informed, who has failed of this discipline, whose mental work does not painfully betray the lack. Still, far be the day when reverence for schools,

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examinations, diplomas shall be strong enough to bar independent spirits from any reward of the intellectual life. No university faculty on earth dare,—not all such faculties together dare,—to profess human knowledge in its entirety. To get an actual encyclopedia you must go outside. Much of the world's best thinking must continue to be done, as always hitherto, by non-schoolmen like John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, and Eduard von Hartmann.

The method of college teaching has in important respects changed for the worse. Wordsworth, also De Quincey, distinguished literature into two kinds,—the literature of knowledge and the literature of power,—books that inform and books that inspire and create. You can fruitfully divide methods of collegiate instruction in the same way. There is instruction that merely imparts information and there is instruction that sets on fire, consumes and recreates the pupil. The one conceives the student as a receptacle, and its motto is, 'Fill him up'; the other conceives him as a rational being, and its motto is, 'Build him up.' Your typical college professor of to-day represents the one kind; President Mark Hopkins in his prime the other. This instruction of impartation has nearly swept the field, displacing the old instruction of power. In higher classes, especially, there is not enough drill, too little of resolute grapple between teacher's and learner's mind. Socrates's method of give and take is forgotten. The crib is filled with food, but little effort put forth to make it appetizing or nutritious, still less to give the eater voracity and assimilating power. He may eat or he may starve. Very many teachers wholly repudiate the function of men-making, anxious solely to exalt the subjects which they teach. They compass land and sea to build a course of lectures, a book, a system, but, save as an incident, do nothing upon the infinitely more needful task of furthering the manhood they face each day in class.

No wonder that students in college show, as compared

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with those of years past, great dearth of moral enthusiasm. There is fair zeal for hard study, for intellectual attainments, for qualifications that shall bring place and name and fortune; but little for ideals, truth on its own account. Quite in vain would you search American institutions of high learning to find students, as one easily could do once, in societies, in dormitories, on college walks, engaging each other with blood-heat arguments, sometimes leading to duels, on questions like slavery, capital punishment, the rights of majorities. Equally vital questions crowd the forum to-day, issues on whose solution the whole weal of humanity hangs; but they stir very little the breasts of college men. Nor can one refer this in any great degree to change of view touching debate as a means of advancing truth. Its main cause is sheer moral apathy.

4. The doctrine of evolution, deriving each higher life-form from a lower one by insensible differentiation, is quite compatible with the highest human culture, but mechanical or atelic evolution is not so. Purely Darwinian ethics,—biological, hedonistic,—making self-love the final source of all our moral promptings, could never have reared the best selfhood our humanity has realized and can never sustain this. The philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche is a perfectly logical working out of Darwinian biology in the field of men's moral life. Could that strange teacher sight earth from where he is, it would certainly refresh him to see his doctrine spreading,—the doctrine that might makes right, that Jenghis Khan, Timur, Alexander, and such conquerors are the model men, that to love all, forgive injuries, help the poor and lowly, and so on, is a religion fit only for slaves, that Christ's great words have already lost all power over superior races and individuals and must soon completely and forever pass away.

In memorable chapters Arthur James Balfour shows what the effect must be should biological ethics thus triumph. He points out that to live worthily, to obey high

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ideals, is in the long run impossible for him who does not view the world as somehow the product of purpose.

The assumptions of naturalism absolutely contradict not only our spontaneous moral beliefs and promptings, but also derivative convictions that are of vital moment to society if progress is to mark the future. Naturalism can give no reason why any sentiment, impulse, or conviction which in any manner is of advantage to the race should be preferred to any other impulse or conviction as more worthy of consideration or obedience. The basest appetites, the hardest selfishness, the most ferocious hatred, naturalism places on the same level of nobility,—call the level low or high,—as the most self-denying devotion or the most death-defying heroism. The tiger in you and the saint in you proceed from the same kind of causes; both were evolved for the same end, the maintenance of the species. By the theory of unpurposed or mechanical evolution conscience itself, the sweetest, loftiest, most unselfish virtue, can have no diviner meaning than that the family, tribe, or nation is biologically more valuable than the individual.

Reasoning according to the principles of purposeless evolution, let us suppose the process of evolution reversed. Imagine courage and self-control to have been the qualities first needed, first evolved, and therefore most radically ingrained in the nature of our ancestors, and think of selfishness, cowardice, greed, and lust as impulses called for and hence developed only at a later stage of the world's growth. In that case, naturalistic evolution would bid us look for those exalted emotions which now attend courage and abnegation, in connection with selfishness, cowardice, and lust. Preachers would then earnestly warn us to beware of excessive indulgence in deeds of self-immolation as a deadly thing. Hereditary instinct bears you that way, they would say, but you must resist it. Mortify the longing to do good which is in your members, and gird yourselves for rioting and drunkenness, chambering and wantonness, strife and envying. Do not im-

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peril your soul by toil for others, but, as you value salvation, cultivate with all your might the grace of having a good time.

As moral conduct finds in the theory of mechanical evolution no justification by looking back to the genesis of our experiences, upon the same hypothesis it finds none in looking forward. In that view, the individual, of course, ceases forever with his bodily death. But the race itself does not survive him long. In a period quite possible to be measured, its term almost in sight, the energies of our solar system will decay. The sun will stop shining, and the earth, too cold longer to produce or to continue life, will cease to be the habitation of man. All will then be as if conscious spirits had never been. Religion, reason, and art, with the glorious records which they had while there was mind to contemplate them, will be clean gone forever. Life and love, hate and death, everything speakable and unspeakable which now engages human thought, as well as all the realms of undiscovered and potential being, will be canceled in blank annihilation.

True, the moral results of thinking like this have not yet fully revealed themselves in any community. Which means in part that the people who so believe have not been able to impress their ideas upon their fellows, and in part that the believers themselves probably do not, a single one of them, realize in their characters the inevitable logic of their convictions. But this schism between conviction and conduct cannot continue forever. The mind of man is at bottom rational. Inevitably, sooner or later, his beliefs take effect in his behavior. Either the naturalistic thinking or the altruistic conduct must go by the board. If naturalism is the truth, morality is but a haphazard catalogue of prudential regulations; beauty is unsubstantial and accidental, not eternal; and even reason is nothing else but a habit by which our thoughts chance to take one course rather than another. Well says Mr. Balfour: "All that gives dignity to life, all

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that gives value to effort, shrinks and fades under the pitiless glare of a creed like this."

Such are, as it seems to us, the worst reefs athwart the track of the world's spiritual commerce in our day; such is our chart of the seas where they lie. Our review brings heartening along with soberness. Tenacious as mediæval gloom was, it did at last give way. The sources of culture gush perennially. If former checks upon their flow proved temporary, the present subsidence will be so,—the more certainly because of books and schools, instrumentalities once feeble, but now and always henceforth invincible.

In what quarter of the heavens dawn will first show, it were rash to predict. Socialism will run a long course, so will perverse education. There are happy signs that wealth-seekers are beginning to distinguish between wealth as a means and wealth as an end. Hardest to reform will doubtless be men's faith. Perhaps another Messiah will have to be awaited. Meantime, every child of the day may do somewhat to widen the skirts of light. As Emerson exhorts: "Bend to the persuasion which is flowing to you from every highest prompting of human nature to be its tongue to the heart of man and to show the besotted world how passing fair is wisdom."

E. Benjamin Andrews.

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ORIGINALITY AND CULTURE.

J. W. SCOTT.

WITH the progress of mechanical invention and the growing ease with which the material needs of man have come to be supplied, a great store of human energy and skill has been set free to spend itself on satisfying our higher human wants. These wants have had to be created. In a large extent they have been so; and, in-

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dividually at least, they are tolerably supplied. But the coördination of these wants has not by any means kept pace with the awakening of them. And this fact has given to every phase of present-day life a certain distractedness of aspect. We are conscious of multitudinous wants without knowing their relative value. We lack a principle whereby to regulate their many claims. And the confusion intensifies the practical problem of life, right down through all classes of society. Even the humble economy of a working man's household is the meeting ground of an infinitely more complex set of forces than in the days when a hundred modern wants which now clamor for satisfaction, still slept in unconsciousness. In fact, the problem presented there gives us almost a miniature picture of the problem which civilization as a whole is tending to present. When the baffled old working man, struggling to reconcile himself to the ways of his growing family and provide for them, looks back wistfully to the time when no such thing as a bicycle or a country house was ever needed by people of his class, the real source of his trouble is a fear lest these new needs, rushing in, may crowd out other and more fundamental ones, or deprive them of their due and proper place. What he dreads is the confusion of his life's economy; the unloosing of that firm organic connection which once obtained between the different interests of his life. That dread is not, of course, always well founded. If life is ever to rise to a higher plane, it must be through such temporary disorder. Nevertheless, the disorder is real. And in it there is risk. The individual has cut his moorings and departed from the old safe ways of conducting life. He has given to new needs a legitimate voice. He has summoned them from the depths of unconsciousness, and having done so, he cannot lay them again. As a result he may rise to a higher life. If he succeeds in harmonizing them all, he will do so. On the other hand, if he fails, he sinks lower than he was. And it is gravely to be feared that, for the present at any rate, and on certain planes of our

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civilization, the task is proving too much. Masses of our once thrifty poor are finding themselves so incessantly besieged by all manner of new conveniences, new opportunities, new interests and entertainments, that every need they are capable of feeling has been awakened; and the conflicting claims have become so difficult to adjust that many are practically giving up the task in despair and falling back on the policy of satisfying needs indiscriminately, as time and chance determine.

But the conditions do not affect the economic field only. The whole output of the world of culture,—literary work, artistic production, philosophic speculation, scientific discovery, even political and philanthropic endeavor,—seems equally to have outrun man's power to dispose of it. When the average educated individual allows himself to respond to the ideal forces of his time, when he sets himself to appreciate something of its art, follow the main trend of its politics, read its representative literature, he is very apt to become overwhelmed. He finds that those who act as the bearers of the higher culture to mankind, do not conspire together to win anything for him and present it to him as a whole. They are inspired men and women, audacious in their pioneering work, zealous to break new paths for mankind into a higher life. But they are not a band. Their enterprise is not one enterprise. They are broken up into a multiplicity of disconnected forces, each engrossed in its own work and proud of any fragment of truth or of beauty which it may have been able to capture. There seems to be no real supplementation of one part of the work by another. The individual looks in vain for any extensive corroboration of the one bit of truth, or any adequate setting for the fragment of beauty. He thus misses the inspiring sense of a goal,—a whole of life which the entire enterprise might have been gradually revealing to him. He finds himself in a universe of contradictions, where he no sooner commits himself to one line of thought or standard of beauty than he runs against some other with, apparently, an

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equal claim to his allegiance. He is, in fact, in the same distracted state as the baffled manager of the modern household confronting his conflicting claims. He is in a universe to which he cannot adjust himself because it is itself incoherent. Nor is it his own fault that he is in this position. He has not, any more than the working man, entered into this self-discrepant, distracted universe capriciously. No one who really lives can be out of it. No one can be wholly oblivious to what the ideal tendencies of his time are offering him. Rumors which live in the air he breathes, force the individual to hear what politicians are planning, or artists producing, or theologians arguing about. And to listen is *ipso facto* to acquire interests. Every faintest echo which succeeds in attracting his attention runs its chance of setting up a permanent interest in itself,—leaving some trace upon him of a desire to hear more about it or understand it better. To be educated, in fact, means to have one's susceptibilities to such things awakened, and, once awakened, they are not to be lulled to sleep again.

This inability to get above the details of life has its most sinister outcome in the way it changes our standards of value. In the first place it prevents our interest in any activity being really deep. There are too many kinds of activity. Or rather, the kinds are too different. The plentitude of intellectual and artistic endeavor which civilization is presenting to us, lacks organic connection. There is no one goal to it, no end, however faint or far away, in which we might take an absolute interest; nothing towards which all the elements bend their strength; nothing of which we can say: this is that 'higher life' which all our efforts are meant to secure. We thus cannot ask seriously about any pursuit we take up, what is the ultimate point of it? We are forced to turn aside from the question of ultimate values altogether. Either we must lose our interest in life, or we must learn to be content with interests less complete. We have to become engrossed in the particulars and details of our occupation,

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and cease to reflect on its ultimate purpose. We must cease to dwell upon what our work is in the long run, or what it means to the world, and find what satisfaction we can in the mere fact that it occupies us. Thus there becomes fixed for us a standard of value. We appreciate work, whether our own or that of others, according to its power to occupy or arrest attention. We measure the writer or artist not by the content of his message, but by the piquancy or novelty of his manner of bringing it. We lay emphasis not on the universal, but on the individual; we value "the peculiar impression, the individual tone, the subjective, personal hue." Give this tendency free scope and the warping of our practical ideals is the result. The number of interesting pursuits or objects in the world becomes as endless as our interest in each is shallow. Whatever can strike a new note, offer a fresh idea, provide the entertainment of an hour, is admitted to a place among the worthy occupations of man; until when one is seeking an aim for one's own life, the generous impulses die and the selfish ones take their place. Devotion to an objective cause gives place to the mere ambition to make one's mark, to do something special, striking, distinctive; something which can be called one's own and which will compel attention. We cease to aim at getting work done, and begin to aim at making ourselves interesting.

We have been trying to bring into view one of those broad, pervasive ideals which move over the whole surface of our social life, and whose influence in molding thought and conduct is all the greater because it is so silent and unobserved. Far more people aim at being great, than are aware that they do so. And we have been trying to exhibit the logic whereby the present extraordinary accumulation of the elements of culture has issued in giving a certain bias to our conception of human greatness. Our next task is to examine the validity of the conception as thus modified.

In the first place, conditions are to be found, and some-

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times in very unlikely places, fitted to encourage another and a very different conception. In the commercial and industrial world, the clash of competition tells us very plainly the value of being distinctive; how important it often is to the business man to be able to escape the overcrowded lines and strike out with something fresh. His whole life, even, seems at times to be but one long effort to attain the unique,—to find some new human need he can supply, or whim he can pamper, some new salable article or new way of producing the old article,—at any rate, to find some means or other of being the only one of his class and doing what no one else is doing. And so far, he seems to be aiming at the kind of greatness we have delineated above. Yet even in the business world itself the mere determination to stand for one thing and abjure all contact with everything else is not sufficient. The concatenation of economic conditions is so close, the ties between one business interest and another are so vital, that the individual must at least keep up an intelligent interest in other 'lines' than his own. He must see his own position. He must understand what his particular product does to supply human need as a whole, on what the demand for it depends, what its real place is in the complex circulation of human products. He must be able to step back from his specialty, so to speak, and 'envisage' it in its context; otherwise he will be able to foresee neither advantage nor disaster. And this function, if we think of it, will be seen to be the pursuit of an ideal, which is the very reverse of a deification of mere distinctiveness. It is, in embryo, the ideal of culture. Culture, in the genuine classic sense of the term, *is* simply the ability to transcend specialized interests and bring them into their true perspective. It is the ability to set the obtrusive elements of our life back into their place, deprive them of their false importance and bring the really greater things into the centre. And the mere effort of a man to bring the economic conditions of the time before his mind in their true relations for the sake

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of his business, carries him some way towards this. It is an effort to make a coherent self-explaining world, out of a confusion of forces whose special incidence upon his own life is largely a matter of accident and is out of all proper relation to their real importance in the objective whole which they constitute.

It would be easy to show that conditions also exist which impel a man further, and towards a fuller realization of what we have called the ideal of culture. The individual is not himself a mere bundle of disconnected interests. He is a personality. He has an impulse towards wholeness in him which demands to see the whole interests of man, political, social, artistic, religious, in their true perspective. But this demand, by reason of certain native human tendencies, is always hard to fulfil. The first essential to its fulfillment, under any circumstances, is a certain self-sacrifice. The individual must commit himself to the world. He must recognize from the outset that he is only a learner, and that the world is full of wiser men than he. He must be quick to avail himself of these, eager to accept teaching from any of them who have anything to teach him. Especially should he study the history of the past, and endeavor to come under the influence of teachers of other ages than his own. He should let himself be influenced and guided by the great souls who have made out their title to be the teachers of our race. Only in this way can he find wisdom at the fountain head, and enter into his spiritual inheritance.

I have said that we have a native unwillingness to abandon ourselves to the larger current of the world's culture. Now, at first sight, reflection rather seems to justify such a tendency. For grant that what we have just said about the ideal of culture is true,—that its essence lies in wide acquaintance with the facts of the world, that the need of it is native to the mind of man, that the beginnings of a call for it are traceable deep down in the workaday world of industry and busi-

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ness competition. Is there not another need, equally deeply rooted in the soil of modern life, of whose existence business specialization is itself a symptom, namely the need for what is called originality? Is it not just the necessity for new things, and for bringing the things we already need up to a new standard of efficiency, which has made us specialize, and which is constantly driving us on to specialize further? And if the search for the unique and special characterizes the industrial world, is it not a fact that the same tendency governs the literary and artistic world even more? And have we not to reckon with that fact? There probably never was a time when the whole range of human susceptibilities was more thoroughly ransacked for new wants, new interests, new literary and artistic tastes. We cannot be indifferent to these demands. Not bread and butter only, but to some extent culture itself depends on our power to minister to them. It is expected of the man of culture that he will be able to set truth in striking lights and awaken new ideas. It is part of his business to be original. Now, surely, to let oneself be influenced by other minds, even by the master minds of all time, will be to endanger this originality. In occupying ourselves with their ideas we shall lose our own. We shall have to be content to reflect their wisdom, to shine as it were in a borrowed light. Such a practice, it might be said, may do little harm in some cases. It may work very well with those in whom originality does not count, those who have nothing to do but work on given methods or teach accepted doctrines. But for anyone so placed that he must before all things bring to his work the force of an original personality, it would seem to mean irreparable loss. In short, if a man has any original ideas, the counsel of wisdom is that he should guard them. Let him not go and steep his mind in the thoughts of others unless he wants to be their mouthpiece. He will lose his personality in that fashion. He will no longer be an individual by himself, with whom the world has to reckon, but simply one of the crowd, whose

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mind is swayed by ideas which are the world's, and which are the instruments whereby the world molds the crowd into their common shape.

This, then, is the kind of theory whereby the conditions which already make so powerfully for the worship of mere distinctiveness come to be intellectually reinforced. Is it tenable? In the first place, there should be no delusion as to the importance of personality. The need for that is not confined to some walks of life only, but is found practically everywhere. It is the biggest asset with which a man can enter the business world, and a literateur or an artist without it is probably a failure from the beginning. The only question is whether what we call culture,—the practice of assiduously acquainting ourselves with what other minds have thought and felt,—will be injurious to it. And it seems to me that we are beating the air in this matter until we gain some clear idea of what personality and originality are,—what it is to be original and to be a person.

When I look to the world's brightest examples of original genius, so far from finding that that submissive, receptive attitude of mind,—that willingness to accept the guidance and wisdom of the great past which we have spoken about,—was injurious to them, I seem to find that it was just what made them. A man's personality is a thing which needs to be made. He does not bring it full fledged into the world with him. Strange as it may seem, personality is a thing which a man absorbs from his environment as a plant absorbs air and light. He acquires it, little by little, out of the common storehouse of the world's wisdom. The elements out of which he builds it are gathered from all lands and all ages. He did not create any one of them. They were there already in the world before he was born. In him they are only brought together. We are all plagiarists. In the last resort everything we have or know is borrowed.

This truth is not very difficult to admit in the case of common men and women. When we look at a great

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original genius, however, we are apt to think that he is an exception. What we see first in him is not his debt to the past but his independence of it. This first view is not all wrong. The original genius *is* different from the people who surround him. He is a man whose ideas are his own and who takes his own way. He stands out *against* his own time, holds startling opinions, does unusual deeds. His generation does not understand him, and he may even have to pay the tragic penalty of it,—be hated, ostracized, imprisoned, even done to death. But there is a further truth. After we have seen all that can be seen of his difference from others, we have not yet seen the real man. If we look but a little closer, we shall find that, despite the widest gulf which severs the man of genius from common men, there is between him and them a unison of spirit more profound and real than they know; and it is this which makes him great. It is his real oneness with men's own inner souls which makes them feel his power. This it is which makes his words come home to them whether they will or not, and makes them feel that he is right even while they try to disbelieve him. In the long run, the power of the genius over his less enlightened brethren rests on the fact that he and they are built of the same material. He knows what they know, has been where they have been, has learnt all that they have learnt, *and outreaches them.* He turns out to be different from them, not because he belongs to some other world or other order of things, but simply because he has learnt better than they what they too have tried to learn. That apparently most preposterous view which he thinks right, is just what his generation would have seen to be right, had they learnt well their own lessons. They have but to read back their own history, listen to their own teachers, copy their own heroes as deeply and truly as he has done, to see that his policy, his theory, his style or method was the right one. That rebellion of his against the past was really what all the past had been waiting for, had people only had eyes to

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see. The proof of all which is that they come to see,—they, or their children. Tardily, one after another, the great man's contemporaries and successors *come* to understand him,—yield to follow in his footsteps, accept his reading of things, embrace his despised and rejected message as a very gospel, and raise their altars to the prophet they have stoned.

Personality, then, whether of a great man or of any one of ourselves, is simply so much of the wisdom of the world brought into the focus of an individual life. The elements of it lie, so to speak, diffused all about us, in books, in teachers, in the political and moral and religious usages of our time, in the traditions we inherit, in the habits we form, in the language we learn, in the whole social atmosphere which envelops us. And just because these common influences are the very material of our personality, personality itself is no such unintelligible thing as it is sometimes represented to be. A man's personality is not some peculiar treasure in his breast, some mysterious flickering flame of inward fire which he can only describe in metaphors, and which he must set about trying to 'cultivate' before he can possess it. To cultivate personality is of course a laudable aim. What one wants to condemn are only the strange misconceptions which gather round the endeavor. It is not a process of morbidly groping in the entrails of one's own mind, feeling about for some impalpable elusive something which very likely isn't there. Personality *is* just one's centralized experience of the world, and there is no way of making it greater except by making that experience greater and more centralized, in other words, being a bigger, broader, better man or woman. Every intellectual achievement, every moral victory, every bit of solid work, will leave personality richer, profounder, more delicate. In fact, to cultivate it, the plan is don't cultivate it. Let it alone and do your duty and it will grow.

The function of the great, then, is to fulfill both the

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present and the past. But is it any use to try thus to follow in the footsteps of the great in an age when greatness does not thrive? For at the present moment we look around in vain for examples of greatness of the highest type. To say, in fact, that the output of the products and means of the higher culture is becoming too much for us, is just to say in other words that we lack great men. The function of the great man is to preserve us from being thus overwhelmed. The universe pours out upon us, through a thousand natural and human channels, its mass of conflicting truths and tangled purposes, with which we must try as best we can to reckon, seeing we have to live with them. The great man comes to our aid in these circumstances with that which we most of all need, namely, a point of vision. He leads us through the confusion to a position from which at length we can see something in it, or rather to a position from which we can see the whole of it, to *be* something. He gives us ideas of such depth and such universal applicability, that in their light we are able to test new theories, evaluate new movements, set in order new facts and events, and deal with the whole baffling inundation. The confused babel of tongues evolves itself into an articulate story, and the world gradually acquires some meaning again. Now there is, indeed, at the present time the field which would provide scope for people with such ideas. But though there are, at the moment, men and women who exert most widespread influence, no leading mind seems really to fill the arena. However impressive the following of some leaders or movements may be when seen in the mass and seen from within, they inevitably appear insignificant when set against the depth of indifference towards the particular persons or causes, exhibited by the rest of the intelligent world. We lack leaders who really find the common heart of our time,—to whose touch the age will respond as a whole, in the way the nineteenth century responded to some of its great poets and preachers. It is not of course a simple question of the numerical

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strength of a man's following. If it were, writers like Ibsen or Tolstoy or Nietzsche might possibly enough rank with Goethe and Carlyle and Ruskin. It is a question of character,—of the degree to which the audience swayed by a writer are representative, and sum up in themselves the ripest experience of their time. Present-day movements, even the greatest of them, seem to propagate views of life too narrow, too intense, and too different from one another, for the age to have been touched at its deepest and in its centre by any one of them. They illuminate sections of life, cast flash-lights of amazing brilliancy upon aspects of the universe; but their power to illuminate these aspects is got by neglecting other spheres. Why, then, in such circumstances, should we care to institute any quest for the whole? Is it not all we can do, in an age like ours, to discover and experiment, to throw out feelers in all directions, and do that over all fields of human enterprise? Is it not our business often, too, to labor in the dark; and may we not even accomplish our best work, like Cromwell, when we do not know whither we are going? It is unavoidable that during such a period much should be produced which no one could set in vital relation to any whole, and of which the great man can make no use. But is it not worth while taking this simply as the hazard of the game?

The answer seems to be that the business of an age which lacks great men is to prepare for their coming. And for this it is not merely material that is required, but prepared material. Obviously the less of sheer waste there is in a people's efforts after higher things, the better it will be. And it is possible for a people to squander its energies and swell the amount of useless thought and merely eccentric culture to an unnecessary degree, under the influence of a false ideal. On that account, the point here urged is of perhaps more than merely academic importance,—the point, namely, that even amidst the present disposition to emphasize the intense, the personal, the novel, the best is only to be reached by seeking what is

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not merely intense, but comprehensive, not merely personal, but human, not merely novel, but true. To guide thought and life thus, is to exhibit in concrete form the faith which sees in the present distraction of culture not the symptoms of decay, but the condition of advance. The great of the future, if such there are to be, will inherit from the great of the past. And the material of the present will be the binding link. They will be made possible, therefore, in just the degree to which we grasp the actual material of our own life and form it. In a word, we must, in whatever exploration or pioneering we do, endeavor to let our work be the centre of as much as possible; and refuse to let that pass for work whose affinity with life is narrow and whose range of influence is small. We shall not suffer for that. After all, the total measure of our human good is the amount of life we possess. Our vessel will be full in proportion as we succeed in placing ourselves where the streams of human interest converge. In their own day, the great of the past stood there. And the position we seek, must lie in their direction. It may be more advanced than theirs; it may be in a hundred ways different; but if we are either to be ourselves in the really rich veins of life, or to leave for the great who are to come the material which they can use to the salvation of the world, we must stand in the same line.

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THE IDENTITY OF THE IDEALS.

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THE thesis of this paper is that the ideals of life,—of truth and beauty and virtue,—are identical as regards form or the demands which they set to the concrete will. The difference in our ideal activities lies, not in their form, but in the specific end in which human nature

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strives to embody the ideals,—the discovery of truth with its characteristic satisfaction, the creation and joy of beauty, and the making of a social character with its concomitant happiness. In short, the content, not the form, differentiates the ideals.

I. There have been various efforts in the past both towards the unification and the differentiation of the ideals. But both types of effort have been largely futile from the failure to distinguish between the form and the content of ideal activity, between the ideal demands and their concrete embodiments. A word first about the attempts at identification. The kinship of ideals was felt by the ancient Hebrew psalmist in the striking invitation: "Oh, worship the Lord in the beauty of holiness." But we do not look for abstract analysis in this quarter. We are reminded of a similar poetic identification by Voltaire: "Only truth is beautiful, only virtue is loveable." We naturally look to the philosophers for systematic statement. Here too, however, the identification will be found to be intuitional and fragmentary.

Plato shares with his Greek background the feeling that the good and true and beautiful are somehow one. In the 'Protagoras' he strives to identify the virtues as knowledge, for it is knowledge that must furnish the measure in the evaluation of goods; and insight when present cannot fail to control conduct. Hence the problem of virtue becomes the problem of education. By implication all the values of life are here reduced to truth. In the 'Philebus' he identifies beauty and virtue in terms of their common denominator: "Measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue the world over." In the 'Philebus' and the 'Republic' he makes the good the final genus, including under it truth, virtue, and beauty. In the 'Symposium,' beauty, with its intoxicating contemplation, becomes the supreme ideal. But these are merely brilliant intuitions,—looking now to the form, now to the content of the ideals for unity.

In modern times Shaftesbury has summarized for us

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the Greek point of view as regards this essential kinship of the ideals. "What is beautiful is harmonious and proportionable; what is harmonious and proportionable is true; and what is at once both beautiful and true is of consequence agreeable and good." But this statement too is impressionistic. It fails to divorce form and content; and as regards the latter fails to furnish the differentia. It amounts to only a *feeling* for the kinship of the ideals. It does not unravel the problem. The same Greek feeling is to be found in the poet Schiller, as regards the kinship of beauty and virtue, where, on the one hand, beauty refines us into virtue and, on the other, the virtuous life must be looked upon in its perfect stage as the beautiful soul. Lotze, in like manner, feels the kinship of truth and beauty. For him the ultimate self-evidence of the unity of truth "must no longer be called logical but esthetic and accordingly will find the touch-stone of its validity no longer in the unthinkableness, but in the plain absurdity of its contrary." And again: "The coherence of the many single elements of truth which enables them to be ranged under a simple fundamental idea may rest upon esthetic propriety."[1] Here too the relation is a matter of intuition, not of clearness and distinctness.

My revered teacher, the late C. C. Everett, came back to the problem of identification again and again. Thus he tells us: "Goodness and beauty are really manifestations of truth."[2] Again: "The three ideas of the reason are simply manifestations of one and the same principle. The first affirms that which is, the second that which ought to be, while in the third we find that which is as it ought to be, the fulfilled perfection."[3] To this relation to the will I shall come back later, but what made Everett feel the kinship was the implication of unity in each ideal.

Lately there has been an attempt to identify the types of value from the biological point of view, sometimes in

[1] Lotze, "Logic" (Eng. Trans.), Vol. II, pp. 329-330.
[2] "The Psychol. Elements of Rel. Faith," p. 148. [3] *Ibid.*, 200.

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terms of adjustment and sometimes in terms of satisfaction. But apart from the adequacy of the method, this is after all only the statement of the genus. It still remains to state the differentia in each case, whether of adjustments or satisfactions. Of course this must be done in terms of concrete values. At any rate the fancied unification is only vagueness.

II. If the efforts at unification of ideals have been intuitional and confused, so have the efforts at differentiation. Thus it has been suggested that the esthetic attitude differs from the scientific and moral in that the esthetic object is isolated and sufficient unto itself, while the other attitudes imply larger connections. But in no case can we isolate so as to cut off completely from the background of experience. This is the more of life, which our ideal abstraction is intended to make significant. In each case there must be the fringe, the suggestive value. Art is as meaningless as science, where the individual fails to bring the necessary equipment of experience. The object in any case is a focus of suggestion, an effort, not merely to suppress, but to control association in a definite direction. The suggestions, however, must grow out from the expressed relations,—the object, not from the mere label. They must be continuous with the object and germane to it,—intrinsic and not merely extrinsic, internal and not merely external to the theme. The savage and the child do not discover the beauty in the Angelus because they lack the background of experience to suggest its internal meaning.

Since our ideal strivings are meanings, they *must* in the nature of the case select and abstract such aspects as will make the rest significant. In a measure all idealization is isolation, emphasis. But they must suggest, too, the larger setting and unity. The whole is never the merely presented even in art. We might define art, with more truth, as companionship with the universe, to which the selected aspect furnishes the friendly introduction. Not merely what is presented, but rather what we bring

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in the way of experience and demands, is what constitutes artistic creation and appreciation. The selected object is the focus, the nuclear constellation of content, which suggests the richness of concrete experience. All idealization is abstraction, but abstraction not for its own sake, but for the sake of making the concrete significant.

Since in each field the object is constituted by the selective interest, we cannot make this the differentia. In the case of each type of ideal realization, we must know the selective aim for the activity to have meaning. I saw little of merit in a painting before which I stood recently, until I read the subject, "Fleeting Shadows." And then it was marvelous. The artist had selected this aspect, the rest was foil. Lamb refused to admit that $2 \times 2 = 4$ until he knew what use was to be made of it. Whether true or not depends upon the selective aim. Of abstract quantities it is true, but not of human beings. Whether a deed is morally significant or not depends upon the aim. If done from impulse, it is a mere natural event like the falling stone. If done from motive, it indicates a good or mean character. Thus all ideals tend in part to abstract, isolate, frame. But they also have their larger individual and cosmic setting.

It has been customary to credit moral activity with the aim of improvement as contrasted with other types of ideal activity. But it must be clear now that, in neither case, do we take experience as we find it. In each case must the immediate be reconstructed in conformity with our ideal demands. In each case must there be selection, emphasis, suppression of motley details in order to make experience significant. In neither case do we make the facts or data. We create by selection; we bring out the promising relations; we experiment to express in terms of the presented material what we deeply and truly mean as idealizing selves.

Another attempt at differentiation of ideals is based upon their relation to attention. The esthetic ideal, for example, is held to be characterized by spontaneous at-

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tention, unconscious creativeness, the immediate absorption of the will, while the scientific and ethical ideals, especially the latter, are held to involve active and strenuous attention. Attention, however, does not furnish conclusive differentia. The moral life cannot be distinguished from the esthetic by the sense of effort involved in the obedience to the moral law. We must be careful not to confuse points of view,—the point of view of the creative activity and that of the spectator of the result. The latter does not necessarily require effort in any case. As regards the former it may require effort in any ideal activity. Working by genius does not mean working without effort, even though genius is more than a dint for hard work. Artists do not necessarily dash off the results which we sometimes find it so easy to appreciate. Few realize the painstaking toil that has entered into what seems to us so spontaneous and satisfying. The original of many a stylist seems fairly lost in the corrections which overlay it. The artist may have spoiled many pictures, with heartrending consciousness lest he should miss the gleam, before he gave us this masterly result. Nor is it an unmistakable sign of art that we should enjoy it immediately,—as it were, love it at first sight. The first impression in the world of art is not, any more than in the world of truth, necessarily most worth while. In either case, the immediate hazy intuition must be made clear and distinct by analysis of the idea of the author in its various moments. This eventually brings back the sense of unity greatly enhanced. In the case of the moral life, temptation and effort may indicate only a bad education. They are no test of the worth of conduct. The really moral life finds socialized conduct, the proper volitional response, largely automatic,—a second nature controlling the primitive type. The sense of effort should be a transition stage to spontaneous obedience of the moral law. In any case idealized conduct means controlled or measured conduct, and this can only be had through training. At

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the beginning of the ideal life the gods set labor. Spontaneous mastery, absorbed attention in the ideal object, in the case of any ideal activity, logical, esthetic, or moral, is the fruit of training and self-control. The feeling of effort indicates the novice. It has nothing to do with the worth of the activity. Some people could not give spontaneous attention to anything but rag time. That does not make them moral.

Each form of ideal activity has its ought, its sense of incompleteness, the command of the ideal, or, to use Professor Palmer's phrase, the command of the whole to the part. Beauty and truth as creative activities have their ought as well as the moral law,—their sense of failure, their feeling for potential wholeness, "which bids us neither sit nor stand but go" that we may attain the ideal. From life's larger point of view, at any rate, the poet, as well as the sick soul cowering before the categorical imperative, feels the discrepancy between what is and what ought to be. Hence the sense of fragmentariness, hence the effort at improvement. The ought characterizes all ideal realization in the process of becoming; and seldom, especially in the deeper genius, is the process complete. Tragic is the moment when he can say to his life's ideal: "*Verweile doch du bist so schön.*" Spontaneous genius seldom, if ever, exists outside of the story books.

Sometimes, indeed, for a limited purpose, the consciousness of discrepancy between attainment and ideal scarcely enters into the particular judgment. Sometimes a particular truth seems to come as a flash of intuition, the brief lyric pours itself into a final mold in an ecstatic birth of beauty, the good deed comes with a sense of enthusiasm and self-surrender instead of effort. Each viewed in its isolation seems final and satisfying. But such cases are exceptions, and, even so, are the gift of a previous set, subconsciously incubated in the meantime. Goethe's Faust required a life time of labor to produce and takes as long to appreciate.

As regards results, that is, life as a whole, here too no

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sharp line can be drawn. It is no detraction from beauty that it has results on our larger activity. On the contrary, it inevitably has such results and must be judged in a measure by them. Art has no license to violate our other ideal demands. It must be true to science in dealing with an actual world. It cannot make its own anatomy or space perspective. It must be estimated in scientific terms, even though it is not science. So likewise must it be considered with reference to the larger race life. It has subserved and still subserves a use in race survival. As the grown man's play it has its important place in the economy of human life. To be beautiful an object must be idealized, *i. e.*, liberated from the sensuous. Its suggestion must be *ideal* suggestion. Thus it purifies. The same can be said of truth. Truth has its results, its larger setting in life. While it may not be pursued for its use, it has its use in making life more efficient. While it is not morality, it is a noble pursuit and gives dignity and calm to the soul. Nor is the moral ideal to be judged merely by effects. It is sometimes, notably in its highest instances, tragically out of accord with its temporary environment. Sometimes it is permanently impracticable, though nevertheless noble and inspiring. Extreme otherworldliness, 'love your enemies,' mystical union, *etc.*, may never become practical types, but nevertheless they furnish noble reliefs and corrective view-points to our workaday, prudential world.

If we try to differentiate the ideals from the point of view of development, we must be consistent. We must be careful to take them from the same standpoint. If we look at them as ideal results or in retrospect, they of course cannot develop. The past as such does not change. The hypothesis of Thales, whether true or mistaken, marks a mile post in science. The emancipation proclamation taken as a deed remains what it is. It may be evaluated as a historic event independent of the agent. So with the art work. Schubert's unfinished symphony is as finished as it is going to be.

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If, however, we take the creative point of view, the particular results become moments in a life history. Hypotheses are steps in discovery, deeds are the marking places in the progressive realization of will, each successive work unfolds the larger motives and possibilities of the artist. Each Madonna of Raphael gives not only the spectator, but the artist an additional insight into his idealized conception of womanhood; and in the series we can see improvement, clearer consciousness of aim. Finished results,—absolutely finished,—are but an illusion from the creative point of view, a testimony to our limitations.

If you look again at ideal striving with reference to the plasticity of its world, it would seem at first glance as though we had struck a profound difference. Truth seems to most people to deal with a rigid, predetermined constitution, given outright, while in ethics, in a strenuous way, and in esthetics, in perhaps a genial way, we must somehow and to some extent alter the world to fit our ideals. The contrast, I think, is more superficial than real. Truth, so far as it is our activity, is a genuinely creative process. If there is an absolute truth, our efforts must indeed seem feeble copies to an omniscient spectator. But we have no first-hand knowledge of an absolute truth any more than we have an intuition of absolute beauty. So far as our finite experience is concerned, we create truth,—as we create institutions and art,—to meet our needs. In neither case do we proceed independent of experience. We must select out of its richness the significant aspects. In neither case do we make the laws arbitrarily, but rather discover their implications in our nature. In the last analysis, in either case, we may be imitating an absolute mind, but that does not alter our finite problem. The realm of truth is as plastic in the hands of the potter as the world of beauty. The seemingly more rigid character of the former is due to taking truth in retrospect instead of in prospect, as made rather than in the making.

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The contrasts which we have examined have been made so striking by taking ideal activities from different points of view,—the point of view of the spectator being contrasted with that of the producer, the part-point of view with the whole-point of view, the point of view of effort with the point of view of mastery, the point of view of the internal meaning with the point of view of the external relations. We can look at any of our ideal activities from these and other points of view. We can, for example, look at beauty from the point of view of creative activity or from the point of view of the spectator or assimilator. So in the case of truth or virtue. We can look at separate results,—separate concepts, separate deeds, or separate pictures,—or we can regard them from the point of view of a self-realizing process of truth, beauty, and virtue. In any case we must be careful in comparing the ideals to adopt the same point of view for each comparison,—to compare development with development, creative activity with creative activity, finished product with finished product, etc. The confusing of points of view led to the failure of the above comparisons.

So long as we regard our ideal activities from the same point of view, we find that what we can say of one ideal in the way of formal characterization we can always say of the others. There may be pedagogical convenience in setting the ideals over against each other for certain purposes. But the difference finally does not lie in the form, but in the content. In our survey we have seen how some have emphasized the abstract character of truth as wholly abstract. Some have emphasized the selective character of art as complete isolation. Some have emphasized the infinite demand of the moral law and contrasted it with the finitude of our other ideals. But these are not fair contrasts. They are not made from the same point of view. The abstractions of truth must be made, as must the selections of art and virtue, in the service of attaining a larger insight into the concreteness of life, not for the sake of abstraction. Art, like truth and virtue, only

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isolates for clearness and distinctness. The seeming isolation of the frame,—of the specific science, of the particular art work, of the particular life-conduct,—merges in its depths into the cosmic background and can be understood only with reference to this. The object as framed in the focus of attention serves but to suggest a vague sentiment or 'recollection' of the constitution of the universe which makes certain ideal demands upon itself through us and in which the sharp outlines of our abstraction fade into the moving, continuous woof of reality. The larger part of the meaning is always in the fringe. And if the ideal, as in the case of moral striving, appears as an infinite imperative, this is no less true of our other ideal demands in so far as we dwell upon the prospective, creative side and measure the felt potentialties of human nature in terms of its finite attainment. We must strive to bring clearness and distinctness not only into the ideal object, but we must bring such clearness and distinctness into the relations of the ideals themselves, and thus rescue them from the confusion of mixed view-points.

III. Having laid down the thesis that the ideals, as abstract or formal, are identical in all our striving for evaluation, we must now try to make clear what these ideals are. It will be seen on scrutiny that our ideal activity implies four demands which the object must meet. They may be stated as unity, harmony, simplicity, and universality. In the first place there must be *unity*. The various parts of the situation must be capable of being understood in terms of one idea, they must follow from a common principle or purpose which they are seen to embody. This can be shown in scientific synthesis, whether inductive or deductive. A generalization is never a mere collection or summary of particulars. The mere cinematographic registration of facts in repetitive memory does not constitute truth. The sequence of rain and sunshine, weddings and divorces, births and funerals is a meaningless show unless we can read the sequence in terms of

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a universal. Events, in order to be science, must be seen to follow from an hypothesis, and the hypothesis from the events. They must, for our pragmatic purposes at least, embody an idea or tendency. Bodies must not merely fall, but they must be predictable in terms of a mathematical law; life must not merely present a riotous sequence of change, but there must be within it a tendency to change in definite ways. There must be overlapping, the unity of a universal.

The same is true in art. What we must first discover in the object of beauty is the idea expressed in the details, the universal embodied in the diversity of parts. This universal may not lie at the surface. You must live in the presence of the Sistine Madonna, you must be willing to give serious study to Hamlet, to grasp the significant unity. Else the Sistine painting is a collection of more or less pleasing figures, Hamlet a series of more or less interesting episodes. You can't go to sleep over the great master-pieces any more than over the great scientific hypotheses and grasp their significance. You must enter into the creative idea of the artist.

What is true of science and art is likewise true of virtue. The virtuous life is not a series of episodes,—of more or less beneficent impulsive acts. Such a life is non-moral. You must find the meaning, the motive, the idea to be realized in the multitude of events and choices. They must be strung on a universal in the light of which they can be interpreted. If you are taking account of life as a spectator, you must put yourself at the actor's point of view, or as nearly so as your human limitations permit. Not only through the ages, but through the acts of each individual will with which you strive to sympathize, there must run a purpose. The shallow excuse: I did not mean it, is an attempt to place oneself outside of moral responsibility. When it is clear that a deed follows from no principle, we not only individually, but legally, abandon the ethical criterion of good or bad. We see then that the first demand upon ideal activity, whether

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taken from the agent's or the spectator's point of view, is the discovery of an idea or universal in the variety of facts.

In the second place, in all ideal activity there must be *harmony,*—the parts must support or reënforce each other within a whole. Take it first in the realm of science: Facts must lean on ideas, and ideas on facts. There must be fluency of transitions or adjustments. There must be not merely evidence, but organized disjunctive evidence, where the parts supplement and reenforce each other. And the evidence must be adequate. It must be proportional in complexity to the idea which it aims to support. We cannot rest a momentous hypothesis on slender evidence and feel security or ease in the relation any more than we can rest an immense edifice on slender pillars and have our will satisfied with the result.

Harmony in science means not merely organization within one hypothesis, but it means also that hypothesis must support and reënforce hypothesis within the overlapping fields of experience. Species must supplement each other, as well as individual lean upon individual within the larger kind which we strive to define. Harmony, organization, is therefore of the very nature of scientific system. One negative instance, one outstanding fact which fails to support the rest within the scope of the idea, destroys the idea's claim to express the facts of the kind and challenges to a new idea.

In art the importance of harmony is even more obvious. It is not enough that each part bears the imprint of the idea, like a heap of stamped bricks, but they must mutually reënforce the idea. In Guido Reni's "Aurora" every part testifies to the glory of the coming day. But more than that, each part helps to reënforce the idea. Movement, brilliancy, color, beauty of form, contrast,—all coöperate and converge to fasten the attention to the idea of nature's oft-repeated wonder. In dramatic opera the human voice, the instrumental music, the scenic setting, the acting,—all combine to reënforce the idea of

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the composer. Let either be false, and the harmony is marred.

That harmony is essential to the moral life has been emphasized both by common speech and by the philosopher. The moral life is the balanced life, the rounded life, the life in which each tendency of human nature plays its proper part, each event receives its proper emphasis. Even with unity of motive a life can easily be marred by wrong emphasis, by making the trivial into the focal and the important into the by-play. The virtuous life is the life which gives each interest and moment its due. It is a just life. What harmony in each case,—logical, esthetic, and moral,—emphasizes is that each part has a claim which must be recognized; and in turn that no part must stand by itself. It *has* a claim, but it is a claim within a whole. The parts must support the principal idea; but this they can do only when the idea is adequate to incorporate the parts.

Again, all ideal activity demands *simplicity* or *economy*. The ideal tolerates nothing superfluous. It is jealous of its rights to express itself. Sometimes the characteristic of simplicity has been emphasized as all sufficient to define ideal activity. Truth is simple, beauty is simple, virtue is simple. So they are. But simplicity alone does not define these attitudes. In the first place, simplicity is meaningless until you specify your type of unity. It expresses the negative rather than the positive side of ideal selection. Again, simplicity does not necessarily mean agreement or harmony within the unity. We must not read the parts out of court, as has so often been done, for the sake of simplicity. Parmenides did so and left nothing but empty being,—neither true, nor beautiful, nor virtuous. Simplicity is only one ideal demand and must be pursued in harmony with the other demands.

In science, the demand for simplicity means that entities or hypotheses must not be multiplied. The simplest hypothesis which will meet the facts is regarded as scientifically true. Our theories must be molded upon reality

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as we must take it in our experience. While the more complex Ptolemaic astronomy might be made to meet the facts by cumbrous additions, we believe that the simpler Copernican system comes nearer expressing the real stellar relations. We must reduce our theory to the fewest principles which will meet the situation.

In art, as in science, simplicity is a fundamental demand, but here too simplicity must vary with the idea to be expressed. Hamlet cannot be expressed in as simple terms as the clown. The idea must have adequate complexity. Where, however, the inferior artist betrays his lack of genius is in the superfluous details, the obscuring promiscuity. No wonder art has seemed the mere removal of the superfluous, the chiseling away of the extraneous marble. This point of view, however, forgets that marbles do not come veined with Apollos and Venuses and that simplicity itself is meaningless except with reference to the selective idea.

In the moral life, too, simplicity is important. There must be directness of aim, the suppression of irrelevant detail, emphasis of the essential. How many a life loses itself in the mere multitude of busy episodes. The great life differs from the small in its simplicity, as the novel differs from gossip. Here again simplicity is not the only demand. Mephistopheles is more simple than Faust. We must judge life by its type of unity and the adequacy of this unity to harmonize the claims of life. There may be over-specialization as well as too much complexity. The idea alone can decide what details to suppress, what tendencies to emphasize.

Finally, all ideal activity implies *universality* in the sense of social objectivity. This does not mean a consensus of all. It means that those with adequate development and training should be able to share with the agent the ideal object. Ideal activity cannot terminate in mere private states of consciousness. This again can be seen in all the varieties of content which the ideal may take. First of all, there can be no private truth. The processes

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of truth must be capable of verification by other observers. Else we have mythology, hallucination, error. Science is primarily a social institution, the outgrowth of our common mental constitution and common situations. Neither can beauty be private. It may require development and culture on the part of the spectators. But if no one but one should ever find an object beautiful, we would probably regard him as having a queer taste. Art, too, is a social institution, our common joy in creative activity and its results. It must define common situations. The social character of the ideal becomes still more striking in the case of the moral life. We may overlook an individual's erroneous thinking, we may laugh at his outlandish taste, but we cannot neglect his anti-social conduct. Our ethical judgments are through and through social judgments,—the balancing of claims from their fitness to a common life. True, the immediate social environment may prove wrong. It may give the hemlock to Socrates and crucify Jesus. But to some social environment our conduct must seem valid and fruitful, if we are at length to be pronounced moral. Only the immoral man claims an ethics of his own, and he only as an exception for himself, not for others. Even the fruits of vice could not be enjoyed in an anti-social world.

We have seen so far how in each mode of ideal activity the ideal is identical. It is the content that individuates. We have examined in turn the four characteristics of the ideal and their application to the different ideal activities. The question may be raised: Cannot these characteristics be still more simplified? This has been attempted in the past. I shall only note one such possibility, and that is the reduction of our ideal categories to the demand for clearness and distinctness. Descartes made this the final criterion of truth. It has been suggested by Hildebrand as the final criterion of art. I believe that such a reduction is impossible if we give this criterion the subjective significance which Descartes attached to it. We must reduce it to its 'cash value,' in terms of

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the relations which we discover within the content that embodies the idea. What people *feel* to be clear and distinct is as various as their tastes; and so long as we place the criterion on a subjective basis, we can have no standardization. In fact a criterion which needs to be standardized, as Descartes tried to standardize clearness and distinctness by an appeal to a God who would not deceive, is hardly a criterion. If, on the other hand, we give clearness and distinctness a pragmatic significance, it will be found to imply all the ideal characteristics already stated. Pragmatically, it becomes the clear and distinct expression of an idea in its selected content, or the clarifying of the content in terms of the idea. For such clear and distinct expression must have unity within the parts. The idea must include the facts, or the facts must fall within the idea. There must be organization or the mutual support of the parts. There must be no irrelevant details. There must be social objectivity. Just because the idea is thus pragmatically clear and distinct, it must compel the social approval of the competent.

IV. If ideals are differentiated by their matter and not by their form, we must cast a passing glance at the content of the ideals. From the point of view of content, we may take human nature in its three classic modes as cognitive, as appreciative, and as volitional, bearing in mind that ideals have no application at all until human nature attains the complexity of being consciously selective. Ideal demands, when applied to the relation of ideas to perceptions and to other ideas, become the quest for science. To attain fluency, harmony, simplicity, and universality as regards the agreement of the idea with the constitution which it intends is ideal realization in the realm of knowing. But we have an affective nature, too, and objects must be measured not merely in terms of their existence, but in terms of their value. To make objects fluent, harmonious, clear and distinct, and universal, so far as our human affective nature is concerned, constitutes ideal realization in the realm of appreciation.

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Lastly, our volitional claims must be measured in terms of other volitional claims in individual and social history. To fulfill the ideal demands of fluency, harmony, simplicity, and universality in the realm of our volitional conduct, constitutes ideal realization in terms of virtue.

We would have, then, as our criterion the clearness and distinctness of the idea as expressed in the selected object,—the object of thought, the object of feeling, the object of voluntary conduct. When the clearness and distinctness pertains to agreement with a selected constitution, we have truth; when it pertains to appreciation, we have art; when it pertains to the evaluation of will, we have morality. In either case the idea must be adequate, it must be economic, it must leave no outstanding details. The difference is not in the ideal, but in the process or object selected.

It is evident that, of the three, the last overlaps, in a vital way, the other aspects of our nature. Indeed it is impossible except for abstract purposes to treat human nature as divided into compartments. The ideational activity would be but a pale ghost except as floating in the affective and volitional background. In turn, beauty must have meaning, and so involves the ideational side. All creative activity finally must have its spring in the will and its tendencies. If ideals are identical in their form, they also overlap in their matter. They must blend in the unity of the one life.

I have tried to show that our ideal activities are identical as regards their form, the ideal demands to be realized. By this insistence I do not mean to ignore the fact that the ideal, as *realized* in the different modes of human nature, differentiates into unique species. Science, art, and morality are different in the concrete, as truly as they are identical in the abstract. They constitute specific embodiments of the will. When we seek truth, we do not seek beauty as our aim, when we seek beauty we do not seek morality. Satisfactions they all are; and as such they are all included in the good, as Plato pointed

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out long ago. But they are different species of the good. Each works within a certain type of material or instrument, through which it realizes its function in making clear and distinct the end. The matter or instrument of science is conceptual relations; the matter of art is concrete imagination; the matter of ethics is impulse. Each sets itself certain limitations, respects the nature of its material. The ideal, in the case of truth-seeking, sets itself the limitation of agreement with a selected constitution, abstract or concrete. That our will sometimes figures as a creative factor in this constitution, that it *makes* ideas come true, does not alter the necessity for our cognitive nature to take account of the facts as made, of discovering the laws in the sequence. While human nature must make ideal demands upon the universe to have truth, it can only succeed provided that the universe lends itself to such idealization. We cannot legislate arbitrarily to nature. We must try to discover clearness and distinctness *within* the relations of nature. That success here is possible is due to the fact that reason is not an arbitrary addition to nature, but that reason grows up in the soil of nature, is nature's reflection upon itself.

In beauty the aim is not the breaking up and systematizing of reality for the discovery of its constitution, but for the sake of social and constant objects of enjoyment,—the joy in activity and contemplation on the part of the developing, historic will. This producing of agreement between nature and our affective-emotional human nature is a different value or satisfaction from that which our search for truth yields. Here too, however, nature and human nature must conspire. As parts of the evolution of nature, we are such and nature is such, that we can discern relations and objects which furnish permanent and spontaneous joy in the play of our faculties. We are made for the sunset as much as the sunset is made for us.

Finally, the ethical end in the concrete is the harmonious adjustment of the individual to the historic social will,—the discovery of right or justice in the measure of

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volitional claims. Here, too, life or nature lends itself to such adjustments of claims. Our ideal demands are found to be practical and, in the progressive realization of the meaning of life, the only practical ways of social conduct. Nature again conspires with human nature.

While the concrete values or ways of realization are different for thought, feeling, and character; while they lead to unique satisfaction of the will, they must support and supplement each other, and, because subjected to the same ideal demands, they must fundamentally and ultimately agree with each other. That is, the truth must, without surrendering its specific character as true, also be found beautiful and noble; and so with the other ideal values. "Human nature in its progressive realization can be seen to be fundamentally one, and the realization of the true must be seen to be fundamentally bound up with the right and the beautiful, and all to be species of the good of the entire self, though this does not prevent us from recognizing certain differentia in this ultimate good. The good in the concrete always means proper functioning on the part of human nature in its various relations, the harmonious activity of all its capacities, fluency of life, consistency of transitions. The right means fluency of functioning as regards human individuals in their institutional relations, the proportional equalization of claims. The beautiful means the harmonious and complete expression of our ideal demands in terms of our affective nature, the feeling of fitness and support as regards the various parts of the esthetic object. Truth means the fluent termination of the clear and distinct idea in its intended facts. In the equilibrated life of the individual as a whole, all human nature, — cognitive, emotional, and volitional, — must function with ease and fluency of transition without any conflict of the activity for the true with the realization of the beautiful or the right. They are nevertheless *specific* forms of the good; and, in our imperfect finite develop-

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ment there may be provisional discord."[4] In the meantime, while the conflict is partial and halting, the unity on the formal side is clear and eternal.

It is clear that, in idealizing human nature as individual, the same ideal demands hold as in the case of the modal types of realization. Here, too, there must be unity, harmony, simplicity, and universality. An ultimate ideal must be found comprehensive enough to include all of our human tendencies. Further, the parts must harmonize or reënforce each other. The part-ideals must work together so as to supplement and interpenetrate within the whole of life. Here, too, there must be simplification and universality. Within life in its wholeness there can be no conflict of reason.

Such wholeness, however, we fail to find within our finite human realization. And as our nature must be loyal to such a wholeness or perfection and cannot rest in the provisional and partial realization, the religious consciousness, the conception and worship of God, must eke out our finite limitations. In our religious loyalty we feel that our ideals are concretely realized. Religion adds no new values to those already mentioned. But it adds the sense of completeness, of unification, and of conservation to our finite ideal strivings. The identity of the abstract form is here exchanged for the unique unity of an individual life, in which form and content are fully blended, where the unity of the ideal purpose embraces all the facts, where the parts all support each other, where there is clearness and distinctness of relationships of parts, and where all mere subjectivity disappears in the organized whole. This final unity of concrete interpenetration is at the other end from the abstract formal ideals which we have considered.

The end of life is to transcend finality, in the sense of abstract ideals with their sense of obligation, and to reach spontaneity,—unity of form and content, perfect activity.

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[4] "Truth and Reality," Macmillan, 1911, pp. 238, 239.



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In a perfect being the ideals interpenetrate each other as they clothe themselves in a matter no longer foreign to themselves, but their idealized and transfigured embodiment. This living unity we worship as God.

JOHN E. BOODIN.

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS.

THE VALUE OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY *

HELEN WODEHOUSE.

IN *The Manchester Guardian* of June 29th, 1911, there occurred the following paragraph: "The nerves of the dockers were in a jumpy state. . . . They were in the mood for anything, either to leave their work or to go on with it, and the bare shouting of the word 'strike' seems to have turned the balance of their minds on the side of leaving it. . . . Men ran along the docks shouting 'Strike! strike!' and with scarcely an inquiry as to why they were striking men stopped work."

Beginners in psychology, I find, commonly lay down the rule, "Every man seeks what after deliberation he proposes to himself as his greatest good," or "Every man does at all times what he thinks will bring him the greatest pleasure in the long run."

Of late years a good many books have been written on such subjects as 'social psychology,' 'crowd psychology,' 'human nature in politics'; and a great part of the authors' endeavor, though not the whole, has been directed towards emphasizing such observations as my first quotation gave, in opposition to the doctrine stated in my second. When we think of it, we must all recognize that we have made similar observations ourselves, and yet the incompatible doctrine keeps possession of part of our minds. The philosophical thinker in each of us is apt

* A lecture delivered to the Leeds Summer School of the Workers' Educational Association, 1911.

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still to assume that everyone acts rationally for some clear purpose, and to argue accordingly. The practical politician in each of us acts on a different assumption, and puts up such notices as those I saw last month on a Yorkshire wall: "Vote for Robinson, Everybody's Man." "Vote for Robinson and Win." When we are conducting an election, we believe that voters can be moved by bold assertion without argument, that they are affected by a vivid picture, by a flag, by a song, by continued suggestion and by mass of suggestion, by old habits and obscure instincts and innumerable chances. Yet at the next opportunity the former compartment of mind is likely enough to come uppermost again, and if we are democrats, we may justify democracy by our belief in the free and intelligent voter; in the clear-headed citizen making up his mind, unbribed and unconstrained, as to the measure which will bring him the greatest good in the long run. Even constraint, we may think in this mood, has little power; or we used to think so. In 1870 it was possible to write:

> Are ye so strong, O kings, O strong men? Nay,
> Waste all ye will and gather all ye may,
> Yet one thing is there that ye shall not slay,
> Even thought, that fire nor iron can affright.
>
> The woundless and invisible thought that goes
> Free throughout time as north or south wind blows;
> Far throughout space as east or west sea flows,
> And all dark things before it are made bright.

In 1912 it is written that if rich people thought it worth while to buy up the whole of the halfpenny press, they could slay most of the thought of England.

Now of course there is truth in both these doctrines, as in most pairs of incompatible beliefs. Social psychologists are occupied at present with bringing forward one side of the truth, to which in their opinion less than justice has been done; and this may sometimes lead them to neglect the complementary element or seem to neglect it. They intend, however, now and always to sug-

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gest to us particularly that humanity is a very odd and complex machine, and that if we try to govern it or to make it govern itself, we had better study it and realize what its nature is. For instance, they suggest we had better read their books.

To this claim an able reply has been made which, in part, I wish to consider in this paper. Mr. Guy Field, in the *Hibbert Journal* for October, 1910, has an article on "The Fallacy of the Social Psychologist," in which he urges two chief arguments. In the first place, he says, social psychology tells us nothing new or useful that properly belongs to it. "Political observation of this kind is not new, and is not in the strict sense a science. . . . It is work for the man of practical political experience, not for the laboratory psychologist. . . . This empirical work is constantly being carried on: and by some it is done well, and by some badly. But it is absurd to suggest that there is anything new about it, or that a necessary condition of its successful prosecution is a knowledge of the standard works on psychology." Secondly, Mr. Field says, what the politician needs is not so much either psychology or empirical observation, as ethics. No doubt we ought to know what people will probably do, but it is far more important to know what they ought to do. It is useful to know that they are not reasonable, but only that we may train them to reason.

I wish to intervene in this controversy without making a direct reply to either side as a whole; and to try to explain what, in my opinion, the use of social psychology should come to be. To Mr. Field's first point, the distinction between psychology and empirical observation, I attach no great importance. A science cannot thus be ruled off from empirical observation until the science has entered on a stage of growth in which empirical observation can no longer contribute to it anything of value. Physics and chemistry have perhaps reached this stage; psychology, except in certain specialized branches, will probably never reach it. For the present the street and

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the pollingbooth and the agent's office are as useful to psychology as the laboratory is, and therefore belong to it as legitimately. No doubt one writer out of zeal for his subject, or another out of respect for what is not his own subject, may exaggerate the novelty of his material and his conclusions. But to lay much stress upon the statement that these are 'not psychology' would be to turn an important question into a matter of words. The office of psychology is to collect, develop, formulate, and enforce the lessons of practical experience, and to remind us of them whenever we need it. From its performance of this function, what hopes may we have for the improvement of political thought?

In the first place, the deliberate collection and discussion of observations made on human nature has, I consider, a real chance of popularizing various useful pieces of knowledge about human nature, and thereby of hindering various false theories on the subject.

Coming home in the train from school as a child, I remember overhearing a conversation about some acquaintance of the speaker's who had suffered from consumption. "They took such care of her, you can't think; there was never a breath of air came into that house; but she died." This conversation would hardly be possible now, simply because the knowledge of certain medical facts has been more popularly diffused. Ignorant or instructed, people will have medical theories of some sort, and if they are not taught to believe that windows should be open they will believe on equally strong principles that they should be shut. Similarly, people will inevitably have psychological theories of some sort, and theories much wider than can be based on their own observations. The result of having but a narrow experience of human nature, and no supplementing of that experience, is not that the person generalizes less than he otherwise would do, but that he generalizes in a far more abstract and unjustifiable way. Popular thought will invent in a moment and support forever the doctrine that instincts are unalterable

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and infallible, or that everyone acts for the sake of pleasure, or that it is of no use to educate the children of a burglar on account of their 'criminal heredity.' There will be psychological beliefs of some sort, bad if not good, and if social psychology becomes a fashionable study, it may possibly make some of them a little better. In this way the professional student might even come to influence the plain man's view on the antagonism of races or the boarding-out of pauper children.

I would mention one belief in particular that I hope might be hindered: the belief in the singleness and simpleness of ordinary motives. We need to render finally impossible such writing as states that the desire for wealth is the sole motive to productive labor; that though "some may feel themselves still able to argue that the desire for social inequality is capable of being replaced by some other desire," yet only one is proposed as possible, "the desire for the welfare of the human race at large. It is general benevolence, as opposed to private selfishness." This leaves two motives (possibly three) conceivable though not compatible, but another writer has only one. "Of anything approaching to confiscatory socialism there is no real danger. Man is not by nature socialistic. He will, as a plain matter of fact, continue to love himself better than his neighbor, to seek in the first place his own advantage." Socialism may be impossible, but it cannot be met by such arguments as this; yet they are put forward, not by dead 'classical economists,' but by living authorities.[1] We may hope that the spread of psychological knowledge may gradually render it more difficult to speak with such confident simplicity of that extraordinarily complicated creature, man.

The belief in simple motives has its necessary supplement in another idea which we may hope to see weak-

[1] Mallock, "Social Equality," p. 208; and Edmund Vincent, essay in "A Plea for Liberty." A doctor told me the other day that he happened to know for a fact that Lloyd George was actuated simply by the desire to obtain votes in order that he might retain his salary as Chancellor.

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ened,—the belief in other people's wilful wickedness. Our nurse, needing to find a single motive to account for our complicated behavior, could only find one, "You think of nothing but how you can give the most trouble." In education this belief has really been rather seriously discredited, by the spread of what in spite of Mr. Field I can only call a juster psychology. But in politics it is still possible to believe in the 'utter selfishness of the working man,' and the 'cynical brutality of the landlord class,' and the deceitfulness of 'the sixty million crafty scoundrels who inhabit the German empire.' Yet even here it is becoming scarcely possible to condemn our opponents as heartily as our fathers did.

Once more, we may be helped to disbelieve not only in simple motives, but in simple satisfactions. I canvassed once for a woman candidate for a city council, and was rewarded by the phrase of a voter who explained that he wished to see every woman in her proper position, "well dressed, fairly stout, with a comfortable mind, and her feet on a nice carpet."

Besides thus popularizing some knowledge which may hinder us from forming hasty theories, the spread of psychological thought may help us in another way,—by inculcating a certain habit of mind. As we come to realize more vividly the intricacy of the machine with which we have to do, we may come to think more of the care needed in our own dealings with it. To a man like Tolstoy, the machinery seemed so simple that he disregarded it altogether. "The question," he said, "is not, what kind of community-life is best, but, What are *you* going to do as a reasonable being appearing for a brief moment in the world, who may depart at any moment? . . . I know nothing of the results, I only know what one must do." This is a dangerous manner of thought, in spite of the nobility which prompted it.

In general, an acquaintance with psychology should strengthen the habit of thinking carefully of method. In education and in politics it is already doing so. Contrast

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the attitude of the modern trained teacher with that of the old-style matron of an orphanage, who explained to me at the top of her voice that "of course you've got to *make* children do things." Contrast the attitude of the experienced political or social worker with that of a young naval officer of my acquaintance, learning reluctantly how to bring voters to the poll: "But I should *make* them go." I cannot help thinking that a somewhat similar attitude is suggested by Mr. Field's essay. "It is important to know how people will probably act . . . but this . . . knowledge is really only a part, and the less important part, of the necessary qualifications for a politician. . . . It is far more important that he should make up his mind clearly as to how they ought to act, or how he wishes them to act." The statement is true, of course; and yet it calls up a vision of practical problems attacked in a spirit that would be likely to end in ill feeling at least. It is important to know not only how people ought to act, but how only they are able to act, and by what means they can be helped to change.

In the third place, by guarding us against wrong beliefs about human nature, the social psychologist may guard us also against a wrong political philosophy. Something has been written of the possible bad effects of the study of social psychology in the way of producing cynicism in young politicians. I cannot, however, imagine anything more dangerous for a young politician than to go into politics believing that the gift of the suffrage is justified by the wisdom, broad-mindedness, and clear-mindedness of the electors. In the actual work of an election he will see his intelligent citizens and notice what motives seem to affect them. He will stand by the polling-booth in the evening when a kindly policeman explains to him (as to the present writer) that "it does take a long time to sign a paper when you can see two or three of them." Politics and democracy become 'a queer business' and then 'a dirty business,' and the council chamber where a woman must not speak turns with strange speed

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into the arena where she may not go. We can remain democrats only if we find and hold a deeper political philosophy. Social psychology will not provide this, but it ought to help us by rendering the false philosophy impossible, and ruling it out of all reference in the arguments of democrats and anti-democrats alike.

In the same way, the spread of psychological knowledge may guard us against misleading ideals. "It is no good insisting on the fact," says Mr. Field, "that the great majority of actions are not done from rational motives. We should try to secure that they should be." Well, something, much indeed, may be done. We shall not abolish habit and suggestibility, but we may train them, use them, and guard against abuse. To this end are directed the proposals for purifying elections, for instance, whether by holding elections on Sunday, by closing public houses, or by promoting better education and training in practical responsibility. Further, as Mr. Field himself recognizes, useful self-consciousness is likely to be increased in some cases by the actual increase of the knowledge of danger. But in all such endeavors we must be on our guard against an important ambiguity in the phrase 'rational conduct.' Mr. Field writes:

> The whole situation shows clearly that what people are in need of is a process of intellectualizing the emotions. That is to say, we must make conscious and explicit all the desires and impulses which are moving us to action. We must know exactly what are the different things which we want. And then we must criticise them, place them side by side, compare them, and weigh them against each other. We must realize that we cannot satisfy all the desires which contradict each other. . . . We must endeavour to get all this clearly, and then, whatever our choice is, we shall at least have taken it with our eyes open.

The writer himself adds, "We may admit that in few, if any, can this process be brought to perfection." To pursue such an ideal is, in fact, surely to court despair. Somehow we must get a clearer view of the kind of rationality we can hope for, and I should like to propose this as the next problem for the professional psychologist,

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with a few words to indicate its nature. Reasonableness in the sense of wholeness is not the same as reasonableness in the sense of distinctness and explicitness, and what we need above all is the first and not the second. Scarcely any of us, in the most important moments of our lives, can have gone through the process described by Mr. Field, yet in the most important sense we have acted reasonably. What is all-important is not the making conscious and explicit (good as that may be), but the permeation and shaping of the whole nature by its highest elements; not the abolition of the sub-rational, but its molding by reason.

May we hope, finally, that psychology will not destroy political enthusiasm but rather give it a juster basis? "I believe politics to be an extremely practical kind of business," writes an American author, "and that the communities which succeed best in it are those who bring least enthusiasm to the conduct of their affairs."[2] A Frenchman describes the perfectly successful State of the future as presided over by an aluminum statue of Louis Philippe, set in a public garden which is planted with cauliflowers and common laurels.[3] The enthusiasm, however, which greater knowledge is thus to abolish, perhaps need not be particularly regretted. It is a somewhat abstract feeling, tending to seek for simple and vivid situations, and leading at times to such welcomes as greeted the 'blood-red blossom' of the Crimean War, and such regrets as are expressed in Mr. Newbolt's verse on the conclusion of South African peace. If such ideals and such loyalties disappear with decreasing ignorance, we may hope that other ideals will be established, less 'high,' perhaps, but more "deep, wide, solid, thorough, intelligent."[4] To say that increase of knowledge of any sort must spoil the best idealism is like saying that a modern doctor is shut out from the idealism of a magic-

[2] Godkin, "Problems of Modern Democracy," 72.

[3] Tarde, "Underground Man."

[4] Bosanquet, "Civilisation of Christendom."

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working medicine-man. As we come to know the body politic more intimately and accurately, we may realize more and more the intricacy, the weakness, and the strength of human beings; their enormous difficulties; their pathos and magnificence; their insignificance, and the rich significance of that body and soul which by the travail of centuries is being made from them, and which may well claim in any age the loyalty of its members.

> We are but men, are we,
> And thou art Italy;
> What gift shall we deserve to give?
> How shall we die to do thee service or how live?

HELEN WODEHOUSE.

BINGLEY, ENGLAND.

THE ELEMENTS AND CHARACTER OF TOLSTOY'S WELTANSCHAUUNG.*

ARCHIBALD A. BOWMAN.

THERE is something not altogether appropriate in considering Tolstoy's work in the light of a contribution to the theory of morals, religion, or art. The mixed character of his writings, their indefeasible saturation with his personality, and his extravagant opposition to the scientific and philosophical attitude render it scarcely possible to handle his teaching, precise and categorical though it became, as a specific body of theory.

No writer of the first rank, with the possible exception of Rousseau, has given himself away as Tolstoy has done. The occasional abandon which is the essence of the lyrical spirit, the conscious depreciatory egotism characteristic of certain forms of humor, the unconscious egotism which

* This presentation is offered with the deference due from one who can approach his author only through the medium of translations, and in the hope that any conclusions come to are confined to points which a knowledge of the original would not necessarily compromise. The translation chiefly used is that of Professor Leo Wiener.

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idealizes and so in a sense objectifies the self, offer no analogue to the sustained and meticulous self-revelation that spontaneously infects the whole body of Tolstoy's writing. It is true that the time may not yet have come for a complete survey of this remarkable personality, and that we ought to wait until his voluminous diaries, exceeding, it appears, the bulk of his published work, are available. As it is, the type is sufficiently clear, and there exists abundant material for a general presentation.

In the *fact* of Tolstoy we are confronted with a spiritual phenomenon of impressive proportions, yet perfectly definite in kind and not unfamiliar in many of its features,—presenting therefore to the historical reason a clearly indicated line of judgment. On the other hand, within the *content* of the phenomenon and constituting its most singular note, we have to reckon a highly peculiar *Weltanschauung,* directed critically upon the order which the critic himself exemplifies. This, of course, at once raises a problem for the expositor. Are we to accept Tolstoy's final repudiation of himself and the order to which he belongs as expressing most adequately the man and his evangel, or are we to fall back on a naturalistic derivation of the gospel of renunciation itself? It may be that the true course lies in neither of these alternatives, but in the endeavor to bring them into intelligible relation; and certainly this is the project that suggests itself as safest and most natural to the interpreter. The problem has the peculiar features of any attempt to explain a system of ideals. If we pursue the line of treatment appropriate to such a case, it will bring us to a position somewhat analogous to Tolstoy's own; for although it does not, of course, commit us to the moral and religious creed to which he himself in the end stood so passionately committed, on the other hand a large part of his work, and in a sense almost the whole of it, is an attempt to give *actuality* to his ethical idealism both as achievement and as irrefragable theory. Tolstoy exemplifies in its extremest form the tragic and tragically genuine predica-

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ment of a soul struggling to sustain its existence beyond its moral depths; and if there is a *problem* for the interpreter, it is that there is first of all an *opposition* in the elements of the situation. In any case, the difficulty has been stated not as demanding a preliminary solution, but as furnishing a clue to the characterization of Tolstoy's personality and writings.

If we survey the latter as a whole, two features irresistibly and continuously obtrude themselves; and the evolution of Tolstoy's literary and spiritual life is determined by the original correlation and the fluctuating relationships, terminating in internecine opposition, of these two.

It must be affirmed, in the first place, that Tolstoy, perhaps beyond any writer of the present age, was possessed by what we might describe as an engrossing appetite (not to say infatuation) for mere *being*. The energy of his character went out with a reckless force and spontaneity to appropriate the variety of experience open to a susceptible nature amply endowed with resources. The story of this has been briefly told in "My Confession." His profligacy was a derivative of the same tendency and is marked by a characteristic catholicity of taste. In the sphere of his art, this prodigality of nature assumes a guise peculiarly characteristic of the national literature. The distinctiveness and value of that realism which was developed by the Russian novelists has been admirably estimated by M. de Vogüe.[1] It will be enough here to indicate the bearing of this literary feature on the substance of Tolstoy's moral and religious teaching.

In its most typical form, and especially in his sustained creative endeavors, Tolstoy's manner is that of a loitering progress through a labyrinth of infinitesimals. He wanders among the minutiæ of life with the charmed and naïve interest of a child, exhaustlessly observant, irresistibly receptive. It may be questioned whether his

[1] "Le roman russe."

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greatest artistic quality is not his consummate power of presenting the incident of a common day and lending exquisiteness to verisimilitude. In this kind nothing could be more convincing than the exquisite opening of "Domestic Happiness." There are spaces in his narrative (one need only refer to the charming outdoor and hunting passages at Otrádnoe and Mikháylovka in "War and Peace" or to many of the domestic and agrarian scenes in "Anna Karénin") where the episodic interest develops a completeness that leaves us for the time satisfied and quite indifferent to the main current; and in the larger works the accumulated impression becomes at moments almost that of rankness.

This impression in turn disappears when we reach the culminating points which occur at intervals; and we become aware that, beneath the crowded irregularity of the piece, there is a constant rhythm or pulse regulated by a prevailing spiritual attitude. It is this that now demands our attention.

From an early point it is apparent that the objective secular interest in men and things, which always had so great a power to arrest and hold the mind of the artist, is liable to become embarrassed by accessions of a reflective disquiet. Even in "The Cossacks," where the writer's charmed impressionability is in its first flush, we find this ominous interpolation; and with the growth of Tolstoy's artistic power the growth of the reflective element proceeds in geometric ratio. It is doubtless a question of fundamental importance what is the source and character of this peculiar strain; but the question involves a reference to the national type and literature which would lead us far beyond Tolstoy. One conjecture only will be hazarded. There seems no reason why we should seek the ultimate springs of that critical tendency, which eventually developed into an all-absorbing Christian idealism, in any distinctive faculty or endowment, or indeed elsewhere than in the general impressibility which underlay Tolstoy's artistic activity and gave to his work its

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transcendent realism. If this is so, the warring elements in his mind and work will appear together in a common fund of sensibility.

The view is strengthened when we consider the nature of the quality with which we are dealing. Both in the artistic and in the ethico-religious form, it is characterized by the clear non-mystical order of apprehension. In the one sphere there is the infinite aptitude for exact and detailed characterization, in the other an irresistible logical and analytic faculty. For the massive synthetic movements of German speculation he has only impatient dissent. His attitude to Hegel's system, occasionally revealed, can hardly be considered as (even in an elementary sense) informed, but is a clear indication of temperament; and significance of a sort might equally well be attached to the relative sympathy of his incidental allusions to Kant. That Tolstoy busied himself, to a certain extent, with Kant's writings he has himself told us; and at times proximate analogies and even exact parallelisms can be detected. Considering his mental constitution and attitude rather than the content of his teaching, we should be justified in seeking for Tolstoy's historical affinities in those great critical movements of thought which form a periodically recurring phase in human progress and are most inclusively designated under the rubric of Illumination. Only, this statement must be qualified by the admission that Tolstoy belongs to the exceptional and non-representative figures in the movement, his place being analogous to that of Socrates rather than of Hippias in the Greek Enlightenment, and to that of Rousseau rather than of Diderot in the French. Under this proviso Tolstoy clearly ranks with those thinkers who surprise truth rather by sense and acuteness than by divination.

It cannot of course be asserted that he was insensible to the appeal of the *Dinge des Jenseits*. In the all-inclusiveness of his interest, there is a place for such suggestions of mystery as the early incident which foreshadows the manner of Anna Karénin's end; and many

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of the familiar but obscure or particularly impressive experiences, dreams, the sight of the starry heavens, inexplicable psychical impressions, acquire a spiritual significance or become instrumental in the vast reconstitution of values which is the nerve of Tolstoy's attitude to life.[2] Apart from this, the ordinary facts of existence and particularly the solemn dispensations of life and death contained more mystery than he could contemplate without trouble; and where we find the shadow of the supernatural, it is usually in a form akin to that which William Archer has pointed out in Ibsen's treatment of the same,—a mere suggestiveness of the occult in the texture of normal experience. It might be added that where Ibsen latterly succumbed to the mystery of the pathological, Tolstoy kept clearing his mind to the end, of the very idea of mystery. This side of his development could not be more surprisingly revealed than in the versatility with which, only a year or two after having touched the nadir of dramatic horror in "The Dominion of Darkness," and amidst the moral strain of the period which produced "The Kreutzer Sonata," he springs upon us that gay and fantastic satire of spiritualism, "The Fruits of Enlightenment."

The constitution of Tolstoy's mind, as disclosed both

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[2] One need only refer to the constant association in "War and Peace" between the depths of the sky, seen in moments of reflection or of crisis, and the infinitude which is circumfused about the paltriness of human existence. The sterile and ineffectual womanhood of Sónya is suggested in a psychical experience known to most people.

'Sónya crossed the parlour with a wine-glass, on her way to the buffet-room. Natásha looked at her and at the crack in the buffet-room door, and it appeared to her that she was recalling that there had once been that crack and Sónya had passed by with a wine glass.

"Yes, it was just like that," thought Natásha. "Sónya, is it you?" Natásha called out, strumming on the bass string. "Oh, you are here!" Sónya said, with a shudder, walking up and listening to the music. "What is it,—'The Storm'?" she said, timidly, being afraid that she was making a mistake. "Precisely in that way she shuddered then, and came up to me, and smiled timidly," Natásha thought, "and just so I thought that something was lacking in her." ' "War and Peace," Vol. II, p. 392 (Wiener's tr.).

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in reasoning and in assimilative contemplation, finds striking expression in his theory of art. In the tenth chapter of his treatise on the subject, he attacks the obscure and oracular manner which he conceived to have grown up when art ceased to be national and "the artist composed for a small circle of men, who were under exclusive conditions,"—the art which is exemplified at the present day in what is known as decadence; and he lays it down as a fundamental character in all true art that it must be comprehensible.

This criterion, which of course brings Tolstoy into line with the spirit of Illumination, at the same time, when interpreted as he understood it, indicates where he transcends that order. By comprehensibility he does not mean anything of a purely intellectual or logical nature,—far less what has been familiarized and standardized by tradition. His conception is involved in some complexity and raises a host of metaphysical questions; but several points stand out clear and unambiguous.

Art for Tolstoy is an adjunct and development of religion, and its comprehensibility is associated with the character which makes the latter intelligible to men. In this connection religion is especially signalized by the type of feeling to which it gives rise. Tolstoy defines art as a means of communication: in contradistinction to words it communicates feelings. It is these feelings which are universally comprehensible,—provided, that is, the religion out of which they spring is the religion of the time; for "the art which conveys sensations which result from the consciousness of a former time, which is obsolete and outlived, has always been condemned and despised." Genuine religious sensation must always be new. It gives conscious expression to "the forward movement of humanity." Here we find the secret of comprehensibility. "If art is a conveyance of sentiments which result from the religious consciousness of men, how can a sentiment be incomprehensible if it is based on religion, that is, on the relation of man to God? Such art must have

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been, and in reality has been, at all times comprehensible, because the relation of every man to God is one and the same."[3]

This universality based on a completely clear and indubitable form of feeling, identified with sincerity, though incompatible with every kind of obscurity or illusiveness in art, is not in any way opposed to the sense of minute gradations. On the contrary, Tolstoy maintains that art depends on infinitesimal niceties (of pitch, for example, or of drawing); and his exact position is indicated (in the somewhat haphazard manner in which he frequently makes his most important theoretical points) where he asserts that these fundamental niceties, so far from requiring elaborate training, are "discovered by the feeling alone," or "only when a man abandons himself to a sensation."

It is obvious that such a view of art has a certain theoretical affinity with the Kantian doctrine which lays the foundation of the esthetic in no objective character, but in a universal form of subjectivity. Tolstoy expressly denies to art any truly objective definition among those that have been given. Elsewhere he declares that "it is impossible to interpret an artist's production." What the artist has to communicate can be conveyed only by

[3] The difficulty of reconciling this claim for universality in art (a universality both of time and place) with the proposition that art has its root only in the religious sentiment, which is new, is hardly done justice to by Tolstoy; but the elements of a solution in conformity with his views are to be found in his various positions, and particularly in the fact that he seeks his criterion in feeling. Thus, it might be argued, although an obsolete religion has not the power of inspiring sound artistic endeavor, the genuine products of such a religion, arising out of sentiments which were new at the time, retain a perpetual power of emotional appeal. This solution throws a heavy onus on the feeling which has to interpret for us what is genuinely new in this sense and what effete. In the very next sentence to the one last quoted, Tolstoy goes on to say that "the temples and the singing in them have always been comprehensible to men." But what are we to make of this in connection with his almost Voltairean treatment of the modern church service (*e. g.*, "Resurrection," Pt. I, ch. 39: *cf.* "The Kingdom of God is within You") for which he can only account by including it under the set of influences that he designates collectively hypnotism?

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means of his art. Where we are concerned with feeling, there is nothing to explain, no place for criticism; and "an interpretation in words of a product of art proves only that he who is interpreting is unable to be infected by art." Criticism has arisen only where the art of the higher classes has become divorced from the religious consciousness of the time. "National art has a definite and indubitable inner criterion,—religious consciousness."

In this there is more than a suggestion of the irreducible apriority which, in various specific forms, according to Kant, underlies experience in all its aspects,—whether as knowledge, morality, or artistic appreciation. No doubt the systematic exposition of these forms, especially on their constructive and objective side, is not in the spirit of Tolstoy's writing; but the application of his general criterion, once he has found it, is essentially the exhibition of principles which we must suppose to preside *a priori* over experience, because they alone coördinate and give meaning to it. Frequently his propagandist writings,—"My Religion," for example, and particularly "The Christian Teaching,"—pretend to a symmetry and exhaustiveness of principle which are entirely at one with Kant's manner.

Of peculiar significance is Tolstoy's treatment of the relation of beauty and goodness, which occurs in the seventh chapter of "What is Art?" He marks his departure from pagan values by disintegrating what he conceives to be the compound notion of καλοκἀγαθία, and setting up beauty, goodness, and truth as fundamentally distinct and mutually irreducible ultimate principles.

Goodness is the eternal, highest purpose of our life. No matter how we may understand goodness, our life is nothing but a striving after goodness, that is, toward God. Goodness is actually a fundamental concept which metaphysically forms the essence of our consciousness, a concept which is not definable by reason. Goodness is what cannot be defined by anything, but which defines everything else. But beauty, if we are not satisfied with words, but speak of what we comprehend,—beauty is nothing but what

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pleases us.[4] The concept of beauty not only does not coincide with goodness, but is rather opposed to it, since goodness for the most part coincides with victory over bias, while beauty is the foundation of all our bias. The more we abandon ourselves to beauty, the more do we depart from goodness. . . . But as to truth, we can still less ascribe to this member of the imaginary triad either unity with goodness and beauty, or even any independent existence. What we call truth is only a correspondence of the expression or definition of the subject with its essence, or with all men's universal comprehension of the subject. Now what is there in common between the concepts of beauty and truth on the one side, and of goodness on the other?[5]

The comparison could doubtless be pursued much further; but enough has been said to indicate the general affinity on the intellectual side. Our business is now to go back upon our previous characterization and to show this keenly rationalistic view of principles emerging along with the sense for particularity out of what was there called "a common fund of sensibility." In this the French Illumination will again furnish certain features of similarity as well as of difference.

Presupposing nothing more than a catholic appreciation of the facts of life and a capacity for comparison and contrast, we should be justified in expecting to find these attended by a special sort of reflective accompaniment.

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[4] It is important to notice that beauty is not for Tolstoy identical with that which, in the sense determined by him, gives genuine artistic value to feeling. Beauty, therefore, he maintains, in contradistinction to Kant, is not the subject-matter of true art.

[5] It is not safe to institute parallelisms without regard to the relative prominence of the passages compared in the whole body of each writer's work; although the extraordinary logical coherence of Tolstoy's thought somewhat reduces the danger from false emphasis. Taken along with so many other features, his correspondence view of truth suggests Kant's definition in the "Critique of Pure Reason": "the agreement of our knowledge with objects" (Analytic of Principles, ch. III),—*i. e.*, as he afterwards makes clear, in judgment or "the relation of an object to our understanding" (Dialectic, Introd.). Hegel's transcendence of this view (*e. g.*, "Phænomenologie," p. 66, Collected Works) would again mark the line of cleavage. Of course, in the theoretical, as distinct from the esthetic sphere, the "essence" or "all men's comprehension of the subject" does not accurately characterize the universal concept in Kant,—although a recent attempt has been made to reduce the concept to such subjective uniformity (*vid.* Simmel, "Vorlesungen über Kant").

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The facts in time, by their natural gravitation into and out of groups and orders, would be bound to generate a more or less definite spiritual attitude and outlook; and the product would be consolidated, though invested with an air of negativity, by opposition.

As a matter of fact the French Illumination is marked by a relative absence of positive doctrine. The spirit of the movement is none the less definite. It is connected with the resolution of the established order into its elements, and the intellectual zest for free and sometimes licentious or fantastic recombination. In the general upturn, all that is preposterous and criminal in accredited human institutions is thrown to the surface.

In a conversation on Goethe's "Faust," dated February 16, 1833, and reported in the "Table Talk," Coleridge outlines the plan of a drama conceived on somewhat similar lines. "My Devil," he says, "was to be, like Goethe's, the universal humorist, who should make all things vain and nothing worth, by a perpetual collation of the great with the little in the presence of the infinite."

Except for the allusion to the infinite, the sense of which is singularly absent in the Illumination, these words offer a fair presentation of much in Voltaire's and, to a certain degree, in Diderot's prose writings; and it would be an interesting inquiry how far Goethe, whose understanding of both writers was so intimate and sympathetic, may have been guided in the conception of his Mephistopheles by the all-disturbing humor of the Enlightenment.

A portion of this dæmonic spirit is an original endowment of Tolstoy—only that in his case "the presence of the infinite" is the leading feature.[6] To say nothing of his presentation of history in "War and Peace," we find among his earlier and minor writings, such as "Sevastopol" and "Polikushka," a large infusion of an irony akin to Voltaire's. The difference, however, in intellectual and

[6] See particularly, "My Confession," ch. IX.

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emotional depth, as well as in the capacity for identification with a cause,[7] pressing upon him continually, as we have seen, the consciousness of infinitude, in the end reduces the ironical character to a minor feature in the mass of his work.

A further highly significant point, and one which connects with the peculiar realism of the national literature, is the strangely nonchalant way in which Tolstoy accepts into his picture of life the more uncertain and the darker hues. These lie across his canvas in an infinite checkerwork of minor tones. Nothing could throw into clearer contrast the comparative simplicity of the moral and esthetic cleavages, which give its general character to our European literature.[8] There is a definiteness of feature, a resort to the typical both in human character and in situation, an unmistakable call to judgment, infecting even the works which we regard as least categorical and most enigmatic. Our humorous literature itself cannot escape this characterization; for humor as known to us is the specific call for a specific reaction; and the quality of prevailing humor (what gives their character to works which we distinguish as comedy) is the demand that a typical attitude of spirit be sustained over a certain area.

In Tolstoy's imaginative work, and particularly where he rises highest in creative spontaneity, there is a remarkable absence of appeal to typical attitudes and judgments. His most interesting creations, highly characterized as

[7] There is a decided difference of quality and mass between Tolstoy's ultimate self-identification with Christianity and the support given to the cause of peace and freedom by the writers of the Illumination. No doubt a certain similarity can be detected between the spirit which led to the championship of Calas and Lally-Tollendal, and that which impelled Tolstoy to take up the cause of the suffering and oppressed. But the Christianity which Tolstoy adopted involves a much completer subordination of the nature and intellect than was necessary in order to produce the "Letter to the Chief of the Irkútsk Disciplinary Battalion" or "Famine or No Famine?"

[8] On the literary aspect of this there are some fine remarks by George Moore in the Introduction which he contributes to Lena Milman's translation of Dostoievsky's "Poor Folk."

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they are, impress one, in a way hardly ever realized in Western literature, as growing by inappreciable degrees out of the infinitude of their own elements. We might say that Tolstoy has a unique gift of abandoning his characters to themselves and to their fate. There are points at which he seems to let them out of his hands altogether. Like the progress of his incident, the development of his creatures advances episodically. There are seemingly fortuitous collisions of spiritual currents, movements which slowly or abruptly stir the surface of events, and rise into critical and sometimes thrilling uncertainty,—only to subside and pass away. Up to a certain point the relations of Anna Karénin and Aleksyéy Aleksándrovich are full of these critical uncertainties, where for the moment it seems undecided on which side the wave will break. The *rapprochement* between Sergyéy Ivánovich and Várenka is a remarkable instance, coming as it does abruptly into the centre of interest and disappearing without result.

This naïve acceptance of elements without prejudice frequently renders it difficult to tell whether a characterization is to be taken under one or another of various categories, or indeed under any category at all. Especially difficult is it to be sure with what degree of satirical infection many sinister *aperçus* upon life and character are to be received. (The same remark would hold of Dostoievsky.) When Voltaire begins "La Princesse de Babylone" with the words: "Le vieux Bélus, roi de Babylone, se croyait le premier homme de la terre, car tous ses courtisans le lui disaient, et ses historiographes le lui prouvaient," the note of satire is unmistakable; and we at once adjust our minds to the proper attitude. But when Tolstoy, in a work of solemn beauty, noticing the effect produced upon his friends by the death of Iván Ilích, adds: "The very fact of the death of a close friend evoked in all those who heard of it, as it always does, a feeling of joy because it was Iván Ilích who had died and not they," it is not so easy exactly to interpret the spirit

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of the saying. Certainly such propositions in Tolstoy must frequently be taken as bare and unjudged observation of fact; and it is clear that the irony and humor of his earlier work, even where the abundance of its elements remains, is gradually engrossed by the deepening hues of his religious experience.

This wavering and indefinite character in Tolstoy's writings of course offers no contradiction to the sense for clear particularity which marks both his creative and his reflective work, and illustrates his disapproval of the obscurity of decadent art. The spiritual indecision, which distinguishes so many of his chief characters, Pierre, Levín, and to a certain degree Nekhlyúdov (in spite of the resolution of his character), is in entire consonance with the fundamental realism of his manner. And here, as usual, we find a theoretical parallel to his actual achievement.

In the spirited sketch entitled "Lucerne" he writes:

> An unfortunate, miserable being is man with his need of positive solutions, cast into this eternally moving, endless ocean of good and evil, of facts, of reflections and contradictions! . . . If man but learned not to judge and not to think sharply and positively, and not to give answers to questions given to him only that they might always remain questions! . . . They have made subdivisions for themselves in this eternally moving, endless, endlessly mixed chaos of good and evil; they have drawn imaginary lines on this sea, and now are waiting for this sea to cleave apart, as though there were not millions of other subdivisions from an entirely different point of view, in another plane. . . . Endless is the mercy and all-wisdom of Him who has permitted and has commanded all these contradictions to exist. Only to you, insignificant worm, who are boldly, unlawfully trying to penetrate His laws, His intentions,—only to you do they appear as contradictions. . . .

In considering Tolstoy's characters we must apply a remark made upon the desultory progress of his narrative. Beneath the varying surface there is the same uniform movement of spirit, resulting ultimately in a unity of accumulated impressions which has all the value of strong, consistent individualization. We come to understand that the hand of the master, though hidden, is all the time guiding his work to irresistible conclusions.

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In his creative and his reflective work alike, it is easy to detect the actual operation of the influences which disturb the elements of his universe and issue in his final *Weltanschauung*. These are connected with his absorbing interest in the human; and the chief dynamic is to be found in his impressibility by the critical experiences which lend a new focus to existence,—above all birth, marriage, and death. In "My Confession" he has explained the part played by death in the great *Wertumgestaltung;* and we know that birth and death were associated in his mind as bearing a similar part in the evolution of a moral experience. Describing Levín's feelings on the birth of his child, he says: "All he knew and felt was that what was taking place was very much like what the year before had taken place in the hotel of the provincial city," on the death-bed of his brother Nikoláy. But that had been sorrow, and this was joy. But that sorrow and this joy were alike outside all habitual conditions of life and were, in that habitual life, openings, as it were, through which something superior was disclosed."

It is these great dispensations which for Tolstoy became the interpreters of the life that he loved to follow through the detail of its ordinary level. In view of the enveloping infinitude, the things of this world first lost and then regained their value; and in the process, Enlightenment acquired a complete newness and reality of spiritual connotation far beyond anything known to the representatives of what is called Illumination.

It is true that we have not yet nearly exhausted the analogy. The springs of that ridicule, in which moral distinctions seem to perish, and the sources of the profoundest moral regeneration lie close together. They both connect with the unveiling in the intellect, or in the depth of the soul, of these forms which tradition has sanctified and which have lent their sanctity to tradition. Thus we find certain general resemblances between Tolstoy's position and that of the French group, for example, in such external considerations as the condemnation of war or

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that admiration of the Quakers which appears so strangely yet so naturally, in Voltaire. Indeed, did it not compromise the lines of historical association too far, we might seek for affinities where tradition has found chiefly opposition. The great moral teacher often referred to as the Founder of Christianity constantly employs types passed over or rejected by the official standards,—the child or the pariah,—in order to turn the official standards out of court. This is of the very essence of the age of the Encyclopædia, with its parabolic use of the eastern tale and the satirical romance. The enlightened savage, the unsophisticated Huron, the man from Sirius become the critics of established usage. In his general revision of values, Tolstoy is dominated by characters which are the very types of weakness and obscurity. Nothing is more consistently maintained throughout his whole work than this feature. From Uncle Eróshka, in the early phase of his work, to Platón Karatáev and the outcast Máslova, we find a succession of characters whose business it is to dissolve into its elements the whole fabric of the known moral universe. The part played by children is abnormal, and the significance of the child's standpoint fundamental. "It is the children," says Tolstoy, "who look soundly at life."[9]

The positive side of the analogy must not be pursued too far. We know that Tolstoy at an early age read Voltaire with enjoyment;[10] but, as has been said, the humanity and brooding impressionability of the Russian writer carries him far beyond the more entirely intellectual level of the latter.[11] We may measure the difference in many ways. It is the difference between conviction and conversion. There was a time, doubtless, when

[9] "Lucerne," Vol. III, p. 255, Wiener's tr. [10] See "My Confession."

[11] It must be admitted that amidst the light-footed blasphemies of "L'Ingénu," the dæmonic spirit has led the man who has been so generally supposed incapable of the finer humanity to the verge of a genuine female creation. In the story of Mlle. St. Yves the unquenchable laughter is for once almost quenched in something deeper than the lachrymose sentiment which flooded the literature and life of the times.

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a thing like Diderot's terrible satire, "Le Neveu de Rameau," would have appealed to Tolstoy; there came a point at which he could hardly have handled the theme without solemnity.

But we have reached the limit of uncontroversial presentation. It is a matter of standpoint how far the Christianity of which Tolstoy became the apostle really introduces a fundamental change. In the present article the stress has been laid on the homogeneity and continuity of his character and development. From the earliest stage we find the elements of his *Weltanschauung* in a state of highly unstable equilibrium and ready at any moment for the collapse and possible recovery out of which we must suppose conversions to arise. Not only so, but there is noticeable, throughout the disintegration of his universe, a steadily-growing reconstitution according to the values which he ultimately comes to regard as specifically Christian. In the pre-Christian works, which he afterwards renounced, there are passages which appear to state the Christian standpoint as convincingly as he ever stated it in his polemical writings. On the other hand, he carried over into the period of his Christian development the same distinctive features which characterize the earlier creative epoch. We may here pass over in reverent silence the return of nature upon the man, leading to the recurrent agonies of that struggle which terminated in the tragedy at Astapovo. A less painful illustration can be drawn from the sphere of his art.

Among the qualities in art which he condemns from the new Christian standpoint are two which he designates imitation and effectiveness. From the description which he gives of these it is clear that he is depicting characters which, taken together, go to constitute that essential feature in his own work here designated realism.[12] The

[12] One example may be given under each head. Under "imitation" Tolstoy includes "the speeches" which "are not told so as to make the best sense, but as incoherently as they are in life, with interruptions and

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strange thing is that, in his later writings (even the theological treatise like "My Religion"), Tolstoy continues to make most effective use of these qualities. "The Kreutzer Sonata" is an excellent example of the condemned manner, while "Resurrection," which illustrates this in a supreme degree, is posterior to the treatise, "What is Art?"

There is a depth of paradox in these later works, in which Tolstoy, with power scarcely abated, though with charm largely impaired, enlists all the resources of the art he condemned to inculcate a gospel which seemed to him to furnish the motive for his condemnation of this art.

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abrupt endings." These fragments of conversation are a constant feature in his own writing, and not least in "Resurrection." Again under "effectiveness" he quotes as an example a coroner's description in a murder case. But what are we to say of the ghastly catalogue given in the case of the murdered Smyelkóv?

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE REALM OF ENDS OR PLURALISM AND THEISM: The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of St. Andrews in the Years 1907-10. By James Ward. Cambridge (England): The University Press; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1911. Pp. xv, 490.

The object of Professor Ward's second series of Gifford Lectures is to furnish a more detailed and constructive working out of the Idealism which in the first series chiefly showed itself in a general criticism of Naturalism. It may be true that nothing really exists but spirit or spirits; but this is not obvious and there seem to be facts that contradict it. Hence the necessity for the idealist of the kind of detailed work, which Professor Ward here undertakes, to show that those aspects of the world that we commonly regard as typical of matter are perfectly compatible with the existence of nothing but mind. It is again, of course, open to the idealist as to everyone else to lay stress on the unity or the differentiation of the universe, and Professor Ward, as the title of his lecture indicates, starts from the latter. He has therefore to defend his position, on the one hand, against persons who are not idealists and to prove to them that what is real is not matter but spirit; and, on the other hand, against idealists who think unity logically prior to plurality, he has to prove that what is real is not spirit but spirits. Finally, in the second part of the book, an attempt is made to show that we have a right to introduce more unity into our theory of the world than a pluralism based on purely empirical grounds will warrant, and that this additional unity is to be found in a creative God who is not, however, the Absolute of the monistic idealist.

The more direct arguments against the naturalist with which the book opens are admittedly but a summary of those of "Naturalism and Agnosticism." There must always be a dualism of subject and object, and it may be convenient for the purposes of science to consider the latter apart from the former. But to carry this abstraction back into philosophy, as being the whole truth, leads to inseparable difficulties when we have to

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deal with the facts of mental life and the relation of mind to body. Again, physics no longer holds that its atoms and ether are real over against the perceptible world, but that they are a descriptive scheme for enabling us to forecast events under definite perceptible circumstances in that world. Finally, what Professor Ward calls 'real categories' as distinct from merely descriptive ones have been actually obtained from analogy with minds: such are efficient causation, substance, and the unity of nature. In a great measure I am in agreement with Professor Ward's criticisms here. But, of course, to refute naturalism is not necessarily to prove idealism, since it is quite possible to hold that matter may exist as well as mind and that, when left to itself, it obeys the laws of conservation of energy and momentum, but that it can also be moved by minds when it stands in appropriate relations to them. Nor does it seem safe to rest very much on the doctrine that physical science is merely descriptive without a prolonged discussion of precisely what is meant by description. If the assumption of the existence of certain entities obeying certain laws accounts for what is actually found to be true, must we not say that this fact increases the probability of the assumption, and so that a successful description is some guarantee that the entities that are assumed by it to exist really do so? But, of course, this very line of argument furnishes a justification for Professor Ward's main procedure in the present work. For the fact is that the assumptions of physics account very well for what can be observed of inanimate matter and, when rightly understood, are not intrinsically impossible, but they do not succeed very well with animated matter or mind. If then Professor Ward can show that the assumption that nothing exists but minds will account as well for the behavior of apparently inanimate matter and better for that of animated bodies and minds, he will be justified in holding that his hypothesis has great probability.

Professor Ward makes a great deal of the contrast between science and history which we see when we take the world as it appears at first sight. Naturalism attempts to replace all history by science, and his view would be that when there seems to be nothing but science, there is still history of a simple kind. As I understand it, the distinction intended is that history describes unique individuals and their acts, whilst science deals with laws and with individuals merely as instances of them. It does not

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appear to me that Professor Ward's theory of matter is really any more history than that of a pure naturalist. If Professor Ward had to deal with the particular monads that constitute a particular piece of matter by name, and could state no general laws about them, this would be history, and, as such, I submit, it would be far less valuable as philosophy than what he actually offers us. But what he actually offers us is the general law that monads, though they are unique individuals, agree in certain respects, that, for instance, they may acquire habits and lose initiative, and that then they exhibit the uniformities that are commonly supposed to characterize matter. This might perhaps be described as a conversion of physics into sociology, but not as a conversion of science into history. A pluralistic philosophy may require unique individuals, but its statements about them must be general, for otherwise it would have to refer to them by an infinite number of proper names. With regard to Professor Ward's attitude toward pluralism, I think the following is a fair statement as far as concerns the first part of the book at any rate. The world, as we know it, is on the face of it a more or less unified plurality, and even a singularistic philosophy must at least start from this appearance. But, on the one hand, the arguments of the singularist to prove on metaphysical grounds that there must really be a great deal more unity than there appears to be, are invalid, and, on the other hand, if we accept the singularist's Absolute, the appearance of the many, as we know them, from which the singularist himself must start, becomes inexplicable. Hence arise the following questions: May we not suppose that the intimacy of the union of the many is not fixed but increases as times goes on? And if so, what is the minimum amount of unity that we must assume in the beginning to account for that which has now been reached, and how much more unification may we reasonably expect in the future? These questions Professor Ward attempts to answer on the initial supposition that all that is real is minds.

Professor Ward's arguments against Singularism occur in the second chapter. He, of course, admits that there must be some unity, but he denies that the amount of unity that the singularist requires is compatible with the observable characteristics of the differentiations. If we are to make the Absolute a mind, and to know what we mean by that statement, we must suppose it to be analogous in essential respects to the minds that we do

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know. Now these minds involve a subjective and an objective side, which are distinguishable though united. To suppose that the Absolute mind can manage with nothing but the subject side is to make an abstraction that has every appearance of being unwarrantable. To suppose that the object side is enough is to relapse into naturalism. Hence there remain the possibilities: (1) that the Absolute is in some sense its own Other, and (2) that its unity is something that transcends the distinction of subject and object. If the latter view be accepted, we must ask the singularist by what right he continues to call that a mind which has lost the most characteristic feature of minds that we know. The former view is supposed to be supported by the analogy of self-consciousness in finite minds. But these at least are never conscious of self without also being conscious of not-self, and this may be essential to any mind. Professor Ward does not perhaps pay enough attention to the alternative that Lotze, whose discussion on this subject is excellent, suggests, viz., that the necessity of an Other either for stirring the Ego into that activity that ends in self-consciousness or as an essential part of the total object of its cognition may depend on the finitude of the finite mind and not be essential to mind in general. But we may agree that unless there is some positive ground for supposing that a mind can exist without this limitation, we practise an unjustifiable abstraction in assuming such a mind. If (as seems to me necessary, though I do not think Professor Ward would admit it) we suppose that entities like colors and sounds are objects to minds, and yet cannot exist except when perceived, it seems to me possible to suppose a single mind whose Other entirely consisted of objects whose existence depended on their being objects to that mind. But the difficulty of making the Absolute a mind of this sort is that we cannot suppose that we ourselves and the other (minds) finite minds that we believe to exist are objects like colors and sounds. So that it is really over the relation of the many finite minds to the one Absolute one that singularism seems to break down. On this question some discussion of the metaphysical bearing of the case of Sally Beauchamp,—the most important new piece of relevant empirical fact that has emerged since Lotze discussed this subject,—would have been welcome from a psychologist of Professor Ward's eminence.

Having decided for spiritualistic pluralism, Professor Ward now tries to see how little unity need be put in at the beginning

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to get out as much as we now have. He thinks it enough to assume that all the individuals strive to better themselves and to conserve what they have already won; the obstacles against which they strive are the strivings of other monads; each monad 'perceives' every other; and the Leibnitian Principle of Continuity. Professor Ward thinks that the history of human societies and of biological organisms will show us that with these assumptions an increasing amount of unity can be obtained and that it is reasonable to suppose by analogy that there has all along been a similar process from a state of less to one of greater unification. The apparent lack of spontaneity and the complete predictability that rules in the realm of matter is to be explained by the analogy of unprogressive societies, which have become hidebound in habits. The constants of physics, moreover, may very well be merely statistical, and we know that in a quite advanced society constant statistical averages may mark great individual differences. So far as I can see, the only respect in which this theory of matter differs in its practical outcome from the mere usual view is that there is always the possibility that the world of matter might some day wake up again like the Empire of Japan. Can it be theoretically maintained?

In the first place, matter as we know it is not exhausted in its qualities by saying that its actions are calculable. It also appears to be extended and movable. Now unless monads be extended and movable, it is difficult to see how any collection of them can seem to be so. Leibniz tried to explain this by saying that there were a great number of monads and that we perceived them confusedly. But the difficulty here is not that we perceive less than there is to perceive, but that we perceive something with *different* qualities and relations from what really is there. Hence we must either suppose that certain minds or certain collections of them really are extended and movable, or that we never perceive other monads but only have presentations caused by them. I understand the latter alternative to be rejected by Professor Ward, who mentions Reid in this connection with approval. I very much doubt whether it be really possible to reject representative ideas, but if so, we must certainly grant that some minds or at any rate some collections of minds are extended and stand in spatial relations to each other. I do not think there is anything impossible in such a view, but it is admittedly rather a startling one.

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Professor Ward further discusses the question whether the view that the monads have acquired habits does not assume a fixed order and thus fail to explain it. His argument is that only what interests produces habits, and that what interests may very well be much more regular than our total experience. This is undoubtedly true, but it is also necessary that the recurrences should be pretty frequent, and selection cannot increase their frequency. Moreover, the monads at this low stage are supposed to have very short memories. Hence I am still doubtful whether in a world, with so little external recurrence as Professor Ward assumes, habits could arise.

We must now notice Professor Ward's discussion of Contingency with which is connected his doctrine of evolution as epigenesis. By the latter is meant that the higher stages depend for their existence on the lower ones, but that no amount of knowledge of the lower would have enabled us to forecast the higher. But we must not say that the higher stages are uncaused, because a distinction must be drawn between efficient and occasional causation, and it is only the latter that enables us to predict, whilst it is the former which is used in the Law of Universal Causation. Efficient causation, as I understand it, is the relation between a mind quâ active and its acts, so that the law of causation would become, 'Every event is some one's act.' Of course, this is not incompatible with every event having an occasional cause too. Actual recurrence is not essential to occasional causation, but only to the possibility of our finding out laws of occasional causation. Still, unless there be an à priori reason for supposing that every event has an occasional cause, we may admit that there is no reason why we should suppose one where, from the nature of the case, we cannot find it: and this is the actual state of affairs in many historical events and human actions. Professor Ward says that contingency must tend to decrease as time goes on. I cannot follow this. I understand that habitual actions are subject to occasional causation, and that, as time goes on, more and more actions become habitual. True, Professor Ward holds,—I am not very clear why,—that there will never be a time when *all* actions have become habitual, but at any rate we are certain that the mass of habitual action increases, and not certain that there is a proportionate increase in the free ones; for no positive reason is offered for supposing that the sleeping monads will ever wake. What we must take

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Professor Ward to mean is that the friction due to mere misunderstanding and selfishness on the part of the intelligent monads will tend to a minimum. Thus three meanings of contingency are involved: (1) this friction, (2) collision between the volitions of intelligent monads and the habits of petrified ones, and (3) the fact that the behavior of non-petrified monads is not capable of prediction.

We must now regretfully leave the many other interesting points in the pluralistic part of the work and shortly consider the Theistic part. God is approached from a consideration of the upper and lower limits of pluralism, and the fact that without him the final unification cannot be taken as certain. The first consideration involves an explicit rejection of the principle of continuity, which has previously been accepted. Professor Ward does not seem to me to indicate any ground for thus accepting the principle so far, and arguing from it, and then rejecting it. Of course, a *last term* in the monadic hierarchy is probably compatible with the principle, but this would not be God whom Professor Ward always and rightly compares to a *limit.* Professor Ward admirably criticises a number of theories of creation, and ends by adopting a creative God, but confessing that creation is a mystery. It does not seem to me that this confession disconcerts him as much as might be expected. His argument here is that it would be very ominous for our theory of creation if it did not make creation a mystery, since it is something outside the world as a whole and not a relation between parts of it. But surely here 'the world' = the universe and that = the monads + God, so that creation is within the world from the philosophic point of view. But a more serious objection is that the mystery seems to lie not in the mere modus operandi of God (which would be tolerable enough), but in what is meant by creation. Until we can have some light on the second question, creation remains a mere word and as such it seems useless to philosophy and insusceptible of proof even by arguments based on ethical and religious considerations. Does it in fact come to more than the aspiration (or in some, the conviction) that in some way unknown to us things will turn out better than any empirical evidence can give us a certain warrant for believing?

A creative God having been accepted, the rest of the book is a theodicy. Speculative pessimism falls an easy victim to Pro-

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fessor Ward's dialectics, and the author then turns to reconcile the admitted evils of the world with God's goodness. The line that he takes is that we must certainly suppose God to be bound by the laws of logic, and that, further, we must not attempt to suppose a world different in kind from the pluralistic one of free agents considered in the first part of the book. Hence the evil in the world is attributable to the defective use that the monads have made of their freedom, but God cannot be blamed for having made them free. What God did in creation was to limit possibilities, but not to close all but one; evil is due to wrong volitions of monads within the range of possibilities that God left open to them. This line of defense is a great deal more satisfactory in dealing with moral than with physical evil. Physical evil is due not so much to the erroneous volitions of higher monads (though it is partly so caused) as to those monads whose inherent incapacity for progress has made them crystalize into matter. Professor Ward's defense here is that the regularity of matter is of more value to the higher monads, in spite of the fact that it leads to some disasters, than would a less regular system be. Against this view I would suggest two objections: (1) I should have thought that immunity from physical disasters might have been cheaply bought at the price of occasional miracles. And the more the optimist insists on the infrequency of grave physical disasters, the less he can maintain that their aversion by miracles would be counterbalanced by the loss of the advantages due to regularity; and (2) Does not this defense treat the lower monads not as ends, but as means to the welfare of the higher monads? Surely Professor Ward's universe has in it a tragedy so vast that nothing like it exists in one where matter is lifeless, viz., the petrification of perhaps the vast majority of minds. And since we unhesitatingly use them as means, will not the principle of continuity suggest that monads higher than ourselves use us as means? Conditions of space have compelled me to neglect many interesting and important items in Professor Ward's book; but it is to be hoped that enough has been said to show that it teems with interest (and naturally with points of controversy) for all who can enjoy an earnest and brilliant attempt to grapple with the deepest questions of what the world is and what may be hoped from it.

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THE SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS INSIGHT: THE BROSS LECTURES, 1911. By Josiah Royce. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912. Pp. xvi, 297.

This little volume is indeed Professor Royce's *Sonnenklarer Bericht* of his entire system. Shorn of its religious dress,—which the object and the occasion of these lectures demanded,—the book contains a synthetic and popular (in the good sense) presentation of the sources of *spiritual* insight which a Voluntaristic Idealism affords.

Professor Royce, in applying his idealism to the problem of religion, uses old names for some new ways of feeling. The well-known religious categories, which in their original usage had a vital significance, but which later theology rendered abstract and threadbare, are reinvested by Royce with a concrete meaning. Such a category is Salvation. The higher religions are based on the postulate that man needs to be saved. For Royce, salvation is a universal need, a matter not of any one time or faith. It is a problem of life and experience. It arises whenever life is defined in terms of some highest good and whenever the danger of losing this highest good is realized.

An insight into the need and the way of salvation, an insight that man stands in danger of missing the goal of life, and that there is some means of escape from this danger, Royce calls a religious insight. There are several sources of such insight, with a study and criticism of which the whole volume deals.

A widely accepted source of insight is furnished, of course, by revelation. But whoever relies upon this source is involved in what Royce calls the "religious paradox,"—the paradox of insisting that the individual, though unable to know the divine by his own light, is yet able to distinguish a divine revelation from any other report. "The paradox is that a being who is ignorant of his duty and of his destiny as to need guidance at every point, so weak as to need saving, should still hope, in his fallible experience, to get into touch with anything divine" (p. 25).

One way of solving this paradox seems to lie in the appeal to a personal religious experience defined by James as "the experience of individuals who regard themselves as 'alone with the divine'" (p. 27). It is an experience "which mysteriously wells up from the subliminal self, from the soundless depth of

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our subconsciousness" (p. 47). But valuable and necessary though such individual experience is, it does not solve the religious paradox. The paradox still remains: the individual in his isolation, "alone with the divine," finds salvation in which all other individuals shall share. Which of the many and the conflicting individual experiences reveals *the* divine? For an answer to this question one must appeal to social experience.

Social experience as a source of religious insight teaches "salvation through the fostering of human brotherhood" (p. 58). Such a doctrine insists upon the religious meaning of social service and upon the fact that men can only be saved together and not separately. But though the need of human companionship as a means to salvation is a universal need, yet mere companionship does not solve the religious paradox; for man and his fellow equally need salvation. Social experience, if it is to solve the paradox, must be viewed as a process "which is not only human but superhuman" (p. 74). "Human society as it now is . . . is a chaos of needs, . . . the whole social order groans and travails together in pain . . . longing for salvation" (p. 75). How the social order as a whole may be saved, and through it the individual, reason must teach us.

Reason as a higher source of religious insight is indeed not the reason of "barren intellectualism" opposed to "intuition"; but it is a "broader intuition, the sort of seeing that grasps many views in one, that surveys life as it were from above" (p. 86). The office of reason is to get articulate insight,—"insight into wholes rather than fragments" (p. 91). Now reason, —conceived as a constructively synthetic process,—shows that science and commonsense alike manifest what Royce calls the "religious paradox";—they both involve the admission of human fallibility and ignorance and the confidence in a truth beyond the revelation of our momentary experience. It is a universal paradox which pervades all types of opinion,—social, personal, and scientific. Commonsense, though incapable of being personally experienced or verified by any human individual, is yet a standard to which individual judgments appeal. And all expressions, such as the verdict of science, consensus of opinion, human experience, are expressions which illustrate the universal paradox of appealing to standards which no man ever individually possesses and with which all individual opinions must agree. And upon such a reference to a super-individual

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standard depend the very ideas of truth and error; for truth and error can only mean agreement or disagreement with the "wider insight" of mankind which never belongs to any one individual.

This "wider insight"—of mankind, commonsense, science—must be universalized. To the synthetic insight of reason the universal paradox reveals the reality of a superhuman type of life which the religious need seeks. Royce's arguments for an Absolute are too well known to be summarized here. In this volume the arguments are not merely repeated, but sharply and lucidly restated.

The source of religious insight furnished by reason is not merely theoretical, but it has a vital relation to the Will. That the will and the reason have one logic in common; that the truth of an idea may be said to be constituted by its "workings," but that these workings must be conceived as "absolute workings," —all this is sufficiently familiar to the student of Royce's Voluntaristic Idealism or Absolute Pragmatism. Just as our ideas are true or false in so far as they agree or disagree with a "wider insight" of reality, just so our deeds have meaning only in so far as they are in conformity with the will of a larger life. And thus the will as well as the reason is a source of religious insight, for the meaning of any rational irrevocable deed implies an absolute view of reality.

How the individual can 'get religion,' so to speak, how the conclusions of a Voluntaristic Idealism may be practically applied in the life of every individual, Royce undertakes to show in the concluding chapters of the book. His philosophy of loyalty is here restated as the synthesis of all the sources of religious insight. The spirit of loyalty demands all the elements,—individual experience, social coöperation, reasonable insight, voluntary choice,—which the other sources have exemplified. Every individual who is loyal to his consciously chosen task is "loyal to loyalty" and has thus solved the religious paradox. "From the lonely and darkened depth of his personal finitude, from the chaos of his social promptings and of his worldly ambitions, amid all the storms of fortune, 'midst of hell's laughter and noises appalling,' he has heard the voice of the Spirit" (p. 210).

Loyalty, as the crowning source of religious insight, idealizes evil, for "there could not be loyalty in a world where the loyal being himself met no adversities that personally belonged to and

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entered his own inner life" (p. 253). Loyalty also defines a kingdom of God, as it were, called by Royce the Invisible Church. All the loyal,—whatever their cause,—constitute one genuine religious brotherhood. And thus the loyal co-workers in any field,—in art, science, society,—are, according to Royce, religious devotees and in communion with the Absolute Spirit; for they are loyal to super-individual causes whose meaning and rationality can only be understood in terms of one super-human Life.

Those who are repelled by Idealism on account of its alleged thin abstractions and remoteness from life should read this 'sun-clear' and 'life-intoxicated' book.

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Harvard University.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE. By George Malcolm Stratton. London: George Allen & Co., 1911. Pp. 367. (Published in the Library of Philosophy. Edited by J. H. Muirhead.)

Although Professor Stratton is a professional psychologist, he has found occasion to refer in the text of this book to only one of the psychologists who have made their names known in the field of religion, and that reference is insignificant. The mention of this fact is intended here as an acknowledgment of the originality of Professor Stratton in the treatment of his problem.

His data come first from the great canonical collections, the epics, the reliable accounts of customs and observances, and only in the second place from introspective reports of individuals. For, as the author believes, not the statements of individuals in answer to questions or otherwise, but "the prayer, the hymn, the myth, the sacred prophecies . . . furnish to the psychologist the best means of examining the full nature of religion, in its diverse forms" (Preface). If one's purpose is to give a vivid and definite impression of the conflict of motives and practices in religious life, this method is undoubtedly the better one. But there are problems for the solution of which individual records are the more precious, and even the only sufficient source of information.

Students of religion owe Professor Stratton a debt of gratitude for having opened more systematically and widely than

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had been done before, the treasure-house of social religious records. No race, and hardly any people, remains unrepresented: Australians, North and South Americans, Mexicans, Chinese, Japanese, Malays, Hindoos, Egyptians, Greeks, Jews, Arabs, Persians, are made to contribute from their sacred writings, or unwritten customs and beliefs, to an admirably comprehensive picture of the varieties of motives, practices, and ideas, which enter into the almost endless forms of religion.

The book is divided into four parts with the following titles: *Conflicts in Regard to Feeling and Emotion; Conflicts in Regard to Action; Conflicts in Regard to Religious Thought; Central Forces in Religion.* This last part is much the shortest; it includes forty-two pages, divided into three chapters: *The Idealizing Act, Change and Permanence in the Ideal, Standards in Religion.*

The manysidedness, the breadth of sympathy, the careful moderation, and the literary taste evinced in this book give it a place apart. Concerning the outcome of the work, it can be said truly that the author has achieved his end, namely, to give "a vivid and definite impression of the war of motives in religion" (Preface). This conflict he has succeeded in making evident, in explaining, and in illustrating by like conflicts that are not religious. We are shown in an impressive array of facts drawn from every quarter of the earth, that there is in religious life both appreciation and contempt of self, breadth and narrowness of sympathy, acceptation and renunciation of the world, gloom and cheer, coolness and fondness for rites, activity and passivity, trust and jealousy of intellect, opposition of picture and thought in the representation of the divine, many gods and one god, divinities at hand and divinities afar off. (I have merely reproduced, more or less textually, headings of chapters.)

These merits acknowledged and appreciated, there remains in my mind a regret that Professor Stratton treated his subject as he did. But he performed a task of his own choosing, and many will doubtless disagree with me and feel that a more profitable point of view than the one from which he proceeded in his investigation of religious life, could hardly have been found. In any case there will be unanimity, I suppose, in the opinion that the book is as much a study of the rich diversity of human nature seen in religious life, as a study of religion itself.

The only criticism I shall offer will bear upon the author's

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definition of religion and his defense of the noetic value of religion. The formula in which he expresses the dominant characteristic of religion seems to me deficient in that it places the emphasis upon appreciation, *i. e.*, upon a class of feelings and not upon active desire. The sense of value is no more a specific characteristic of religion than is any other feeling. "Religion," he tells us, "is the appreciation of an unseen world, usually an unseen company; and religion is also whatever seems clearly to be moving toward such an appreciation or to be returning from it. Or perhaps it might better be described as man's whole bearing toward what seems to him the Best or Greatest." A little further on he adds: "Religion is the gradual awakening to the weight and import of a peculiar order of objects. The sense of value, of significance, has found a new medium, a new direction" (pp. 343, 345). The deeper aspect of religion,—because the deeper aspect of life,—is in my opinion a desire for, and an attempt to secure things that are valued. But that which differentiates religious from secular life is the kind of power from which the gratification of desire is expected. To be religious is better defined, in my opinion, as *entering into or standing in dynamic relation* with an unseen hyperhuman company because of one's appreciation of the outcome of this relation.

I find myself in complete agreement with the author's understanding of the relation of feeling to religion as set forth in a passage on pages 341-2, beginning with the sentence, "The truth is missed when some special feeling is believed to be religion's characteristic mark."[1]

The chief interest of the last chapter (*Standards of Religion*) lies in its defense of the proposition that "Religion is justified in taking part in the discovery of the truth." This old question is again much in evidence since the advent of the pragmatic philosophy. I shall use Professor Stratton's presentation as an occasion for a brief expression of my own views.

I wish that instead of insisting upon the right of the heart and of the conscience to a share in the establishment of objective truth, he had insisted rather upon the *nature* of that influence

[1] See also pp. 121, 122, 125*ff*, and compare my similar statements in "Religion as a Factor in the Struggle for Life," *Am. Jr. of Psy. and Educ.*, II, 1906, pp. 314-318. See also the two first chapters of "A Psychological Study of Religion: Its Origin, Function, and Future," Macmillan & Co., 1912.

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and indicated the *limitations* of the function of desire and need in the determination of objective truth. What are exactly the respective legitimate functions of heart and intellect? Man has not waited for the permission of the philosopher to accept the guidance of his moral needs in determining reality. Religious souls have usually done more; they have behaved as if the moral needs were not merely one of the guides to knowledge, but its own instrument. It is because of this wantonness of piety that the dominant religious beliefs of the present, instead of harmonizing with and completing those of science, are altogether alien or antagonistic to them. The Ritschlian school of theology, for instance, in order to save 'faith,' claims in behalf of theology a complete divorce of science and metaphysics.

The relation of human needs,—whether the need of causal explanation, of logical consistency, of moral harmony, or of any other kind,—to the discovery of the reality through which they may be gratified is expressible in the following propositions. All human needs have the same function in the discovery of factual truth: they constitute merely demands and incentives. It is the intellect which passes upon the validity of each factual proposition made in the interest of any need. The determination "of the concrete system of facts" qualified to meet the demands of the heart and of conscience belongs thus also to science.

Can those who would reject these propositions say why and wherein the rights of the intellect should be different when the question is one of the satisfaction of the body from when it is one of the satisfaction of the heart? In the first case, there is, for instance, a craving. The object desired may take a definite form, let it be some particular food or medicine. The desired food or drug taken, the body is satisfied. In the second case, the heart yearns for friendship or love; the object of the craving may here also assume a definite form; it may be a man, a woman, or a god. Presently the heart has found its satisfaction. The need as felt, and the gratification as experienced, are incontrovertible, absolute facts. It would be as absurd for science to challenge them as to challenge bare sensation or simple feeling. But it is otherwise when it is affirmed that one particular substance is the cause of the relief to the body or that the objective existence of a particular transhuman Order or Being is the

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cause of the moral comfort. Here science is in both cases in its rightful province.

What is the intention of those who in this connection remind us, as does Professor Stratton, that science proceeds upon assumptions that cannot be fully verified, that "scientific labor is always a sifting and a rearranging and supplementing of what the senses offer." What of that? Is it implied that an equal freedom is refused to religion? Would that religion were as careful in establishing its factual truths as is science! The only proper use that may be made of this reminder, is as a warning to religion that although it, as well as science, possesses the right to make hypotheses, it cannot claim for them equal certainty with those of science until, when examined with all possible 'critical cunning,' these religious hypotheses have been found to fit the facts for the explanation of which they were devised as well as the scientific hypotheses agree with the facts to which they refer. Does, for instance, the hypothesis of a righteous and benevolent personal God in direct communication with man and in control of the physical world fit the facts as the known physical phenomena fit the hypotheses of science? The only possible answer to this query is negative.

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THE STABILITY OF TRUTH: A DISCUSSION OF REALITY AS RELATED TO THOUGHT AND ACTION. By David Starr Jordan. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911. Pp. 180.

The gist of this little volume,—the substance of six lectures delivered on the John Calvin McNair Foundation, in the University of North Carolina, in January, 1910,—is expressed in the following passages: "The purpose of this book is to set forth the doctrine that the final test of truth is found in trusting our lives to it. Truth is livable, while error is not, and the difference appears through the strain of the conduct of life. Science is human experience tested and set in order. . . . It is often claimed that the real nature of the thing in itself is so distant from our experiences, so absolutely inscrutable, incomprehensible, and unknowable, that we can have no truth whatever in regard to it. All we have is our expression of certain effects on our consciousness. We assume, without real

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proof, it is said, that our various sensations are transcripts of any actuality whatever, and, furthermore, that we do not know that our sense impressions accord in any degree with impressions which may be made on other types of consciousness. It is further asserted that our own sense-impressions, whatever they may be, are in every case vitiated (or vitalized) by personal and individual habits of inference and reasoning. All these qualities of personality, it is claimed, lead us, if possible, still further from the actual character of the actual thing in itself.

"The answer to this is found in that fact that men and animals are guided by their realities. They live by truth. That they move safely implies safe guidance, the power to 'size up the situation' about them with substantial accuracy, so far as it concerns themselves. . . . The sense-organs of every animal are so constructed that its realities are adequate to its needs. The need is not that of a 'copy or transcript of nature, but accuracy as prompting fruitful attack or exploitation.' For this truth in dealing with external things is not primarily knowledge of the things themselves, but rather of their relation to each other and to us. Effective action depends on ability to 'size up a situation.' It is the situation or correlation of objects which impresses us rather than the things in themselves" (pp. 4, 7).

The author follows closely the pragmatism of James, but makes an important change in terminology. 'Livableness' is the test of truth for him rather than 'workableness.' "An idea may be 'workable' because the people concerned are willing to try to use it in their work. . . . If a doctrine is livable, we can trust our lives to it. . . . This is the final test, the test of the long run, for no doctrine can find its full test in the lifetime of an individual" (p 11). This livableness of truth the author finds exemplified in the great body of scientific knowledge. "We do not yet know what electricity is. We have large experience in what it will do, and in the changing relations of objects produced by changes in electrical conditions. This knowledge tested and set in order constitutes electrical science. To this we trust our lives every day, those of us who travel by rail at the mercy of the block system and the train despatcher. If this knowledge were not true so far as it goes, and so far as it concerns us, the error involved in it would prove fatal, not at once necessarily, nor to all of us, but in the long run to the race, to all who trust to the methods by which this knowledge was obtained" (p. 12).

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Again, the test of livableness is exemplified in the process of organic evolution. "In the main it is a process of adaptation, by which the needs of the organism are brought into closer and closer correspondence with the demands of the environment. . . . The brain and its associated structures form what we may term a device for making action safe. The safety of action is the animal's test of realities" (p. 47). Finally, this test of livableness is the test of moral worth. "Might does not make right, but that which is right will justify itself as the basis of race stability" (p. 57).

The remainder of the book is but an elaboration of this thesis of livableness as the test of truth. It is interesting to note, as coming from the pen of an eminent scientist, the pragmatic conclusion as to the relative claims of vitalism and mechanism. "The long dispute as to mechanism and vitalism cannot end in a victory of one side or the other. If processes of life are included under 'chemism,' then 'chemism' is not a perfectly simple and transparent idea. It must include all the complexities gathered under the term vitalism. Life is so different from anything which would be inferred from a knowledge of the simple phenomena of chemistry and physics, that it seems to call for special terms and special explanations. . . . But chemical forces are adequate to produce whatever effects chemical forces can be shown to produce. 'If the mystery of causal sequences is the same everywhere, nothing is gained for explanatory purposes by exaggerating it at one place and then giving it a name'" (p. 75).

The weakest portion of the book is that in which it seeks to fulfill the conditions of the lectureship "to show the mutual bearing of science and theology upon each other, and to prove the existence (so far as may be) of God from Nature." Here, unquestionably, the scientist finds himself in an uncomfortable situation; and he makes all haste to escape as quickly and as discreetly as possible. One paragraph to prove the existence of God; and the matter is carefully abandoned. Philosophic readers will scarcely be satisfied with so summary and inherently self-contradictory a dismissal of the subject. "Our experience with the objective universe and its effects on our subjective consciousness, seems to imply the existence of a still larger consciousness, in which the objective and subjective shall be united. . . . There seems to be outside ourselves, as well as within, a com-

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pelling 'force that makes for righteousness.' Outside ourselves is 'the ceaseless flow of energy and the rational intelligence that pervades it. . . .' That there should exist a 'law of Heaven and earth whose way is solid, substantial, vast, and unchanging' seems to imply an intelligence adequate to have made it so, and to comprehend it as a whole," etc. (p. 40).

On the whole the book is an interesting presentation of the pragmatic method as exemplified in the realm of science and in the conduct of life. It is particularly noteworthy in so far as it comes from one who speaks with the authority of the expert scientist. If it fails to comply with the conditions of the foundation, such failure does not detract from the wholesomeness of much of its logical spirit.

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THE LIFE OF RUSKIN. By E. T. Cook. London: George Allen & Co., 1911. 2 Vols. Pp. xxv, 540; xiv, 615.

RUSKIN: A STUDY IN PERSONALITY. By A. C. Benson. London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1911. Pp. 264.

As Mr. Cook justly laments, an attitude of 'we have got long past that now' prevails towards Ruskin's work nowadays; yet, with the possible exception of Carlyle, no English man of letters has so deeply influenced the general moral tone of his time. To understand this influence we must note that both Ruskin and Carlyle, unlike though they were in many ways, were united in a fundamental sympathy of antagonism to the world in general and to the orthodox English school of economists in particular. They are the leaders of the reaction against that complacent 'mid-Victorian' spirit, which died as the nineteenth century wore on, and whose death seemed to those that hated it to mean the rebirth of imagination and emotion in the treatment of human affairs. It is significant that they were both of lowland Scots stock,—an origin which secured for them both a large dose of deeply puritanical religious feeling. Their points of difference no doubt are striking. Carlyle was almost a peasant. Ruskin's parents were of humble origin, but his father was a successful wine merchant of literary and artistic tastes, who bequeathed to his son a

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large fortunte and a genuine *bourgeois* love, very alien to Carlyle, of elegance and refinement. Carlyle's up-bringing was spare and grim; Ruskin's coddled childhood was passed in a London suburb where evangelical strictness became almost graceful in an atmosphere of luxury. Carlyle never lost the dourness of his native hills; Ruskin was notable for accessibility and for suavity of address. Carlyle cared nothing for art; half Ruskin's life was talking and writing about beauty. Yet in the welter of London, iniquitous center of a coarsely material civilization, these two weary and tormented spirits knew themselves for kin, whereas with Rossetti, the true artist and worshiper of beauty, Ruskin quarreled definitely. Stormy passages there were. In the earlier days Carlyle fastened on the younger man as good a label as on any of those that he hated, "a bottle of beautiful soda-water." But as time passed they drew closer together, and to the second phase of Ruskin's work Carlyle gave whole-hearted approval. When his growls became too outrageous, Ruskin would throw his arms round the bear and lovingly protest, "Now, now, this is too bad!" So we find Carlyle writing (1869), "Many, many are the Phœbus Apollo celestial arrows you will have shot into the foul Pythons and poisonous abominable Megatheriums and Plesiosaurians that go staggering about, large as cathedrals, in our sunk epoch again"; and, in 1872, "No other man in England that I meet has in him the divine rage against iniquity, falsity, and baseness that Ruskin has, and that every man ought to have."

Carlyle's judgments were often enough wrong-headed, and we may be inclined not to take this one very seriously, so dim a figure has Ruskin become compared with Carlyle himself. One reason for this probably is that while Carlyle had something of that rugged Johnsonian greatness which makes personality survive in anecdotes and memoirs, Ruskin's character, though morally much more estimable, is too ethereal, too inhuman both in its weakness and its strength, to be permanently attractive. However that may be, he begins to suffer the common fate of the great writer who has reached the stage of collected editions: the imposing volumes are stacked on our shelves, and our ideas about him grow vague and fixed. In this case, if we mention him, it is usually with some irritation. We think of Ruskin art pottery, or of those bad-tempered little volumes,

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"Mornings in Florence" and "St. Mark's Rest," which are still part of the less enlightened tourist's equipment in Italy. Sometimes, as in fairness, we give him credit for discovering Turner, whereas in fact he by no means discovered Turner, but merely vindicated Turner's later manner against the critics of the '40's. But persists on the whole a vision of a querulous dogmatist scolding 'like a mad governess' because we cannot fall in with his bitterly narrow religious views, or will not accept a definition of beauty which he has no sooner laid down than he upsets it by a contradictory definition; preaching stern morality in endless incoherent books while he rolls luxuriously through Europe in a post-chaise; as Professor at Oxford scandalizing audiences by a mixture of buffoonery and intolerance; founding a derided St. George's Guild with badges and sham medieval titles of honor; finally in old age exchanging romantic letters with troops of May Queens. In short, the general impression left on our minds is a rather unpleasant one of extravagant sentimentality. We have moved into a different age where the celestial arrows seem to have lost their sting.

There is tragedy in this, because Ruskin's life was both noble and useful, though it was full of failures, and absurd failures, too. Mr. Cook does not bring out this fact clearly enough. His volumes are perfectly candid, and contain, admirably marshaled, all the materials for forming an estimate of Ruskin's genius; but they are no more than a good specimen of ordinary official biography, just but reverential, and not lively. Mr. Benson goes much deeper. It does not matter that the lectures which he has put together as a book are discursive and unpolished. They make delightful reading, and, above all, they fulfill the promise of their title, "A Study in Personality"; indeed, it would be hard to mention a more skilfull performance in the way of sympathetic yet detached delineation of a great man's character. Mr. Benson seems to agree with Tolstoy in thinking Ruskin one of the great forces of the nineteenth century, yet he does not minimize his failures or the element of the ludicrous in them. He notes Ruskin's Scotch canniness and stiffness of backbone,—the very qualities which, when combined with an ardently emotional temperament, are apt to obliterate for their possessor the line between the sublime and the ridiculous. And as regards Ruskin's fame as an art critic Mr. Benson does not mince matters. As a critic (and in this capacity he was most

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imperiously dogmatic) he was incompetent, because ignorant and narrow-minded. True, he opened up many new and important fields, his great achievements in this line being, in addition to the defence of Turner, his launching of the Pre-Raphaelites and his discovery of Italian Gothic, of the Primitives, of Tintoret, and of Carpaccio. But his appreciations did not blaze out from any systematic study of beautiful things; they were, rather, accidental results of the deeper fires of his nature,—fires far other than the artist's or scholar's passion for beauty as such,—and consequently were quite erratic and arbitrary. His gaze, wherever he directed it, to the chiseling of a capital or the veined articulations of a leaf, had an extraordinary quality of patient and piercing observation. But he directed it on irrelevant principles. He was always thinking of God and duty. Hence, though he agreed with what Mazzini said of him,—that he had "the most analytical mind in Europe,"—his was the kind of analytical power which, though it may be necessary, is not sufficient to the making of a critic. The applause which greeted his art-criticism combined with his natural self-confidence to delude him on this head, the reason why the public respected his pronouncements about art being, as Mr. Benson well points out, partly that he connected art with religion and morality, and partly that he hit the popular taste for a show of system-making. "It is an ironical proof of the turn of the Anglo-Saxon reader for what may be called the book-keeping theory of literature, that it [the public] accepted Ruskin's art-teaching . . . because it was conveyed under the form of sub-divisions" (p. 133). The whole pretty business of classification is of course the merest child's-play; he said himself that he had great difficulty to keep the seven lamps of architecture from becoming eight or nine "or even quite a vulgar row of footlight," and on the side of esthetic theory no one can now maintain that Ruskin's views have any value apart from their incidental suggestiveness. Nor has his teaching had any effect on the practical side of art. Except for his encouragement of the Pre-Raphaelites (themselves a flutter which has now subsided) he influenced no school of painting. With all his reputation he could not get the Turner drawings properly cared for. The frescoes with which he helped to decorate the Oxford Union have faded. The Oxford Museum, built under his supervision, was a failure. The whole apparatus

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of his Gothic revival is lumber. Similarly, if we turn to the economic side of his work, that impracticable road, which he caused his Oxford students to build at Hinckley, is typical of the whole. Dickens's novels contributed to the improvement of workhouses and private schools; they helped to abolish Doctor's Commons and untrained sick-nurses; we may even trace to them in some measure the speeding-up of legal procedure and of the routine of government offices. No comparable reform of a practical nature can be directly connected with Ruskin, whose desire to improve the world was yet loftier and purer than that of Dickens. He was a pioneer of education among workingmen, and Mr. Cook points out that he advocated many ideas which, thought mad at the time, have since been put into practice; for instance old-age pensions and universal elementary education. But meanwhile he was ridiculed as a visionary, and neither politicians nor the public paid any attention to his schemes of social welfare. The one definite plan for land reform and regeneration of the people which he actually floated, the St. George's Guild, scarcely pretended to be seaworthy, and foundered at once amid universal laughter. His most tangible success is, perhaps, a certain revolution in the bookselling trade, the establishment of the 'net book system,' which his popularity as a writer on art enabled him to bring about. Was Carlyle, then, deluded by personal sympathy when he saw him as a Phœbus Apollo transfixing poisonous Megatheriums?

The answer must be that Carlyle was right. Ruskin was a preacher and a prophet. He may not have succeeded in getting done any particular thing that was preëminently worth doing, yet, by published writings, by lecturing and teaching, by a constant flood of letters and by wide personal intercourse, he deeply affected English life in two ways: his zeal for righteousness pricked the consciences of large numbers of people, and his zeal for beauty in nature and art to some extent opened their eyes. The analysis of Turner's merits, the sermons of "Modern Painters," the theories of "The Stones of Venice" as to the relation between art and national morality, the economics (drawn from a study of Xenophon and Plato and Isaiah) of "Unto this Last,"—all this may be hopelessly incorrect, yet it did at every turn bring home to multitudes new images of goodness and beauty. We are a 'practical' people,

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and it is fatally easy for us, even in the twentieth century, to stint municipal and national expenditure on art and education, and to count nothing good but what can be measured in terms of cash: it would have been much easier, had Ruskin never written. Surely it is a great thing to have made the British public even begin to take art seriously, and it is a greater thing to have infected many minds with a sense of the intolerable evil of modern industrial conditions. No writer has been so efficient in communicating both aspiration for high ideals and intense hatred of existing evils. And what made him efficient was his acquisition, by patient toil, of a style of such flexibility that it could range through every tone, from the bite of ironic denunciation, through pompous and measured rhetoric, to heights of lyrical splendor. In whatever respects he failed, in language he must be admitted to be an artist of that major breed which writes well not merely for the sake of writing well, but from an unquenchable sincerity without which no intricacy of word-painting will greatly move a large audience. And for a style to be really effective in England, it is not enough that it should spring from sincerity alone; that sincerity itself must be deep-rooted in religion and morality. With all his foibles Ruskin succeeded because he passionately desired that mankind should turn away from evil, and because he had the Bible not only in his mouth, but in his heart. Such a temperament, though it may fit a man to influence his generation, leads almost inevitably to self-torture and suffering which fame can hardly recompense. But I have no space to dwell on the inner tragedies of Ruskin's life; they are traced to their sources in Mr. Benson's book. A phrase of Manning's well expresses this background of pain: "Fors Clavigera," he said, was like listening to the beating of one's heart in a nightmare; and I will end by quoting a sentence from a letter of Ruskin's to C. E. Norton: "The peace in which I am at present is only as if I had buried myself in a tuft of grass on a battle-field wet with blood, for the cry of the earth about me is in my ears continually."

SYDNEY WATERLOW.

London, England.

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VARIA SOCRATICA: FIRST SERIES. By A. E. Taylor. St. Andrew's University Publications. Oxford, Parker, 1911. Pp. xii, 269.

Without attempting a discussion, which would not be appropriate here, of the theories propounded in this book, I wish to draw the attention of readers to them, as they are important not merely for the classical scholar or the student of ancient philosophy, but for anyone who is interested in the personality and position of Socrates. The figure of Socrates dominates Greek philosophy; its combination of nobility with homely picturesqueness has a fascination that never dies; nothing that enlarges or greatly changes our conception of the martyr and sage who was one of the forces inspiring Platonism can be indifferent to us. It would therefore be a pity if Prof. Taylor, who attacks all ordinary views about Socrates and contends that the history of Greek philosophy must be re-written, were only read by specialists.

We are accustomed to think of Socrates as above all 'a moralist of the marketplace,' an original character, with a touch of the prophet's madness, who in and out of season practised a system of cross-questioning with the object of clearing up men's ideas about right and wrong conduct. Apart from ethics, we do not usually connect him with any definite philosophical theories; he stands out rather as a stimulus to philosophy in others, and as in this way the chief, if not the only, begetter of Platonism and the Academy. He was tried, as we all know, on a charge of impiety and corruption of the young; yet most of us would be hard put to it to give any precise account of the bearing of these proceedings on his life and doctrines. Over both these matters, his death and the nature of his relation to Platonism, a certain veil of mystery does in fact still hang. The difficulty as to Plato is roughly this. Xenophon (a humdrum but trustworthy writer), Aristotle and Aristophanes (in his burlesque *The Clouds*) combine on the whole to represent Socrates as having indeed in his youth been interested in physics, mathematics, and cosmological speculations, but as confining himself in mature life to ethics and politics; yet his disciple Plato wrote a series of dialogues which dramatically picture him as developing the body of metaphysical doctrine that centers round the famous 'theory of ideas.' Which are we to believe? The ordinary way

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of getting over the difficulty is to say that the Socrates of the dialogues is almost all invention,—that it is his own splendid poetry and refined speculations that Plato puts into the mouth of the master. Again, the trial and death of Socrates remain enigmatic in spite of the full accounts of them that are extant. The leaders of the restored democracy were sober men, not extremists; why should they have singled him out as a victim? The charges have an air of being trumped up, and the motives of the prosecution are obscure.

These are real difficulties, and the great merit of Prof. Taylor's book is that it drags them to the light and tries to solve them by bringing them into connection with one another. First, as to the trial. We require, as its real cause, an 'impiety' which shall also be high treason. This Prof. Taylor finds in Socrates's adhesion to Orphic and Pythagorean doctrines, in itself harmless enough, but made dangerous by his personal eminence and the fact that the Pythagoreans were foreigners with anti-democratic tendencies. When we see that Socrates was suspected as the 'able and dangerous head' of an association of foreigners, a semi-mystical brotherhood who hated the democracy and imported religious novelties, his removal as a menace to the state becomes intelligible. His Pythagoreanism, again, gives the clue to the other great puzzle, the question as to the historical value of the Platonic dialogues. Starting from the mystical side of his character, which is admitted, Prof. Taylor argues that the conception of him as merely a moralist is wholly false. The dialogues are not fiction; the teacher whom we see in them combining the two aspects of Pythagoreanism,—the religious ecstasy of the follower of the True Way and the systematic intellectual activity of the mathematician, scientist, and metaphysician,—is a true picture of the actual man. The 'theory of ideas' was familiar to him, as was the whole Platonic apparatus of technical terms connected with the doctrine of things in themselves. He appears "not merely as the continuator of the religious side of Pythagoreanism, the Olympic contest for eternal life against the world, the flesh and the devil, but also as its continuator on the more purely speculative side, as a searcher after the real essences and causes of the world-order" (p. 266).

The theory is startling and revolutionary. To establish it Prof. Taylor manipulates a vast mass of evidence with an erudition which can only be admired, and an ingenuity which, while

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it is admired, must sometimes be suspected. Much of Plato's *Apology* has to be interpreted afresh; Xenophon has to be discredited altogether; a greater weight has to be put on the testimony of Aristophanes's *Clouds* than the play will perhaps bear; a crucial passage of Aristotle has to be explained away. Tremendous operations all of them, and opinions will differ as to the extent to which, in attacking them, Prof. Taylor has given us 'truth mixed with error, shade with rays.' Meanwhile there can be no dispute as to the service he has done in showing up the puzzles, too often shirked, that cluster round a subject which is vital for the whole history of philosophy. We are promised a second series of essays on the same theme, and I hope that their appearance will not be long delayed.

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UN ROMANTISME UTILITAIRE: Étude sur le mouvement pragmatiste. Par René Berthelot, membre de l'Académie de Belgique. Le pragmatisme chez Nietzsche et chez Poincaré. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1911. Pp. 416.

In accordance with his interpretation of pragmatism as "un romantisme utilitaire," M. Berthelot seeks various divergent sources for the thought of Nietzsche and Poincaré, and his work is interesting and able as a history of modern thought. The best part of the book is that devoted to the "fragmentary and hesitating" pragmatism of the scientist, where the treatment of the doctrine of probability is particularly good and suggestive. The defense of Euclidean geometry will interest many, although it does not seem conclusive, whilst no reason seems given for the concluding remark (p. 401) that the principles of geometry correspond to an essential moment in the mind's dialectic.

In discussing Nietzsche, M. Berthelot is too interested in seeking 'sources,' although this makes his essay more generally instructive. He tends to agreement with Nietzsche chiefly in his ethical views. Moralists go astray in postulating a system of practical judgments free from contradiction (pp. 180*ff*): the conflict of moral interests shows that this is absurd. But surely there is no *contradiction* in saying, for example, that x is good, y is good, and x and y are not both obtainable; yet this is all that M. Berthelot offers as his proof.

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Both Nietzsche and Poincaré, he thinks, are misled by equivocal terms, such as 'life,' 'simple,' etc. A future work is promised on forms of pragmatism intermediary to the radical pragmatism of the artist, Nietzsche, and the tentative partial pragmatism of the scientist, Poincaré. M. Berthelot has certainly undertaken the most complete account and criticism yet attempted of this movement, and this first installment abundantly shows his competence for such a considerable task.

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RAZIONALISMO E MISTICISMO, SAGGI E PROFILI. By Michele Losacco. Milano: Libreria Editrice Milanese, 1911. Pp. 259.

The first half of this book consists of six fairly long essays on Rationalism and Mysticism, Mysticism in the early Greek Philosophers, The Renaissance of Mysticism, Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie* and Rationalism, Rationalism and Intuitionism, and on Jacob Boehme. The second hundred pages contain fourteen brief articles on Hegel, Leopardi, Hamann, Croce, Delacroix, Varisco, etc., of such an ephemeral nature that they hardly merited reprinting in a volume. It would seem that the title is due to an attempt to confer a fictitious unity by an opening essay upon a number of scattered articles and reviews. Rationalism and mysticism, indeed, understood as the author wishes to understand those terms, would shelter any philosophical writing whatever under its ægis. Rationalism, we are told, is "that attitude which admits the presence in the universe of an absolute and infinite reason whereof human consciousness forms but a part." Of mysticism we are given no formal definition of the writer's own, but he quotes with approval: "The word 'mystic' is used to designate anyone who regards as supreme a definite ideal, for which he strives with his whole being, whether that ideal be religious, moral, æsthetic, or political. Reasoned philosophical demonstration may be present together with the emotion which inspires the pursuit of this ideal,—or it may be absent. In any case, however, the necessary characteristic remains the need of fixing the thought upon an object which of itself entirely satisfies it."

Neither is the former the rationalism nor the latter the mysti-

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cism of the common use of language. The title of the book is decidedly misleading.

It may indeed be that the permanent value of mystic teaching lies in the immediately felt sanction of morality, and indirectly in a profound impulse toward the elevation of the practical life. But mysticism is in itself not a practical attitude toward life. It is a system of metaphysics which for the most part results in a definite aversion from the life of the world around, and in the quietist ethics of the Orient. To divorce mysticism from metaphysics is to take away from it its very essence; and the contention that mysticism is not concerned with a 'knowledge' of ultimate reality, but that this manifestation is "a strange aberration" (p. 10) is a misconception which goes far to confuse the already somewhat disjointed discussions in the book. Even so, the author is not careful to maintain consistently this conception of mysticism. In one passage he seems, in spite of the very radical contradiction to his general position, definitely to accept the Hegelian thesis, when he says: "Not everyone is able to rise to the heights of philosophic abstraction, but everyone has the capacity of unconsciously living the life of the philosopher, apprehending the Absolute in that simple and primitive manner, which is the soul's immediate contact with God."

It would appear that the writer has allowed himself, first to replace mysticism by Christian mysticism, and then to replace Christian mysticism by Christian ethics. In several passages, in so many words, he argues from Christian mysticism to mysticism in general (*e. g.*, pp. 11-13). This profound misunderstanding certainly detracts from the value of the book regarded as a study in mysticism and gives a decidedly paradoxical turn to the main thesis, which is an attempt to show that religion and philosophy (intuition and reason) are mutually compatible.

The conclusion to which the argument leads him, broken as it is by essays and reviews that have little in common with this theme, is reached in the last of the essays in the second half of the book. "Neither science nor philosophy can replace religion, because both tell us that the world is so because it is so, and do but transcribe it ideally. They are aristocratic and separatist. They do not fraternize with and comfort everybody as religion does. They add nothing from beyond to the world of experience. They allow no meaning to the profound desire of

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the individual spirit to project its own value and eternality beyond the limits of finite experience." Mysticism (*i. e.*, religion) is to be interpreted as a manifestation of practical activity. As such it can come into no collision with rationalism (*i. e.*, philosophical idealism).

Religion has had to sacrifice too much to win acquittal. To confine mysticism to conduct at the outset is to have rendered the aim of the discussion superfluous. Hegel's solution is far preferable; and it is better to leave a naked opposition than to reconcile religion and philosophy by multilating both.

Nevertheless, the attempt is interesting. The criticism of Bergson in the fifth essay is moderate and sound; but the book as a whole is disappointing. It was hardly to have been expected that articles and essays of this nature would have shown an entire unity of plan, but some of them are so trifling and so loosely connected with the argument that their inclusion is a serious blemish on a work, which by its title implies a good deal more than a collection of *disjecta membra*.

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PERSONALITY IN CHRIST AND IN OURSELVES. By William Sanday, D.D., LL.D., Litt.D., Lady Margaret Professor and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1911. Pp. 75.

In this book Dr. Sanday continues discussions begun in another work called "Christologies Ancient and Modern." His object is to render the Incarnation intelligible to the modern mind, approaching it from the standpoint of psychology. His question is: How far does the present knowledge of the human mind enable us to understand the statement that Jesus Christ was very God and very man?

He thinks that the conception of the subliminal self,—on which some psychologists, notably the late F. W. H. Myers ("Human Personality") and Professor William James ("The Varieties of Religious Experience") have laid much emphasis,—throws some light on the question. It is held that the succession of conscious states is but a small part of our inner life. Below the threshold of distinct consciousness is a large reservoir in which are stored the results of past experiences. These states

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are active and they continually influence one another; for principles, ideas, and emotions often return from the depths considerably modified. More: from this subliminal region there comes, sometimes at least, what did not enter through the senses or had its origin in reflection on the data supplied by them. This suggests that there is another entrance to the mind through which it comes into direct contact with an order of realities different from that accessible immediately or mediately to the senses. The reservoir is not, so to speak, closed at its lower end. It is fed from below. In the subliminal depths we come into relation with the Divine. The unconscious region or subliminal self is the proper and natural sphere of divine influence in the soul. Hence the method of Divine operation is hidden. A man prays; this is a direct and conscious act: the answer is not. "The man finds that he *has* what he wants, and what he has asked for; his strength *is* proportioned to his need; he *does* have joy and peace in believing. And he knows that this is due to no effort of his own, but to some subtle movement in the depths of his being" (p. 41). These secret workings come nearer the surface in some exceptional natures such as prophets and mystics; they have a more vivid experience of God than ordinary men, as we see by a reference to their writings and biographies.

Now Christ's inner life had this subliminal region, and his Deity had its 'seat' there. His consciousness was truly human in its operations, and the mode and region of the working of the Divine indwelling were not essentially different in Him from what they are in us, in so far as the Holy Spirit may be said to dwell in our hearts. "The difference was not in the essence, nor yet in the mode or sphere of the indwelling, but *in the relation of the indwelling to the Person.*" The Divine influences in us "touch more lightly or less lightly upon the Person, but they do not *hold and possess* it, as the Deity within Him *held and possessed* the Person of the incarnate Christ" (p. 48).

This interesting hypothesis suggests several questions, two of the more fundamental being the following: How is human personality to be conceived? And, What is the nature of the relation between the Divine and the human? Professor Sanday gives an answer to the first question. He does not, however, discuss the second; nor does he seem to have thought out his conception of personality in relation to it. The word person, he says, may denote the ground of individual being, or the total

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self which includes the body, the vehicle of perception and motor activity and the medium of relation with other selves, or a smaller inner self. This last is the essential person. It is not compound, but simple, one and indivisible. Yet it is continuous with the whole. It represents the chief activities of the soul and dominates the others. Its function is to govern, control, unify. This self is (i) the centre or pivot or determining principle of unity; (ii) the thread of personal unity and identity; (iii) the vehicle of reflective consciousness; (iv) possesses the power of initiative; and has (v) the power of authoritative control.

It is questionable whether Dr. Sanday would find many psychologists to accept his description of the attributes of the ego. The attributes mentioned are too abstract and general to account for the concrete unity and organization characteristic of human experience, whether religious or non-religious. Some of them cannot be asserted except on general metaphysical grounds. Psychological data do not afford ground for saying that the small inner self is more simple and indivisible than the larger self with which it is in continuous active relation. And why should reflection be attributed to this self and perception denied it? Fundamentally, as Prof. Ward maintains ("Naturalism and Agnosticism," Vol. II, Part IV), the difference between perceiving and thinking is a difference of complexity. The subject of sense experience is one and continuous with the subject of knowledge. Again, the sense of continuity and identity depends, many psychologists believe, on the mass of vital sensations. Moreover,—and this objection is more serious for Dr. Sanday's theory,—his conception of self does not help us to understand the relation between the Divine and the human. The hypothesis of the subliminal self is independent of it. The two conceptions are merely brought together by the further hypothesis that the ego's life is largely subliminal. From the mystical point of view, —which seems to be the point of view from which Prof. Sanday approaches his problem,—it may be urged, on the one hand, that the ego is too large, and on the other, that it is too small; too large in that it leaves too solid a core of individuality to resist the union of the human consciousness with the Divine; and too small in view of the singular inclusiveness of the mystical consciousness. To meet the one objection, the individual core should be reduced to a point or mere centre. To meet the other

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it should be expanded without limit. Stress should be laid either on the idea that everything the self knows is external to it; or on the idea that it includes all that it knows. If the latter idea be emphasized, it may be said that "in its widest possible sense a man's self is the sum total of all that he *can* call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and his children, his ancestors and his friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank account. All these give him the same emotions. If they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast down,—not necessarily in the same degree for each thing, but in much the same way for all" ("James, Principle of Psychology," I, pp. 291-2). Mystics sometimes identify themselves with the universe. They are conscious of oneness with God. The lowering of the threshold of consciousness may be the condition of the expansion of self so as to embrace the Divine. In harmony with this view stress should be laid on the intuitional rather than on the reflective powers of the self.

As already observed, Dr. Sanday does not discuss the nature of the relation between the Divine and the human. He uses the words 'Divine *influence*,' 'Divine *working*,' and speaks of the '*action* of the spirit of God upon the human spirit and faculties of apprehension.' Prof. Howison ("The Limits of Evolution") argues strongly that the influence of the Divine on the human can only be by illumination. The conception of efficient causality should be utterly repudiated in describing it. Prof. Ward, however, thinks ("The Realm of Ends") that we have a valid conception of Divine efficiency in the conception of creation,—a kind of efficient action which has nothing analogous to it in human experience. And the new man is conceived by St. Paul as the creation of God. But is this conception the right one to describe the communion of the human and the Divine in ourselves and in Christ? Communion between finite beings is mediated by knowledge. The knowing relation, Dr. Ward has pointed out, is ultimate and underivative. It cannot be expressed in terms of the lower category of causality. There are causal interactions within experience. But the primary and fundamental relation between the ego and what it knows is not causal. If, however, the relation between the Divine and the human is below the threshold of consciousness and the term

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creation is inapplicable, are we not driven to employ the inferior category of causality to express it, or to leave it undefined, and so to find refuge for our perplexities in the unknown?

Professor Sanday has put forward his views in his usual cautious and tentative fashion. And he invites philosophical criticism. It is to be hoped that he will work out further his interesting and suggestive hypothesis.

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Bala, North Wales.

THE PROVINCE OF THE STATE. By Sir Roland K. Wilson, Bart. London: P. S. King & Son, 1911. Pp. xxi, 321.

This is the best recent statement that I know of a point of view in political and social theory not very fashionable nowadays. In the running fight between the advocates, on the one hand, of various forms of State Socialism and the defenders, on the other, of private property and the liberty of the individual, the superiority, to judge from the noise made and the weight of metal thrown, to say nothing of actual legislation, has been all with the more advanced school. "These fight like husbands and live lovers those." But this book, with its plea for "the libertarian state, or state reduced to its lowest terms" has one great advantage over most works both of its own and of the opposite school. The author is a jurist rather than a philosopher, and his theory of the State is characteristic of the legal temperament at its best: it is clear and logical, everyone can understand it, and it seems to provide a definite rule for deciding what the State ought and ought not to do. For Burke the State is "a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection"; for the Neo-Hegelians (T. H. Green and Bosanquet) it is the organ of the 'real will' of its individual members (= their better selves); for Marxian socialists it is the sole rightful owner of property and of the instruments of production. All these conceptions are at once too vague and too ambitious for Sir Roland Wilson; the problem being at bottom always an ethical one,—to decide, namely, how coercion of the individual by government can be justified,—requires for its solution some less fantastic formula.

Sir Roland solves it by narrowing its basis. No one will deny that it is the business of government to keep the peace between individuals: no civilized life is possible unless injustice, vio-

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lence, and aggression are prevented. But why go further? Why not assume that this, which certainly is *a* function of the State, is *the* function of the State,—is its essence and definition? This is what Sir Roland does: the State is a "justice-enforcing association," and nothing more. Except for certain marginal difficulties, this formula simplifies everything, for we have only to ask, as to any particular activity, whether it is incidental to the great end of enforcing justice between man and man; if it is, then the State not only may but must undertake it; if not, not.

Thus, on the positive side, we at once obtain the following functions of the State: (1) The establishment and maintenance of judicial tribunals. Sir Roland has long been known as an advocate of law-reform, and this is an important feature of his Utopia. He would have justice practically gratuitous and brought within the reach of all, and he holds that the efficiency of the industrial system would thereby be immensely increased. (2) A police force, army and navy, diplomatic service, colonial office, fiscal department, and legislative department are all obviously indispensable in the business of enforcing justice either among the members of one justice-association or between them and the members of another. But (3) the State must also manage all the land and keep up roads, bridges, etc., because everyone has the right of free locomotion over the earth's surface and of access to its resources. Thus (and in this, the second great distinctive feature of his position, Sir Roland agrees with the earlier rather than the later Herbert Spencer) land will be nationalized "in order that the various rights of occupation and user suitable for cultivation, mining, building, and other industries may be leased from time to time to those able to turn each natural resource to the best account, and therefore to pay the highest ground-rent to the community" (p. 241). (4) Finally, it follows from our formula that the State must maintain dangerous and derelict persons (criminals, lunatics, paupers, and guardianless children), partly because they may become a danger or a nuisance to others, partly because they have rights of their own. Such are the main positive functions flowing from his definition; it is when we draw the necessary inferences as to what the State must not do that the interest becomes acute.

First and foremost, the State must provide no kind of educa-

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tion, unless perhaps it may need some officers not to be bought in the open market, *e. g.*, gunnery or torpedo specialists. Nor may it subsidize any kind of public worship, patronize science, art, or literature, nor confer honors (except naval and military distinctions). It should not release either party to a contractual obligation, *e. g.*, a workman forced to accept a subsistence wage from an employer. None of these things come within the scope of enforcing justice, and are best left to private enterprise stimulated by an improved legal system. There remains a number of marginal questions where the line is not so clear. Should the State regulate alcohol, vice, cruelty to animals, public health? Plainly government must intervene to some extent in these matters, or individuals will injure one another; for instance, there must be emergency hospitals, as otherwise a person who has a fit in the street would hamper the police in their regulation of the traffic. But, with our formula before us, intervention will be reduced to a minimum, instead of being constantly extended, as is the existing tendency.

It would seem at first sight as if Sir Roland's Utopia, were it established, would probably not be an improvement in any important respect on the organization of any existing progressive community. As regards the abolition of State-provided education, the weight of opinion among all polite peoples is, as he recognizes, against him. It seems unlikely that any judicial system, however drastically reformed, could have such far-reaching economic effects as he expects; and he himself admits, in the very interesting pages which he devotes to finance, that his scheme of land-nationalization would make no great difference, at any rate for many years, to the sums which the State would find it necessary to raise by rates and taxes. Yet he recognizes that there is something radically wrong with the economic position of modern states, and that the key to social improvement is to be sought in finance; he is in substantial agreement with Mr. J. A. Hobson's diagnosis of the ills of the industrial system and with his desire to use taxation as an instrument for 'socializing surplus profits,' though he disagrees with that writer and his school as to the limits of State regulation, as to State operation of industries, and as to the objects of national and municipal expenditure (p. 240). In short, though something may in the long run be hoped from adjustments of taxation, Sir Roland lays the greatest stress, as a remedy for the unequal distribu-

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tion of wealth, on the indirect effects of cheapening and speeding up legal processes, of State ownership of land, of an improved poor-law, and of the all-round stimulus which will follow on the State's retirement from such enterprises as education which are best left to individuals. At each of these points the theory that determines him is that injustice, not poverty, is the enemy against which statesmen should bend their efforts; if injustice is efficiently combated, the foundations of poverty will be sapped, and its final overthrow may be left to individual initiative.

There are two main lines of argument by which this theory may be supported; Sir Roland uses both, and often, as it seems to me, fails to distinguish clearly between them. It may be said that the restriction of State activity to the enforcement of justice is an *a priori* principle involved in the very meaning of the word 'State'; or again reasons for the restriction may be sought in its consequences: it may be urged that better results will follow from the restriction of State activity than from the modern tendency to enlarge it. Now evidently in using an argument of this second kind, it is very important not to include among the good results in question the observance of the very principle postulated as their cause, for if we do this we incur a vicious circle; yet it is not easy for anyone to avoid this error who is convinced that the principle is valuable for its own sake. This is the trap into which Sir Roland seems often to fall. If, in comparing the benefits to be expected from limiting and extending State action, respectively, we are careful to eliminate this fallacious element, we shall not easily come to any certain conclusion. In education, for instance, can we feel sure, apart from an assumption that, of its very nature, the State ought not to provide schools, that State schools must be worse than private ones? Sir Roland argues indeed that on the whole they will be worse and will produce worse effects; but these arguments are not by themselves very convincing, and he is in fact also influenced by the consideration that "there is no injustice, no aggression" (p. 90) in a rich man's being able to give his children a better education than a poor man, and that therefore the State ought not to interfere. So again with industry. We may agree with much of Sir Roland's criticism of collectivism: but unless we weight our judgment beforehand with the principle that, as there is no injustice in a rich man's being able

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to hire a poor man to work at a subsistence wage, therefore there is no opening here for State interference, it is impossible to feel certain that more harm than good is done in the long run by legislative enactment of a minimum wage.

Perhaps, however, the other line of argument is sound. Perhaps the extension of State activity beyond the bare enforcing of justice is so clear an evil in itself that, even were it conceivable that the State could make the whole community wiser and better, still we ought to act on the principle that it is the business of the State to enforce justice and not to "make the whole community wiser and better" (p. 121). In general it may be urged that all such principles drawn from abstract definitions are risky. Sir Roland's definition in particular seems open to the objection that it oscillates between vagueness and a certain rigid narrowness. It is narrow, because it often seems to be based solely on such 'rights' as are recognized by English law, whereas it might well be argued that a man may suffer wrong without legal redress,—that, for instance, it is 'unjust' that one man should have more money than he knows how to spend while another can barely make a living. And often Sir Roland does use the conceptions of justice and right in this vaguer, looser, non-legal sense; as, for instance, when he defends the right of the community to the benefits of land-nationalization or of the disestablishment of the Church. The door once opened in this way, I do not see on what principle he can refuse to extend his conception of justice as widely as any socialist; but then his definition of the State's essential function collapses. It may finally be added that, so far as it is precise, this definition, with its unimaginative legal implications, is emotionally unsatisfactory. From this point of view, Burke's "partnership in every virtue and in all perfection" is far preferable.

With so much criticism I have left myself little space for praise, and can only say that the clearness with which Sir Roland makes all his points is altogether admirable. The book is beautifully written. It is full of ripe judgments on men and affairs, expressed with a pleasant dry humor, and never overweighted by the stores of learning and experience on which they evidently rest. And it is singularly free from false sentiment and prejudice.

SYDNEY WATERLOW.

London, England.

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THE SPIRIT OF SOCIAL WORK. By Edward T. Devine. New York: Charities Publication Committee, 1911. Pp. 231.

Dr. Devine's book, a collection of papers and addresses on such subjects as Tenement House Reform, Poverty, Woman's Suffrage, the Problem of Crime, charges that responsibility for present-day suffering and wrong belongs primarily to the organized society which permits them, rather than, as in the 'older ethics,' to an individual here and there. To quote his own words: "The dominant idea of the modern philanthropy . . . is . . . a determination to seek out and to strike effectively at those organized forces of evil, at those particular causes of dependence and intolerable living conditions which are beyond the control of the individuals whom they injure and whom they too often destroy. . . . I ask your attention to the common element in alcoholism as fostered by the liquor trust; the destruction of the health . . . of little children in . . . factories, . . . mines, . . . and tenement-house industries, . . . the erection and management of dwellings which are dark, unsanitary, and indecent, because they are among the gilt-edged investments . . . yielding ten and twenty-five per cent. on the capital, but yielding also a plentiful harvest of tuberculosis and other disease" (pp. 194, 195). It is not the criminal himself "at whom stones are to be thrown, but literally the community itself, the individuals who surround the prisoners . . . above all, the spectators" (p. 111).

One of the strongest addresses in the volume is that in which this point of view is applied to the problem of the police. Here as elsewhere, the author drives home his special plea that it is "the outgrown social institution against which society requires protection" (p. 117). "The whole machinery of our courts is much better adapted to sifting out evidence . . . than to handling such questions of education, psychology, reformation, and social economy as are involved in fixing the length of a term of imprisonment or the conditions under which a man guilty of crime can wisely be restored to freedom. . . . We would not buy a suit of clothes or accept an invitation to dinner on such slight acquaintance with the matter as suffices for a decision which may mean imprisonment for six months, the loss of a job, the blasting of a reputation, the beginning of a career of crime "(p. 146).

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There is a tendency for those who urge the doctrine of social responsibility to ignore the fact that social institutions are created by responsible individuals. Dr. Devine, however, avoids this one-sidedness by such statements as these: "Each factory is put up by individual human beings acting for themselves or as agents for stockholders; . . . some one selects the site and is thus responsible for putting it where labor is abundant and therefore probably 'congested,' or elsewhere; . . . some one decides how to equip the factory, . . . whether men, women, or children are to be employed, . . . what wages they are to receive and what hours they are to work" (p. 162). Without such a statement, inconsistent as it may appear in connection with the emphasis on the responsibility of society, we should find it hard to see where the author could make room for his 'religious' treatment of poverty. This, he declares, differs from all other treatments "in its inspiration, not in its mechanics." "It has behind it spiritual power, the quickening influence of a passion for rescuing a human soul from destruction, a calm faith that every human effort directed toward a good end is in line with the moral order of the universe, that God is in nature and in human history, and that we are his instruments" (pp. 170, 169).

The book is an admirable, earnest plea for its special point that inasmuch as injustice is social in its origin, the remedies must be sought in the action of organized society. It is typical of a conception which social workers are doing well to force into the ethical consciousness of our day. But it is also typical of the difficulty arising from the attempt to apply religious sanctions, which are essentially individualistic and spiritual, to doctrines of social determinism. As a single illustration, we might cite the failure to emphasize the spiritual nature of those who suffer from the wrongs which are here so illuminatingly arraigned. A genuinely 'religious' treatment of poverty would not fail to stress the fact that among the "possibilities," "the life," "the powers," "the welfare" (to use the author's terms), the realization of which is hindered by social injustice there are the moral possibilities which no improvement in housing conditions *per se* can be trusted to develop. Not even the need of emphasizing social responsibility ought to obscure this fact. But may not the difficulty arise from an inadequacy in the conception of religion?

Brooklyn, N. Y. HENRY NEUMANN.

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EUGENIO RIGNANO UPON THE INHERITANCE OF ACQUIRED CHARACTERS. A Hypothesis of Heredity, Development and Assimilation. Authorized English Translation by Basil C. H. Harvey. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1911. Pp. 413.

Much credit is due to Dr. Basil Harvey for this translation of Rignano's work into very readable and natural English whereby his original theories concerning the fundamental problems of biology are placed within the reach of English-speaking biologists and philosophers. It is, however, unfortunate that so much time has elapsed before we were provided with a translation of this work that appeared in French as early as 1906 and later in German and Italian; more especially is this so since much significant literature bearing upon the subject has appeared in the interval.

The book is essentially biological; its interest for philosophers lies rather in the positive conclusions which the author seeks to establish, particularly those concerning the physico-chemical interpretation of life and the inheritance of acquired characters, rather than in the array of facts and technical arguments whereon those conclusions are based.

Rignano treats vital phenomena throughout from the point of view of physical science, and the net results of his researches are summed up in three new hypotheses or fundamental conceptions. Stated briefly these are: First, the very interesting hypothesis of centro-epigenesis, as distinct from preformation on the one hand, and simple epigenesis on the other. He examines these two theories and gives his reasons for rejecting each of them. He elaborates his own theory with great care since, in combination with his second hypothesis, he derives therefrom an explanation of the inheritance of acquired characters as well as for a number of other biological problems. Second, the hypothesis that all living substance possesses the property of accumulating and giving back specific nervous energy. In the author's words, "Each specific nervous current deposits a very definite substance which, in its turn, is capable of provoking again exclusively the same specificity of current as that by which it was itself deposited." From this hypothesis Rignano derives an explanation of all mnemonic phenomena, from histologic specialization to the psycho-mnemonic phenom-

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enon of memory. Third, an hypothesis which the author postulates only as provisional at present, which interprets vital phenomena by an intra-nuclear oscillating nervous discharge. By this conception, in combination with that of the second hypothesis, he explains that fundamental property of all living things,—Assimilation. The vital element he regards as a double specific elemental accumulator in continual charge and discharge.

The detailed criticism of these hypotheses is properly the work of biology; philosophy need only consider the general results. Many modern philosophers will be fundamentally at variance with Rignano's point of view. Among these will be all thinkers who believe in the autonomy of life. There are certainly many who hold that vital phenomena are elemental and specific in their nature, that they cannot be explained by chemistry, physics, or any kind of mechanism, nor can they be interpreted by comparison with any physico-chemical model known. In fact, a new category is required to embrace them. Nevertheless, the author's hypotheses deserve careful consideration, moreover, it is always illuminating to examine how far the conceptions, which have been found to be most fruitful in one branch of knowledge, are applicable to a widely different sphere. The explanation of the inheritance of acquired characters which the author deduces from his hypotheses is, of course, open to criticism from the same quarter; but there are relatively few men who will accept the positive conclusion concerning this inheritance and so feel that an explanation thereof is required. In this country, at any rate, the Lamarckian hypothesis is practically dead; indeed, one would think that none of the younger students of heredity can hold it, unless they are ignorant of much that has been written of recent years concerning it.

Even by those who cannot accept the main conclusions of the book, it will be found to be both interesting and suggestive, and it is certainly marked by lucidity and consistency of thought. Finally, it is a notable attempt to find in mechanism the ultimate interpretation of the universe.

M. LIGHTFOOT EASTWOOD.

Horrobin Hill, Heaton, Bolton, England.

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THE ANARCHISTS, THEIR FAITH AND THEIR RECORD. By E. A. Vizetelly. London: John Lane, 1912. Pp. xiv, 308.

In this volume Mr. Vizetelly does not attempt any serious discussion of the ethics of anarchism, nor does he analyze the psychology of the bomb-throwing and dynamiting criminal. Yet the case for and against the outcast who registers his protest against society by blowing up cafés or stabbing august personages is worth arguing; anarchist theories of society deserve to be examined; and a dissection of the passions animating wretches like Ravachol, Caserio, and Luccheni, whose half-bestial features (rather artlessly depicted by the author himself) glower at us from these pages, could not fail to provide matter of deepest interest. We would give much, for instance, for a glimpse into the mind of Nobiling, the scientific recluse who peppered the Emperor William I with a shotgun from a window in Unter den Linden. Among those who have attempted the lives of princes in modern times he seems to have been (apart from Russian revolutionaries) the only man of good birth and real intellectual attainments, and the disproportion between his character and the futility of his attempt remains a curious problem. How much, in such crimes, is to be put down to madness? How much to desire for fame swollen to a fantastic bulk in the twilight between madness and sanity? How much to sober conviction? For light on such questions it is still to novelists like Dostoievsky and Mr. Joseph Conrad that we must turn, rather than to Mr. Vizetelly.

His book, in fact, is almost purely historical, and historical in the sense that, though trying to bring the various efflorescences of anarchist outrage into some connection with political causes, it is mainly a register of explosions and assassinations. This is not to say that it cannot be read with interest. Many of the events narrated are very exciting; in particular we may mention the murder of Carnot at Lyons, of which the author was a near eye-witness. A great merit of the book is that it pours scorn on the romantic theory, dear to the official mind, that anarchist outrages are dictated by widespread international secret societies. It seems certain that normally there is no cohesion among the groups, and that each crime is the work of some privately inspired individual. I regret that Mr. Vizetelly should add his drop to the ocean of sentiment that has been

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poured out over the fate of the Empress Elizabeth of Austria. She was beautiful, she quarrelled with her husband, she rode hard to hounds; but these facts do not really entitle her to more sympathy than President McKinley or King Humbert.

SYDNEY WATERLOW.

London, England.

SEEMS SO! A WORKING-CLASS VIEW OF POLITICS. By Stephen Reynolds and Bob and Tom Woolley. London: Macmillan & Co., 1911. Pp. xxvii, 321.

This book aims at giving the upper classes a deeper understanding of the mental attitudes of the lower classes; it urges that the legislation carried by the rich should be more disinterested and more in accordance with lower-class wishes. But the exposition is not quite happy.

The last chapter makes some interesting points about working-class psychology. Earlier in the book the views of two Devonshire fishermen are set forth in direct speech. Most of these views being rather slashing, it is a pity that Mr. Reynolds should endorse them.

The second part looks more like his own work, untrammeled by collaboration with his fishermen friends. It contains sweeping generalizations, of which many seem mistaken. Mistaken, too, is the implication throughout that these social and political views are those of a majority not only of the working-classes, but of the entire population. Take his summary of working-class education: 'The biggest fraud ever forced upon us'; or his observation on women's suffrage: 'People whose weekly income barely feeds and houses them cannot afford to experiment in changes.' This is not the attitude of the industrial Midlands and York. Much of the criticism which the three collaborators make on recent legislation, achieved or meditated, amounts to this,—a cruel restriction of the liberties of the poor by the rich for their own ends. Mr. Reynolds betrays a deep distrust of education, to which, perhaps, there is no better reply than a certain utterance of Dr. Johnson's. "I am always afraid of determining on the side of envy and cruelty. The privileges of education may sometimes be improperly bestowed, but I shall always fear to withhold them, lest I should be yielding to the suggestions of pride, while I persuade myself that I am follow-

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ing the maxims of policy." But Mr. Reynolds's instincts are generous, and he has not been content to be the outside observer. Everyone must admire the spirit which led him to share the rough life of a couple of Dartmouth fishermen, not for a few days only, but for weeks. There is room for more of such books; and, indeed, Mr. Reynolds has already written another and a better one.

OSCAR ECKHARD.

Manchester, England.

INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY. By Robert M. Yerkes. London: C. Bell & Sons, Ltd.; New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911. Pp. 427.

Mr. Yerkes has ably accomplished the promise of his preface to provide an outline of the science of psychology, but we fail to agree with him about the function that he would have his book fulfil. We submit that a skeleton is not an appropriate introduction to this subject, because we believe that the supreme error to be avoided in such a work is that of sketchiness. Psychology is studied to little purpose unless it is concerned with real living experience from the outset. At this stage a general and technical treatment of the subject, with its systematic pigeon-holing of doctrines, its characteristic distribution of dark and light type, its inevitable skimming over the surface of great questions, is of no avail. The chief difficulty in the study of psychology lies in the tendency to substitute technical description for direct and living psychical experience, and if we are to wage war effectively upon this evil, we must start from direct experience carefully and even minutely observed. For this reason there is indeed a sense in which the text-book for the beginner must be more detailed than that for the more advanced student, and therefore, we recommend the use of Mr. Yerkes's book after, instead of before, the manual. It would thereby have a place different from the one he planned; for when the manual has taught the student to live and be interested in psychological problems, then the present outline may effectively reduce his facts to order and enable him to discriminate the wood from the trees.

The book is divided into six sections which deal consecutively with: The Nature, Aims, and Methods of Psychology; Descrip-

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tion in Psychology and its Results; Genetic Psychology; General Principles and Laws; Psychological Explanation; and the Control of the Mental Life. The last of these sections includes discussions upon Education and Eugenics. Each chapter opens with the quotation of some very interesting and valuable piece of introspection and closes with a class exercise. The latter are a most valuable and unique addition in spite of the fact that they are frequently unrelated to the topic of the chapter. Indeed these exercises may prove to be the most memorable part of the book, for they develop that habit of observing one's own and other people's minds which alone can endow the subject with vitality and interest. The suggestions for supplementary reading are welcome, for if they are followed they will do much to counteract the inevitable limitations of the outline.

The book generally is comprehensive and should provide an illuminating summary for innumerable students who have acquired some knowledge and genuine power of psychological thought.

M. LIGHTFOOT EASTWOOD.

Bolton, England.

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DO NATIONS GROW OLD?

R. M. MacIVER.

DO nations grow old and die, even as men do? Is there set for the race, as for the single life, one immutable law of mortality? It is a commonplace of our thinking, that they do. We discover in history the ruins of vanished states,—"Assyria, Greece, Rome, Carthage, what are they?"—and the thought occurs that our time too is coming. As the Greek moralized over Persia, the Roman over Greece, as we to-day moralize over Rome, will not some new future people moralize over us? Are there not already gloomy prophets who foresee the end, and trace in our present life the symptoms of senility?

I hope to show in this paper that this common view is superficial and false, and that if ever a nation dies or is dissolved, such a disaster is no necessary fulfillment of the law of its existence. Because a society lives, it does not follow that it shall die.

The chief scientific support of the popular idea is found in the vicious 'social organism' theory which Herbert Spencer did so much to perpetuate, the view that a society is a kind of organism, like the living body of a plant or animal or man, showing a similar relation of part to part and of part to whole, a similar unity and a similar course of life. If we regard a community as an organism, we are ready to attribute to the larger unity the qualities that distinguish the smaller. An organism is born, develops, reaches maturity, declines, and dies.

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It comes into being and passes out of being. Within these limits of appearance and disappearance its life may be represented as a simple curve slowly mounting up and more suddenly declining. If the supposed analogy holds, a society, too, is born into being and passes out of being, a society, too, may be represented as following a gradual upward curve till, having reached a culminating point, it descends quickly through decline into extinction. Such an idea is undoubtedly at the back of our minds when we speak of the 'decline and fall' of nations, or even of the 'maturity' which preceded the decline, maturity being the culminating point of the simple curve of life. But all the time we are thinking on the lines of a most inapt analogy. A community is not born and a community does not necessarily die. A society has no maturity, no predestined culminating point. It does indeed exhibit growth and decline continually, but to understand that growth and decline, we must banish the idea that it is the growth of something which was born and the decline of something that must die. We must banish the idea that a society is always at some point in a simple curve of life.

It may seem a hard saying, this that a society is not born and does not die. Has every society existed before Time was? Does not history tell us of the beginning of some societies, even modern history? Did the communities of America have no beginning? Can we not name the very year of their birth? And if they have had a beginning, must they not, too, have an end? Can a society be an exception to the general law that Time devours all his children?

The answer is simple. In a society the generations of life are integrally bound together, young life with old life, parents with youth. Now life is a process of evolution, and evolution knows nothing of beginning or end. It knows nothing of a time when life sprang out of lifelessness, and nothing of a time when life shall be resolved in lifelessness. Evolu-

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tionary science cannot say whether there has been a beginning or whether there will be an end. It knows an intermediate space only. It has the vision of a traveler on a road who can trace backward the path he has trodden and foresee a very little of the path to come, but cannot even conceive a beginning to the road or to his traveling. A living thing by its very nature cannot conceive a beginning to life. But life is essentially and always social life. Every living thing is born into society and owes its life to society. Wherever there is life, there is a society however rudimentary. Science, knowing nothing of the birth of life, knows therefore nothing of the birth of society. And the same is true of its end. It is only that which is born that must die, and unless we show that a society has been born, we can never show that it must die. We can go further and say positively that any society which exists to-day must in fact be the evolution of a society that has existed from the unknown beginning. Individuals, generations, succeed each other in a chain of life. But society is always there, not successive like the generations, but continuous, changing incessantly but never dying. If the stream of life flows anywhere to-day, it is a stream that has flowed continuously from beyond the bourne of time. Every living thing is born into a society of which he in time becomes a member, and so the society itself, its spirit constantly renewed by its successive members, the inheritors of the traditions and thoughts and usages of their fathers, lives on. It is like a flame that never dies because it is constantly fed. So long as a single human being endures, a society has existed from the remotest past until now. Every living being is thus a member of a society which has endured through all time. The very existence of a single society to-day is the last proof that societies do not necessarily follow a simple curve of life, up to maturity and thence down to extinction. The law of evolution reveals direction alone, not beginning nor end, the pathway of life, and neither its en-

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trance nor its goal. It reveals an up or a down, a progress or a retrogression, a sinking or a rising of life. It reveals no law of mortality. Therefore to understand the progress or the decline of a society, we must remember that we have no right to make it subject to that law of mortality which inexorably governs the living body, the organism.

Societies develop, they do not begin. The new life of America did not begin when English adventurers settled in Virginia, or English Puritans in New England. Alike they brought their social life into the new land. There are no new societies save in the division or extension or reformation of preëxistent societies.

It is needful to make a distinction at this point, for the term 'society' may be used in two senses, only one of which is here intended. Thus, on the one hand, Scotland is a society, so is the United Kingdom, so is the city of Manchester. Here society means an integral (though not necessarily self-sufficient) community, including within itself all the essential social activities or functions, a common life, in short, of greater or lesser extent. On the other hand, a lodge of free masons is a society, a trade union is a society, a church and a university are societies. But these are not communities, they arise within the common life, and are means for its greater fulfillment. Notice the difference. The community, the integral society, is a life, an end in itself, a living whole. The association, the partial society, is usually a means to that life, and usually rests on a contract of its members. The association comes into being when the contract is made, and dies when the contract is cancelled. The society for the abolition of slavery came into being when men agreed to use their joint endeavor for the removal of a social disgrace: it ended when the object of its existence was fulfilled. Other associations are concerned, not with the attainment merely, but with the maintenance of some social end, and therefore are more enduring: supreme among these is the State. But the

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community is greater even than the State. It is not an institution, something set up, not an association, something agreed upon: it is that which establishes institutions and forms associations. When we speak of society in this sense we mean some area, greater or smaller, of communal life. It may mean village or parish or city or country, provided that within it all the essential activities of life are found. This proviso excludes those imperfect communities, such as monasteries and nunneries, which, though maintaining a common life, do not maintain all the essential functions of life. What I mean by society throughout this paper is any community which is a real focus of social life. It is the community and not the association with which we are here concerned.

Now every society so understood is a very complex thing, a web composed of many threads crossing and recrossing. Parts are closely united, parts remotely. Every large society contains numerous smaller ones, and every small society enters into the social life of wider groups; all common life is a question of degree. There are bonds uniting all mankind, there are bonds uniting two human beings and in so far separating them from all the rest of mankind. There are countless degrees of unity and difference within all society. The difference has been realized from the beginning, the unity is only being slowly realized to-day. But this mere fact of infinite grades of unity extending out from the innermost circle of the family to the uttermost bounds of humanity is already a sufficient disproof of the doctrine which makes of any social group, the nation, for instance, a self-subsistent organic whole subject to the organic law.

I do not intend to follow out that argument, I wish rather to make appeal to history. Were the social-organism theory true, every community must have a time of birth, a time of growth, a culmination, a time of decline, and an hour of death. That is the process of the organic life. Every present society would then be at some stage in that process of growing old, whether young,

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adult, or senescent. And the last stage would mean an inevitable process toward dissolution, without hope of recovery, to be evaded by no effort its members could make. And there would be on record many instances of past societies which had run their course and disappeared out of life.

History shatters that illusion. History indeed shows that societies are not necessarily immortal. Peoples have perished of violence and of pestilence. There are to-day on the earth societies of human beings which are undoubtedly in process of extinction, where no new life in equal quality and vigor is united to the old to continue the society. There are to-day in Asia and in Africa and in America aboriginal peoples who are dying out under the conditions of life brought to them by superior races. Therefore a society is certainly exposed to the danger of mortality: it may die, but yet it is not its nature to fulfill a cycle of life that ends in death. The wrecks of history are like the fossils of prehistoric animals, they tell us that some types of living creature have disappeared, leaving no successors. They do not tell us that all types must so disappear, for we know in fact that many types have survived, some with no change, others changing to meet changing conditions. We cannot predict the death of mankind of racial old age because we have discovered the bones of saurians.

We may now take some historical instances, those that most readily occur when we talk of the fall of nations, and show that, whatever their decline and fall may mean, it does not mean the passing out of existence of a society. Let us take first the community or communities that made ancient Greece, as we know it from the time depicted in the Homeric poems. We may say that Homeric Greece passed away, that the Greece of Herodotus and Thucydides passed away, that the Greece of the Macedonian supremacy passed away; we may take broader periods, and speak of ancient and mediæval and modern Greece. But make the periods what we

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please: there is never a point at which the community dies, as there is an hour in which the organism dies. There has been a continuous Greek society from the beginning of history until to-day, a society whose level of civilization and vigor has risen and fallen and risen again. What we find is never the death of a body, but always the transformation of a spirit. The former is momentary, determinate, final; the latter is gradual, continuous, infinite. Here there is no body that as it ages at last subdues the spirit. For a society is neither old nor young, and need not grow older or younger. Hence its life is not subject to the rhythm of organic life or to the law of organic mortality. The organic life appears at a definite point out of the unknown and, fulfilling its simple curve, disappears at a definite point into the unknown. But for the curve of communal life there is no base line whence it arises and into which it falls. This is evident if we trace the course of the Greek communities, from the days of Homeric barbarism, barbarism half hidden by the splendor of the past, to the height of fifth century achievement, down through Macedonian and Roman domination and lastly Turkish oppression, and up again after it all, not indeed to anything of its former height, but at least to the higher level revealed in new national unity and consciousness of liberty. Customs and manners and institutions and forms of civilization pass away, but the social life, of which these were merely expressions, may persist throughout it all. To that life we can assign neither beginning nor end.

We may take as a further illustration the case of that community whose downfall has more than any other impressed the historian with a sense of the mortality of all things human. It is an illustration which brings out clearly the need for distinguishing the passing institutions from the undying life of society. At a certain period of history, the social life centering round the city of Rome had extended so far as to make of Italy a social

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unity, an integral society. The decline of that society is the most momentous in history, but its life has survived every historical disaster. Through all the history of Rome there has lived a continuous society, sometimes threatened with destruction, at the hands of Gauls or Carthaginians or Goths, but never destroyed, rising and falling to social heights and depths alike almost unparalleled, sometimes torn and disunited, sometimes almost overwhelmed by the wave of barbaric immigration, but in the end revealing in rediscovered unity the immortal integrity of communal life. The Roman Empire passed away, but the social life of Rome and Italy never failed altogether. The life changed just as the language changed in which it found expression, but both life and language remained. States come into being and are dissolved, but society which creates them is greater than they. The Roman *empire* was not a society, not a living thing, but an imposed system, an institution. When the communal life of Italy slackened, it could no longer enforce that system over the communal life of its subject communities. The system collapsed, the life survived. It may even be that the growing life of these subject societies,—"the bursting of the ripe seed," as one recent writer has expressed it,—was as much responsible for the collapse of empire as the weakening life of Italy. As a community grows strong it refuses to accept institutions imposed from without, institutions it has not itself created for the furtherance of its own life. At any rate we must distinguish the fall of a State from the death of a community. The State, the institution collapses, it may be in an hour, the society lives on and creates new institutions, a new State. The fall of a State is a commonplace of history, the death of a society is an event most rare and most abnormal. Most of the societies that have figured in history have indeed suffered eclipse, but none of these have perished, and some have risen again and are even now rising, a witness to the eternal possibility of social rejuvenescence.

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When we understand that the terms 'birth,' 'maturity,' and 'death' have no necessary connection with the life of a society, we have taken the first step toward the understanding of that incessant rise and fall, the increase and the decrease of social vigor and vitality. It is not something measurable, this spiritual activity (if it is not the life of a body, what can it be but the life of a spirit)? It has a thousand manifestations, political, religious, philanthropic, literary, artistic, intellectual, some of which may be in vigor while others are in decline. A people's religious or literary activity may be greatest when its political activity is least, though this is very far from being the rule. On the contrary, all those activities seem to be bound up together, being but different expressions of one common life. As that life stirs to new activity, not in one only, but in manifold forms does it reveal itself. The great reformation of religious thought and the great renaissance of science and art and literature almost together heralded the new world. On the whole, then, we can estimate in some rough fashion the relative intensity and advance of social life. We agree that Athenian society flourished most in the time of Pericles, that Roman society declined from vigor to complete decadence under the emperors, that England became great and strong in the days of Elizabeth. We judge, usually,—and rightly,—the social vigor of a people not by its artistic or intellectual eminence, but by the degree in which it coöperates in the maintenance and welfare of the state, the central institution of the national life and the first expression of its unity. But the social vigor shown in a strong and active state generally shows itself at the same time in every form of social activity, in the life of the thousand societies of commerce, science, art, and education.

How are we to understand this social life? What are the symptoms of its vigor and decline? A society is a common life, dependent for its vitality on the worth of its members and on the degree to which these members

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contribute that worth to the community. There are the elements of all social well-being, the worth of the individual, his personality, and the extent of his coöperation with his fellows, his sociality. These are the tests of all society, not one alone, but both together. The ant and the bee give themselves up to their society, but because they have little to give, all their social sacrifice avails them little. The hermit gives nothing to his society, and therefore a country of hermits, were they never so great and wise, would also attain to nothing. But in a true society, the two factors, the strength of individuality and the strength of sociality, work together, and indeed they never can be really independent of one another. For as each of us makes his society, so does our society make each of us. Our individuality if it is strong goes out to strengthen,—if it is weak to weaken,—our society; to our society we owe in turn the measure of our individuality. The opposition of society and individuality is accidental, in essentials they develop out of one another, and as a true society seeks to develop individuality, so the most gifted individuality finds its expression and fulfillment in society. The more the members of a community enter into the life of that community, the richer by the amount of what they themselves have brought becomes that life. This ever-renewed flame of social activity rises and falls continually. Its quality is the quality of the social units whose common life it is —if the fuel is poor, how can the flame be bright? Its intensity is the degree in which these members are united in that common life,—scatter the coals and what once glowed in a radiant focus will flicker feebly in dispersed and meager fires. It is this spiritual activity we call society, this conscious coöperation in a great common life, that sustains within it the life of every contributor, as the energy of its ardent center keeps every coal in a fire aglow. To fall away from that fire is to pale and grow cold like a cinder, to lose the communion of society is to lose the community in which each life is quickened.

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If that be so, we must interpret social progress and social decline in terms of spirit at the last. On whatever physical conditions a society depends, we must remember that these change but little while the society is passing on from phase to phase. The earth, the physical basis on which all life is forever dependent, alters scarcely at all in the memory of man: the productivity, agricultural and mineral, of the soil, the heat of the sun, the succession of the seasons, these vary to a scarcely appreciable degree from generation to generation. The physical changes that do occur are mostly those brought about by men's own ingenuity and invention, are social products. The endless activity of man is progressively making the physical conditions always more favorable, making nature always more subservient to his ends, to his length of life, to his security and comfort of life. Nature is passive to his hands. For our purpose, therefore, we can regard the physical basis of society as in itself stable and unchanging, and we must turn, if we are to inquire into the conditions of a society's decay, to its own inner spiritual nature.

Historians are fond of giving reasons for the decline of peoples and the fall of states. These reasons, if our account is true, are at best secondary conditions, results of a lowering of the spiritual activity rather than its causes. This and this alone is social decay, the slackening of the social will, the loosening of the bonds that unite men, not forcibly but freely, within their society, the progressive weakening in each of the social purpose which is the first principle of the social life of all. Mr. Balfour in his essay on "Decadence" is right in refusing to admit that mere historical circumstances, external events, the defeat of armies, the mistakes of statesmen, constitute the full explanation of the waning of social life, the social enfeeblement that is made catastrophic when it involves the dissolution of a State. "It is in vain that historians enumerate the public calamities which preceded and no doubt contributed to the final

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catastrophe. Civil dissensions, military disasters, famine, pestilences, tyrants, tax-gatherers, growing burdens, and waning wealth,—the gloomy catalogue is unrolled before our eyes, yet somehow it does not in all cases fully satisfy us. We feel that some of these diseases are of a kind which a vigorous body politic should easily be able to survive, that others are secondary symptoms of some obscurer malady, and that in neither case do they supply us with the full explanations of which we are in search." Defeat, pestilence, and famine may decimate a people and not crush its spirit or its vitality. It is the strength and character of its spiritual unity that makes or unmakes a people. Not decimation of numbers, a loss speedily reparable, but enfeeblement of spirit is the ultimate social misfortune, and the cause of social disaster. So Byron says of Greece:

> No foreign foe could quell
> Thy soul, till from itself it fell.

As with decadence, so with progress. We must interpret progress in terms of this spiritual activity alone. Herbert Spencer explained all progress as differentiation, the growth of heterogeneity, and undoubtedly the increasing complexity of social life, as of all life, is the surest and most striking sign of its development. But to call this the progress of society is to make structure prior to the life that animates and shapes structure. As a society advances, it grows in complexity, it requires more and more associations within it to express the fullness of its communal life. But it is that life which brings the new complexity of structure into being, and here we are concerned, not with the result, but with the nature of the cause. Progress has no meaning except in the light of purposes and needs. It is those purposes and needs, consciously realized, that are the driving force in the differentiation of society. The life and the needs of life are here at any rate before the structure. It is this life and the meaning of its progress that concern us here.

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And here there is but one form of explanation, that which looks at the spiritual activity whose two aspects are personality and sociality.

It is of course true that, without appropriate physical conditions, a community, like a plant in poor soil, will never develop. There will never arise the fine flower of civilization in the snows of northern Greenland or the parched wastes of Central Australia. The Eskimo and the Australian Blackfellow are as surely stunted by their physical surroundings as the actual lichen of the snows and the mulga scrub of the desert. And yet, we must repeat, the physical conditions remain almost constant,[1] and therefore do not explain the progress of the peoples who do progress. In explaining the rise of Greece, we may lay stress on the opportunity given by a mountainous country with a great seaboard and a mediterranean climate. But these remained when the life of the Greek cities dwindled to insignificance. In explaining the rise of England we may lay stress on her island isolation and her mineral wealth,—but no one believes that these will ever save England from decadence. Therefore they are not the sources of her greatness,—though without them that greatness might never have been fulfilled. It is the heightening of the social spirit, the strengthening of the social will, which is the will to realize oneself in the greater realization of one's community as apart from the will to realize oneself at the expense of that community, it is the growth of the sense of solidarity as each appreciates more and contributes more to the worth of the common life,—there is the meaning of social progress.

But, it may be objected, have you not overlooked one physical factor which is no more constant than the social spirit itself, and the development or degeneration of

[1] The exhaustion of the mineral resources of a country would be an exception. Such a change might involve a social decline, but there are no clear historical instances.

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which has tremendous importance for society? Granted that the world of outer nature does not change appreciably from age to age, save when it is changed by man, are not our human bodies themselves inconstant and variable? It is one of the chief arguments of the modern pessimist that the individual organism is growing finer as civilization advances, is threatened by all manner of new dangers. This is not the place to inquire whether here also the gain does not greatly exceed the loss, whether the history of human organic evolution, like the history of human social evolution, does not offer fair grounds of hope and reveal, in spite of perils and set-backs, a verifiable progress. All that is important for our argument is that this bodily change is in the end the result of the spiritual activity of man, is the readaptation of our bodies to new conditions of life, which we ourselves have willed. If then there is decadence here, the cause is the same as before, a spiritual failure in the members of the decadent society. *If* there is decadence,—but all that is so-called does not deserve the name. We must begin by distinguishing the atrophy of no longer useful organs from the decay of the organism. A recent writer in the *Edinburgh Review* has expressed the difference admirably in the following passage:

> People cry out, in Chamberlainite phrasealogy, 'eyes are going,' 'teeth are going,' 'hair has gone!' If it were true, it would only be a minor incident in human evolution. Mankind are a species of bald apes: if the hair of their heads degenerates, as that of their bodies has already done, it would seem a very natural progress of evolution. But teeth also are 'going.' Doubtless in evolving from the simian stage, there has been a great diminution of size or degeneration of the jaws. Men do not have the massive and protruding jaws that characterize gorillas, nor are their teeth of the same strength. The wisdom teeth in a considerable proportion of humanity never develop at all; and their degeneration is, in the opinion of many, a valuable and desirable eventuality. . . . It is no doubt pleasant to have eyes which can distinguish the satellites of Jupiter, but they would be of no great service in civilized life; far more valuable is the mental vision which gradually gives us the mastery of our fate. It would occasionally be serviceable to have jaws and teeth which could crack a cocoanut; certain pastimes would doubtless be facilitated if our sense of smell was as acute as that of a dog; and in listening to

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an indistinct speaker it would be of undeniable utility if our degenerate ear-muscles still retained their former function, so that we could adjust our ears like a horse or a donkey. But the loss of these aptitudes has been attended by the gain of other more important aptitudes; so that their progressive degeneration has helped us to obtain the mastery over all animals in which they have retained full development. . . . It is scarcely possible to examine any region of the body without finding evidence that along with evolution of new structures, there has gone a progressive degeneration of old structures.[2] 'Claws are going,' 'hair is going,' 'tails have gone,' such might have been the refrain of a pessimistic ape-man a hundred thousand years ago. And the complaint must have seemed well justified: for how was he to keep warm in winter without his furry coat? and how was he to climb about the trees if he had no tail wherewith to swing himself among the branches?

You see, tails were very useful in that primitive society. But when man had attained to coöperative house-building and the use of tools, they had willed away the use, and indirectly the possession, of tails.

There is no escape from the conclusion: it is in the spiritual activity of society that the nature of social progress and decadence is found, there and there alone. This inevitable conclusion is also one full of hope. It relieves the mind from the fatalistic doctrine, a necessary corollary of the social-organism theory, that societies grow old and decay inevitably by mere lapse of time, with no hope against an inexorable law. In truth, societies grow in experience, in knowledge, and in power, as each generation hands down its gains. They do not grow in age, for each generation is new, new as was the inconceivable beginning of life, indeed with an increased capacity of life in so far as past generations have striven to improve it. We can discover no law which burdens the new generations with an inherited weight of age. Society alone is granted that rare and inestimable possession, the advantage of experience without its penalty of powerlessness. To grow wiser without growing older is perhaps

[2] Wiedersheim in his "Der Bau des Menschen" reckons in human beings fifteen organs that are progressing, seventeen that are decaying though still partially useful, and one hundred and seven that are rudimentary and altogether useless.

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the highest boon a man could ask of the gods. That boon is granted to society.

We talk of young peoples, of new nations. Let us remember that no nation is younger than another, except in spirit, in the strength of the social will. The peoples of America are no younger than the peoples of Europe; the new nations of our colonies, of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, are the children of an older England only in the same sense as we ourselves are its offspring. If their spirit is younger, it is because new conditions of life stimulate old energies, because new opportunities and new freedom renew the spirit. But let us not for one moment suppose that a new country is the only or the surest stimulus of the spirit of society. Far more potent forces exist stored within every community, the challenge of the ideal still so imperfectly realized, the vision of present attainment which past attainment has made possible. When that challenge and that vision enter the heart of the members of a society, uniting them more closely in common effort, in social solidarity, its life is already renewed. "Here or nowhere is our America." Thus and not otherwise does a society become young. While its ears are open to that challenge and its eyes to that vision, it will never know old age.

Even to the individual, bound as he is to the wheel of organic change, there comes at intervals, longer or shorter, a period of renewal, a sense of greater good, of greater worth in existence, as if fresh oil had been poured on the flame of life. To the unaging community that period may come at any time. Our organic bodies refuse at last to respond to the call of the spirit. They lose that power of response which is the very principle of life. But a society can always renew its body, its body is the shell of institutions and customs it has created for the protection of its spirit. If these grow old it can cast them off like an outworn garment, it can replace them, as it has done before, by new and better institutions and customs. Our will at last avails not, for all our

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vision of health and strength, to stay the oncoming of decay, but the will of a society avails; if only it sees the vision, if only it hears the challenge. It is therefore absurd to talk, as men have talked in every age, of the *inevitable* decadence which must sometime at the last befall our country. For indeed society is a spiritual thing to which there belongs no natural destiny of decay and death. Into that ever-rejuvenated life each of us is taken up, in spite of our mere organic fate. If that life fail, it is a failure of the spirit, unpredictable as the coming and going of the wind. And if it fail, it may be renewed; for the failure is not the inexorable failure of old age preceding dissolution, but like the falling of the wind, the abating of a power which again springs into rediscovered life.

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VALUE AND OBLIGATION.

J. LAIRD.

THE object of this paper is to discuss the relation between two questions which are fundamental in any ethical theory. These questions are: What do we mean by calling anything good? and Why ought we to do this or that? That it is important to consider these questions, and the connection between them, can hardly be doubted. They are questions of theory, it is true, and they can hardly be discussed in any way that is other than abstract. The concrete treatment of ethics has a different aim. It asks, What is good? and What ought we to do? This is ethics as the plain man understands it and, probably, he does well to confine his attention to these questions. But since the abstract questions are logically prior to the others, they must be discussed first by scientific ethics. The position of ethics is the same in this respect as that of any other science. The results of sci-

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ence move on the plane of common sense,—they correct and amplify, but they do not destroy and they do not distort. On the other hand, the ultimate principles and the ultimate definitions of science present far greater difficulties to the ordinary mind. They seem verbal or nebulous, although, in point of fact, they are neither. I do not mean to imply, of course, that concrete ethics can be deduced from these abstract considerations. I should as readily maintain that it is possible to deduce the number of houses in Aberdeen from the geologists' definition of granite. All I wish to say is that the answer to these two abstract questions is indispensable to a systematic study of ethics. And that is all that is implied by classing ethics among the sciences.

It is well to notice at the outset that the two questions are distinct, so that, if there is a connection between them, that connection cannot be shown by reducing one to the other. It may be true, in fact, that if a thing is good it ought to exist, or ought to be done, and that, if we can attain it, we should strive to do so. Conversely, it may be true that if anything ought to be done, or ought to exist, it is therefore good. But the meaning of the statements is different. They are not mere synonyms, nor can one be obtained from the other by way of analysis. We shall see, ere long, that the relation between 'good' and 'ought' is not nearly so simple as the above remarks suggest. But, if it were so, the connection would still be, in the language of the philosophers, a synthetic connection.

Two other preliminary considerations are equally essential. The first is that the term good (or bad) even if it is not ambiguous, covers a far wider field than ethics, the second that the term ought (or ought not) covers a narrower one. We say that Jones, in our village cricket eleven, is a good bat, and we also say, equally naturally, that Bishop Burnet, with all his faults, was a good man at heart. These are different senses of the word good, but both contain a common core of meaning, since both

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have in common the notion of worth or value. To say that anything has value or worth is precisely the same as to say that it is good. The difficulty is only that the word good is frequently used to mean morally good, and *that* is the term which exactly covers the field of ethics. Bishop Burnet was a good man morally. Jones may be, but again he may not. We do not touch that question when we praise his prowess as a batsman.

Indeed, the distinction between worth and moral worth is one of the first points that is impressed on the student of ethics. He is told at the beginning of his career that ethics is but one of the normative sciences, and he has to learn how to distinguish it from others such as æsthetics. The phrase normative science, as he comes to see, is only a translation of 'science involving a standard of value,' but the values with which ethics is concerned refer to a different subject-matter from those that pertain to æsthetics. The subject-matter of æsthetics is beauty, or ugliness, that of ethics is conduct. The same problem arises, once again, if the student is asked to criticize Hume's doctrine that 'natural abilities,' such as wit, or grace, or skill, since they are instances of personal merit, cannot ultimately be distinguished from the virtues. It is necessary to distinguish the appreciation based on moral grounds, from that which is based on grounds other than moral. Who can help admiring the gay, the witty, the cultured Congreve? Regarded as a work of art, he has a luster all his own. It does not follow that *The Old Bachelor* is good ethical reading, or that Congreve's relations with Mrs. Bracegirdle are morally praiseworthy. It will be our task, later, to consider more carefully wherein this difference consists. Meanwhile it is enough to point it out.

While it is less obvious that ethics must deal with more than the ought, it is none the less certain. The ought is an imperative, a command or rule of command, and is therefore addressed to the will. But there are many qualities of character which enter into moral conduct

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without being directly subject to volitional control. By using the word will I do not wish to take refuge in the faculty psychology. The will is *only* a faculty, it is not a thing; but the word will indicates a definite set of psychical facts, and may therefore he used without misleading consequences.

The Scripture tells us to love our neighbor as ourselves; that is to say, it enjoins a certain emotional disposition, as well as enjoining actions. But how can love be commanded? It is futile to do so since it is not within a man's power to love or not to love as he chooses. He may, indeed, strive to attain this disposition: that he ought to do so is fully admitted by Kant, from whom the above example is taken: and he may, indirectly, do much toward acquiring it. But that is not sufficient. The disposition with which an act is done, the loving kindness of virtue, forms part of the moral quality of conduct; and ethics, accordingly, is wider than the ought.

Let us begin, then, by attempting to explain what we mean by calling anything good. This is a different question from asking for a definition of that which is good. There may be many definitions of good, in the sense that a number of descriptive phrases may demarcate precisely the same object. 'That which ought to exist' or 'That which can be thought out as a member of a perfect whole' may be definitions in this (which is the usual) sense of the word. To consider whether they are or are not, is no part of the purpose of this paper. It is concerned with the meaning of the term good itself,—the adjective, not the substantive,—and it is clear that neither the definitions proposed, nor any others of the same type, are answers to this question.

'To have value' or 'to have worth' are, as we have seen, synonyms for the adjective good. Another synonym,—or is it, perhaps, a significant definition of the meaning of good?—is found in the word approval. To ascribe value to anything, and to approve it, are one and the same. What, then, is the nature of this approval?

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Some theories will have it that approval is, in the end, an attitude of feeling; that is what the school of moral sentiment said in the eighteenth century,—Hume may be taken as their representative,—and what the *Werth-theorie* of such a writer as Meinong says to-day. Other thinkers, such as Hobbes or von Ehrenfels, maintain (to put the matter in our terminology) that the clue to the nature of value must be sought in the nature of desire. Spinoza, in some of his utterances, maintains the same view.[1] These theories of the nature of approval have, despite their differences, very much in common. Feeling and desire are closely connected: they are both ways in which the subject is attracted by the thought of certain objects, and it was because feeling, on their psychology, was necessarily the spring to action that it received its prominence in the writings of the moral sense school. The awareness of good must inspire action. Virtue must be amiable. It must touch our breasts. The intellect, on the contrary, is cool and dispassionate, and consequently the apprehension of value cannot pertain to it.

Naturally, we cannot suppose that so many great thinkers, whose strength lay especially in the domain of psychology, had no grounds on which to base this theory of the nature of approval. We shall see that their analysis was defective, but these defects lay rather in what they denied than in what they asserted. Feeling and desire *are* the mainsprings of action, and approval is connected with them in a specially important way. This is a fact which any theory must admit and try to explain. There is a distinction, however, which writers like Hume failed to recognize. Moral approval and æsthetic approval are, both, kinds of approval. The virtuoso and the saint, in their different ways, reach out toward the realm of values. But it is no part of the feeling connected with æsthetic approval to lead to action, whereas the moral approval

[1] "Ethics," Part III, prop. 39.

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of the saint should do so. The desire to imitate a great painter or to possess his works does refer to conduct, yet these desires, even if an inevitable consequent of æsthetic appreciation, have neither part nor lot in that appreciation itself.

Approval, however, more especially moral approval, cannot be a matter of mere feeling or mere desire, or even of a particular kind of feeling or desire. Approval implies certain other characteristics, which can only be satisfied by judgment. If moral discriminations, to use the old phrase, were matters of feeling alone, there could be no morality. Morality would have disappeared into something else, something rather like it, indeed, but still not the same. The awareness of moral distinctions implies certain claims, and, if these are not satisfied, morality falls. These claims, expressed abstractly, are the claims of objectivity, universality, disinterestedness, and authority. Strive as he will, no advocate of feeling or desire can account for these claims in terms of his theory. Hume tried hard, and he failed. He failed because his task was hopeless, as is easy to see, if we consider the claims in detail.

Objectivity is the simplest and clearest of them. Suppose that Williams, behind the counter, complains of the meanness, or the tyranny, of Jenkins the manager. When he does so, he means to condemn the character and the actions of Jenkins. He does not mean only that he has certain feelings with regard to Jenkins, nor does he mean only that most men, who had heard what Jenkins did, would, through the contagion of sympathy, feel with him in the matter. He means that, but he also means much more. And Hume himself has to admit it. To call a man an enemy or a rival is, he says, to express a private preference. To call him vicious or depraved is to 'speak a different language' altogether. The private preference has become a general preference. But no feeling ceases to be private because other men have similar ones, and that is the utmost stretch of generality which Hume's

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theory can reach. There is only one answer. To call Jenkins a villain is to make a statement *about Jenkins,* not about anyone's feelings with regard to him. That statement claims to be either true or false, and truth or falsity pertain to judgment only. The objectivity of morals, accordingly, requires judgment and cannot rest on feeling.

The 'general preference' was overworked on the moral sense theory, since it had to do duty also for universality and for disinterestedness. The claim of universality means only that if a given act or person is, for some reason or other, rightly accounted worthy of esteem, then that esteem must also be accorded to a similar act, wherever and whenever it occurs, and to a similar person, irrespective of the accidents of space and time and all they imply. Disinterestedness, or impartiality, implies the same. But where shall we find such a feeling? Drake was a freebooter (often), and so were his opponents. But no true Englishman feels toward Drake as he does toward the Spaniards. If he admires the Spaniards at all, it is only because their courage increases the splendor of Drake's achievements. The McLeans and the MacDonnells were quite as reprehensible as the Stepney anarchists or the Paris motor bandits, but we do not quote the 'good old rule' and the 'simple plan' quite so complacently in the modern instances as in the ancient. When we reflect, we can see how far the cases are parallel, and with what measure they should be weighed one against the other. The reflection may be present, even in the moment of passion, though, then, it is usually impotent. But, impotent or not, it can surely claim the rightful superiority.

There are moral feelings, of course, and there are moral desires. But these feelings and desires are derivative. They depend upon the moral judgment. Their strength may outrun that of the moral judgment, and the result is fanaticism or a kind of lynch law. They may blind the moral judgment, too, and keep it from weighing

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the case as it should be weighed. But that only shows that moral desires and moral feelings are not exempt from the common lot of feeling and desire. They are good servants, but bad masters. If our desires and our feelings always harmonized with our judgment, the evil doers would be few. The growth of character consists in regulating them, and it is just as dangerous to allow our judgments of value to be distorted by feeling as our judgments of fact. The primacy of judgment in this respect is the real reason why neither desire nor feeling by themselves are a sufficient account of moral discriminations. They do not possess the authority of the moral judgment. If they impel to action, they do so because of their strength.—the obligation of the moral sense school, was, as they themselves admitted, but an 'interested obligation.' And strength is not authority.

Before passing to the subject of obligation,—which is of course, authority regarded from another point of view, —it will be well to treat of two questions that have, hitherto, been left somewhat obscure. We admitted, or rather declared, that judgments of value have a special connection with feeling and desire. What, then, is this connection? We declared, again, that a judgment of moral worth covers less than a judgment of worth in general. Where, precisely, does the difference lie? What is moral worth?

In considering the first question the fundamental point to notice is that there is no such thing as blind desire or blind feeling. On the contrary desire and feeling must be guided and informed by cognition, and cognition, in its explicit form, is judgment. When we are pleased, we are pleased with something, and, still more obviously, when we desire, we desire something. We may, it is true, want something without knowing clearly what we want, and take steps to allay the wants which are comparatively random and haphazard. But they are never absolutely so. Although we do not know clearly, we do know vaguely. When we are thirsty, we desire drink;

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when we are cold, we desire warmth. The parched wanderer in the desert, however desperate his case and however blind or perplexed his judgment, will never try to allay his anguish by kindling a fire. Groping itself implies some degree of expectation, and an expectation which is restricted to certain channels and has no concern with others. At every stage our feelings and desires are guided by our cognition of objects. They are, indeed, the special way in which an object, so far as cognized, attracts the subject.

To see this, is half the battle. When we desire anything, we desire to possess it, or cause its existence, or modify it in some way. The cognition which guides desire has this aim in view and it exists in behalf of possible action. The state of desire includes both the attraction of the object, and the appetency or endeavor after it. But the desire for anything also includes the awareness of value in that which is desired. It is desired because it indicates a situation that is better than the present,—not necessarily morally better, nor necessarily better on the whole, but better, in some aspect and in some degree, than the present state or its continuance. Indeed this cognition of value in the object desired is the principal respect in which cognition really is a guide. The state of the facts, no doubt, circumscribes our desires, quite apart from their value. There is no value in a railway time table as such, but it is an important fact if we want to go to London. The more definite and the more imperious the desires, the more must cognition study the facts, that it may use them as means to its ends. But so long as they are mere facts, they are mere means. If they are desired as ends, they must be desired because of the value they are seen to contain.

It is not surprising, then, that the awareness of value should have a specially close and intimate connection with feeling and desire. These must be guided not by cognition only, but by cognition which includes the awareness of worth. And we are now better able to approach

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our second question,—that of the distinguishing characteristics of moral worth. Moral worth is worth as exhibited in the sphere of conduct. Let us see what this statement implies.

Conduct may be defined most simply as responsible behavior, but it is a difficult, and, perhaps, an impossible task, to say where behavior ceases to be responsible. The limiting cases, however, are not of great importance. If we can point to behavior which is indubitably conduct, we have done enough for ethics. When an agent has foresight of the ends he is capable of attaining, when he can choose between these ends without being forced by some agency foreign to him, then his action is an instance of conduct. If these elements are entirely absent, there is no conduct. The absence of constraint, in the vast majority of cases, depends upon the harmony of the end chosen with the character of the man himself and, therefore, we may speak of conduct as the expression of the character in action. This is a commonplace of any text book of ethics. It is a commonplace also that the clearest instance of conduct is to be seen in choice after mature deliberation. Such deliberation, of course, is neither always possible, nor always necessary. There may not be time enough to reflect and, again, the course before us may be so clear that deliberation is otiose. These facts, however, do not affect the general principle.

Now, what does a man do when he deliberates? Granting that he has sufficient time and sufficient information, he considers the various practicable alternatives that are open to him. If he recognizes that a given alternative is not really possible for him, that, however splendid it may seem in the abstract, and however admirable if performed by some one with different opportunities and a different nature from himself, it is yet beyond his reach, then that alternative straightway ceases to be vital for him. He must restrict himself, therefore, to alternatives that are really practicable, and, if he does what is morally good, he must choose that alternative which will attain

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the greatest possible value within his power. The value of the probable effects of this action upon the man himself and upon others, the consistency of the action with the general plan of life to which he (on the whole) adheres,—these considerations, and others like them, all must enter. True, the standard for the comparison of these values, permits of innumerable disputes. It is, perhaps, a question of direct intuition for which no reason can be given since none is required. We perceive directly that generosity is better than masked selfishness, and that is the whole of the matter. It may be, again, that values must be measured by reference to an ideal or, even, that some indirect criterion,—the hedonic calculus, let us say, —is the surest guide. These questions are not for us. What is certain is that the deliberation of the morally good man consists in the valuation of practicable alternatives with a view to choosing that which is best. The valuation, it is true, need not add and subtract units after the manner of arithmetic. To demand that would be as absurd as to demand a pair of scales to weigh the motives. It need not, again, take the form which Benjamin Franklin advised. We need not jot the alternatives down and balance them by the aid of a merchant's pencil. The point is that this valuation is essential, whatever be the form in which it is usually, or most conveniently, made.

It is necessary, is these matters, to distinguish between the objective and the subjective point of view. From the objective point of view, an action is morally right when it exhibits the maximum value that can be attained by the agent. But the action, to be moral, must be an instance of conduct, and therefore the subjective point of view, the intention and the responsibility of the agent, is still more important. The agent, no doubt, may have inadequate information as to fact, and he may form false judgments of value. He may try, for instance, to rescue a drowning man, although his own powers as a swimmer are inadequate to the task, or he might, through excessive

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humility, decline a task for which he was preëminently fitted. We cannot, therefore, look to the subjective point of view only, in our estimate of moral worth. But with these limitations it is true that a man acts rightly if he strives to attain the greatest value open to him.

There is yet another qualification to make, however. The agent, if he acts morally, must not only strive to attain the best course of action open to him, but he must strive to do so *just because it is the best.* Anything else is legality, not morality. And this explains, incidentally, why many personal excellences are admired æsthetically without being morally approved. They are shown in conduct, they may be deliberately chosen, and they have value. But if the agent could have chosen something better, or if he chose them for some other reason than their superior excellence to any other alternative open to him, then they are morally blameworthy, even if worthy of praise in other respects.

Our discussion, it may appear, has strayed from the high road, into bypath meadow. That is but appearance, however; in reality we are now enabled, for the first time, to attack the real problem of this paper. We have dealt hitherto with the problems of worth, of moral worth, and of that which is morally right or wrong. Worth, we have seen, has a special connection with desire and feeling but depends ultimately upon a judgment of value. Moral worth refers to conduct and conduct requires, at least, knowledge and choice on the part of the agent. Deliberation, it is true, is not essential to conduct, but it shows these necessary implications of conduct in their clearest form. It is really the attempt to justify to ourselves a given line of action. A man who can choose in this way is morally responsible for his actions. The volitional element is not, as we shall see, the whole of moral worth, but it is essential to any action which has moral worth (positive or negative as the case may be). That which is right or wrong, however, does refer wholly to this volitional element. An action is

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morally right only if it is chosen because it is the best, the most valuable, thing to do for a given man in a given place and time.

Now that which is morally right and that which a man ought to do, are one and the same, so that now we have found the answer to our question. Some ethical theories, it is true, have sought the sum and substance of ethics in the ought and have even maintained, as Kant did, that the notion of ought must be prior to that of good. Other theories, again, have spoken almost entirely in terms of good. Neither of these types of theory is correct. The ought has a meaning and a place of its own since it speaks of a rule of command addressed to the will of a rational being. This is no part of the meaning of worth. But the rules are not commanded in their own right. There is a reason for them and that reason lies in their worth. The point, indeed, is very familiar. Any general rule will clash with some other general rule in some instances. It is my duty to assist the police, it is also my duty to protect and help my friends. What if I learn that my friend is a murderer? Surely, in such an instance, the only possible course is to ask what is the best thing to do in the particular case before me. If my judgment is sound and I follow it, I shall have acted as I ought.

There is a last ditch which the defenders of the primacy of obligation may still contest. Is it not true, they may ask, that I recognize what morality is by recognizing what I have *got* to do. Luther's *Ich kann nicht anders* is the keystone of ethics. Again, we have insisted on the attractiveness of good. The awareness of values in possible action necessarily arouses desire. But duty must often be done in the teeth of desire. The answer to these objections is really very simple. In the first place it is irrelevant how we come by a particular notion. Custom and early training, it is true, impress first of all on the child (and upon those races which are still in their childhood) that certain kinds of conduct are commanded and others are forbidden, and these rules are shrouded in a

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sort of religious halo that frequently does duty for conscience. But the task of the moral man, and the task of ethics, is to rise above this stage and to see whether the rules are justifiable and on what principle the justification can rest. In the second place it is true, no doubt, that the right course need not be pleasant, and this despite the fact that the good attracts while duty may be stern and hard. The sternness of duty, perhaps, is apt to be exaggerated through undue attention to certain special cases. Some instances of duty are less dreadful than the action of Brutus when he condemned his son. It may be a man's duty to play tennis of an evening in order to preserve his health. But, omitting this plea, we can still hold fast to our position. Although the thought of attainable value always attracts, and although there can be no desire which is not guided by some apprehension of value, it does not follow that the judgment of greatest attainable value always attracts the most. To suppose that would be to suppose a necessary and complete harmony between thought, feeling, and action, and this, so far from being a presupposition, is the chief aim of moral training. The gratification which a man seeks may be a little present ease, or a little present enjoyment, at the expense of his whole life. The ease or the enjoyment do attract and do have their value. It would be the man's duty to seek them if nothing else came in their way. Similarly, the ideal of the life attracts and the man knows that it should have superiority. But it does not attract enough. The reason of the sin is not that the man does not seek the good, but that he does not seek the best.

I shall conclude this paper by answering yet another objection and making one further explanation. The objection is that the ought is only apparently, not really, narrower than the concept of moral worth. Let it be granted that if the smile with which the gift is given were chosen with the same care as the gift itself, our moral nature would rise in revolt. It is true, none the less, that the loving kindness of virtue must proceed from

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the moral character of the agent. But can we not say that a man ought to have a better, a more generous character than he has? I do not wish to ask what are the limits within which this or that man may develop his character. All I maintain is, that if the objection means that his character ought to be better than he himself can make it, then the objection is false. No one denies that he ought to try to be generous, but the objection, in the form I have stated it, refers not to the man, but to his maker. Thus it is possible to say that one man is morally better than another, although each does his best. That is not a paradox, but a truism. There is no one, of course, who always does his best, but there are sufficiently close approximations to make the statement significant in fact, as well as in theory. The mistake arises from requiring, —after the manner of criminal law,—an equal standard for every man, without sufficient respect for the differences of persons.

The explanation supplies, in a way, an interesting corroboration of our theory. The ought, as we have seen, refers to that essential feature of conduct which is concerned with volition. It is a rule of command addressed to the will, and this is the reason at once for the limitations and for the importance of the ought. Let us ask, therefore, whether our account is consistent with the psychology of will. Ethics, of course, does not depend upon psychology, but it involves psychology. It speaks not of human nature as such, but of human nature at its best. Still, it cannot ignore the facts of human nature.

Will implies the choice of action, and action which the agent believes to be in his power. He can neither will the action, nor resolve upon it, unless he has this belief. Beliefs, of course, are instances of cognition. It is plain, therefore, that will is guided by explicit cognition and cognition, moreover, which is restricted in the special way we have seen to be characteristic of the ought. For the thought of 'ought' implies the thought of 'can.' But will is more than the contemplation and the comparison

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of possible lines of action. They are contemplated with reference to another essential constituent of will, the constituent which we call choice. This is the 'fiat,' the 'let it be done and done by me' which is an ultimate and profoundly important characteristic of mental life. But the choice besides being guided by cognition is necessarily prompted by desire. Desire, in fact, is the feeling attitude of the subject with respect to possible action. Now we have shown that every desire includes some awareness of the value of the end toward which it strives. It follows that not cognition only, but also cognition of values, plays its part necessarily in will, however specific and peculiar the nature of will may be. Surely, then, it is plain that the ought is no stranger to psychology, and that if human nature can be morally trained, it must be trained in the way our theory suggests. The elements which the ought implies, the reasons which make it binding, may be found, in some form or other, in almost any instance of human action. They must occur in every instance of human conduct. In order that there may be conduct there must be volition, that volition must be restricted to what the agent believes to be within his power, and must be guided by awareness of values. The ought works within this sphere. It demands only that these elements be united in the best possible way. To consider this, to ask how these elements should conspire and what should be their aim, is the task of ethics. It may include more. It does not include less.

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THE COMBINATION VERSUS THE CONSUMER.

H. B. REED.

IN the competitive system it was supposed that charging all you could get in an open market brought a fair price. According to Adam Smith, the relations of supply and demand made every commodity bring a fair or

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natural price, a price that covered the cost of bringing an article to market, including subsistence for the wage earner, subsistence for the trader, and the ordinary rent to the land-owner. If the supply was less than the effectual demand, the price went above the natural one; but immediately production increased and reduced the price to normal. If the supply was greater than the effectual demand, the price fell below the natural one; but immediately some production ceased and raised the price to its normal. This argument is still believed by many. For example, so distinguished an authority as President Hadley gives a fresh restatement of it in his "Standards of Public Morality" (pp. 37-43). His argument is essentially as follows: (1) A fair price fixed according to cost of production is detrimental to the trader because some articles will not bear it. If therefore a trader is to make ends meet, he must be allowed to charge extra prices on other articles that will bear them. (2) A fixed price conforming to cost often results in scarcity and want, for people will not save so long as prices remain the same. But this is avoided if the price is left free, for it will rise as the article becomes scarce, and this necessitates thrift and increased production. (3) Under a fixed price, people who most want a thing often fail to get it, while under a free price they are able to get it by paying a price higher than the fixed one. (4) A price determined naturally in an open competitive market is just, since if one merchant charges extortionately, his competitor promptly undersells him. (5) Therefore, prices and production, if left to themselves, produce far more favorable results to society than a system of control according to some imaginary standards of justice.

The soundness of this argument for the natural and automatic justice resulting from the competitive system depends altogether upon the truth of the underlying assumptions, namely, those of fair competition and an open and free market. With reference to the open market it

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assumes a free flux and change of all the factors of industry. If the laborer is engaged in an industry in which there is an over-production, he is free either to withdraw or to change to an industry in which there is a scarcity of production. Similarly, the capitalist can either shut down his plant or take up another line of manufacturing, and the land-owner can either withdraw his land or begin growing crops in which production is scarce. That is to say, a laborer is free to stop coal-mining and promptly begin work either as a baker or as an engineer or as a skilled mechanic in a steel plant. The rolling mills in steel could stop turning out steel rails and begin the manufacture of shoes or lumber.

Not only is such a perfect flux required to make the system always yield natural prices; there must be also a pre-knowledge of all the conditions and factors that bring about changes in the market price. For example, if, during the next year, there were going to be a dry season in Western Canada and a favorable season in Southern Russia, the Russians, in order to avoid scarcity in the wheat market, would have to know this fact and bring a greater number of fields under cultivation, and the Canadians would have to know it so as to avoid an over-supply of labor and a useless putting out of crops. The over-supply of labor in Canada would either have to move to Russia or find employment in other industries in which there would be a scarcity of production. In fact, nothing short of an absolute knowledge of the world would satisfy the necessary conditions.

It is well known that this mobility with respect to industry does not exist. There is an element of permanency to be considered. In the laborer it is habit; in the capitalist, the fixity of machinery; and in land, the nature of soil in the relation to the seasons of the year. The laborer cannot change and train his habits for a new trade and in the meantime support his family; nor is he free to withdraw his labor, for he usually has no surplus. The capitalist cannot shut down his plant for

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a very long time without infringing upon his dividends and credit. Nor can the land-owner usually forego his rent without some injury or failure in his business relations. So far, then, as there is permanency in any of the factors of industry, the natural or fair price in an open competitive market will not be obtained. So if there is a scarcity in wheat, it will probably be a year before the production will be increased. If it is in steel, or in coal, the scarcity may never be remedied, for no more mines may be available to new competitors. In such a case, the market price could always be maintained above Adam Smith's natural price.

In this view, then, the assumption of the free mobility of the factors of industry is taken with too much extravagance and in so far invalidates the natural and automatic justice of the competitive system. There is an equal extravagance with regard to the assumption of fair competition. For competitors fair competition obtains when the rules and opportunities under which they operate apply equally to all. It is not so important what the rules are as it is to have them affect all alike. There are many ways in which this condition is violated when combinations enter the field. The combination can start a siege of price-cutting upon a small trader and wholly destroy his business by spending only a small part of its capital. Because of its ability to supply the carrier with a large and regular traffic, it can obtain a rebate large enough to cover the small shipper's profit and so close the market against him. Because of its extensive capital and organization, it can carry on a system of espionage by which railroad and competitors' employés are paid for furnishing information about the small trader's business, through which information it can go to the competitor's customer and get his trade either by offering lower prices or even by giving the goods gratis; or, if it has a monopoly on some goods which the customer must have, by refusing to trade with him at all unless he ceases to patronize competitors; or, if the customer is

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a small dealer, by threatening to open competition with him and ruin his business. The combination can also promote its own business and injure that of a competitor through improper use of the press and through questionable advertising. It can furnish editors with editorials which discount the wares of the competitor and praise the merits of its own, or it can cause advertising to the same effect to be printed in the reading columns in the form of disinterested news. It can also go before a legislative body and often by means of its capital alone secure legislation favorable to itself, but unfavorable to competitors; or it can employ able lawyers and solicitors who, through their persuasion often secure the same sort of legislation. And with respect to matters in the courts, it is well known that the combination can gain much through delays and appeals which are quite impossible to small traders. In these and many other ways, the combination can carry on competition from which the small trader is almost wholly excluded because of his small capital. But this competition is bound ere long to prove fatal to his business.

Let us suppose that the combination, by carrying on competition in ways that are not open to the small trader, establishes a monopoly. What then happens to the price? The combination still supposes that charging all it can get brings a fair price. The consumer is not compelled to buy. If then the combination is willing to sell at a given price and the consumer is willing to pay that price, the result is a 'fair price.' Even if the price is more than twice above cost, the consumer is still not overcharged, for he is willing to pay the price asked. This is the point of view taken by the combination. Undoubtedly a contract made between two reasonable beings is fair, *provided they are equally dependent upon each other*. The question is then whether the monopolist and the consumer *are* equally dependent upon each other. The monopolist must, of course, sell his goods in order to make profits. He cannot sell them for more than they

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will bear. But his business is not dependent upon any one individual's purchase. So what independence the individual purchaser has is limited by the number of his alternatives, that is, the number of substitutes which he has for the goods which the monopolist sells. If the monopolist is a carrier to a central market from a point where the only important produce is wheat, it is clear that the farmer's alternatives are few and that his profits will depend upon the carrier's rates. If wheat sells for eighty cents per bushel at the central market, and fifteen cents per bushel is a fair rate for the carrier, that is, a rate high enough to permit him to conduct an efficient business, then the farmer should receive sixty-five cents for his wheat. But the carrier may raise his rate to thirty cents and reduce the farmer's price to fifty cents. The farmer is still compelled to sell at fifty cents and pay the carrier thirty cents, for the grain is useless in his granary, and he has no other way of disposing of it. He must, therefore, sell in order to be able to purchase goods needed, such as farm implements, clothing, and books. Where, then, the carrier has a monopoly, he can determine in what proportion the shipper shall divide his profits with him.

To bring out the point more clearly, we may cite the classic example of the baker's monopoly. A starving man with a dollar in his pocket has the alternative of parting either with his life or with his dollar for a loaf of bread. He chooses to spend his dollar, although five cents would have been enough for the baker.

From these illustrations it is clearly seen that when a trader once has a monopoly upon a useful commodity, the equal dependence between seller and buyer is destroyed. The buyer has lost the alternative of competition which prevented him from being over-charged, and he is unable to find substitutes which are equally as good and cheap as the monopolist's products. So long, therefore, as the monopolist is left to bargain individually with each consumer, there is no equality, and a free and

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fair contract is impossible. To make the monopolist and the consumer equally dependent upon each other, all the consumers must combine and bargain collectively with the monopolist or combination of traders. The monopolist then must sell to this combination of consumers in order to realize any profits, and he must sell at such prices as the consumers think reasonable. The consumers would pay a price sufficient to enable the monopolist to carry on a flourishing business and receive an average return upon his capital, for otherwise they could not get the monopolist's goods in the quantity and quality in which they want them. In this way alone can the consumer bargain fairly with the monopolist.

But then there is the practical problem of forming a combination among the consumers, for in not a few cases the consumers are scattered over an entire nation and, in some, over many nations. It is unnecessary that the consumers of separate nations combine, for as yet there is no combination of manufacturers with which a single nation cannot deal fairly and equally. But the consumers of a given nation are already combined and have an organization in the State. Their recourse is then to have the State bargain in their behalf with the monopoly. There are many reasons for making this arrangement: only the State can bargain fairly with the combination. The State protected consumers against unreasonable prices in allowing traders freely to compete with each other. It allowed traders to charge all they could get, for in an open market, under fair competition, they could not get too much. But competition often became too strong and caused too many traders to fall into bankruptcy. To avoid this, the State allowed traders to combine for regulating production and prices. This made possible unequal competition between the combination and the small trader. The State failed to prevent this, and the result was monopoly. The monopoly still kept charging all it could get. But charging all it could get in a closed market, under no competition, proved to be

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extortion to the consumer. To prevent this, the State should again resume its protection of the consumer, not necessarily by reintroducing competition, but by regulating the monopoly. It should do this not only because of its former protection of the consumer against unfair prices through competition, but also because, if it protects the trader against the wastes of competition and of unregulated production, it should treat the consumer equally well by protecting him against the extortion of monopoly.

I believe the justness and fairness of this reasoning and conclusion to be indisputable. Charging all you can get in an open market under fair competition brings fair prices. But charging all you can get in a closed market under no competition is extortion, just as taxation without representation is tyranny. Even under competition, charging all you can get is not fair unless the competition is fair and affects all traders alike, large or small; for just in so far as competition is unequal, and just in so far as a trader enjoys monopoly, he can charge unreasonable prices. If the State, then, relies upon competition to bring justice to the consumer, it should undertake to make competition fair and make the 'rules of the game' apply equally to all. But if it allows monopoly, then it is obliged to regulate it. All the arguments against State interference with the course of trade, however applicable to conditions of fair competition, lose all their force as applied to monopoly; for, under monopoly, prices and production are no more free and left to adjust themselves. On the contrary, they are fixed and regulated by the monopolist. The consumer or people then have to choose between a price as fixed by the monopolist, who regulates the price primarily with reference to his own interests, and a price as fixed by an intelligent Public Service Commissioner, who regulates prices with reference to the interests of all, both consumer and producer. To suppose that an intelligent and disinterested commissioner could not do as well as a self-interested

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monopolist is presumptuous and requires proof, especially in view of the success of some present-day Public Service Commissions. To recite the failures and disasters of mediæval regulation is no argument; for the mediæval idea of a fixed price, which did not recognize changes required by new conditions, is not necessarily adopted by a modern commission which does recognize such conditions and changes. Moreover, in mediæval times the judge thought it sufficient to fix prices without interfering with production, and this was the cause of his failure. But in the present day, we are in control of both production and prices, and, therefore, conditions are favorable for the success of public regulation.

The problem, then, is by what principles shall the State regulate and determine fair prices. We can get some help in this by reviewing what the courts have actually done in this respect.

There is a rather extended series of judicial opinions as to what constitutes a fair rate of profit for monopolistic public service corporations and a fair capitalization upon which a lawful return may be demanded. It is unnecessary for our purpose to review all of these. It will be sufficient to state some of the conclusions that have been reached. In the beginning, there was confusion as to whether the basic valuation upon which a rate of return may be expected is to be determined by the use or the earning capacity of the corporation, or by the original cost of its properties, or by their cost of reproduction in present condition. It was soon noticed that earning capacity could not be used, for it was the fairness of earning that was under question. Nor could the actual capitalization of the corporation be used, for it was usually based upon the earning capacity. Original cost was found to be impractical, for a number of reasons. In many cases it could not be determined. Or, again, the plant might have not been economically constructed, or it might have been constructed at a time when prices were either unusually high or unusually low.

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If they were unusually high, it would be unfair to consumers to make them pay a return upon an investment that is much higher than it would be upon a plant newly built. If they were unusually low, the owner could not afford to operate the plant after prices became high, if he were allowed no more than a constitutional return upon the original cost. That is to say, a valuation determined by original cost does not adjust itself to the changes in prices and values that are constantly occurring. For these reasons the courts have rejected original cost and have adopted as the basis of valuation for determining reasonable returns the cost required to reproduce in their present condition the properties used for the convenience of the public, allowing both for depreciation and appreciation. To avoid unusual circumstances or fluctuation in this cost, the average price of labor and material for a period of years is usually taken, —either this or an average year in which there are no unusual fluctuations. There appears to be no dispute as to admitting into this basic valuation all the tangible assets used for the public convenience, but there is still some doubt as to the admittance of intangible assets, such as franchise, good will, going value, good management, and advantageous location. In cases where a public service corporation has a monopoly, the Supreme Court has not allowed any of these elements except franchise to form part of the capitalization upon which to base rate-charges, and franchises are admitted only when the State has allowed them to be capitalized and be made an article of commerce. There is a good reason for this, because in so far as the intangible assets possess value, it is derived from the earning capacity of the physical plant; and where the fairness of this earning capacity is in question, it is obviously reasoning in a circle to say that a portion of the earning capacity should enter the capitalization upon which a fair earning is to be based.

After the valuation is determined in the manner outlined, then account is taken of the operating expenses

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per annum. In these also an average is usually taken for a period of years. Included in the operating expenses is a certain rate per cent. of allowance for depreciation, renewals, and extraordinary accidents. It is then determined what a fair income would be upon the valuation as thus determined. This is added to the operating expenses and the total is divided by the average annual quantity of units of service or goods sold. The result is regarded as the fair rate or price. As to what constitutes a fair rate of profit, the rule is that it is the amount ordinarily sought and obtained in such investments in the locality of the one under question that are equally as safe.[1] It is such a rate as would be accepted in a given business by the prudent and reasonable man,—as he is known in law. In the Consolidated Gas case this was determined to be six per cent. for New York City.[2]

It will be seen that the courts do not ask what ought to be a fair price or profit. They assume that the average of what is, is right; or rather, the average of the opinions of common sense is right. A fair profit for a given investment is the average profit ordinarily received in investments of that kind. A fair price for a given commodity is the average of the prices ordinarily obtained for that commodity. A fair wage for a given service is the average paid the laborer for the performance of that

[1] Consolidated Gas Case, 157 Fed., 871; 212 U. S., 50.

[2] This brief statement of the judicial method of determining fair prices is based primarily upon the following cases: Consolidated Gas case cited above; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S., 574; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul v. Minnesota, 134 U. S., 458; Cleveland and Railway Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S., 445-6; San Diego Land and Town Co. v. Jasper, 110 Fed., 714; Collings v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., 82 Fed., 854; San Diego Land and Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S., 442; Stanislaus v. San Joaquin C. & I. Co., 192 U. S., 214; Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Houston, etc., 90 Fed., 687; 9 I. C. C. Rep., 402; Contra Costa Water Co. v. City of Oakland, 113 Pac., 681; Cedar Rapids Gas Light Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 120 N. W. Rep., 969; Brunswick Water Dist. v. Maine Water Co., 59 Atl. Rep., 540; National Water Works Co. v. Kansas City, 62 Fed., 865; Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U. S., 203.

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labor. Undoubtedly this is the best that the law can do; for the law, in order to be enforcible and applicable, must be simply and clearly stated in the form of a general rule. It cannot take account of particular circumstances and particular individuals, for these would confuse the rule and would not generally apply. If such can be taken into account, it is only by the prudence of the judge who applies the rule. In ethics, however, account is taken of individuals and particulars, and we ask whether 'what is' is what ought to be—ought to be for the best interests of all concerned. From the point of view of social justice, several matters appear to be open to discussion. We notice only the problem of allowing for good management and individual initiative. In business establishments improvements are made either for the sake of maintaining a present rate of income which is being endangered by the improved facilities of competitors, or for the sake of increasing the income. In monopolies, the incentive from competition is lost, although the desire either to maintain an established reputation and credit in the business world, or to win the same if it is not already established, is still effective. Yet it cannot be denied that improvements are made in most cases for the purpose of increasing profits. Nor can it be denied that good management is desirable in a public business. Not only does the public demand efficient service; it also desires it at as reasonable rates as possible. If a good manager, through economical operation and other improvements could greatly reduce the cost of service and consequently lower the rates to the public, there would be a saving for which it would be worth paying well. But a manager who could effect such reductions would demand his reward, and it is unlikely that an average rate of profit would satisfy him; for the same ability applied to competitive business would bring more than an average return. Nor can it be said to be just to reward superior ability at the same rates as average ability. It agrees with our sense of justice to treat

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unequals unequally. If it is the judicial policy to allow no more than an average return for public business, incentive to good management is lost; for if the profits are to be reduced to the average rate as soon as a lower cost of service is effected, there is no inducement to make improvements.

To this line of objection it may, however, be replied that the judicial rate of profit does not altogether fail to reward merit. The average rate of profit is at least not confiscatory, and it does allow some incentive to good management. If rate charges at a given time are fixed to yield six per cent. profit on the investment, it is possible to increase the profits, on the one hand, by increasing the volume of business, and on the other, by reducing the cost of service or production; provided, however, that the rates as fixed are not lowered as soon as these results are obtained. There is no good reason for thinking that this lowering would be effected promptly, for judicial action is both slow and presumably prudent. Whether these avenues would allow sufficient incentive to managerial ability, can only be determined by experience, although the probability is that the judicial return could never adequately reward exceptional ability.

The difficulties with the judicial determination of a fair price could, however, be largely obviated by putting the supervision of public or monopolistic business into the hands of an expert Public Service Commissioner who is familiar with the details of the business, instead of a judge, who at best is restricted to averages and generalities, and is therefore unable to do adequate justice to the individual. The expert could easily determine whether or not the average rate of profit was enough to conduct as efficient a business as is desired by the public. If it is not enough, he could recommend or fix higher rates. If the business is ineffectively managed, he could detect the flaws and suggest remedies rather than oblige the company by raising rates. He also could determine whether or not exceptional ability is required to conduct

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the business, and what would be a just reward for the same. And if, under given rate charges, the original rate of profit had been raised through the skill of the manager in extending the business and reducing the cost of service, he would not at once correspondingly reduce the prevailing rates, for so he could reward good management and leave an incentive for the making of improvements. That is, the expert would not be restricted to the judicial rate of return and could, therefore, do adequate justice to individuals and make modifications where special circumstances require it. The expert could thus more exactly determine what reward is *needed* to produce the efficiency demanded by the public. But as soon as we mention needs as a criterion for determining fair profits and prices, then we wonder why it is that a Public Service Commissioner must use this criterion, and by what practical means needs are to be determined.

It is conceded by some moralists that need would be the most ethical basis upon which to distribute wealth, if it were possible to devise some practical means by which need could be defined. But whom we should be willing to make the judge of our needs seems unanswerable unless every one is to be made the judge of his own needs. That is to say, the system of unlimited competition is the best determinator of needs. But we have already seen that competitive principles are not applicable to conditions of monopoly, and that here new standards of need are required. Upon examination, the theory of needs appears not to be unpractical as applied to monopolies, whatever may be its difficulties as a general principle for the distribution of wealth. For although a perfect standard may not be attainable, certain needs are fairly evident, and their measure is reasonably objective.

As space does not permit an adequate discussion, I can merely refer schematically to certain points which fall under the two general aspects of cost of production and business efficiency.

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It may be assumed that a monopoly will not sell its goods or services for less than cost of production, cost of production being used as a phrase to cover cost of materials, labor, and depreciation of capital, and determined according to the judicial method as already outlined. Nor can a monopoly charge more than its goods will bear. But we have seen that charging what the goods will bear under conditions of monopoly results in extortion. So the fair price is somewhere between cost of production and what the goods will bear. The judicial method assumes that a fair price is one that allows an average profit upon the cost of production. But this assumes that the wage paid to labor is fair and that the capitalist has a right to demand the ordinary rate of profit. The socialist denies both of these assumptions and claims that the difference between cost of production and the gross earnings should return to labor, for labor produced it.

I shall have to assume without proof that some use of capital is necessary, and that it does perform a function and hence must be provided for. The point at issue is, then, How much profit is justified?

From the point of view of needs, the judicial standard of average return upon capital is open to question. It is well known that many capitalists cannot possibly consume all their interest. If by needs we mean what is needed for a comfortable living, it follows that the average rate of return on capital is much too large. If the non-consumable income is reinvested in the production of necessaries, it is, however, doing good work. But if it is spent upon luxuries or invested in the production of luxuries, then it is a stimulus to idleness and would do more good if it were in the hands of a man of smaller income who could use it in the securing of necessities. At those points, then, where non-consumable income tends to increase the consumption and the production of luxuries or to produce those results that are not on the whole socially desirable, the average rate of return

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is very properly reduced. A graduated income tax is one means of solving this problem, but what form this should take can be determined only by experience. I mention this matter of a good living because I do not think it can be overlooked in the regulation of monopolies, nor is it impossible to regulate incomes with reference to it. But a Public Service Commission could not do much in this direction, for it would interfere with the law. If it should reduce the rate of return upon capital much below the average, its regulation would be invalidated by the courts as being confiscatory even though it were not. The Public Service Commission can only determine what the least return is that must be paid upon capital in order to get its benefit under present conditions. The lower limit would evidently be something above the rate of income from state securities because of the greater risk in public service business.

So much the capitalist would need. In addition, capital, the instrument of production, needs an allowance not only for depreciation to maintain a given industry at its present efficiency, but also for growth and progress. Industry not being static, but dynamic and growing, something must be set aside to meet the cost of extensions and permanent improvements as well as extraordinary accidents that are liable to occur. This is required to meet the growing needs of the public and to insure a continual efficient service, which, if not provided for, would mean loss and handicap in the future. These would be the minima needed by capital and the capitalist to satisfy the interest of the public.

The wage needed by labor is also an important consideration. The judicial determination of a fair profit does not open this question, but assumes that wages are not subject to review as included in the operating expenses. The socialist, however, disputes this and demands a larger wage; and he is not entirely wrong, even from an economic point of view, in demanding a larger wage, for it may very well be that a larger wage would

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better the laborer's efficiency. The capitalist is willing to pay the minimum wage, that is, the amount required to maintain labor at its present efficiency. But if labor is kept in a static condition while capital is allowed to grow and improve, industry as a whole will suffer. In the progress of industry, all the factors must be allowed to grow in proportion. (See Hobson, "Industrial System," chapters IV-VII.) The laborer, therefore, needs a certain allowance for his cost of growth just the same as capital. If it improves his efficiency, both industry and the public will be benefited. If it raises his standard of living, not only will his community have a better citizen, but his wants will be multiplied and so demand increased production and call for new investments—a situation equally beneficial to the capitalist. Besides, since the laborer's standard of living is much below that of the capitalist, a considerable share of the costs of progress should return to him in order to make his living more comparable with that of the best members of society. He may be capable of living well quite as much as the capitalist, and if he has an opportunity to develop his capacities, he may be a more capable and useful man than the capitalist. If so, then it is to the interest of society to provide a means by which his powers can be gradually realized, for it can never be undesirable to have as many efficient men in society as possible, no matter whether they originate in ghettos or in palaces. For these reasons, it is desirable, in the administration of business, to provide the laborer with as much of the costs of progress as he can effectively use; for it means greater efficiency, better citizens, multiplied wants, and increased production,—a situation beneficial to all classes of society.

In determining the needs of labor and capital, we also satisfied the needs of the consumer. It is in his interest that a public supervisor of monopoly is required. The average consumer is quite willing to pay for goods or services what is reasonably needed to produce them in

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the quality and quantity desired. But he is unwilling to pay a price or tax to the mere power of monopoly. He demands to be put in position to be able to bargain equally with the combination or monopoly. But he cannot do this without assistance from the State, which alone has compulsory power over monopolies. He demands this not only as a matter of economy, but also because of his sense of dignity and independence. In a democracy, the State alone has the right to exercise coercion over a free man. And if the State uses its power over the free man in the interests of the nation and of the republic, he is willing to sacrifice himself. But if he is required to make sacrifices for the mere interests of another private citizen, who is no better than he, but who can extort from him because of privileges and powers unjustly won, then his moral being rebels and demands equality and justice. If, then, the public supervisor of monopoly requires the monopolist to exact no more from consumers than he reasonably needs for the conducting of a business in the efficiency desired by the public, the consumer will feel that his dignity is respected and that he is in a position to bargain equally and fairly with the combination or monopoly.

Summing up, we should say that the needs of a monopolistic business are determined, on the one hand, by the cost of production, and on the other, by the efficiency of the business. The public supervisor finds first the average of what is, according to the judicial method. He finds what is required to reproduce the tangible assets used in the business, what the operating expenses are, what wage is paid to labor, what is set aside for depreciation and improvements, and what return the capitalist is accustomed to receive. He does not then assume, as the judge, that the average of what is, is right, but after finding this, he examines whether the business is economically and effectively managed, whether any old and out-of-date machinery is being used, where improvements can be made, whether labor is being paid as much

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as is needed to make it efficient, whether enough is being set aside to meet the growing demands of the business, and whether the capitalist is receiving too much or too little. Having made this examination, he then calculates what rates or prices are required to meet the reasonable needs of the business and fixes them for the consumer.

The objection that needs cannot be determined, I do not believe well founded. Cost of production is ascertainable by accountancy, and efficiency is also a subject of judgment. By experience it can be readily ascertained whether a lower rate brings poorer service or whether a higher rate brings either improvements or luxuries, or whether a higher wage to the laborer raises his standard of living and efficiency or means greater dissipation. Efficiency can, of course, not be quantitively determined like cost of production. Neither can we tell whether men are good or bad by mathematical calculation, yet common sense does judge whether men are good or bad, and with some measure of accuracy. In the same way, it judges between efficiency and inefficiency, and with enough accuracy for practical purposes.

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SOME WEAK POINTS IN ANCIENT GREEK ETHICS.

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WHETHER it is possible for a people to organize a government on such principles that it shall be permanent, as human affairs go, is a question that at present receives but little attention because its affirmative is taken for granted. Our contemporaries, except a comparatively small number of pessimists, have such unbounded faith in the ability of that indefinable agency

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'the people' to cope successfully with every exigency and crisis that may arise that they can hardly conceive the possibility of the virtual extinction of a nationality. This faith is not only modern but recent. As long as the governing class was relatively small and to a large extent self-perpetuating, its chief aim was to grant to the mass of the citizens just enough privileges to keep them from becoming unduly dissatisfied and troublesome. We have a striking example of this state of mind in the deliberations of the Congress of Vienna with its long-drawn-out trades and deals. It was an assemblage of sovereigns who took no account whatever of the wishes of their subjects. In the main they were successful, because the lack of general intelligence made such a tutelage endurable. But the performance could not be repeated. Whether the twentieth century is going to the opposite extreme is a problem that time alone can solve. Everyone, however, will admit that the democracy of our day is thoroughly imbued with the spirit of self-confidence. To most of the Greek thinkers human affairs move in cycles and there is no such a thing as continuous progress. Plato and Aristotle believed that there had been many civilizations before their time which had passed away. They believed that the growth of society was like that of the individual tree, not like that of the forest which continually renews itself. Nor was it the belief of the Greeks alone that a people cannot long remain at the acme of prosperity. We do not know what precise signification the Hebrew prophets attached to their vaticinations; but all of them seem to have foreseen and predicted the swift destruction or the gradual transformation of the existing order and the rise of a government on a totally different basis. Many Christian savants and scholars likewise, until quite recently, held a similar belief. We have no criteria by which to fix the beginnings of the nations that now occupy the foremost place in the world's drama. However, the centuries during which the modern languages were in process of formation were coeval with the rise of the

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nations speaking them. It is therefore doubtful whether any can claim to be more than a thousand years old. This is a brief period compared with the life of several empires of the pre-Christian era.

It is proposed to consider here a few of the causes that brought about the virtual extinction of the ancient Greeks, to us the most important people of antiquity. Within somewhat narrow limits their civilization rose to a height that has never been surpassed, perhaps not attained since their day. It is evident that the perpetuity of a nation depends upon a general recognition of the binding force of certain moral obligations such as veracity, the right to life and property, reciprocal responsibility, a considerable degree of altruism, and perhaps an enlightened patriotism as distinguished from a narrow particularism. The Romans established a State that endured for more than a thousand years,—it would be correct to say, for more than two thousand,—without producing a noteworthy writer upon the theory of the State; the Greeks produced a number of authors who discoursed lucidly upon the principles of government while in practical statecraft their countrymen were mere children. The ancient Greeks seem to have been incapable of taking life seriously. The Spartans were to some extent an exception, but not the Dorian stock to which they belonged. In this respect they likewise differed widely from the Romans. Owing to their persistent belief in the constant interference of the gods in human affairs, they were continually under the temptation, to which most of them yielded, to practise the philosophy of life which bids its votaries to endeavor above everything else to have a 'good time,' as the modern phrase goes; and for them to have a good time meant to gratify their senses. "They that laugh shall not rule." A statesman must not be a moral cynic. He must not sneer at the foibles of those he is called to govern, nor be lacking in faith in their moral qualities, or their sense of justice. He must have an abiding faith in their gradual perfectibility. To us it

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seems well nigh incredible that all the men in a city would assemble year after year to listen to the buffooneries of an Aristophanes and his ilk when it was in the direst straits owing to the wars that encompassed it. Although there might be no money in the public treasury to meet the urgent expenses of the government, there was always enough to pay for public spectacles. "Since we may be killed to-morrow, or carried off by disease a few days hence, or starved to death within the year, let us make the most of the passing hour."[1]

Men are sometimes deterred from committing crimes by the recollection of the evil effects of former deeds of like character. The past serves as a warning voice for the future. In fact, men have no guide for the present but the past. But the Athenians wanted no warnings of this sort. Admonitions made them feel uncomfortable, and they did not want to feel uncomfortable, however profitable such a state of mind might be. When Phrynichus had the temerity to bring on the stage a play founded on a recent event, "The Capture of Miletus," which reminded his countrymen of a deed they preferred to forget, they imposed upon him a heavy fine. The only historical drama that has been preserved,—and there may have been no others,— is the "Persæ" of Æschylus, which is virtually a panegyric on Greek valor. The tragic no less than the comic poets frequently criticized, more or less directly, public men and their acts; and in a community where every citizen knew every other, the most veiled allusion would be readily understood. But whatever wholesome effect might have been produced

[1] How widely different is the effect of an impending public calamity on a Christian nation, those can testify who like the writer had the opportunity to observe the public mind in Germany at the breaking out of the Franco-Prussian war. The general feeling can be expressed in the distich:

Let him who laughed now laugh no more:
Let him now pray who never prayed before.

The churches were full; the theaters empty.

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was effaced by the choral odes interspersed among the dialogues; and these odes invariably eulogized the city without stint. Cynical and pessimistic as Euripides usually was, some of the noblest hymns of praise on Athens occur in his works. It will not reform a man to keep saying to him, "You are a bad fellow and have many faults, but after all you are better than anybody else on the face of the earth." In order that no painful effect might remain in the minds of the spectators of a succession of tragedies, the day's performance always closed with a satyr-drama. This was usually of a more or less sportive character. Whether it is a legitimate function of tragedy to instruct is a question that has been much discussed. That the affirmative view is the one most generally held is evident not only from the writings of those who have dealt with the theory, but also from numerous dramatic productions beginning with the Mysteries and Miracle Plays in the later Middle Age and continuing to our time. The Athenian drama was, however, designed to entertain, not to instruct, or at least instruction was merely incidental. It presented nothing new to the spectators, except now and then a slight variation of a familiar legend.

Moral conduct means self-restraint. It means the inhibition or control of the natural impulses whether spasmodic or persistent. It means a fixing of the mind on a future good, not on present enjoyment. It means a constant keeping in view the wellbeing of the larger number rather than the gratification of self, or even of a group. It demands the control of the will by an unprejudiced judgment. It demands a quest for enlightenment that must never be allowed to fall into desuetude. For the man who wishes to do the best and to be the best of which he is capable, there is no rest in this life, as Emerson puts it. Even if we admit with Kant that the only good thing in this world is a good will, the content of the *good* needs to be clearly apprehended; it is not a matter that can be settled once for all, nor is it plain to the unen-

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lightened judgment. The Epicureans no less than the Stoics postulated a highest good; but they attached diametrically opposite meanings to the term.

A notable weakness of the Athenians both from the viewpoint of personal and of political ethics was their chauvinism. This primitive trait they never outgrew. Demos was always willing to listen to the criticism and vilification of his prominent men; never of himself. If one takes the public orations of Demosthenes at their face value, they were addressed to an audience of patriots, of men who had not only made great sacrifices for their country but were ready to repeat them. The facts of the case tell a widely different story. The orator needed the good will of his hearers, and would certainly not have got it had he told them the unvarnished truth. Herodotus was convinced that his countrymen were but "of yesterday" when compared with the Egyptians. Plato and Aristotle knew that there were older nations than theirs, and governments far more stable; but the populace took no lessons from experience, not even from their own. Nor was it the poets alone who were wont to indulge in encomiums on Athens. Socrates did not believe there was another city in the world so desirable as a place of residence as the one in which he was born. While this may have been the case, it merely shows how bad the world was.

The political oratory of Demosthenes occasionally strikes a high moral note, especially when he is not trying to curry favor with the ecclessia. But he is well nigh an exception. Public speakers generally appealed to the most short-sighted and narrow expediency. This is conspicuously evident in those harangues composed by Thucydides for the purpose of setting forth the views of the different parties in the momentous struggle of which he has left to posterity such a graphic account. To us who are accustomed to the fervent appeals made by English and American political orators to the eternal principles of right and justice, it seems well nigh incredible that

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a people, who were in many respects exceptionally keen-witted, could listen with approval to such sophistries. While it is true that in modern times the practice often falls far short of the theory, it is worthy of note that the ideal was not only never lost sight of, but was constantly upheld and defended. It was only for a short period, when such men as Themistocles and Pericles guided the ship of State, that the Athenians can be said to have pursued a rational policy. Albeit, these men lived in times of stress when external pressure almost compelled all parties to lay aside their bickerings or choose the alternative of bringing irretrievable ruin upon the commonwealth. Similar unanimity would have produced like happy results when the populace was confronted with the dilemma of dealing with Philip of Macedon as a friend or a foe. When the course chosen was followed in a half-hearted way, the result was not difficult to foresee by those who were not blind to the signs of the times. The populace had become so venal that enlightened patriotism had scant material to work on.

It is possible for a high degree of morality to flourish under a corrupt administration; but in a State where every thinker, no less than every time-serving politician, identifies morals with politics, the one is degraded just as fast as the other is overslaughed by personal aims. Every citizen is a man before he is a politician or an official. If the man is open to corrupt influences and prone to yield to pecuniary temptation, his civic obligations rarely deter him from evil courses. Moral progress in a State is usually from beneath upward; rarely vice versa. It is not often that the morals of a people are improved by the government under which they live. The early Christians were, according to all the testimony now available, inspired by the spirit of a high morality. But as soon as the Church became a part of the governing machinery of the empire, it began to degenerate. The morals of dissent are always more strict than those of a State Church. On this point conditions

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in modern Russia are particularly instructive; there is virtually no dissent. 'Forgive your enemies' is as important an injunction in politics as in morals. The practical moralist like the true Christian forgives his enemies; the practical politician treats them as if he had done so. No other specious virtue is so much in evidence in our day. Yet it is a truth that all governments have been slow to learn; hence it is hardly surprising that the Greeks never learned it. If a government is to be stable, the defeated party must lay aside its animosities and yield obedience to the laws enacted or approved by its opponents, no matter how unjust it may regard them. And the victorious party must not seek to take vengeance on its adversaries merely for the reason that they represent the opposition. Furthermore, no matter how heinous a crime a citizen may commit, it must not be regarded as working corruption of blood. In Greek legend the hereditary curse is much in evidence; it is hardly less so in Greek history. That the Greeks were always on the watch to make use of this belief, so generally held, is forcibly exemplified in the Cylon affair. Although the reputed sacrilegious deed had been committed almost two centuries earlier, the Spartans, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, revived that charge against the Alcmæonidæ, with which family Pericles was remotely connected, for the purpose of weakening his prestige among his fellow Athenians.[2] A government that cannot or will not protect the life and property of

[2] It is sad testimony to human depravity that the belief in a blood-taint has persisted so long. It is probably the last survival of the clan feeling, which held every member responsible for the crimes of every other. The framers of the constitution of the United States felt it incumbent upon themselves to declare that attainder of treason should not work corruption of blood. Although the statute, formerly invoked by those who sought to make use of it to the discomfiture of their enemies, has not been put into effect for more than a century, it was not repealed by the English parliament until within the memory of men still living. That the Greeks, and in a less degree the Romans, never outgrew the belief in a hereditary curse, should therefore not surprise us.

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its citizens is hardly worthy of the name. It should be called a biarchy, although this somewhat rare term is usually employed in a different sense. Under the tyrannical rule of the Thirty, the government not only would not protect its law-abiding citizens; it made itself the active instrument of flagrant injustice. It gave encouragement to delators and, on their testimony, put to death or drove into exile all who were suspected of present or prospective hostility to their violent proceedings. The era of 'good feeling' that followed their overthrow is almost the only instance in which a counter-revolution in a Greek State was not followed by bloody reprisals.

It should not surprise us that a Russian peasant or a Neapolitan fisherman puts faith in a statuette or a relic; but that a people, so enlightened, in many regards, as were the Athenians, should believe that the gods were amenable to bribery is almost incredible. It was, however, the outward projection of the psyche of the people. As soon as men have learned to believe that the divine favor can be won only by faith in an upright life, they cease to put faith in any external agency. To us it seems well nigh incredible that a people who could believe their gods capable of every form of immorality; who would laugh when they were brought upon the stage solely for the purpose of being made ridiculous, could banish an Anaxagoras for impiety or put to death a Socrates for corrupting the youth and for introducing a false religion. That a high moral ideal and a fatalistic creed are not incompatible was demonstrated by the lives of many of the Stoics. But a creed in which the gods are believed to interfere, at any moment, in human affairs, for the most frivolous reasons, sometimes for the distinct purpose of turning men from the right path, is thoroughly vicious. The Greek gods were governed in their likes and dislikes by whims that would be called childish had they not been so intrinsically malicious. It is not a mere chance, we are compelled to believe, that more of Euripides's plays have been preserved than of any other

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dramatist. The popular taste preferred them because they are pervaded by a strange mixture of fatalism and fiendish malevolence on the part of his divinities. The conduct of Aphrodite in Hippolytus is incredibly ferocious. Most of the Greek gods were believed to be envious of human prosperity, no matter how honestly earned, and were always on the lookout for an opportunity to turn it into misfortune. As success was held to be due to the favor of some supernatural being, it was enough to arouse the enmity of one or more of the Olympian hierarchy, and the prospective victim was kept under surveillance until an opportunity occurred to bring disaster upon him. It was a part of the Greek popular faith that misfortunes are almost always due to some ceremony neglected or to honors withheld; but the irate gods are never influenced by moral motives. Some men like Paris and Odysseus are favorites of one or more gods, without the slightest regard to their deserts.

There is reason to believe that the popular ethical ideal of the Greeks did not advance until it came under the influence of Judaism and Christianity, else why should Plutarch still feel called upon to protest so vehemently against the low standard of the native poets? Notwithstanding the exquisite taste of the Greeks in the plastic arts and in literature, there were few among them who were not tainted with a strain of savagery. It is often said of the savage that he never forgets a benefit or forgives an injury. It is well known that this state of mind was expressed by a favorite maxim among the Greeks. As dramas are written for the public, they reflect the popular taste better than any other form of literature. The vindictiveness which many of the tragic characters display is appalling. The women are as truculent as the men. Since Electra was brought upon the stage by each of the three great tragic poets, she must have been a favorite with Athenian audiences. Her lot in the palace was a hard one, but it was scarcely an unnatural one to the Greeks of the fifth century B. C. The poets have,

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however, made the most of it for their purposes. After the assassination of her father, she prayed without ceasing for the return of Orestes in order that the son might avenge the death of the father. So fierce is her vindictiveness, that at times she seems hardly human. Medea is another mythological character who was, if possible, even more of a fury than Electra, as she spares not even her own children. Hecuba, in the frenzy of her ferocity against Achilles, expresses the desire to devour him raw, —a truly bestial wish. If a lion or a tiger could speak, he would doubtless use similar language.

Not only do Greeks as individuals frequently exhibit this trait: communities and legislative bodies do likewise. Summary vengeance is sometimes visited on suspected or guilty victims in civilized countries by mobs. But a mob is an extra-legal tribunal. It operates in defiance of law and only in rare cases. On the other hand, the Atheninan ecclessia now and then resolved itself into a mob and perverted justice under cover of legality. The vicious manipulation of law to suit the exigencies of particular cases, and the disregard of equity, was the chief reason why no Greek State was able to build up a legal system worthy of the name. It is a curious fact in the history of jurisprudence, that the empire which had its capital on the shores of the Bosporus, was ruled for a thousand years through a body of laws that had been developed by a government which had its seat on the banks of the Tiber.

That the women of the historic era were as fierce and brutal and vindictive as the men, was proved on an occasion referred to by Demosthenes in his "Oration on the Crown." When the Athenians had decided to follow the advice of Themistocles, to embark in their ships and abandon their city and country to the Persian invader, a certain Cyrsilus attempted to dissuade them. His suggestion was perfectly proper and, under the circumstances, seemed wise; at any rate the populace could have accepted or rejected it. Nevertheless, the men

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stoned him to death and the women his unfortunate wife. And these acts are commended by the orator as evidence of devoted patriotism. Herodotus tells a similar story, but adds no comment. When Mardonius was in Athens, he sent a representative to offer terms to the exiled citizens. A man named Lycidas, a member of the council, proposed that the conditions before the assembly be accepted. "However, the Athenians,—both those in the council and those who stood without, when they heard the advice,—were full of wrath, and forthwith surrounded Lycidas and stoned him to death. When the women learned what had happened, each exhorted her fellow, and one brought another to take part in the deed. They all flocked of their own accord to the home of Lycidas, and stoned to death his wife and children." The condemnation of the ten generals is so well known that it needs to be merely referred to here.

It is doubtful whether an exact equivalent of our term *mercy* occurs in any Greek classical author. It is foreign to Greek psychology. The Athenians erected an altar to Pity in their capital, but it was the only one in Greece, and we do not know when it was built. Moreover, pity is not mercy. We cannot believe that the Thirty Tyrants felt no pity for their unfortunate victims, yet they showed them no mercy. Æschylus often uses the word pity, and justice still oftener; but mercy and forgiveness are not in his vocabulary. In the "Chœphoræ," Electra prays to the Manes of her father to have pity on her and her brother. She implores them to grant her burning desires that the murderers may die for just retribution. When the chorus asks her whether her willingness to commit murder, even in requital, is not impious, her answer is, "How impious! to recompense an enemy with evil!" The shout of justice is, "For words of hatred let hatred be the recompense, and for each dreadful stroke let the striker be struck with death." In another passage, Orestes threatens to leave his father's shade unhonored with the savor of burnt sacrifice if he

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does not render aid. "Justice breathes the destroying anger upon her foes." It is instructive to note that, in these and similar passages, justice has a more restricted and personal meaning than we attach to it. We are in fact dealing with the spirit that keeps alive the blood-feud. We may be certain that a modern dramatist would have assigned a widely different *rôle* to this Cinderella of the olden time. She and her brother would have come to their own by a consistent concatenation of events. The Greek tragic poets rarely had scruples against permitting their *dramatis personæ* to disregard every moral obligation if, by so doing, they could slake their thirst for revenge.

It shows a strangely perverted taste, according to modern ideas, that the Athenians would suffer no men and women to be brought upon the stage except the familiar figures of their gruesome legends. The Greek moralists, from Plato to Plutarch, were fully cognizant of the pernicious influence exercised by the current myths upon the morals of the young. They believed that men are intrinsically better than the gods of the populace or the demi-gods of the heroic age. They knew that the poets kept alive the morals of an outgrown era. But their warnings produced no visible effect. When the Greeks were not fierce, they were frivolous. After their great tragic poets had passed away, they turned with zest to the comedies of Menander, chiefly because he exhibited taste and masterly skill in pandering to the wants of the populace. So far as we are in position to judge, none of his countrymen had such a delicate touch, when dealing with the almost endless variety of low intrigues with which his fertile imagination teemed, and in representing the gratification of lust as a legitimate, or at least a venial, pursuit. There is a good deal of truth in the saying of the author of "Ben-Hur" that "to be a Roman is to be a brute." Albeit, we may be certain that no representative Roman would have commended such a character as Odysseus, a man whose highest merit, in the

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eyes of his countrymen, was that he never lacked an excuse for breaking his word when he considered it to his advantage to do so, or hesitated to tell a lie when it seemed to serve his purpose better than the truth. Men usually admire most those characters who most nearly resemble themselves. If we keep this fact in mind, we shall not be at a loss to comprehend why the mythical Odysseus and Achilles were so highly regarded by the Greeks of flesh and blood.

It is probable that all primitive religions are neither moral nor immoral; they are simply non-moral. They are the outward projection of the psyche of the people professing them. Xenophanes had observed this, if it be true as reported, that he remarked, "If oxen had hands, so as to paint, they would paint their gods in the form of oxen." So long as a man or a group of men conceive religion as consisting mainly in the practice of a ritual, it will have no influence on the character of its votaries. Moral gods can be propitiated only by a moral life. Almost all the Greeks of the ancient world, closely imitated by the Eastern Church, the unconscious heir of much of its mythology, laid much stress on the observance of ceremonies. Socrates, for reasons unknown to us, always paid great deference to custom in such matters. If Xenophon's testimony can be trusted, he actually believed that the will of the gods could be ascertained by making use of the traditional rules of divination. When we consider that the Greek lands, as early as the sixth century B. C., had given birth to a number of men who endeavored to solve some of the problems that confronted them in the physical universe, it seems strange that no overtowering personality in the domain of ethics appeared among them: men who were endowed with sufficient intellectual acumen and projected efficiency to distinguish clearly between religion and ethics, or to formulate a monotheistic system, in which religion should consist in the recognition of duty as a divine command, to speak in the language of Kant. This

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was a stage of progress which the Hebrew prophets had attained three or four centuries earlier, and from which their successors never receded. Even if, with Reinach, we define religion as *un ensemble de scruples qui font obstacle au libre exercise de nos facultés,* it may be permeated with moral sanctions. "Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than to God, choose ye." The man who tells the truth because God has said, "Thou shalt not bear false witness," is deterred by his scruples against lying, quite as much as he who, for whatever reason, has scruples against setting out on a journey on Friday, or beginning it with the left foot first. It is a common practice among Christian parents to warn their children against the commission of sins by citing the commands of God.

Treason is almost the only crime for which modern penologists have offered no excuse or paliation. Governments have from time immemorial recognized the fact that public sentiment is unalterably hostile to treason in every form; hence those in power have often inflicted the extreme penalty on men who were traitors only by a forced interpretation of a statute. The bribery in which so many of the Greeks were concerned was in reality nothing less than treason. They rendered service to a foreign power for a consideration. Although the fact is not often so bluntly expressed, there is no doubt that, as men have been and still are, government is impossible without bribery. For every man who seeks a public office from a patriotic motive, at least ten do so for its emoluments. This is, however, not treason. And there is reason to believe that the ethical standard of Greek 'politics' was no less unsatisfactory to the rigid moralist than is that of modern times. But many of the citizens of Greek states were not only willing to take and ready to give bribes; they more or less openly lent their services to a foreign power while ostensibly serving their own country. It has long been a universally accepted axiom that moral conduct is possible only within the State.

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Most Greek thinkers, however, erred in assigning to the State a positive moral influence, in holding that moral conduct can be predicated solely of men in so far as they are citizens. Those modern writers also err who maintain that the moral and the civil law are one and the same thing. In the main, every State aims to promote the moral sentiments,—at least some moral sentiments. The chief function of government, however, is to remove or hold in check those hindrances to activities that spring from immoral motives. Morality is personal; the State as a law-making and law-executing corporation can only act on men in the mass, that is by treating them all alike and not otherwise. A State that is not sufficiently powerful to cope successfully with its internal disintegrating forces is doomed to decay and ultimate dissolution. Free Greece fell from lack of insight on the part of a majority of its citizens. There is often no justification for the man who attacks a State from within, on the plea that he is a reformer; there is never any for him who seeks to overthrow it with the aid of strangers, or who sells his services to a foreign power.

The number of Greeks who were implicated in acts of a more or less treasonable character is so large that their names would make a long list. There was hardly a prominent statesman who was not, at some period of his career, under more or less well-grounded suspicion. Why was this? What was there in the Greek character that made it particularly prone to yield to temptation? The contrast with the Romans is noteworthy, as their annals are virtually without an instance of the kind. As treason is almost always a crime of deliberation, rarely of impulse, it is never difficult to discover the motive. A man becomes a traitor to his country either for personal gain or for revenge. Among the Greeks, the former motive was generally the deciding factor. Within certain narrow limits, they were patriotic, yet they were individualistic. This characteristic is shown in their art and in their philosophy. When art is not individual, it is

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mere handicraft. Philosophy is of necessity personal. The number of philosophers who founded more or less independent systems is large. The Greek people were sensuous: they were lovers of that which affords gratification to the senses, although there were striking exceptions among them. If, then, a statesman, or even the average citizen, was unable to feel the paramount claim of his country upon his allegiance and was constantly impelled by the promptings of a sensuous diathesis, and if, then, a foreign power offered him the means of gratification which his own poor country could not supply, he would always be under the temptation to sell his services to the highest bidder. While it is, therefore, not possible for us to understand why the ancient Greeks surpassed all other peoples in natural endowments, it is not particularly difficult to see why, being what they were, they lacked the narrow and intense patriotism of the Romans, and why none of their tribes were able to found an enduring State. Some of the world's greatest geniuses were handicapped by regrettable weaknesses. Although the Greeks did many things well, there was one thing they could not do. The Romans, because they were endowed with a strong feeling of solidarity, evolved and put in practice principles of government that are still recognized as valid. The Greeks, no less than the Romans, were gregarious; but there was in their psyche a strong anti-social strain. The former, for the very reason that the State and tradition had a feebler hold upon them, developed art and literature and the beginnings of science. They carried the two former to the highest pitch of excellence and became the teachers of the unending future; the latter performed a similar service in jurisprudence, a science that is of necessity the outgrowth of intelligent coöperation. While then Greek philosophers and students of statecraft composed notable treatises on the duties of the citizen, their practical statesmanship was an almost unbroken succession of failures.

A moral law is conceivable under one of two sanctions,

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and probably under none other. One is that of an omniscient God who embodies the highest ethical aspirations of men; the other that of an over-soul, a superman, the spirit of the most advanced and enlightened humanity as exemplified in the highest types of the human race. Socrates is said to have believed that the gods are omniscient and omnipresent. But, we may well ask, What gods? All or only some of them? If only some of them, which ones? The affirmation raises a problem which the Greeks were unable to solve, which none of them probably ever tried seriously to solve, because a solution is impossible. The unity of the moral law is irreconcilable with a multiplicity of deities. The Romans effected a partial solution in the interest of the government by their custom of receiving hospitably and naturalizing the gods of their enemies.

CHARLES W. SUPER.

ATHENS, OHIO.

THE INSTITUTIONAL SELF.

J. DASHIELL STOOPS.

IN Spencer we have a classical defense of the ethics of individualism. In the first place, it is assumed that the individual has natural rights independent of his relations to organized society, with which rights society must not interfere. This is contrary to psychology and history. From the standpoint of social psychology the individual is not a fixed entity. The character of the individual varies with the type of society of which he is a member. The individuality of the primitive savage is determined by his manner of functioning in a specific group. The same holds true of the civilized individual who functions voluntarily in a complex social group. When Spencer tells us that the ideal of corporate ethics contemplates a return to primitive forms of society, he fails to discriminate between the primitive and the mod-

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ern type of corporate life. In the one, the individual is not differentiated within his group; in the other, this differentiation has taken place and the relations binding the individual to his group are not merely instinctive; they are interpreted through a more or less conscious process of reflection. Spencer's statement that, as corporate life increases, individual liberty decreases, is contrary to all our social psychology. The more complex the society in which an individual functions, the more complex is his individuality. Nor is the distinction between family ethics and social ethics justifiable. The individual can no more be treated as a complete unit in the social world than in the family. There is just as much growth, imitation, and education in the field of social ethics as in the ethics of the family. In the earlier development of the theory of evolution it was natural that Huxley and Spencer should interpret survival in individual terms, but it seems to be clear now that among gregarious animals survival is a matter of the group as well as of the individual. And herein is the answer to Spencer's contention that the good must not suffer for the evil. Since both classes exist in the same group, the worse some members become, the more are all the members in danger. Criminality and disease are not merely the just and providential punishment of the worst classes, as Spencer declares. They are the scourge of the entire social group in which they exist. The recognition of the individual, on which Spencer insists, is a fundamental truth, but it is a half truth. It is not true that any society is but the sum of a certain number of individuals. Such a statement assumes that individuals first preëxist as fixed realities and that then society is constituted by some contract dependent upon the reason and choice of these independent individuals. The basal relationships of instinct and custom, with which we are familiar in all primitive groups, are not unmade by the development of the reflective individual will. Spencer's association psychology, by which he defends

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individualism, is itself a product of intellectualism in psychology; it actually overlooked the social instincts because they are deeper than sensations and ideas with which alone intellectualism deals.

Human individuality consists not in separateness, but in the rise of volition. But this reflective will is not extraneous to, it is the individual phase of, the total self, between which and the social group there exists an organic unity which the will may control but cannot create or destroy. The will is necessary to constitute human society. But society is not the mere sum of individual wills, nor is the individual merely a product of society. The organic unity of the individual and his group and the differentiation of the individual will within the group are necessary phases of human nature. The unity of the individual and his group exists prior to the development of the reflective will of the individual, but without the reflective will of the individual the group would not be a human society. Volition must coöperate with this deeper organic unity to constitute human society. But solidarity is the more primitive form, not individualism. There is no such thing as individuals independently coming together to constitute a society. Biology tells us that the complex organism was not formed by a combination of independent cells, but that in the cell itself from which the organism develops there is latent the principle of organization which is manifest in the growth of the complex organism. Just so, society is not the artificial product of the union of independent individuals. It is rather the outward expression of the principle of organization latent in the human individual himself.

The recognition of the individual is a necessary stage in the development of the highest morality. Ceremonies and customs, tribal and national, are thus distinguished from personal morality. Only by becoming individual can morality become universal. When morality is seen to grow out of principles rather than tradition and custom, when it becomes individual, it is in a fair way to be-

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come universal. It is through individuals that society is lifted from the level of custom and tradition to that of reflective morality. Group morality is instinctive and, therefore, conservative; reflection is individual and tends, therefore, to progress. Individual reflection must build upon group instincts. But the will of the individual is necessary to morality. "Obedience to a law," says Pollock,[1] "is not right conduct, but only a step toward it. Righteous men are not they who obey moral precepts, but they whose conduct is the foundation of moral precepts; and the wisest and best of men have always said that obedience to precepts is not righteousness, but only the beginning of righteousness." But at the same time the function of the reflective will is not to unmake the unity which exists between the individual and his group. Conscience, according to the author just quoted, "is not a conviction, or anything put into the mind by teaching, but an ingrown organic habit; and therefore its reign is indefeasible. Were the populous earth to be devastated by some new fury of nature, and but one man left on its face, yet would he not be alone. Though no more duty or service were possible for him, though in the heavens and in the earth there were no eye to see him, yet so long as the thought and will remained uncrushed, the common voice of man would live and bear witness in that one survivor, and the dignity of man be enthroned in that solitary soul."[2] Intellectualistic individualism overlooks the fact that the self is more phyletic, to use Stanley Hall's phrase, than individual. As Pollock expresses it, man is not so much a philosophic, as a social, animal. "Very few men dare to be individual in their vices, or even in their crimes. They mostly strengthen themselves by setting up against the judgment of the community the opinion of some particular class or faction to which they belong; which opinion, however perverse, is a common social bond to

[1] "Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics," p. 298. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 310, 311.

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those who share it, and may be a counter-sanction of great power. The thief is not a being without a conscience, but a man of perverted conscience: the approbation of the thieves' kitchen for a successful exploit outweighs with him the disapprobation of society and the terrors of justice."[3]

Individualism reaches its high-water mark in the writings of Herbert Spencer. His recognition of the individual lies at the basis of the highest form of moral and social life. It is a typical nineteenth century production. The way in which the development of science laid the basis for the recognition of the individual is one of the great triumphs of human knowledge. Modern medical psychology has taken the shackles off the bodies of the insane. Penology, based on a sane psychology, is substituting self-activity and self-recovery for retaliatory punishment. Charity is helping the individual to help himself instead of weakening its recipients by instinctively relieving its own sympathies. Modern education, for political reasons, attempts to reach every voter; for industrial reasons, every worker; for moral reasons, every individual conscience. This is the truth latent in the recognition of the individual. But these individual results have not come through individualism. The competitive individualistic regime has forced the weak to the wall. Individualism benefits only the strong and the competent. Merely to cure the individual when he gets sick will never reach the causes of disease. We can never prevent crime by reforming individual criminals. We must reach the causes of crime; and these are largely social. Eugenics which looks at the individual from the standpoint of the race attempts to reach the real causes of crime and disease.

The arguments of individualism are still generally accepted. As the individual proves his moral efficiency, so it is argued, the State shows its moral insufficiency.

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[3] *Ibid.*, p. 312.

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The man is more than the citizen. The legal restraints of the State contradict the freedom of personality. The individual is an end, the State is only a means. Completely to socialize the self is to destroy individuality. The individual cannot be identified with his social life. The larger the social body, the less its members have in common. This is the well known individualistic point of view.

There is a truth latent in these individualistic statements which ethics cannot ignore. This truth was first proclaimed definitely in the separation of Church and State. Through this separation the individual first achieved the freedom of his voluntary, rational self from the thraldom of a society resting on status. In the primitive social order customs were law. What to us are matters of dress, of etiquette, of taste, of social form, to primitive man were fixed traditions of the group. The gods, the spirits of the departed chiefs, were concerned with these customs. Matters of food, methods of tilling the soil, were sacred affairs. In the family patriarch centered functions that were not only ethical but legal and religious. The individual in the modern sense did not exist. Group responsibility was the order of the day, not individual conscientiousness. One never 'joined' a church as a separate organization. At adolescence every male was initiated into the mysteries of his group. The separation of the Church and State meant that there was a fixed world of law required of all, but that there were some things which were not fixed for all. Here then was a recognized world of opinion, of belief, of preference. This meant the recognition of the individual as a being of will and inner attitudes not fixed from without. It allowed the individual to live in an 'inner' world recognized as distinct from the outer political order. We see this among the Jews after the exile. We observe the same condition of things develop in Greece when the old city-states deteriorated. The schools of philosophy of Greece have the same social significance that the sep-

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arate church organization had in Israel. The synagogue was to the Jew what the philosophic school was to the Greek, the symbol of his inner freedom.

But 'inner' and 'outer' are only aspects of experience. The right to vote and pray and think in one's own way is in itself a purely formal condition of real freedom. One may be free to vote, but if that vote costs him his livelihood, he is theoretically, but not actually, free. One may be free to do his own thinking, but if one has very little knowledge, his freedom of thought is only a possibility, not an actuality. This separation of the 'inner' from the 'outer,' of the moral and individual from the social and the political, because it means the recognition of the individual as free from the conditions of a society of status, is a necessary stage in the evolution of human morality. But wherever this stage of freedom is regarded as a goal, as an end, there history finds the landmarks of moral, social, and political decay. The function of reason is not to analyze itself, but to lead to reasonable action. The will is not independent of instinct and habit; it presupposes them. The reflective self is not an end in itself. The function of the intellect is to rationalize the racial, group self, and to raise it to the level of an institutional self.

Thus we see the threefold movement in the development of the sense of self. At first, the self is objective, social. It is a group self. Then through reflection there develops the exclusive, introspective, conscientious, 'inner' self. But this unhappy self is no sooner free than it grows pessimistic. Not only the Stoics, but even the Epicureans, had a tendency to emphasize suicide. Stern measures are necessary to keep afloat this type of self. The Stoic strengthened himself by excluding the emotions, by admitting only the impersonal processes of the reason. The Epicurean cut loose from the State and lived with his congenial circle of friends. Certainly this is only a halting place; it cannot be a goal of moral development. The goal is the social, 'reconstructed,' in-

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stitutional self. It is the enlarged social self of primitive life, interpreted and rationalized by the conscientious self of reflective enlightenment. It is the rational, voluntary, reflective self amplifying, enlarging itself through its instinctive social equipment derived from the race.

"Educated men no longer believe individualism to be the last word of political philosophy, or the Constitution of the United States the supreme wisdom of statesmanship. . . . Almost every American is chafing at the barriers which the Constitution opposes to social progress." American democracy finds in its constitution a guarantee of personal rights; but so far as it concerns social reconstruction "it is a hidden rock in an uncharted sea." American democracy is "exorcising the spirit of complacent individualism. It has developed a sense of common responsibility, of public duty, of social solidarity. . . . American opinion is now thoroughly alive to the truth that to have the course of industry uncontrolled by the State is by no means to secure freedom of action to the ordinary individual." So speaks Mr. Hobhouse, an eminent authority on social ethics. This is the political formulation of the matter.

Greek philosophy, Hebrew prophecy, and New Testament Christianity brought into the social world a newer sense of self. This represents a genuine addition in the moral evolution of the race. But this newer sense of self must be added to the old group life, the old social instincts, to which it gives direction, control, idealization. When this sense of self comes in opposition to the old order, it leads to social disorganization. Individualism takes certain aspects of experience, like volition and thought, which exist only functionally as control processes, separates these aspects from the social instincts and emotions, and gives us these abstractions for the real self which is both social and individual. This is the philosophical and psychological statement of the matter. In terms of theology it means that the doctrine of the incarnation which the Christian fathers derived from Greek

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philosophy must be interpreted in terms of the social order as the true kingdom of God.

Instinct and emotion constitute the basis of the human mind. Reason is its apex. The first is racial; the second, individual. The foundation of society is in the base of the human mind, not in the apex. The social instincts constitute the foundation of man's moral and social nature. Two types of virtue belong to man in two different forms of social organization. The one set of virtues belongs to an individual as a member of a society founded on status. The other set belongs to the individual as a being of reflection and self-conscious will. The virtues of the one type are social; those of the other type are individual. With respect to loyalty to the group, endurance for common defense, corporate responsibility, respect for group-prohibitions or taboos, and obedience to group-custom, savage morality is far superior to reflective, civilized morality. Primitive man was intensely conscious of his obligations. He had rights only as a member of his group. But his unity with his group was not forced upon him from without. It was the spontaneous expression of his social instincts and emotions selected by nature because of their survival value. Primitive man was, accordingly, well schooled in the distinctly social virtues.

But the development of philosophy, science, art, property, commerce, brought in a new set of virtues which actually made some of the old virtues seem vices. Did not all this automatism mean moral stagnation? Man differs from the gregarious animal by the very fact that in addition to his gregarious instincts he is also a reflective being. Through this reflective process he becomes a being having worth in himself as an individual person. Here we see in process of development another set of virtues, the individual virtues. The intention becomes of more importance than the deed. Purity of heart and 'inner' goodness are more essential than social conformity. And out of this Pandora's box of the

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reflective process arises moral chaos. Reason, pleasure, intuition, nihilism, scepticism, and other forms of moral individualism take the place of the old group morality. Commerce and travel and literature, leading to a comparison of different customs, produce scepticism regarding established customs. Philosophy teaches men to reflect and men can reflect only as individuals. And whether reflection lead to the pleasure-doctrine of the Cyrenaics or to the appeal to Nature of the Cynics or to the titanic moral struggle revealed in the book of Job, it endangers the tradition of corporate responsibility, the chief guarantee of the old social order. The decay of the family is the result of this process, for when men seek their own 'individual' good, they exhibit a negative rather than a positive attitude toward the family as a social institution. Mysticism and scepticism develop in the field of religion, whereas formerly religion and group solidarity were inseparable. The development of industry breaks down primitive communism, and individual property and private enterprise engross men's minds. Such are the developments of the newer sense of self which express themselves in all the departments of life.

Such is the problem which is presented in the reflective stage of moral development. To keep the reflective conscience of the individual and the institutions of organized society in working adjustment is the problem of a further stage of moral discovery. The first stage of moral development shows us the individual as undifferentiated from the group. In the second stage the individual thinks in terms of his own experience. He is no longer objective in his methods of thought, he is introspective. This is the stage of moral development which is universally characterized as that of individualism. But an individual as such is a pure abstraction. Neither society nor the individual can exist on such a basis. Hence a further moral development is necessary. The individual must first find within himself the roots of this social system. The social order must be the spontaneous expres-

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sion of the social instincts latent within the individual himself. The social virtues of the primitive group, and the individual or 'inner' virtues of our second or critical stage of development, are equally essential types of moral characteristics. The most difficult problem of moral development is to preserve and develop within the individual both types of virtues. The loyalty, the self-sacrifice, the patriotism, and the endurance in common defense, the corporate responsibility of the old Greek and Roman city-states were the foundation stones of ancient society and are as essential to a complete morality as the 'inner,' personal, individual, moral characteristics of the reflective ethics of later Greek philosophy or the ethics of the early Christian church. To guarantee the permanence of both these types of moral life demands a still more complex form of moral development. If we call the first stage that of group morality and the second stage that of individualistic or critical morality, we may call the third stage that of the 'reconstructed' or 'socialized' individual. Here the 'inner,' subjective, personal virtues of the individual, or the second, stage, are recognized as correlative to the 'outer,' objective, social relationships of the world of institutions. The third stage preserves the virtues of the first through those of the second, for the third stage differs from the first not by omitting the social virtues, but by expressing them voluntarily. Social institutions on this third level spring from the social experiences and convictions of the individual himself. They are the spontaneous expression and embodiment of the social instincts and emotions interpreted and controlled by reflection, the social instincts and the processes of reflection each being complementary phases of the development of the moral self.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

A PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL PROGRESS. By E. J. Urwick, M.A. London: Methuen, 1912. Pp. xii, 297.

In this animated and suggestive volume, Professor Urwick spreads a fairly wide net. There is something in it for the general reader (we hope he will read it), something for the social reformer, something for the sociologist, something for the social philosopher, and something for the religious thinker, not to say the mystic. Now and then the writer expresses a fear that his conclusions may be far from palatable to one or other of these varieties, especially to the sociologist, and indeed it is not easy for any man to please them all. But he need not so disquiet himself. For if anyone of them takes umbrage, it will certainly not be because his pages, in spirit, tone, criticism, or attack, fail to move within the limits of entirely legitimate controversy. Nor will it be because the attitude is only critical, and, far less, aggressive. On the contrary, one of the merits of the volume is that its central aim, avowed in a preface and confessed in an introductory chapter, is to push in various directions, practical and theoretical, a constructive, positive doctrine, which constrains the writer to deal faithfully with all comers, and if need be to keep them in their proper place.

The keynote of this doctrine is that it is frankly, not to say fervidly, teleogical and religious. The possibility of a philosophy of social progress stands or falls with the fact that the social philosopher, like the social reformer and unlike the sociologist, can rise by faith to a vision of the supreme good and end towards which individuals and societies are forever striving, and in the light of which alone the many facts, tendencies, and struggles of social life can be adequately interpreted and understood. There is no mistaking the strength of conviction with which this is reiterated. It is "faith in his vision of a kingdom of heaven upon earth, in the light of which every wise and good man interprets all social facts, and the whole system of facts, we call our social life." "Progress comes from visions and the faith in them." "Social philosophy . . . involves a

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strong conception of a master aim and master plan of our life; a fervid idealism is the core of it; its essence is to lay hold of a dream of a City of God, and to make all its meanings, all its linkings of effect to cause, all its groupings of change under the laws of sequence and causation, dependent from beginning to end upon the spirit and purpose of the dominating ideal." In the light of such passages, it is hardly necessary for the writer to say that a social philosophy is "very closely analogous to a religious faith." It *is* a religious faith. In this aspect the book is nothing less than a plea for the need for the vision of God.

It is the paramount place assigned to this conception, faith, or vision, that determines Professor Urwick's attitude to the sociologists, which, to say the least, is far from flattering. He does not mince his words. "I do not believe that there is or can be any science of social life; nor do I believe that sociology is or can be a science." No, it cannot be a science because, by its scope and method, it is voluntarily shut out from that conception, faith, or vision of the Good in which, and in which alone, social phenomena, be their investigation never so laborious, can find their adequate explanation. Alas for the sociologist! He may observe, he may generalize, he may analyze the social structure and process with all the aids that the abstract social sciences,—eugenics, for example, or economics,—can furnish ready to his hand; he may synthesize the results of never so many of these abstract sciences into a unity which, in his blind enlightenment, he calls a science; but one thing is lacking, the one thing needful, the perception, namely, that there is a whole spiritual universe of realities and powers, in the apprehension (one may not call it *knowledge*) of which the only attainable synthesis of either individual or social process can ever be found. For men are not merely things, or animals, or minds, or social units, they are souls; and, as souls, even the humblest of them can enter, by the passport of faith and the vision, into a spiritual universe which is incomparably the most important reality and influence in human experience. And so the sociologist is foredoomed to failure. He fails, not because of what he does or tries to do, which no doubt is much, but because of what he cannot do, so long as, in the fatal limitation of the scientific spirit, he is content with his 'facts' (of which Prof. Urwick speaks with scant respect) and averts his eyes from the end, the good,

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the ideal, the things that are not of this world, the things that are God's, which, if he only knew it, are the only things that in the long run seriously matter (one hardly goes beyond the writer's own words in saying it) to the sons of men.

It is just here that the social philosopher, who is throughout contrasted with the sociologist, enjoys his advantage. He has seen the vision. From the entanglements and obscurations of his earthly lot as a struggling social unit, he has risen to an apprehension of the Good. Imperfectly enough it may be, yet with conviction, he has laid hold of the ideal and felt its influence. And having passed through this momentous experience, he is not minded to minimize it. On the contrary, he carries it with him, not only as the source of spiritual strength and spring of effort, but as the clue, the only satisfying clue, to the significance and explanation of social fact and social process. Nor does there seem to be any doubt in our author's mind that philosophy —if we do not expect too much from it—may well hope to succeed where sociology must forever fail.

Whether this contrast between the sociologist and the philosopher,—so much to the advantage of the latter,—may provoke the former to wrath, will depend. Were it taken to mean that the sociologist is shut out from the study of the varieties of religious experience, or the influence of ideals on human life, he might justly resent the monopoly of the spiritual universe by the philosophers. For, of course, the natural history of religions and ideals, and the hopes and aspirations which they inspire, are most certainly within the scope of sociology. Nor is it to be supposed, unless by a hasty reader, that this is denied by Prof. Urwick. The point is that he sees clearly, and says forcibly, that there is all the difference in the world between the sociologist who takes stock of these and other phenomena with the unemotional and unprejudiced scientific eye, and the philosopher or the prophet or the reformer, whose faith in the reality of a spiritual world is unfaltering and whose individual life has felt the masterful force of the aspirations which are evoked by a 'transcendental' (our author uses the word) object, a world of realities and powers into which the sociologist makes no claim to penetrate. This is the claim made for the social philosophers, and on its legitimacy the very possibility of a social philosophy, as Prof. Urwick conceives it, depends.

It is at this point, however, that, having disposed of the

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sociologist, Prof. Urwick has to meet the philosopher. Faith may be salvation, but it is not philosophy. Philosophy is reasoned, and when it ceases to be reasoned, it ceases to be philosophy. And it is just here that our author manifestly parts company with it, for his fundamental conception, his ideal, his vision of the Good, without which any genuine social synthesis is impossible, rests upon individual faith. Nor is this faith provisional. If that were all, philosophy might welcome it as an installment for which in the long run a more rational foundation could be found than the dogmatic but doubtful intuition of the individual mind. But there seems to be no such expectation here. If we understand him aright, Prof. Urwick carries his faith into his philosophy as the last word of social speculation.

This, however, need not be further pressed. There is philosophical precedent for the doctrine that human reason must think or believe where it cannot know. Nor is a philosopher to be called 'a traitor' (our author fears he may be so regarded) for following in the wake of Kant. It may be enough, therefore, to submit the philosophy before us to two further questions. On what ground does this faith rest, and what is its value as a principle of unity?

Into the second of these questions our limits forbid us to enter at any length. It must suffice to recognize with gratitude the many interesting and well-illustrated pages which deal with much that a social teleology can do to deliver social thinkers from the tyranny of abstractions, and to gather together, under a scheme of values, the diverse elements of social life which at once supplement and correct each other. The chapter on this subject ought to be suggestive both to the scientific specialists and to the social reformers, both of whom so easily forget the whole in their one-ideaed absorption in the sectional part. Nor is it little that Prof. Urwick hopes from a social philosophy in this direction. "It is conceivable, that some day, when we think of societies, we shall see them chiefly as vast mind-systems, full of conscious significance in every part, each organ and relationship designed to serve a purpose incessantly worked upon and improved by the ceaseless effort of the society to think out and realize a veritable city of God."

It is, however, rather to the fundamentals that the philosopher will probably turn; in other words, to the analogies and argu-

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ment by which this apostle of teleology would have us accept that faith in the reality of the social ideal on which, as we have seen, all else depends. "Whence then the ideals?" he himself asks, "and whence the will of idealism?"—that will which, we must remember, has the double function of unifying social phenomena and leaving its reforming mark upon society. And the answer to these questions—which is a bit startling—is perhaps best given in some brief statements of the writer himself. One is that the individual man is "essentially supra-social." Another is that "the most significant characteristic of the individual is "his persistent antagonism to the society to which he belongs." A third is that the antagonism is "an antagonism, not of a more or less narrow self to other selves, but of an eternally distinct individual to a society to which, as an individual, he is eternally alien." The words might seem to be a preamble to a philosophy of solitude, of anything indeed rather than *social* progress. Yet it turns out to be otherwise. For, as we read, this "eternally distinct" and "eternally alien" individual is transformed not only into a social philosopher, but into a social reformer, to whose social optimism there are hardly any limits. For it is only when, in his capacity of supra-social individual, man has turned away from the limitations and self-seekings of society that he can, presumably by some sort of intuition, assure himself, with a certainty beyond anything that knowledge or ratiocination can yield, that there is a real end, ideal or good for man, no matter what may happen to society. "Our ideals," so run the words, "are drawn from a non-social source, inspired, if you will, by something beyond this world." This is the first point. The second is that an ideal thus apprehended is—as indeed we might expect—extremely undefined and empty of content, apart from such content as it may borrow from more concrete ideals that come and shape themselves and pass on the changing and unreal surface of social life. Empty though it be, however, this ideal "drawn from a non-social source," is no mere object of mystic or quietistic vision; it is an object that, through aspiration (which we read is "totally distinct from desire") vitalizes "the will," and vitalizes it so overmasteringly that neither the philosopher nor the reformer can rest, till he has done his best to bring society nearer that ideal, the faith in which is not in the least shaken by the fact that it is so empty. The position may be illustrated by the de-

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scription of the real or true individual, as contrasted with the ordinary social unit in whom such infusion of the "true individual" as is present (and we read that it is in some faint measure at any rate to be found in every man) is always more or less smothered by self-seeking desire. For this true individual, "the kernel of spiritual power" which is in every man and especially in the reformers, social philosophers, and saints, is "God-seeker but not self-seeker"; "he aspires but does not desire"; and this aspiration (which reminds one of the Kantian pure reverence for the moral Law) is strong enough to motive the "intensest activity" in social service. And when reforming activity is baffled by a stupid and heedless world,—as it often is,—the philosophic reformer has always the consolation that *his* feet are still planted on "the bed-rock of moral certainty." "The only influence that counts," we read, "is that of the soul—or of some power working through the soul" (the 'or,' one might suggest in passing, is here an extremely important conjunction, the significance of which we might wish to be further elucidated). And in comparison with this "the good man knows that no social events need necessarily be important to any of us." There is more than a dash of Stoicism here. But there is Stoicism also in the assurance that the spirit is not to be quenched by obstacles. Nor does a keen perception of the limitations under which the reforming spirit must work in a refractory world, and in especial of the unpreparedness of the mass for receiving what the reformer has to give, prevent the writer from ending on a note of optimism. "And this is the philosopher's final lesson: to learn that what is of importance is not the reform, but the will that prompts it; not the improvement of social machinery, but the resolve that machinery shall be improved until all are helped by it; not the results achieved by our devises, but the effort to achieve something good for the use of our fellow-creatures. If the reformer dislikes this doctrine, let him remember that it is after all but a corollary from the assumption which we took as a foundation, namely, that the supreme purpose of human life, whether individual or social, is a spiritual purpose, even as the sole interpretation of its significance is a religious interpretation."

The optimism, however, cannot conjure away the difficulties; and Professor Urwick is probably right in thinking that the philosopher, though he may share his hopes, will not be content

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with the grounds on which they are built. Hardly can the philosopher be content to stake the reality of the object, the ideal, on nothing more satisfying to the reason than the intuition of even the salt of the earth, even although this intuition is allowed to be, at any rate in some dim measure, a universal human experience. He knows too well that intuition, even though it is one of the most penetrating, is likewise one of the most fallible organs of truth. He clings too tenaciously to the rational demand that the objective order, the partial vision of what is in these pages declared to be the source of all reforming inspiration, must be recognized, if it is to be truly objective, as embracing Nature and Society in a larger unity. Nor will he be satisfied with the dualism, than which none can be sharper, which divides Desire from Aspiration as with a hatchet, and then attempts to bridge the cleavage by a 'will' that is certain of nothing except the obligation of a general direction and intuition to do something good for society. One cannot help feeling that an ideal or end thus depleted of all objects of desire, even the best and noblest, can hardly bear the weight of the fervor and pertinacity of the devotion it is expected to inspire. And not least, the philosopher will demur—if he holds that the divine plan is progressively revealed in history and in social achievement, he must demur—to the declaration that the individual is not only persistently antagonistic but 'alien' to his society. As a protest against the subjugation of the individual to a given social environment, and an all too passive acquiescence in the social situation as the arbiter of the individual's duties, the pronouncement may stand. And it is doubtless needful enough, in these days when so much has been said about our station and its duties. But one cannot suppress the misgiving that it is not to individuals with whom it is a prime article of faith that they are eternally antagonistic and eternally alien to their society that it is most hopeful to look either for the social philosopher or the social reformer. Not that their aspirations are other than lofty. Are they not "God-seekers and not self-seekers"? No, but because they may find it so uncongenial to return, as apostles of social betterment, to a social world from which they glory in proclaiming their eternal alienation.

One offers these suggestions for what they are worth. It is obvious enough that much more space than is available would

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be needed to make them really effective. But enough has perhaps been said to indicate that Professor Urwick's volume is well worthy of the perusal both of philosophers and reformers. No reader can fail to see that it is the work of a mind that is alive and in living contact with social problems.

JOHN MACCUNN.

Scotland.

A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF BERGSON'S PHILOSOPHY. By J. McKellar Stewart, D.Phil. London: Macmillan & Co., 1911. Pp. x, 304.

To Dr. Stewart the division between Intelligence and Intuition is fundamental in Bergson's philosophy; he is said to regard the former, roughly, as Kant did, but to assert that it is only a fragment of the faculty of knowledge. Dr. Stewart's conclusion is that this doctrine is unsupported by argument and that it fails to solve the difficulties which it claims to destroy. The present book, then, is throughout concerned with this central doctrine as it is developed in Bergson's writings. The expository section is full of repetition, a fault almost unavoidable in criticizing such a writer; it is aggravated, however, by the arrangement of the book, which has an introduction, an exposition, a criticism, and a final estimate. In itself the exposition is full and clear, and will be useful even to the close student of Bergson.

The work, however, is professedly critical. As such it has one very considerable merit, especially in an author who disagrees with the new philosophy: it is genuinely sympathetic, for Dr. Stewart does try to get at Bergson's meaning. Three remarks may be made on this aspect of the book: 1. Dr. Stewart's criticisms seem on the whole sound and conclusive against Bergson. 2. But several points are passed over in silence which might be vigorously controverted; these occur chiefly in Bergson's discussions of mathematics and logic. 3. And towards the end we hear frequently of an easy solution for the difficulties which have prompted Bergson, which, however, seems fully as mysterious as anything the latter has ever said and for which absolutely no reason is given. I shall say a little under each of these heads.

1. Dr. Stewart is right in emphasizing the unpragmatic

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nature of Bergson's philosophy. He points out very well that the view taken of the intellect is arbitrarily abstract, and that at any grade the intellect is concerned with a good deal that is not space or matter: he destroys the view that we can deduce the form of the intellect from its function. He also notes that it is very doubtful if 'intuition' can be called knowledge. (Unfortunately for Bergson, we too have instincts, and there seems no knowledge in them.) His criticism of the ideal genesis of matter and intelligence is also good. Why should the original activity be interrupted at all, and why should it immediately be degraded? "One is forced to the conclusion that Bergson has no clear idea of matter, or, if he has, he has not made his meaning plain" (p. 188). In the genesis of intelligence, on the other hand, it is asumed that mind must become that which it knows. He notes that space and pure homogeneity are simply *not* synonymous, and that Bergson here asserts both that mathematics and physics merely over-accentuate the spatiality of matter, and that mathematics is a veritable means of contact with the absolute.

In short, Bergson has a gratuitously narrow view of reason and intelligence, taken from Kant, and he outdoes Kant in ultimately making space the one category. This must lead to scepticism, if we fail to find an escape in 'intuition.' But Bergson's account of this is equally unsatisfactory. For the doctrine of space is fallacious; we cannot get behind our spatial experience to see how it originated. The doctrine of homogeneous time is inexpugnable merely because of Bergson's definition of space. And thirdly, there is no reason at all why what is described as Duration should be called time. Bergson never distinguishes succession and the conditions of our consciousness of succession: moreover he *has* to admit succession in the material world (p. 225). The intuition of duration does not add to our knowledge: the duration in which we see ourselves acting is never that in which we act, and the latter in Bergson is just as Mr. Bradley's undifferentiated feeling. We can, however, have a *knowledge* of difference, for example, in the self: the introduction of difference is not a negation of judgment.

As for the defence of freedom, it removes freedom from the higher stages of our lives, and cannot explain the inter-connection of the phases in the experience called 'mine.' It is based

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on a complete misunderstanding of 'mechanical causality,' confusing it with the conditions of knowing it.

The intuitive method, indeed, involves the assumption that we cannot know things as they are. Bergson is met with the Kantian puzzle regarding the relation of the categories and their raw material. Philosophy should be inarticulate, and we are led straight to scepticism. And, thinks Dr. Stewart, there are evident signs in Bergson of a revolt against the fundamental opposition of intelligence and intuition.

2. Dr. Stewart does not note what must have struck many readers, especially of the "Essai." That work shows that Bergson is a visualizer; and since, as Dr. Stewart does note, Bergson constantly confuses the conditions of knowledge with the intelligible nature of the object of knowledge, this accounts for his amazing account of how we count and arrange things in 'time.' Bergson always confuses psychology and logic, and his psychology itself is sufficiently wonderful.

Dr. Stewart talks of "an ideal space . . . which is the space of geometry" (p. 215). He seems to think that geometry is necessarily a science dealing with a space which is given, as chemistry deals with 'chemicals' which are given. Consequently, he cannot show how completely Bergson misunderstands the entire nature of mathematics. His remarks on space and time (pp. 219ff.) show a like ignorance of modern work in logic, and are of little value.

3. Dr. Stewart apparently thinks it a weighty recommendation of anything he says, that it is "in line with the best traditions of idealism" (p. 246): this is taken as synonymous with having "hearty acceptance in most quarters worth considering." It is certainly no recommendation of anything he says about mathematics, or of the following points.

Kant, we are told, should not have adopted the classification of judgments in formal logic as a clue to the categories: he should have proceeded from "the reflective analysis of the functioning unity itself" (p. 167, and *cf.* p. 193). If so, it is hard that Bergson should be chastized for telling us how matter and intelligence have occurred, especially as *he* refers to empirical data somehow or other.

"Self-conscious life is the highest manifestation of life which we *can* know. All the other forms of life, then, which we are capable of knowing, must of necessity be known in terms of

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our own self-conscious life. As Professor Caldwell puts it: 'Thought is not *outside* things, but latent in them . . . '" (pp. 183, 184). None of these sentences has a clear meaning, and there is no connection between them, whatever clear meaning be given to them: yet they seem the pith of his philosophy.

Dr. Stewart frequently observes that we do know things, but he says "things as they exist for themselves." Surely he means "as they are," and the other phrase has an illicit implication.

It is implied (on p. 230) that strength of consciousness (whatever that is) is in direct proportion to "clearness of conceptual articulation." Assuming that this is not a definition, what fact does it state?

Personal consciousness is an organism, to understand which we must think of its parts. We do so when we see that they are "factors of a judgment of some kind, which in its turn is an activity of conscious mind in pursuit of an end which is ultimately its own self-realization." "All the judgments or functions of unity are shown to have their source in a self-conscious soul or subject" (p. 233). What this means is not clear at all; the single phrase "self-realization" has no clear connection with "self" and the usual sense of "realization": those in the quarters worth considering should be aware of this nowadays.

Again, Dr. Stewart says that Bergson has given an inadequate analysis of motive, in his account of freedom (p. 263). Our beliefs are "*ours* because *we* have, explicitly or implicitly, attributed to them the predicate 'good'" (p. 251): this seems simply but entirely false! This self is "an organism of conceptual elements." "It is primarily and fundamentally a self whose very existence consists in this re-creation of itself which, we may say [why?], takes place in the practical judgment (however vague it may be, and whatever form it may take) that life is unconditionally good" (p. 253). This is so qualified that it may mean anything, but that is no reason for saying it, and it does not seem true.

The subjective function "as such" (as if we cared about it as not such) can never become an object of presentation: it is quite plain from this that it can be an object of thought, anyhow. Again, "feeling is entirely subjective" (p. 260): is thought (*i. e.*, my thinking) not subjective in the same sense,

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and is anything 'psychical' not so subjective? This sort of thought is plausible only because of the hopeless ambiguity of its technical terms, which have the same sound as so many popular words.

Dr. Stewart is quite certain about freedom. "We *know* that we are free. . . . Free activity is immediately grasped in feeling" (p. 262). But on the same authority, his own, feeling can never become cognitive, being purely subjective: it does not involve the subject-object relation (p. 259).

I have said enough to show that the appeal to the tradition of idealism is a serious one; it ought to be clear that it is not a proof of this amazing psychology and metaphysics.

Dr. Stewart seeks to give us an intellectual category which Bergson thinks of little use. "The truly causal interpretation is, implicitly, to some extent at any rate, teleological" (p. 271). Again note the qualifications! But it is certain that teleology is only the assertion of a certain sort of cause, about which the principle of causality says nothing, any more than it does, *e. g.*, about a physical cause: any other interpretation of causality seems useless and alogical. "The cause . . . can be clearly defined only in the effect" (p. 271). As a matter of fact, the principle directly implies that *each* can be defined separately, so far as it is concerned.

Dr. Stewart concludes, therefore, that we need not supplement the nature of intelligence by intuition, but simply by feeling and will (p. 281). These are "undeniable aspects of our consciousness, and must not be omitted in any attempt to decipher the meaning of the universe." But this is true only as it is of any fact, mechanical or otherwise: the nature of intelligence is not supplemented thereby. Genius brings humanity to a self-realization immediately perceived as such (p. 292), but such intuitions cannot be methodized. The ultimate nature of such personality is unity in difference (p. 300): but what has unity in difference to do with persons more than with other things?

In short, the book suffers from repetition, and from overloading with a philosophy which goes beyond Bergson in vagueness, mystery, and lack of argument, and the reader at the end may have well forgotten the quite excellent passages of exposition and criticism in its earlier parts. It is time that all realized that the age of this 'idealism' as having a monopoly

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of critical and philosophic merit, has gone. It may still be expounded and argued for, no doubt, but it cannot be quoted as in itself a necessary or sufficient reason for saying anything.

RICHARD SMITH.

Cambridge, England.

MODERN SCIENCE AND THE ILLUSIONS OF PROFESSOR BERGSON. By Hugh S. R. Elliot; with a Preface by Sir Ray Lankester. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912. Pp. xix, 257.

Mr. Elliot is concerned here with M. Bergson's philosophy only so far as it claims to be based upon scientific facts and to account for the process of evolution. He gives a sufficiently clear and succinct account of the doctrines he is attacking (ch. II), and criticises them in detail (ch. III): the criticism is burdened with repetition and cannot be called concise. His other chapters, forming the major part of the book, attack metaphysics and defend mechanism. Science and he have no metaphysics: a judgment is the connection of two terms, and there is no term outside the universe and, therefore, no possible judgment about it. A very inadequate chapter on the history of philosophy backs this up. He defends "epiphenomenalism," as a theory now "known" by science: the mental states, however, are not "caused," since that is a term applicable only to matter and motion; nevertheless, he is a strict determinist. "Facts" alone can settle the question, and there is no intervention of a spiritual factor in science or art.

The book will not add to anyone's knowledge of science, and as philosophy it seems very inadequate and crude. But it demolishes much of the new philosophy.

R. SMITH.

Cambridge, England.

LAUGHTER: AN ESSAY ON THE MEANING OF THE COMIC. By Henri Bergson. Authorized translation by Clondesley Brereton and Fred Rothwell. London: Macmillan & Co., 1911. Pp. 200.

This is a fascinating work, with all the clearness characteristic of French criticism and the carefulness of a philosophic thinker, and it is excellently done into English. But few will be converted to M. Bergson's theory of the comic.

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Laughter is defined at the outset as a social corrective of the anti-social, and its cause has universal characteristics, however it occur. The laughable is always human: it is devoid of emotional elements and appeals to intelligence pure and simple; it appeals only to some social group and may be unintelligible to outsiders. It is the automatic and mechanical aspect of what should be living and free that makes us laugh.

With this as a *leitmotiv,* M. Bergson analyzes the comic in forms and movements, in situations and words, and in character.

The chapter dealing with this last phase is the most deeply interesting, for it gives us the author's views on art and its relation to life, and hints at his ethics. Comedy belongs neither to art nor to life; its position is equivocal. Art deals with the individual and real, comedy with types. Comedy organizes laughter, and its material is ready-made when life is seized upon by vanity.

In his conclusion he admits that we often sympathize with the comic character and are relieved from the strain of thinking. Again, "laughter is simply the result of a mechanism set up in us by nature or, what is almost the same thing, by our long acquaintance with social life. It goes off spontaneously. . . . It has no time to look where it hits" (p. 198). But the nature of this sympathy he leaves quite vague. We are told that laughter is often unjust, and should never be kind. If we push the matter farther, the result may be most unflattering: "Laughter is gaiety itself. But the philosopher, who gathers a handful to taste, may find that the substance is scanty and the after-taste bitter."

M. Bergson certainly makes this plausible and very interesting, but in the abstract it is not convincing. He often seems just to take up a *leitmotiv,*—as he would say,—quite arbitrarily; then he displays amazing skill in special pleading. It does not seem true that feeling and laughter are incompatible, and the argument in the book assumes,—for no given reason,—that the only possible feeling would be some form of sympathy. Again, laughter may usually be social, and its evolution may be entirely from social factors, and comedy as a form deals with social groups: but we do have laughter, deep, sincere, valuable, when we are alone and regardless of society. Even if this is his "mechanical" laughter, it is sufficiently notable to

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make his treatment of the subject quite inadequate. He is altogether scornful of any other formulæ, which, however, might go some way to explain this "mechanical laughter." It is gross assumption that laughter is primarily social, and in any case the point is, what is laughter? M. Bergson only takes an obvious effect of much laughter, as its purpose; if we deny this initial assumption, his whole discussion is vitiated.

He discusses a very narrow range of the comic. From his first example, a man slipping in the street, to the pessimistic sentence with which he concludes (quoted above), we have one type of the comic alone, of which the former is sufficiently representative. Of the humorous we see little and hear next to nothing, but it cannot be sharply divorced from the comic and it violates many of his canons. He talks as if a man could never be comical to himself. He neglects (and illustrates!) the difference of national taste in comedy, save so far as he can connect it with the variety of national social customs. He neglects any laughter that is spontaneously hearty: his basis is the dogma that laughter is a social corrective, which he supports by special pleading from a realm of evolution which is purely speculative. He begins by remarking how elusive is the spirit of laughter, which no definition can imprison, and he does make this appear very convincing; for he himself would make what is essentially alive, dead and mechanical.

The book would repay a much more detailed analysis, and it is perfectly delightful to read.

RICHARD SMITH.

Cambridge, England.

FROM RELIGION TO PHILOSOPHY. By F. M. Cornford. London: Arnold, 1912. Pp. xx, 276.

Almost all human beings who have reached any degree of civilization hold, more or less confusedly, a variety of opinions which it would be possible to classify as attempts to solve the great enigmas of existence: Of what is the world made? What is the nature and destiny of the soul? Is there one God or many, and what is the nature of the connection between him (or them) and man and the world? What sort of things are right and wrong, good and evil, and why? We might then sort the solutions into two classes. In so far as the ideal which a

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man sets before himself is that of excluding emotional bias from the consideration of such problems and of accepting only what is reasonable or demonstrable, we have philosophy or science; and in so far as the ideal of demonstrability is blurred, and stress is laid on the emotions, we have religion. In practice neither ideal is ever attained in its purity; also the two classes shade into one another in such a way that it is hard to say at what point the one ends and the other begins, although it is clear enough that as a general rule religions precede philosophies in order of time. But is the sequence causal as well as temporal? And, going further back, can we discover any general causes for the primitive religious beliefs of mankind? Mr. Cornford answers both these questions. In discussing the genesis of religion, he does not propound any original view, but merely adopts the facts and theories of such writers as J. G. Frazer, Lévy-Bruhl, and Emile Durkheim; but in the other part of his task, where he traces a chain of causal connections between the most primitive religious ideas and the philosophical and scientific speculations of the Greeks, he is trying to do something which has never been done before. The result is a book of the profoundest interest and of great originality.

The story he unfolds is roughly as follows. If we wish to picture to ourselves what a primitive society is like before the existence of anything that can properly be called religion, we must realize that the individual savage has scarcely any consciousness of his own apart from the collective consciousness of his group. The 'primitive magical fact' is intense emotional activity, collectively experienced by a group; there is no idea of a God as distinguished from the group, and instead of religious ritual we have a set of common duties and magical observances centred on the totem of the tribe. This is the pre-religious or magical stage. To understand it fully, we must remember that the group is more than a mere collection of human beings. The human beings are divided into exogamous phratries, each of which includes its respective totem; that is to say, the emu-man is not differentiated from the emu-bird, whose garb he assumes on occasion in the mimetic dance. The whole universe is in this way parcelled out into segments, each of which contains, as in a 'magical continuum,' the material elements, the plants or the animals, as the case may be, together with the human beings allotted to it. In totemism nature and

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society are conceived as continuous, for the clan and its totem-species together are one, united by one blood. And in the fact that the boundaries of the various segments are demarcated by taboos, we see the origin of the emotions connected with right and wrong: the emu-man has no private individuality distinct from the collective emotion aroused by the due observance of his functions as an emu.

Religion proper only begins with the dawning of a distinction between myself and the social consciousness, and the first religious representation is an externalization of this collective consciousness, such as we find in the Melanesian *mana* and the North American *wakonda*,—a subtle, homogeneous, fluid form of matter uniting the social group in a bond of kinship. From this there arise by a process of fission two further collective representations, that of God and that of the human soul. The original 'magical continuum' dividing into two 'pools' of human and non-human force, totemism dies out; the magical group ceases to coincide with the clan, and becomes a sort of church, united by its *mana* and consisting of persons with secret and exceptional powers, whose influence can extend over the whole of nature. Here we are already on the verge of history; in Greece the Kouretes and Idæan Daktyls seem to have been such groups. The members of the group are divine, and their collective soul is a dæmon. And, by a parallel process, another kind of dæmon comes into being simultaneously,—the dæmon of an element or department of nature, connected, not with a human group, but with a spatial division.

These two conceptions are very important, as they are the respective sources of the two main currents, first of Greek religion, and then of Greek philosophy. The type of the first kind of dæmon,—the Mystery God, or dæmon of a human group,—is Dionysus, who represents the life of all animate nature as it flows round the recurrent cycle of the year. The framework of the conception is essentially temporal, as opposed to the framework of spatial departments from which the gods of Olympus are developed. The Mystery God always remains human as well as divine, and he is worshiped with orgiastic and sacramental ritual. The Olympians, on the other hand, drift beyond the reach of human emotions into an immutable heaven; there is no mystical communion with them; they are worshiped with sacrifice; they are anthropomorphic and many in number,

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whereas the Dionysiac scheme tends toward pantheism and monotheism. Thus in Homer we find the world spatially distributed among the Olympians in a system of provinces, the principle of division being 'Moira,' or fate, an impersonal entity above and behind the gods. As the gods develop, the supremacy of the more primitive Moira diminishes, but it leaves its traces behind it in, for instance, such a representation of taboo as the river Styx ('shuddering'), 'the great oath of the gods,' which fences off their different departments.

Now although by the time of Thales the Olympians have long receded into the remote heaven, to which from the beginning they were doomed by their origin in spatial conceptions, yet the first Ionian philosophers took the primitive religious framework for granted. Their speculation springs naturally from Olympianism; it is dominated by spatial externality, it is pluralistic, it tends toward atomistic materialism. These early thinkers could not escape the collective representation out of which the Olympians sprang,—the conception, namely, of a primitive life-stuff parcelled out into departments as of right. This primary stuff whether it be 'air or mist' (Anaximenes), 'the limitless' (Anaximander), or 'water' (Thales), is ordered into elements by a process which is conceived as moral, because it is taken over from the prereligious notion of a segmentation of the universe by taboos, the transgression of which constitutes 'injustice.' Thus, Anaximander's 'limitless,' with its four subordinate elements, corresponds to a totemic tribe of four clans: the cosmology is a transcript of the social structure; the primary datum of philosophy is supplied by inherited collective representations. I have no space to trace here the progress of the scientific Ionian school, working on this primary datum, to its conclusion in the atomism of Democritus. I suspect that Mr. Cornford considers it a rake's progress; at any rate, he sums it up as a product of the same temperament as Olympian theology, and, calling it pluralistic, spatial, rationalistic, and fatalistic, contrasts it with the other great development of Greek philosophy, the mystical tradition, the root of which, he urges, is equally to be sought in primitive religion.

The mystical tradition, in which the ideas, not of space, but of time and of number (the measure of time), are fundamental, is derived from the Dionysiac cult-society, a single group with a common life centred in its dæmon. Hence the

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temporal continuity of life is prominent here, together with such notions as that of rebirth and of the Wheel of Time, which is also the Wheel of Right; these give rise to the doctrines of sin, retribution, and purification. For Heracleitus, in violent reaction against Ionian rationalism, the one reality in the flux is soul-substance, with the emphasis on its life in the cycle; and ultimately this soul-stuff, which is common to all things, is a representation of the collective consciousness. Then, in Pythagoreanism, the mystic's passion for unity finds expression in the doctrine of numbers: the tetractys is "the fountain and root of ever-springing nature," a formula combining the notion of rebirth with that procession out of unity into plurality which is characteristic of numerical series. There was, indeed, a dualistic tendency impelling Pythagoreanism towards atomism, just as Pythagoras himself, from having been the dæmon of his church, was in time removed to heaven; but here again I cannot pursue the thesis through all its ingenious details. I will only refer to Mr. Cornford's argument about Empedocles, whose two strange poems he treats as an heroic attempt to reconcile mysticism with Ionian science. One of these poems is religious, the other cosmological, and their author is usually taken as an example of the indifference of these early thinkers to inconsistencies between their religion and their philosophy; Mr. Cornford, on the contrary, claims him as signally illustrating his theory that "cosmological views were almost entirely dictated by and deduced from religious convictions" (p. 240). Finally, a word as to his treatment of Platonism, "the last and greatest attempt to formulate the mystical faith in rational terms." Plato's 'ideas' go straight back to primitive religion, for they are not mere concepts, but 'group-souls' emerging from their class just as the dæmon emerges from the social group to be the depositary of its collective consciousness. Mr. Cornford does not go all the way with Professor Burnet and Professor Taylor (see my review of Professor Taylor's "Varia Socratica" in this JOURNAL for October, 1912) as to Socrates's Orphic and Pythagorean affiliation; and it is interesting to note that, as to Plato, he takes up a less extreme position than those writers. He suggests that Plato did not learn the theory of ideas direct from Socrates; at the time of Socrates's death he was not a Pythagorean adept, but soon after the death he became intimate with the inner circle of mystic friends, and was converted to the doc-

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trines which, in the "Phædo," he then proceeded to put into the master's mouth with more or less historical verisimilitude.

The main object of Mr. Cornford's theory is to show that there is method in the apparent madness of the early Ionian cosmologies, by proving that they are formed under the influence of collective religious representations. Although many parts of his argument are very valuable and interesting, I do not feel that it is convincing as a whole. In the first place, it is doubtful whether the theories of Lévy-Bruhl and Durkheim, whom he unreservedly follows, as to the psychology of primitive men, are the last word on the subject. But, even if we take these theories as substantially correct, what reason is there to think that in 600 B. C. the intellectual atmosphere of Miletus, that go-ahead commercial community, was pervaded by primitive collective representations to such an extent that a Milesian mathematician could not theorize about the universe except under their spell? Mr. Cornford has made out a good case for the derivation of Olympian theology from a departmental system, and perhaps also for the reduction of Orphism and of Pythagoreanism (on its religious side) to the magical cult-society; but it does not seem to follow that scientific thought, even in its first dawn, was dominated by these conceptions, enfeebled as they must have been by the lapse of unnumbered centuries. His cardinal argument is that the early cosmologies cannot be accounted for otherwise. When we find the fathers of philosophy not making those rudimentary observations on physical and psychical facts that we should expect, but dogmatically announcing, for instance, that everything is divided into four elements, and these into pairs of contraries, the only possible inference, it is said, is that they were influenced by religious tradition, since otherwise these fantastic ideas would never have occurred to them. I do not feel sure that these are not just the sort of ideas that would in any case be likely to occur to an early system-maker. One point, however, is peculiarly impressive,—the ethical significance with which the cosmogonies are invested. When Anaximander speaks of injustice and retribution in connection with the separation of the elements, it is tempting to trace here, with Mr. Cornford, a survival of the prehistoric moulding of emotion by the force of departmental taboos.

London, England. SYDNEY WATERLOW.

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PSYCHOANALYSE UND ETHIK. By Dr. Carl Furtmüller. Munich: Ernst Reinhardt, 1912. Pp. vii, 34.

The 'Society for Free Psycho-Analytical Research' was formed in October, 1911, by the secession of certain members of the Viennese Psycho-Analytical Union, who detected a tendency in that body to demand from its members an uncritical adherence to the doctrines of Freud, the founder of psycho-analysis. The leader of the revolt is Dr. Alfred Adler, who is now editing for the new society a series of publications, of which the first is this pamphlet of Dr. Carl Furtmüller's on the bearing of psycho-analysis on ethics. The series promises to be interesting, as the tendencies of the society are outspoken and revolutionary. Dr. Adler is a psychologist and physician whose work on neurotic states is well known; to judge from the present pamphlet and the prospectus of future publications annexed, it is more or less in the light of his theories as to the ultimate analysis of such states that the society proposes to deal with a variety of general subjects. That, at any rate, is what Dr. Furtmüller has done in the case of ethics.

He expresses the cardinal point of difference between Freud and Adler by saying that, whereas Freud discovered the effects on psychic life of the repression of motives, Adler has traced the forces that produce this repression (p. 13). It seems, also, that Adler's theory involves the rejection of Freud's definition of the individual ethical will as being 'a sublimation of *libido*.' Adler's theory is, roughly, that the lever of all psychic development is the feeling of self-depreciation (*Minderwerthigkeitsgefühl*), a feeling which is forced upon children by their whole environment. Against this feeling the individual perpetually struggles to assert his own personality, and the more violent the feeling, the more violent the reaction against it. Psychic development is thus a process of oscillation, where perfect equilibrium is seldom or never attained; for 'compensation' for self-depreciation is liable to be followed by 'over-compensation.' To protect himself, to assure the position of his own personality, the individual will go to extreme lengths; "all children are rigorists in morals," said Goethe, and Demosthenes with his stutter may perform wonders (p. 14). Ethically, the typical way of escape from the sense of worthlessness consists in the individual's adopting as his own the commands imposed on him

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from without; this is "the subjective origin of ethics" (p. 16). "Morality is a means for paralyzing eternal pressure and then retorting it back again externally" (p. 19).

Regarded as a diagnosis, this theory is an ingenious attempt to find the common fundamental element of an immense number of morbid phenomena, such as the different kinds of nervous melancholy and the elusive forms which sexual aberration may take. Obviously, also, it may guide the physician therapeutically. But what is its bearing on ethics as a branch of philosophy?

According to the author, the great function of psycho-analysis in ethics is "to depose the conscience for good and all from its position of arbiter" (p. 7), and this it does by laying bare the unconscious motives, which are the real determinants of our actions, as opposed to the motives of which we are, or think we are, aware. Psycho-analysis produces a wholesome "mistrust of conscience by unmasking the love that lurks beneath hate, the obedience that veils unconscious defiance, the modesty behind which crouches the lust of self-assertion, the shyness which reveals itself as fear of sexual intercourse" (p. 4). Thus the 'deposition of conscience' does not mean that the rightness or wrongness of actions ought to be judged according to their results; that is a view which is described as quite obsolete (p. 6). The ethical quality of an action depends solely on its motives, only the motives require to be analyzed by more refined methods which shall bring out their all-important unconscious element. But even the reader, who feels, as I do, that there is much to be said for regarding Adler's theory of self-depreciation and compensation as likely to throw great light on an enormous and still obscure mass of mental phenomena, may be skeptical as to its importance for philosophy. It seems to be suggested that the feeling of personal worthlessness is the mainspring of all psychic life, and consequently of everybody's moral sense. But it is surely most improbable that this is true; there must be many people who, whether as children or adults, have been little affected by *Minderwerthigkeitsgefühl*, conscious or unconscious. And even if this feeling were universal, how could its detection provide any principle for estimating the goodness or badness, the rightness or wrongness, of actions? If it be a fact that the dictates of conscience are caused by this feeling, even when we least suspect it, that fact

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seems irrelevant to any specifically ethical question. It is irrelevant, for instance, to the question, cavalierly dismissed by the author, whether the moral character of an action depends on its results or on the presence of a conscientious prompting.

The second service which psycho-analysis is expected to perform for ethics is to contribute to the solution of the problem as to the origin of the moral sense. Yet it is hard to see how Adler's theory can do this. Granted that the desire to escape the sense of personal insignificance is the grand reservoir whence, though we know it or not, we all draw the energy for all our actions, nothing has been proved but that we all desire something, and that this desire is a universal cause of actions. The process by which anybody comes to think anything good or any action right remains as obscure as ever.

Finally, the author thinks that psycho-analysis may permit certain general social inferences. It proves, he says (p. 33), that "psychic health is the presupposition of all morality." Psychic disease, and therefore immoral action, is caused by the tension of violent contrasts; hence, if the social contrasts, so striking to-day, could be reduced, we might expect a general improvement in morality. Another result flowing from Adler's theory concerns the position of women. Children, he holds, are obsessed, as part of the *Minderwerthigkeitsgefühl*, by the inferiority of the female sex; this obsession pervades and corrupts all sex problems, and would diminish in a society where women had equal rights with men.

SYDNEY WATERLOW.

London, England.

MAURICE THE PHILOSOPHER. A DIALOGUE. By Harold P. Cooke. (With an Introduction by Dr. F. C. S. Schiller.) Cambridge: Heffer, 1912. Pp. xiii, 107.

The sub-title of this little book is "Happiness, Love, and the Good," and there is no doubt but that questions concerning the nature and mutual relations of these are real questions, which may, therefore, as Dr. Schiller urges in the introduction, aptly form the subject of a dialogue. But the author himself tells us that Dr. Jowett has written that "most of the so-called English dialogues are but poor imitations of Plato . . . " It can only be supposed that Dr. Jowett had forgotten Berkeley

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and Hume, when he wrote this; but it is to be feared that there is much in Mr. Cooke's book which tends to support this accusation. Thus on page 54 this argument occurs:

"'Now consider the following, if you please. If perfect happiness is not perfectly good, will it not contain evil?' 'Yes,' he said. 'I suppose that it will.' 'And perfect happiness and the Good will be different?' 'They will.' 'But is happiness evil?' 'I would not go so far as to say that.' 'Perfect happiness is the same with the Good, then?' cried I."

The imitation of Plato is obvious. And it is poor, because the argument is wholly sophistical, resting on an elementary confusion of two meanings of the term 'perfectly good.' When we say a thing is perfectly good, we may mean either, that it is good and does not involve any evil, or that it is supremely good, the best conceivable thing. Thus, for example, it might well be contended that the happiness derived from hearing the Moonlight Sonata is perfectly good, in that it is good and does not involve any evil, but it would be absurd to say that therefore it was the *Summum Bonum.*

The dialogue is divided into two parts, called, respectively, "Love and Happiness" and "Happiness the Good." In the first, an attempt is made to discuss 'perfect happiness' without bringing in any ethical notions such as 'good.' But if we exclude such notions, there is nothing to discuss, for the question must then be one of simple fact: What does or would, as a matter of fact, give perfect happiness? And this question is incomplete, it is meaningless unless we add to whom? In ethics we *may* ask, "What *ought* to give perfect happiness?" because ethics deals, not with what is, but with what ought to be. But if we are concerned with what does or would give perfect happiness, the answers are as varied as human nature, nay as life itself.

Mr. Cooke thinks he has solved the opposition of egoism and altruism by the consideration that "no one could achieve perfect happiness himself, unless everyone else, who survived, should achieve it." Now it is quite true, that no one *ought* to be perfectly happy, if he knew others were miserable. But to say that, is to bring in ethical notions, which Mr. Cooke would avoid doing. And as a matter of *fact,* there are, unfortunately, many people who *could* be perfectly happy though they knew others to be miserable, and indeed we know that

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certain Christians have thought that the happiness of heaven consisted largely in contemplating the tortures of the damned.

In the second part, an attempt is made to criticize the view, advanced in Mr. Moore's "Principia Ethica," that 'good' is indefinable. The view is stated by "Leonard," who feebly advocates it, in the form that good is a simple notion. This is met by "Lancelot," who reports the discussion and who with "Maurice" evidently represents the author's point of view, with the contention that there are no such things as notions. "Notions, concepts, ideas, call them what you please," said I, "they are but fictions of thought. . . . Had all terms or names been regarded as absolutely distinct in the sense of not being interchangeable, so that no one was substituted for another, who would ever have conceived of a notion as distinct from the word?" . . . "Take away the name, and there is nothing." This is, of course, simply the extreme Nominalism of Hobbes, which is so universally discredited, that it need not be criticized here. Moreover, it quite fails to meet Mr. Moore's contention. Mr. Moore says, it is true, "My point is that 'good' is a simple notion, just as yellow is a simple notion"; but he makes it abundantly clear that he regards good as a simple quality and a quality of things, just as yellow is a simple quality and a quality of things. Even if the author had proved that there were no notions, that would no more refute "Principia Ethica," than it would annihilate yellow.

The position reached in the end is, that 'good' is identical with 'absolutely satisfactory,' universal happiness with the good, and that the good,—"the *vera vita,* the true life,—consists primarily in the perfect love of persons." But no attempt is made to explain the meaning of 'absolutely satisfactory' and 'perfect love,' and I can find no argument for the conclusion apart from the fact that it commends itself to 'Maurice' and 'Lancelot' and presumably to the author.

G. H. Geach.

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A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS. By G. F. Barbour, D.Phil., Edin. Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1911. Pp. xiv, 418.

This book contains a series of comparative studies. The author's method is to discuss the significance of some of the most fundamental concepts of moral philosophy, by dealing with each one, first, as it appears in Greek or in modern ethics, and, then, as it appears in the ethics of the New Testament. His fundamental view appears to be that in every case the New Testament doctrine affords "the crown and completion" (p. viii) of what in extra-Christian ethics is partially or imperfectly grasped. The principal topics thus dealt with are,—the Synthetic Character of the Moral Ideal; the Value of the Individual; the Doctrine of the Common Good; the Place of Reward in Moral Philosophy; Moral Continuity and the Possibility of New Beginnings. In addition, the author emphasizes certain conceptions which are more distinctive of Christian ethics, and sets them in favorable contrast with the highest that other sources of ethical thought and inspiration have produced; such are,—the Nature of Christian Universalism; the Kingdom of God as present and as future; the Christian Idea of Law as Personal; and the contrast of a Natural and a Spiritual Order.

It is hard to resist the impression that to a certain real extent the author's treatment is unconsciously biased by a theological preconception: namely, that Christianity is a uniquely supernatural and final revelation (*cf.* p. 165, where it is implied that *the value of the individual* is "dependent on his relation to the whole body of believers and to their Head"). The effect of this bias can be distinctly discerned at certain points where the author does less than justice to extra-Christian and more than justice to Christian ethics. He observes that "while in its *content* Christian ethics is in the highest degree original, in regard to its *form* and the categories which it employs it is largely dependent on speculative thought" (p. 2). Here he surely claims both too much and too little for Christian ethics. Its *content* is dependent, to an extent much greater than has been supposed, on the content of contemporary Jewish thought and the popular cults of the Græco-Roman world; and it is easy to exaggerate the dependence of its *form* on "specu-

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lative thought." It is important to add that notwithstanding the effects of the theological bias to which we have referred, the book will be found really suggestive and stimulating by students of ethics, and especially by all who are interested in Christian ethics.

The first chapter deals with the doctrine of virtue as synthetic,—as the union of opposite tendencies towards the good: a doctrine suggested by Plato and carried further in the New Testament. What is said of Plato appears to be just. But it is not true to say that the Aristotelian doctrine "lays the chief emphasis on the element of avoidance in the guiding of the moral life" (p. 5), or that the "element of restriction" takes "a more prominent place in the Greek system" (p. 37), or that there is in it a certain apprehension "lest the different virtues should be carried too far" (p. 41). On the other hand, the "recognition of opposite tendencies" by the doctrine of the New Testament is more accurately described as the presence of conflicting elements in that doctrine; and these point not to any conscious endeavor to recognize the "synthetic character" of the Moral Ideal, but to the different and historically independent tributary streams of influence, which have flowed into and helped to compose the main stream of the great world-movement called Christianity.

The theological bias is probably to be discerned most distinctly in Chapter xi (on "The Christian Idea of Law as Personal"). Incidentally the author is unjust to the Old Testament. He refers (p. 296) to the "austere remoteness and generality" of the moral law, poetically set forth in such passages as Deuteronomy iv : 11, but he makes no reference in this connection to xxx : 11-14, where the *inwardness* of the law is forcibly affirmed. Elsewhere indeed the latter passage is quoted (p. 84); but on p. 380 it is referred to as if it were "Christian." Elsewhere again the author refers to the true significance of Hosea xi : 4 (p. 301) and Jeremiah xxxi : 33 (p. 346). But the main thesis of ch. xi is that "Christ is the Christian Law." This form of statement is of course not new; and, as many previous writers have pointed out, it conceals a fundamental confusion of thought. It may mean that Christ lays down certain commands as moral laws to be obeyed; or, that Christ's personal life and example as recorded in the Gospels are to be loved and followed; or, that Christ is a present

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supernatural being now and here inspiring 'believers' with moral insight and strength. And *in any case* it is not to the purpose to contrast 'Christ' and 'philosophy' to the disparagement of the latter (pp. 296, 297). The only meaning of such a contrast is that in moral subjects the mass of mankind are much more powerfully moved by personal influence than by philosophical reasoning or mere precept.

These critical observations, we believe, are justified; but we must repeat that, notwithstanding such defects, the book is in the main a genuine contribution to ethical thinking, which may be welcomed by readers belonging to more than one school. The author has read widely and thoughtfully; and among his incidental references and allusions there are many which are remarkably stimulating and suggestive.

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Manchester, England.

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF ÆSTHETIC JUDGMENT. Translated, with seven introductory essays, notes, and analytical index, by James Creed Meredith. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911. Pp. clxx, 333.

Mr. Meredith has given a very clear and readable translation of Kant's treatise, and further helped the student by his notes and essays, which discuss some of the most important questions in a sympathetic but independent spirit, the result being an altogether useful book and one especially suited for an introduction to the subject. The first essay begins with a statement of what is conceived to be Kant's fundamental presupposition, none the less fundamental for not being definitely put forward as such. Kant, in his search after the conditions that account for the possibility of experience (in its widest sense), reached the conception of "the mind as a system with various special faculties, all combining harmoniously in a teleological unity" (p. xix). 'Teleological,' I take it, Mr. Meredith intends to be explained by the next sentence: "Thus, as Kant says, 'reason is, in regard to the principles of cognition, a perfectly distinct, independent unity, in which, as in an organized body, every member exists for the sake of the others, and all for the sake of each, so that no principle can be viewed with safety, in one relationship, unless it is, at the same time, viewed in re-

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lation to the total use of pure reason." ("Critique of Pure Reason," p. xxxii, *Werke*, Vol. iii, p. 15.) This is very Hegelian, but the great distinction from Hegel is that Kant holds *we* cannot apprehend this ultimate unity, although he is convinced we can only conceive our experience to be what it manifestly is on the supposition that in some sense such a harmony does exist. This conviction, according to Mr. Meredith, was "too dear to the mind of Kant to permit of his calling it in question."

Now the "Critique of Æsthetic Judgment," although an afterthought, affords a clue, and a most valuable one, as to the kind of way in which these distinct faculties might be combined in that super-sensible unity which we have to assume although we cannot fully comprehend it. To start with, there is the "radical distinction" Kant drew between the theoretical and the practical faculty, that is, between "the Subject which is known in its external manifestation in a system of relations, and the Subject as the ultimate source of action, and, therefore, as in antithesis to the mere system of relations" (p. xix). And yet for these two faculties "there must be some underlying unity, whether we can definitely conceive that unity or not" (p. xx). Now, suppose we could discover some capacity "which only belongs to the mind because it is a mind which possesses a theoretical and a practical faculty between which harmony prevails." Suppose we could "further discover that the mind, in that capacity, has a faculty which by virtue of the very conception of this harmonizing and reconciliation of the differences that for the other faculties were ultimate (even though *criticism* might show that the harmony was *presupposed*) is able to make something of its own, *i. e.*, to be constitutive *à priori*" (p. xxi). Ordinary cognition, when the mind is purely theoretical, using the categories of the understanding alone (*e. g.*, substance, cause and effect, unity and plurality, etc.) and dealing with the ordinary concepts of objects based on these,—*e. g.*, such concepts as flower, cow, shell,—finds itself faced with a mass of sense-particulars that it would like to account for. The desire to account for these fully, the hope that we might thus be able to discover a systematic unity throughout the whole of nature, "adapted to our faculties of cognition," is a principle involved in the scientific impulse itself: yet this principle must be called only "a subjective principle,

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i. e., maxim, of judgment" (p. xxvi, quoted from Kant), because it does not tell us *what* we are bound to ascribe to the object. We start our inquiry in the hope: that is all. But peace and joy would certainly be ours, if, in contemplating the character, the form, of an object with which we are confronted as actually embodied in sense-particulars, the mind could feel that these sense-particulars were in some profound and ultimate way bound up with the form itself and the concept that summarized the form. Such an intimate agreement between the actuality of the object, *i. e.,* its existence as presented to sense, and the concept of the object may be called in Kant's technical jargon the *finality* of the form (p. xxvi. „*Zweckmässigkeit.*" Would 'harmony' be a better translation?) Now in the æsthetic pleasure proper we appear to find just such a pleasure as that spoken of here: a feeling, in Mr. Meredith's words, "immediately bound up with the apprehension of the form of an object, so as to constitute an æsthetic representation of its finality" (p. xxvii), that is, I take it, so as to insure that the sense particulars are felt to be profoundly in harmony with the concept. But in what sense "profoundly in harmony"? It is on this point that I do not find Mr. Meredith quite clear, though this may only be because I have not understood him properly. He says, and I quite agree, that in Art this harmony between imagination and understanding, between the concept-making power and the power of representation to sense, is only revealed to us "indirectly through feeling, namely, by means of a sensation of its effect upon the mind. But the sensation does not *itself* immediately testify to its origin" (p. lxi). So far I agree, but he goes on to say that there is not involved "an immediate consciousness of the harmony of imagination and understanding." Now this seems to me to make a distinction without a difference between "the sensation of an effect on the mind" and the *consciousness* of that sensation. If this was all that Kant meant when he spoke of beauty as what pleases *apart from a concept,* it was surely unimportant. Has he not in mind something much deeper, which indeed Mr. Meredith refers to later on, namely, that the harmony between sense and understanding at which cognition is always aiming cannot be attained by cognition itself, in the narrow sense, acting alone? The understanding with all its categories supplies no principle

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by which this can be done: none of the concepts it is adequate to furnish can show us just what we want to feel, give us the sensation that this or that concept is, and must be, embodied precisely in these or those sense-particulars. For this we must draw from a deeper well than the waters of the mere understanding. Moreover, even if some kind of harmony could be derived from the understanding, it would not give us the extraordinary sense of *freedom* that we get in the true æsthetic pleasure. Up to a certain point the sense-particulars of an engine depend on the concept of the engine, but this though it gives us pleasure does not give us the distinctive æsthetic pleasure: we may imagine such a harmony of mechanism carried beyond all definite limits, and even so we should not have the peculiar, and deeper, delight that we have in a curve drawn by Michael Angelo. Our delight, in short, is not something fixed and arranged for us by compliance with ready-made concepts of the understanding,—therefore æsthetic value can never be proved,—yet it is a delight that claims universal validity, and therefore if that claim is to be justified, it must somehow be connected with reason, and if with reason, then with concepts. The only way out of the difficulty is to assume, as Kant shows in the Dialectic of Æsthetic (well interpreted by Mr. Meredith in his last essay), that the judgment of taste, though it rests on no *determinate* concepts, does rest upon a concept of some kind, but one that is indeterminate and indeterminable, one of which we can say no more than that it is "the concept of the supersensible substrate of phenomena generally" (p. 208, § 57).

Mr. Meredith points out very aptly that Kant does not aim at proving absolutely that such a super-sensible substrate exists, only that we must assume it, if we are to admit that judgments of taste, as we know them, can possess universal validity. To allow for this validity, then, we assume an element of reason, something of the nature of a concept, (though a transcendent one): and to allow for the 'freedom,' the 'free play' spoken of above, we must assume an initiating element, analogous to that of the moral idea as conceived by Kant, something, namely, that is not determined by sense, no, nor by the concepts of the understanding, but can assign its own end to itself: and finally, to allow for the accord with sense which is the specific quality of the artistic delight, we must assume a

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harmonizing power that can make sense-perception its vehicle. Now this last result is exactly what is involved in the attainment of the moral ideal, for the effort of morality is to impress upon all the particulars of sense the stamp of its idea, a rational idea that is super-sensible. There is therefore the closest possible analogy between the moral law and the æsthetic faculty, and I imagine it is from this point of view that Kant speaks of "the beautiful" as "the symbol of the morally good." This may be a loose way of speaking, but I take it to mean that if Art could comprehend what it was doing (which it cannot), it would see that it was aiming at an ideal that involved the ideal of the moral law. This seems to agree with Mr. Meredith's interpretation. He says (quoting Kant in part): "Transcendental critique also brings to light the latent significance of beauty, but finds this significance in the supersensible, 'in which the theoretical faculty and the practical are bound up into unity in an intimate and obscure manner.' The reference is not to the moral faculty *simpliciter,* but to the supersensible as the common accord of all our faculties" (p. clviii, cp. § 59). Doubtless, it is likely that Kant's strong moralistic turn, his strong interest in the *will,* may have led him to overstate the case. "There is a difference between morality conceived merely as the absolutely right attitude of the will towards the attainment of other goods, and morality conceived as the will in possession of those goods; between 'the rational concept of the supersensible substrate of all phenomena generally' and the rational concept of that which must be laid as the basis of our elective will in respect of moral laws" (p. 211, § 57, Rem. I).

Kant speaks sometimes as though he ignored the difference. But even if we keep steadily in view the element of pure will and choice in morality, and this perhaps is the wisest thing to do, we must admit that the attainment of the moral ideal would involve more than morality. We cannot, as a result of pure will, force the particulars of sense to obey us in every detail. The creative artist, using something that is not merely will, can come much nearer to achieving it. Kant does not say this in so many words, but it seems to be involved in his system. On the other hand, he lays considerable stress on what may be held, what perhaps he did hold, to be a superiority on the side of the practical reason as such: *viz.,* that its concepts, though not determined by sense or by the understanding, are yet *de-*

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terminate. The super-sensible reason which is at the basis of moral choice tells us definitely what we ought to do (in Kant's opinion): the impulse stirring in the artist does not, and cannot, tell him definitely what to do: it can only make him feel that, when he has satisfied it, he will find that he has harmonized sense and understanding in a way deeper than can depend on any concept of the understanding.

The beautiful, therefore is, something *which pleases without a concept,* which gives the sense of harmony, of 'finality,' *apart from an end,* not because it is below the concepts of the understanding, but because it is above them: it harmonizes them with sense, because it is an expression of the deeper unity from which they both spring. Thus every realization of the beautiful goes beyond sense, "looks out toward" the super-sensible: at least it does so the moment we begin to consider it critically. Herein lies its point of union with the sublime, and Mr. Meredith brings this out in a very instructive essay. But this review is already long, and I have only space to raise one more point. Art, we know, is above the concepts of the understanding, but what is its relation to the transcendent concept? Is the *only* essential difference in that respect between art and morality this, that for art the transcendent concept is indeterminate, while for morality it is determinate? So that morality is nearer, as it were, to a comprehension of what it is doing? Or has art also a compensating advantage on its side, namely, in a deeper accord between sense and understanding than is possible to morality, and the value of which could not be exhausted by *any* concept, even one that was transcendent?

F. Melian Stawell.

London.

The Philosophical Works of Descartes Rendered into English. By Elizabeth S. Haldane, LL.D., and G. R. T. Ross, M.A., D. Phil. In Two Volumes, Volume I. Cambridge University Press, 1911. Pp. vii, 452.

"The aim of this edition," say the translators (p. v), "is to present to English readers all the philosophical works of Descartes which were originally intended for publication." And (p. vi): "The works translated here are the 'Rules,' the 'Method,' the 'Meditations,' with the 'Objections and Re-

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plies,' part of the 'Principles,' the 'Search After Truth,' the 'Passions,' and the 'Notes.' " A merit is the translation of the "Rules" and "Search"; but the translation is not good; words and often whole sentences are wrongly rendered.

A curious point is that, since, as the "Rules" and "Search," in particular, show, Descartes's system was a deductive system based on mathematical principles, yet, though with the "Method" Descartes published the "Geometry," the "Dioptric" and the "Meteors" as "Essays" in the method, these Essays "have not been translated here" (p. 80). Descartes remarked of mere mathematicians and mere metaphysicians that neither class could understand his system; and very little more help in this direction has been given by Miss Haldane and Dr. Ross than it was by the late Professor Veitch.

Again, the translators correctly state (p. v) that "in the 'Passions' we find the full exposition of Descartes's theory that mental and physiological phenomena may be explained by simple mechanical processes. It was a completely new departure to state that such matters were capable of being interpreted thus, and one that has had a fundamental influence on the psychology of the present time." Yet Descartes's mechanical theory of physics, which had and has a far greater influence, is almost neglected. Its full development is contained in the "Principles," and (p. 202) "only a part of the [this] work is here translated, but the titles of the untranslated paragraphs have been given, and from these the nature of their contents can be gathered."

PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN.

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THE IDEA OF A FREE CHURCH. By Henry Sturt. London: The Walter Scott Publishing Company, 1909. Pp. xiii, 309.[1]

It is doubtless unfair to consider a book merely in the light of an assumption as to its psychological origin; but it is difficult to resist the impression that this book represents a mere re-action against a particular view of Christianity or a particular type of ecclesiastical doctrine and practice, represented by some

[1] The writer wishes to express his regret at the unavoidable circumstances which led to the delay in the appearance of this notice.

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tendencies dominant among the Anglican clergy. Of Christianity as taught in England and America, among bodies outside the Anglican pale, the author appears to know little or nothing. In any case, it is certain that Christianity is a much more many-sided phenomenon than he is willing to recognize.

His position is, that Christianity stands condemned, on pragmatic grounds, as not only useless but harmful to humanity. He advocates its destruction, in order that "a new theology," "a new religion," "a new Church," and "new Scriptures," may take its place. Christian ethics is attacked on the familiar ground of its supposed hostility to patriotism, material possessions, and family life. Although by no means a follower of Nietzsche (p. 57), the author has a great dislike for the New Testament, which is quite unfit for "the young and the simple" (p. 304).

In the chapter entitled "A Historical Criticism of Christianity," the author essays to find a historic basis for his judgment that Christianity originated in the activity of certain religious mendicants who devoted themselves to calling urgently upon men to renounce domestic ties in view of the speedy coming of the Messianic Kingdom. We cannot discuss the numerous large questions which this chapter raises. We must, however, say this: important as Professor Alfred Loisy's work is, the author puts that work in a place to which it is not entitled (preface, p. v); and it is not true to say that "the best results" of modern New Testament criticism portray only a Jesus who was constantly obsessed by Messianic and apocalyptic expectations, and that the whole teaching is colored by these emotional anticipations.

The New Theology which is here offered for acceptance on pragmatic grounds does not appear to be very coherent. The God of this pragmatism is one whose primary characteristic is to "receive benefit from the world," "the more in proportion as it progresses" (pp. 115, 116). What he does for the world is to make conditions which are favorable to good endeavor when wisely conducted (pp. 116, 117). But man is not called upon to love God, nor to look to him for moral example (p. 122); he owes no personal allegiance to God, "because there is no personal relation between them, except possibly in the case of mystics, and mysticism has no claim to be regarded as the perfect type of religious experience" (p. 128). For loyalty

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to God we should substitute social and cosmic loyalty. It would seem, then, that the best thing man can do with such a God is to ignore his existence. It is hard to see why man "should bear himself as a free helper" towards a being with whom he can enter into no conceivable personal ethical or spiritual relation.

We are compelled to conclude that the book is overconfident and superficial in its treatment of great themes. To this, we must add that it is insular in its whole outlook. For example: "Scriptures read in churches should be mainly historical,—the famous lives and deeds of great Englishmen, *with a sparing admixture of alien history*" (p. 304). The italics are ours, and comment is needless. If the hut of the Galilean fisherman is very far from the Temple of Humanity, we fear that Mr. Sturt's "Free Church" is even further away.

S. H. MELLONE.

Manchester, England.

PSYCHICAL RESEARCH. By W. F. Barrett, F. R. S. London: Williams & Norgate, 1911. (Home University Library Series.) Pp. viii, 255.

Among the various achievements of scientific progress, for which the last years of the nineteenth and the first years of the twentieth centuries will hereafter be noted, not the least notable are to be found in the field of experimental psychology and psychical research. Some thirty years ago, psychical research, regarded as a science, can hardly be said to have existed; now, in spite of much lingering obscurity and confusion, and although opinions may differ widely as to the conclusions to be drawn from the available evidence, no one, who has given the subject his unprejudiced consideration, will deny that it offers a legitimate field for scientific inquiry.

There are many signs that a serious interest in psychical research is increasing, and amongst them may be reckoned the inclusion of a volume on this subject, treated from a scientific standpoint, in a series intended to make a wide, popular appeal. It is obviously impossible to compress into the scope of such a volume the large mass of detailed evidence now on record in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, and to these records the student must eventually turn; but he will

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be able to form from Sir William Barrett's summary a good general idea as to the nature of the problems with which researchers have been faced and the progress that has been made toward their solution.

All the various phenomena, with which psychical research has concerned itself, are here past in review: hypnotism, dowsing, telepathy, and the more elusive and dubious manifestations of clairvoyance, poltergeists, and the "physical phenomena of spiritualism." In his last chapters Sir William Barrett deals with recent experiments in automatic writing, including "cross-correspondences." These suffer more than the rest from the necessity for condensation: the evidence must be studied *in extenso*, before any adequate basis for an opinion can be obtained.

But this limitation is inherent in the nature of the subject and detracts in no way from the value of Sir William Barrett's book, which is excellently adapted to its purpose. The reader will find in it a clear, careful account of some of the main achievements of psychical research by one who has himself taken part in these achievements and speaks to a large extent from personal knowledge and observation.

London, England. HELEN DE G. VERRALL.

LA SOLIDARITÉ SOCIALE. Annales de l'Institut International de Sociologie. Volumes XII and XIII, containing the proceedings of the Seventh Congress of the Institute. Paris: V. Giard and E. Brièe, 1910. Pp. 324, 326.

The guiding thought in the preparation of the program of this congress was expressed in the words of one of the American delegates, Lester F. Ward: "From a general point of view all sociological problems may be grouped in two great classes, one called social conflict, and the other social solidarity." To the discussion of social conflict were given the labors of the sixth congress of this learned society in 1906; to social solidarity the seventh congress was devoted. Of the volumes containing the report of the latter congress, the first contains papers on social solidarity in time and space, being the history of solidarity and an account of the various institutions of coöperation and mutual helpfulness in the leading countries of the world; the second volume deals with the forms, principles, and limits of solidarity.

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Conflict and solidarity in society,—together, it would seem, these subjects comprise all the concrete material of ethics, the former more frequently presenting ethical problems in their negative manifestations, and the latter in their more positive expression. Certain it is that the volumes before us range the the whole gamut of political, economic, and social issues which are agitating the world to-day. The abstract antithesis between individualistic and socialistic modes of community action came repeatedly to the fore in the discussion.

Professor Charles Gide, in the paper which he presented to the congress, frankly and almost ruefully remarked that the word solidarity is of French origin, is used very frequently in France and rarely in other lands, and yet that France is precisely the country in which a genuine spirit of solidarity is most lacking among the people. The volumes before us, however, make an impressive showing of the many agencies even in France, though still more in other civilized lands, operating for peace, unity, and coöperation, between and within the nations. The reader will find many interesting and profound contributions in these discussions, despite the fact that each speaker found himself forced by lack of space to give his statements in somewhat abstract expression, without the inductive evidence from history and contemporary life. Such generalizations are helpful in betraying the limits as well as in evidencing the advance of sociology. Probably most readers in closing the volumes will recur sympathetically to the words of another of the American delegates, J. Mark Baldwin, who said: "Sociology has not yet attained a truly scientific stage. What we call sociology is often no more than a mass of verbal and formal distinctions, which have an abstract purpose and which are capable not of objective proof, but only of logical demonstration. . . . Further patient and extended observation are necessary."

Princeton University.

FRANK A. FETTER.

HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY: A Textbook of Politics. By Frank Granger. London: Methuen, 1911. Pp. xiv, 241.

Mr. Granger must, we conjecture, be a stimulating lecturer and fascinating in conversation. In the book before us he talks

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about almost everything, and almost always has something to say which arrests and interests the reader. We cannot honestly commend his work as a textbook of politics. It neither eschews controversy; nor gives both sides of controversial questions; nor (often) indicates that there are two sides, and where the opposite side may be found. It deals allusively with a multitude of topics about which the average student knows little or nothing. The line of argument in many cases will be totally unintelligible to the tyro, though it may be obvious enough to experts in the numerous fields of investigation which are visited in turn. Mr. Granger may retort that this is his ideal of a textbook; and we have no difficulty in believing that it may serve his own students admirably, so long as its author is at hand to expand and illustrate its challenging epigrams.

H. O. MEREDITH.

University of Belfast, Ireland.

THE GREAT STATE. Essays in Construction by H. G. Wells, Frances Evelyn Warwick, L. G. Chiozza Money, E. Ray Lankester, C. J. Bond, E. S. P. Haynes, Cecil Chesterton, Cicely Hamilton, Roger Fry, G. R. S. Taylor, Conrad Noel, Herbert Trench, Hugh P. Vowles. London and New York: Harper and Brothers, 1912. Pp. vii, 379.

It may usually be said of collections of essays like the present that they succeed in their general purpose. In spite of divergencies among the writers they do really convey a certain view of the whole. "The Great State" is no exception. To me it seems to be the true successor of "Fabian Essays in Socialism." Two or three of the writers, indeed, are described as individualists; but they have so far subordinated themselves to the predominant ideal that their essays do not stand out incongruously. And, in spite of Mr. Wells's hostility to some aspects of Fabianism, vigorously expressed by him in the opening essay, I should not have imagined that the difference need put him outside the orthodox socialist tradition. He is simply more aware than his precursors of the danger that the Industrial Collectivist State, when founded, may be only a new form of Industrial Capitalism; and, through "When the Sleeper Wakes," he seems to have impressed on his colleagues some perception of the same danger. Nevertheless, both Collectivism

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and Industrialism are still included in the ideal. And in the epithet "great" I am unable to see any fundamental advance. The kind of greatness is left indefinite. Such questions as whether the State is to be conceived as national or imperial or world-wide, monarchical or republican, were probably regarded as too distinctively political for discussion, though it is assumed that it is to be democratic. The relations of science to the Great State are considered by Sir Ray Lankester; but, though his scheme of endowment for the pursuit of new knowledge does not seem incompatible with the system, we are told that he would call himself an individualist; and incidentally he shows that his own aim is at a certain kind of culture-State, with science directing, and not at an industrial State. The "Picture of the Church in the Great State," by the Rev. Conrad Noel, is not even semi-official; and one at least of his colleagues does not expect that the religion of the future will be any form of Christianity. This would mean a considerable difference of spiritual direction. Of a possible bearing of philosophy on the construction of any ideal State and on the life of that State when realized, if anything is said, it is merely in passing. Perhaps to those who were responsible for the scheme this amount of vagueness does not seem a disadvantage; but it certainly makes criticism more difficult. The critic has to deal with a drift or tendency rather than with an outline, however general, of a total plan or doctrine.

Still, in spite of the indeterminateness, I find that I can take up a certain attitude to the ideal indicated; and this, I am afraid, must be antagonistic. The evidently anxious attempt on the part of some of the writers to show how collectivism may be made compatible with liberty has only the effect of confirming my conviction that it cannot. Private property, as it has gradually found legal definition in the historical civilizations, I am only the more convinced after considering such schemes as that of an 'industrial conscription,' is the essential condition of liberty in any real sense. The writers may point out that collectivism will not efface all differences, and that individuals will always have their *peculium* which will depend on their exertions: this only accentuates the determination of industrial occupations (and even changes of occupation) by the direct command of the State, not as one employer among others, but as sole ruler,—collective autocrat.

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Thus the Great State becomes the Servile State that they themselves fear. This, I think, can be proved from the very able essays of Mr. Chiozza Money ("Work in the Great State") and Mr. Roger Fry ("The Artist in the Great State"). For the ultimate social expression of liberty in the sense in which we desire it as an end and not as a mere means I take to be the production of the highest disinterested work. Now this is what Mr. Money has to say about the future position of poetic literature: "I cannot imagine a poet selling his epics in the Great State; I can only see amateur poets, whose Muses shall visit them the more frequently because they are engaged in the useful work of the world" (p. 105). And then in italics: "*Thus I picture an amateur life of individual work and recreation embroidered upon the main social fabric formed by exertion in professional*[1] *work.*" That under such conditions "even the least of poetasters will find it less difficult than now to produce his little volume of verses for the edification of his friends" (p. 107), I can easily believe. A more important point seems to me to be this; that under no conditions of fortune whatever in such a society would the development of a Milton be possible. And this exclusion is indicated with curious exactitude; for Milton, though he could not have lived by them, did sell his epics to a publisher. Now Mr. Money is a Liberal, and Mr. Fry is one of the individualist contributors to the volume; yet we find him also, under the obsession of collectivism, making this concession as regards creative art. "Supposing, then, that under the Great State it was found impossible, at all events at first, to stimulate and organize the abstract creative power of the pure artist, the balance might after all be in favor of the new order if the whole practice of applied art could once more become rational and purposeful. In a world where the objects of daily use and ornament were made with practical common sense, the æsthetic sense would need far less to seek consolation and repose in works of pure art" (pp. 269, 270). It is true that an attempt follows to mitigate this conclusion; but that the writer finds it even for a moment toler-

[1] "Professional" here means industrial. No writer in the book has taken notice of Spencer's great generalization that professional institutions properly so-called and industrial institutions have their origin in different social tissues.

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able is to me a sufficient ground of judgment on the outcome of collectivism. And, though the case is not discussed, the same result would be as necessary in the relation to science as to art and literature. Strenuous devotion to self-chosen work, with discipline strictly subordinated to this, was possible for Darwin as for Milton only because in a society where there is private property there may by some fortunate accident be absolute power of individual choice. Where all (as is projected) must follow a routine appointed by authority, this kind of specialized purpose is excluded. I would add that for the whole society, without excepting any class, the notion of virtue and merit is lowered if not effaced. For how can there be any such thing without autonomy?

This is not written from the point of view of a defender of the existing order. With the most drastic criticisms passed upon the present phase of industrial and social development I agree; but it seems to me that the collectivist writers begin the attack at the wrong point. Apparently their view is that we have to put something else in the place of an obsolete kind of State, in order to meet the demands of a new, a more complex, and a higher society, the result of applied science and machine-industry. The view I should oppose to this is that the modern State, European and American, does not need creating, but exists, and is fully adequate to become the instrument of progressive social change. In so far as it is the result of conscious efforts towards liberty and self-government, from Greek and Roman times through the Middle Ages to the French Revolution and after, it is a far more rational thing than the haphazard product of specialist activities and desire for material gain with which it has been confronted through the industrial revolution. There may be still before us important modifications in the form of the State, but these are of the political kind already known in type from history,—for political history has not stopped. And, after all, its basis, in the monarchies as well as in the republics of the West, is already representative democracy; thwarted, no doubt, in many ways, but quite able to carry out its will when that will becomes clear. That the sleeper has waked in time, and that the general will, though vaguely as yet, intends a new order which shall not be plutocracy, I am as convinced as any socialist.

London, England. T. WHITTAKER.

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SOCIALISM: A Critical Analysis. By O. D. Skelton, Ph.D. Hart, Schaffner and Marx Prize Essay. London: Constable, 1911. Pp. ix, 329.

It is silly to set "the case against socialism" as a subject for a prize intended "to encourage the best thinking of the country to investigate the problems which vitally affect the business world." It is axiomatic that no thinker can be at his best when he is engaged in drawing a brief. This subject (among others) was set by Professor J. B. Clark and his fellow committee men, and the prize was awarded to the author of the book before us. Dr. Skelton has no difficulty in showing that modern Socialists hold exaggerated views in some matters and that Socialists in the past have held and taught things which are now seen to be erroneous. Precisely the same could be demonstrated of Individualism, of Christianity,—in short of any important current of opinion in the history of human thought. We hasten to add that we should have felt precisely the same had the subject chosen been 'the case for socialism': for all we know that subject may have been set in some later year.

Dr. Skelton's work is as good as such work can be. It is thoroughly well informed; it is lucidly and trenchantly written; it is in the main just to 'the enemy.' There are, of course, details which may be challenged. A recent article in *The Economic Journal* places a somewhat different interpretation upon Russian policy in regard to the Mir system from that which Dr. Skelton assumes. Such blemishes are, however, neither very numerous nor very material. Taken as a whole the book is the best attack on socialism we have read since Leroy Beaulieu's "Le Collectivisme." It is doubly welcome after such a book as Mr. Mallock's "Critical Examination." From the point of view of the 'realities' of the movement it seems to us that far too much space is given to Marx's theory and far too little to the practical politics of modern Socialists. Marx's theoretical work is, of course, fair game,—his historical work and his treatment of evidence hardly less so! But all that is really important about him is a short chain of fallacious but plausible argument,—a creed, and the emotions of the men who have gathered themselves about that creed. The creed might have been dealt with in a dozen pages instead of in three chapters, and this would have left more room for a study of the emotions

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about which Dr. Skelton has strangely little to say. The gist of the case which is presented is that socialism so far as it has been definite in its proposals has been wrong or impracticable and that everywhere Socialist parties are being forced away from the pure milk of their gospel to support policies which are not specifically 'Socialist,'—which might be and often are supported by non-Socialists. This is both true and important; but does it not leave out of sight what is equally true and more important, namely, the influence which socialism has exercised over non-Socialist thought? The policies for which Socialists desert the pure milk of their gospel are policies which could not have existed had not that gospel been strenuously preached.

H. O. MEREDITH.

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EDUCATION AND THE MORES. A Sociological Essay. By F. Stuart Chapin, Ph.D. New York: Columbia University Press, 1911. Pp. 106.

Slowly the science of education is developing a sociological basis. The present monograph by Dr. Chapin on "Education and the Mores," which forms No. 2 of Vol. XLIII in the Columbia Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, makes a worthy contribution toward this end. Dr. Chapin's attempt is to interpret education in the light of one of its principal social functions, namely, the conservation of tradition and custom. He has no difficulty in showing that among all peoples the educative process has been used to hand down and conserve social activities which have received the sanction of their communities. This transmission of the social possessions of the race from generation to generation is, of course, one of the most useful functions of education. Still, as Dr. Chapin shows, along with the handing down of much that is socially useful, has gone the conservation of superstition and prejudice. It is the purpose of the essay to show the extent to which our elementary school education is still merely a conserver of tradition and custom, controlled by the mores of the masses and not adjusted to the requirements of present-day life. Dr. Chapin argues that this is one of the reasons for the failure of the present elementary school curriculum; and that until we can emancipate our elementary schools from the influence of mere traditional

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and formal studies we can hardly expect that they will be fitted to turn out efficient citizens.

The monograph is on the whole a worthy contribution to both sociology and education. It is, however, open to criticism at a number of points. Dr. Chapin, for example, speaks of the mores as arising almost entirely through repeated impressions or stimulations of the environment, whereas modern psychology would undoubtedly find the mores equally rooted in the instinctive impulses and other general tendencies of human nature. Again, the cult of individual success as one of the mores of the present time, especially of our middle classes, is not sufficiently emphasized with respect to its influence upon the elementary school curriculum, as perhaps the largest factor in the failure of our public schools as a socializing agency.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.

University of Missouri.

PROBLEMS OF BOY LIFE. Edited by J. H. Whitehouse, M. P. London: P. S. King & Son, 1912. Pp. viii, 342.

This is a very acceptable book of short studies. It deals with boys in various *rôles*,—as industrial learners, as schoolboys, criminals, street-traders, and loungers. Its eighteen articles by a dozen different writers make a useful handbook on a large number of questions connected with the right treatment of boys—a treatment which will turn them into sound men and citizens. Strange to say, it has only recently been recognized in England that the casual and haphazard way in which boys are allowed to pass the critical years between fourteen and eighteen is responsible for a lamentable amount of demoralization and inefficiency, leading to chronic unemployment.

There is still a widespread and deep-rooted conviction that unemployment comes mainly from the fluctuations of industry; and if at any moment there are only two jobs among three men, what is the use, it is said, of the third man being highly and expensively trained? We have, indeed, got away from the crude wage-fund theories of the first half of last century, but it is not quite enough recognized that in England to-day, thickly populated as she is, there is, speaking generally, enough work for all. By every test the resources of the country per head of population are going up and not down. Everyone of us

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then can earn a living wage, if we are worth it, but that presupposes a sound education while we are adolescents.

At present we do not get it. In a valuable article, Mr. R. H. Tawney analyses the economics of boy labor. Apprenticeship is nearly dead, and boys are increasingly used for specialized work which has no educational value and which leads to nothing. Mr. Gibb and Mr. Whitehouse deplore half-time labor, the lowness of the school leaving-age, and the lack of a "practical and living method" in English elementary school teaching. In this connection, Mr. Horsefall writes of the aspirations and successes of Herr Kerschensteiner, Director of Education in Munich; and Miss Marion Phillips treats of the irresponsibility of our poor law guardians, who have an immense power for good or evil over the country children, dealing as they do with two hundred and thirty thousand of them on any one day in the year. But others besides poor law authorities must make changes in their systems. There is the very grave lack of contact between the public school and the elementary school systems,—was there ever a more misleading title than the former? Mr. Paton says of our great public schools, of which we are so proud, that they, like Moab, have settled on their lees. There is much truth in this. The public schools have had their day. They have turned out many a fine English gentleman. But their ideal of a gentleman is too narrow for the life of to-day. Either they must change or become discredited. Perhaps their influence will pass, as Mr. Hope thinks, to our secondary day schools. Perhaps these are destined to become the backbone of a real national system of education,—each one alive and individual, but all part of a comprehensive scheme. "Variety set in a framework of national organization," says Mr. M. E. Sadler, "seems to me the right ideal, and a practicable idea."

O. P. Eckhard.

Manchester, England.

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THE INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS

APRIL, 1913.

THE PRACTICAL TENDENCIES OF BERGSONISM.[1]

ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY.

I.

THE philosophy of Bergson has ceased to be merely a body of arguments and conclusions contained in certain books; it has become an influence to be reckoned with in the life of our time. It may prove to be a transitory influence; what is undeniable is that it is a far-reaching and a potent one. Nearly all who write at all, from ex-presidents and British premiers to the essayists of women's clubs, seem to feel a call to write of the new philosophy. Bergson's ideas, variously metamorphosed but still recognizable, may be heard on Sunday mornings from the pulpit by the devout, or be absorbed from the Sunday newspapers by the profane. Technical discussions of his doctrines, their meaning, sources, historic

[1] Le Roy, E. P., "Une philosophie nouvelle: Henri Bergson." Paris, 1912.

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affinities, fill our philosophical periodicals; but agreeable expositions of them are also abundant in our popular magazines. And, though hostile critics are not wanting, by far the greater part of all this represents a genuine enthusiasm for the new doctrine. Even the philosophically-learned among Bergson's disciples do not hesitate to rank their master with the two or three supreme figures of the history of thought. "Beyond any doubt," M. Le Roy assures us, "the work of M. Bergson will be accounted in the future one of the most characteristic, the most fruitful and the most glorious achievements of our age. It marks a date which history will not forget; it opens a new phase in metaphysics. It is after full reflection, and with entire consciousness of the meaning of the words, that one may say that the revolution which it brings about is the equal in importance of the Kantian revolution or even of the Socratic."

The reasons for much of this vogue cannot be altogether obscure to anyone who has considered the history and the psychology of philosophical and literary fashions. There is a very evident touch of mystification about this philosophy; and the craving to be mystified is a perennial human craving, which it has, in the more highly civilized ages, been one of the historic functions of philosophy to gratify. What the public wants most from its philosophers is an experience of *initiation;* what it is initiated into is often a matter of secondary importance. Men delight in being ushered past the guarded portal, in finding themselves in dim and awful precincts of thought unknown to the natural man, in experiencing the hushed moment of revelation, and in gazing upon strange symbols,—of which none can tell just what they symbolize. The need for a new sort of philosophic *Eleusinia* is recurrent among the cultivated classes every generation or two; it is a phenomenon almost as periodic as commercial crises. And it cannot be denied that Bergson's is the most Eleusinian of contemporary philosophies,—perhaps the most so since the Hegelian and kindred philosophies of the

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Romantic period, with their antithesis of Understanding and Reason, their "higher planes of thinking" which none might enter save those who had been purified from the common logic of the Understanding. With certain of these philosophies, indeed, Bergson's has some very close affinities, not only in what may be called its psychological type, but also in certain particulars of its doctrinal content; though in other particulars it is their exact opposite. By his own statement, his is a philosophy of the ineffable, its central mystery is "repugnant to the very essence of language." And the adepts of the new teaching have the air of going about with monitory fingers on lips and an expression of wondering rapture. One of Bergson's English translators has aptly prefixed to his version, with the author's permission, a motto from Plotinus which is in the true vein of Neo-Platonic mysticism: "If a man were to inquire of Nature the reason of her creative activity and she were willing to give ear and answer, she would say: 'Ask me not, but understand in silence, even as I am silent and am not wont to speak.' " "It is the idea of mystery," says M. Sorel, "which should control the interpretation" of this philosophy; "for 'Creative Evolution' is a manifesto declaring to the modern world that the principal pre-occupation of philosophers should be to reflect on the mysteries of life." We are assured by M. Rageot that unless one is in some sense born again, one cannot acquire that intuition of the real nature of things which is the secret of the new philosophy. M. Le Roy, in his attempt to describe the effects of the Bergsonian Vision Beatific, falls into language which recalls the last canto of Dante's "Paradiso." "A veil interposed between the real and ourselves, which falls of a sudden, as if an enchantment were dissipated, and leaves open before the mind depths of light hitherto unimagined, wherein is revealed before our very eyes, for the first time, reality itself: such is the feeling which is experienced at every page, with singular intensity, by the reader of M. Bergson,"—or at all events, by M.

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Le Roy. "It is a revelation which none who has once received it can ever forget. No words can convey this impression of direct and intimate vision. All that one has hitherto thought is renewed, rejuvenated, as by the freshness of the morning: and everywhere, in the light of that dawn, bud and flower new intuitions, which are felt also to be rich in infinite consequences, heavy and as it were saturated with life, endlessly fertile." And yet "one feels also as if one had always had, in some mysterious penumbra of consciousness, a dim presentiment of that which is now disclosed." Here, clearly, is a philosophy which presents itself as a kind of revelation, and produces in its initiates something approaching the true mystical ecstacy.[2]

The fact that a philosophy gratifies the craving for a sense of initiation proves nothing either for or against it. Profound and serious philosophies may sometimes do this,—though seldom, perhaps, in the highest degree; and irresponsible and superficial philosophies may do it. The question concerning the value and the ultimate practical tendency of the ideas which a philosophy contains is independent of the question concerning the qualities by which it charms and captivates the mind of a generation. Ideas, after all, even philosophies of the ineffable always contain; since a philosopher must say something, and must say something different, and must even go through at least the form of connected reasoning. And, paradoxical though it may appear, not all philosophies of the unutterable are indistinguishable. There are very different ways of describing that which ostensibly

[2] There are, of course, also many things in the special doctrinal content of Bergson's philosophy which help to make it peculiarly congenial to our time. Any attempt at a complete historical explanation of the popular success and wide acceptance of this philosophy would necessarily take account of these more specific factors. But such an attempt cannot be made within the limits of this paper. I may remark, however, that Bergson's vogue is certainly due in part to the peculiarity of which I shall more than once have occasion to speak,—his habit of affirming both sides of nearly all issues, and thus of seeming sympathetic to nearly all types of opinion.

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cannot be described, and the ways differ in their effects upon the ethical attitudes of the initiates. It is, therefore, worth while to scrutinize the practical bearings, the implicit moral and religious ideas, of a teaching so widely diffused and so enthusiastically followed.

Neither on the philosophy of religion nor on ethics has Bergson himself ever said much directly and connectedly. "Religion," as M. Le Roy observes, "is a word which has never yet fallen from his pen." And on moral problems Bergson himself declares that "it is not certain that he will ever publish anything." He will do so, he adds, only if he hereafter reaches in this field "results as demonstrable, or as 'monstrable'" as those in his other works. He apparently, therefore, does not regard his doctrines thus far given to the world as containing any clear or necessary implications with respect to moral issues. But, fortunately or otherwise, it is impossible for a philosopher to say to his ideas "Thus far shalt thou go and no farther." The thing has often been tried, notoriously by Kant, but with equally notorious failure. Even the ingenious founder of Christian Science, who was able to employ unusually drastic measures to this end, has not been able to restrict her followers absolutely to the unaltered iteration of her *ipsissima verba*. What Sir Henry Maine has said of political theories is true of all widely prevalent philosophical ideas: "They are endowed with the faculty possessed by the hero of the Border ballad. When their legs are smitten off they fight upon their stumps. They produce a host of words, and of ideas associated with those words, which remain active and combatant after the parent speculation is mutilated or dead." Not only do they survive the theory which supported them; they also exhibit, during its lifetime, an existence and a development relatively independent of that theory and entirely independent of the author of it. M. Bergson's admirers, therefore, even in this early stage of the growth of his school, have not failed to draw from his teachings moral and religious

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consequences which he has himself thus far refused to recognize or refrained from making explicit. Moreover, he has himself recently consented to set forth the relation of his metaphysics to at least one of the traditional questions of theology,—and it proves to be a relation which few, assuredly, of the readers of his books can have apprehended for themselves. In what follows I shall try both to discriminate and analyze those elements in Bergson's own teaching which appear to contain moral or religious implications in a latent form; and also to point out how some of these implications have in fact been drawn out by his disciples. At a general criticism and evaluation I shall make no attempt until the analysis and exposition is concluded.

"A philosopher worthy of the name," M. Bergson has recently remarked, "never says more than one thing; indeed, he rather strives to say it than says it. For he never sees more than one point." The epigram has that air of paradoxical profundity which charms an admiring public; but it is eminently untrue. Every philosophy thus far discovered can be shown to have been generated by a more or less complicated interworking of diverse dialectical motives and of temperamental inclinations. Certainly Bergson himself has said, and, therefore, no doubt, has seen, a great many things,—things which neither always follow one from another, nor even always avoid contradicting one another. The ideas in Bergson's philosophy are a singularly mixed assortment,—a fact disguised from many of his readers by the smooth and pleasant flow of his style and his felicity in coining metaphors. To harmonize his doctrine, to reduce it to a unity, is to leave out its most distinguishing trait. Extreme diversities of interpretation are naturally to be found among his expositors, whether critical or sympathetic. Professor Kemp Smith finds in him "a detailed and very definite contribution towards the establishment of realism"; Professor Calkins thinks him "first and foremost a personalist, an idealist of the renaissant spiritual-

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istic school." He has been classified as pragmatist and as mystic, as pluralist and as monist, as a temporalist and as a modern Eleatic, as a believer in an immanent and as a believer in a transcendent Deity. And the truth is that he is all of these things at once; that is to say, he employs, and employs repeatedly, arguments and modes of expression which imply each and all of them. The practical tendencies which flow from his teaching may therefore be expected to be correspondingly diverse. Everything will depend upon the element in his theoretical philosophy which is taken as the starting point for ethical or religious developments.

There is, it is true, one note which resounds from Bergson's pages more often than any other. It is the call to a return to the primitive, to a recovery of an original simplicity which has been overlaid with the sophistications of the intellect, to a reabsorption in the immediate. The intuition which we must gain, if we would be admitted into the circle of the *illuminati* (however elusive and hard to acquire) is not a new intuition; it is but the restoration of a lost possession. We are, in the words of M. Le Roy, to "recapture a virginal purity of vision, freed from the habits acquired in the course of the life of action."[3] M. Bergson is the Rousseau of metaphysics, seeking to bring back, not society, but the psychic life of the individual, to a state of nature. Primarily, no doubt, this was for the philosopher himself merely a methodological suggestion for the solution of the metaphysician's problem, that of determining the "ultimate nature of reality." But even in his own thought this conception has long since ceased to be merely a speculative theorem, and has become a program for a sort of inward regeneration. To

[3] It is this conception which M. Le Roy emphasizes above all others in his exposition of "la philosophie nouvelle"; and the exposition has received the full approval of M. Bergson. His interpreter, he writes, "has seized, over and above the method, the *intention* and the *spirit*" of his doctrine; no study of it "could be more conscientious or more faithful." It manifests, on the part of the interpreter, *une profonde sympathie de pensée* with the philosophy interpreted (pp. IV, V).

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"recall our perception to its original character," is for Bergson not merely the way to philosophic insight; it apparently is, in his eyes, also the way to the attainment of the supreme good. If, he writes, this knowledge through intuition ever becomes a general possession, "it is not speculation alone that will profit. Every-day life, too, will be warmed and illumined thereby. . . . When we habituate ourselves to see all things *sub specie durationis*, then at once what was stiff and strained in our galvanized perception becomes relaxed, what was asleep wakes, what was dead is brought to life again. The satisfaction which art can give only to those favored by nature and by fortune, and to them only at long intervals, such satisfactions philosophy, as here understood, will bring to all men at every moment, by breathing once more the breath of life into the phantoms which surround them, and by vivifying men themselves. Thus philosophy will be complementary to science in the realm of practice not less than that of speculation. The applications of science to the convenience of human life can promise us only comfort or, at most, pleasure. But philosophy can give us *joy*."[4] Clearly, it has, after all, not been without encouragement from the master that the disciples have sought to apply his philosophy "in the realm of practice" as well as in "that of speculation"; and the manner in which they have for the most part made the application has been such as he has here indicated: namely, through the assumption that the "return to the immediate" gives not only the supremely illuminating insight, but also the supremely desirable experience.

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[4] "L'Intuition philosophique" in *Rev. de Mét. et de Morale*, XIX, 1911, pp. 826-27. In spite of the above passage, M. Bergson, in a letter published in 1912 (*Études par des Pères de la Compagnie de Jésus*, vol. 130, p. 515), took the position already mentioned,—a position of unwillingness to discuss ethical questions, on the ground that, thus far, no philosophical conclusions upon these questions had been reached by him by the application of his intuitional method. Since writing the paragraph above, I find that Mr. Irving Babbitt has already dwelt upon the analogy between Bergson and Rousseau (*The Nation*, Nov. 14, 1912).

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But what is the nature of this "immediacy" to which we are to return? When we penetrate beneath the incrustation of conceptual thought to the *données immédiates* of consciousness, what is it that we find there, at the heart of our existence? Here is the point at which the characteristic Bergsonian ambiguities begin. The saving contact with the real, as we have seen, is to be had through "intuition"; but of the content of this intuition the most various and irreconcilable accounts are given. There is, I think, almost no type of experience, except that of analytical thinking, with which it is not somewhere identified; and scarcely any attempt,—certainly no coherent and intelligible attempt,—is made to show that these differing versions are equivalent or even harmonious. There are, therefore, as many types of ethical or religious tendency potentially derivable from the doctrine as there are in it diverse statements of the nature of intuition.

Certain negative requisites to this experience are, indeed, laid down with great frequency and emphasis, and are consistent and closely related *inter se;* though they are neither closely related nor consistent with many other things which Bergson says. There are certain phases of life which, we are often and plainly told, we must turn our backs upon, if we would have a full and intuitive acquaintance with "the deeper self" that is in us, *le moi profond.* We must, namely, turn away from logical thought; and from action; and from the conditions of social life. It is no trifling *katharsis* which is required of the candidates for this initiation.

We must turn away from logical thought; because the intellect, a late-born product of evolution, is but a spinner of convenient and conventional ways of symbolizing reality, not a means of apprehending reality as it is. It weaves, as Schopenhauer and the Vedântists taught, a veil of Mâyâ which it hangs between us and that true Being to which we would penetrate, that Being which is at bottom, for Bergson too, an *âtman,* the very Self of

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our selves. The intellect, with its inveterate habit of making distinctions, of thinking things as "outside of" one another, of thinking the moments of time as "before and after" one another, wholly misrepresents the nature of a Self in which all is fusion and interpenetration.

It is true that both M. Bergson and some of his admirers are wont to repel the imputation of anti-intellectualism. Thus M. Desaymard, impressed by the considerable erudition evident in "Matière et Mémoire," declares that philosophy, as conceived by the author of that work, "far from opposing positive science, actually demands of the philosopher a scientific effort far greater than it has hitherto been customary to expect from him. The 'intuition' of the philosopher cannot come into play until after he has inventoried, probed, criticized, often even added to, all the facts which positive science has brought together, in relation to a given subject. . . . This philosophy is not 'anti-scientific'; it is 'ultra-scientific.'" These declarations can be abundantly supported from Bergson's own text; for example, by such a sentence as this, which Mrs. Herman cites from "L'Evolution Créatrice" as decisive evidence of the philosopher's innocence of hostility to the intellect: "Reality itself in the profoundest meaning of the word is reached by the combined and progressive development of science and philosophy." But while Bergson says these things in his books, and still more emphatically in a discourse provoked by criticisms, before the *Société française de philosophie,* it remains an equally emphasized, and, logically, a far more central point of his doctrine that reality can be reached only by a process in which the categories, the methods, and the fundamental presuppositions, not merely of physical science, but of all conceptual thought, are suppressed. We have here merely one instance of the facility and composure with which this writer says and unsays the same things. If there are any propositions in Bergson's philosophy more fundamental and more distinctive than others, they

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are these: that the "deeper reality" is non-spatial and non-quantitative, is indivisible, continuous, mobile, fluid, ever novel; and that "intelligence" is capable of apprehending only the spatial, the quantified, the divisible, the discrete, the immobile, the solid, the recurrent. Thus intelligence is generically incapacitated for introducing us to "the real." Nor does Bergson fail to drive this conclusion home by reiteration and diversified expression. "The intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life";[5] but life constitutes "all that is *positive* in reality."[6] "The intellect can no more admit complete novelty than real becoming; that is to say, here again it lets an essential aspect of life escape, as if it were not intended to think such an object. All our analyses lead us to this conclusion."[5]

In view of all this, M. Bergson's bold declaration that he has never belittled science as a means of gaining acquaintance with reality, "never declared that we need to replace intelligence by something else," cannot be regarded as a wholly accurate generalization about his previous utterances. Even his attempts elsewhere to represent intellectual exercises as a suitable propædeutic to the intuitive insight are without logical motivation; they do not flow from the rest of his doctrine, nor are they congruous with it. "An intuition of reality," he declares in his "Introduction to Metaphysics," "can be had only after one has gained its confidence through a long companionship with its more superficial manifestations. . . . The direct contact of the Self with the Self, the final effort of distinct intuition, would be impossible, except to one who had first assembled and compared a very large number of psychological analyses." But one strives in vain to imagine why, if to attain "the metaphysical intuition" we must "reverse all the ordinary habits" of conceptual thought and analytical reasoning,

[5] "Évolution créatrice," Eng. tr., pp. 164, 165.
[6] *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., VII, p. 388.

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a prolonged immersion in those habits should render this emancipation more easy,—unless, indeed, the effect of such habituation be to breed a disgust or a despair of the intellect. The only consistently Bergsonian ground for regarding intellectual endeavor as an aid to intuition would resemble the ground which some ascetic moralists have found for condoning an intense early addiction to the pursuit of pleasure:—that it the more surely brings about that disillusion which begets the desire for something more satisfying. One remains, then, entirely justified in saying that, by Bergson's express assertions, and also by the general logic of his most fundamental principles, the much-to-be-desired intuition is to be had only by turning away from the intellect and all its works.

Equally involved in the fundamentals of the doctrine is the requirement that we turn away from action. The supposition that Bergson is a pragmatist is, indeed, not without support from his actual utterances. But his pragmatism, as several recent writers have clearly pointed out, is but a subsidiary 'moment' in his philosophy, one which is sublated in the final synthesis,—if there can be said to be a final synthesis. He holds, as do those called pragmatists, that our intellect, with its forms and characteristic modes of operation, was evolved for the sake of action, and is to be understood solely as instrumental to action. But what the intellect is, we have seen; and what action is responsible for, we may therefore infer. The first work of the impulse to action was to fabricate the intellect as its tool; and the entire work of that tool is to shape for us an image of the world as the world's not. *Why* it should work in so strange a fashion, and why a gratuitous misrepresentation of reality should be the necessary presupposition of action, remains obscure; there are few passages of Bergson's more bewilderingly crowded with self-contradictions than the pages in "Creative Evolution" which profess to show not only how but why the intellect and its categories, and especially its trick of thinking in terms

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of space and of "solids," were evolved in the interest of action out of a supposed antecedent state in which, by hypothesis, no intellect, nor categories, nor space, nor solids, nor possibility of action, existed at all. But however this may be, it remains true that there are few principles which Bergson reiterates more frequently than that all modes of thinking which have reference to action or are in any degree influenced by the presuppositions of action, are modes of thinking which lead us directly and hopelessly away from that intuition of reality which he would have us gain. On this side of his doctrine his call for a return to the immediate is nothing less than a call to the contemplative life, to a beholding which transcends all need of doing. Or, if this way of putting it be thought to have a too 'otherworldly' sound, one may say that the way to experience real duration (according to the present version of it) would be to "loaf and invite one's soul," to lie inert and let time flow through one, without distinction of moments, without action, without any of the sophistications due to "intelligence."

Here again, to be sure, we find what is clearly affirmed equally clearly denied; Bergson elsewhere insists that intuition does *not* "consist simply in watching oneself live, 'like an idle shepherd watching the stream flow by.' To speak in this way would be to fail to apprehend the peculiar nature of duration, and the essentially active—nay, the almost violent—character of the metaphysical intuition." But here as before the denial has neither logical roots in the general doctrine nor logical consistency with it—unless, indeed, we are being treated to a play upon the word 'action.' Essential to all that is coherent and distinctive in Bergson's view of knowledge is the contention that action (as he ordinarily uses the word) is conditioned upon the intellect's falsification of reality, and is, therefore, utterly contrary in its nature to the reality-revealing intuition. Only, it is a way with our philosopher to negate even his most essential and

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characteristic doctrines, when they seem to suggest any implication to which objection might naturally be made; or, perhaps one should say, to affirm their opposites, when the rejection of the opposites would gives rise to objection.

We must, finally, turn away from the social life. For, in a secondary degree, the intellect exists as a means for social communication, as that which makes "discourse" possible. Not merely language, but the concepts which language expresses, and the "laws of thought" themselves, are conventions of social intercourse; in the lack of them social intercourse would be impossible, the idea of it meaningless. But of these conventions we must rid ourselves, if we would reach consciousness in its natural state, if we would have contact with the "immediately given." It is no society of selves, acting, and acting with and upon one another, that can be presented to us in the Bergsonian intuition of pure immediacy. The experience is an absolutely solitary one; and the "reality" which it could disclose would, necessarily, according to Bergson's principles, be one in which the "reciprocal externality" of personalities, no less than that of moments of time or points of space, would be annihilated.[7]

These negative prerequisites to the attainment of the Bergsonian "intuition" are laid down, then, in unmistakable terms and with copious iteration, though not without occasional denial. But when one endeavors to gather some notion of the actual content or object of that intuition, one is oppressed with something more than

[7] It may, however, be noted, as a small example of the way in which the categories of Bergson's philosophy reverse their meaning without notice, that in his "Laughter," intelligent conformity to the social requirements of a situation is treated as a case of "mobility" and as in some degree a manifestation of "life"; while the comic, which is made to consist in inadaptability and non-conformity, is an example of "rigidity." Yet the former is obviously also an expression of intellect and of a capacity for making nice distinctions, is wholly a product of social intercourse, and is a form of "discourse."

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an embarrassment of riches. Ineffable though the reality therein revealed is said to be, there are offered at least six different and irreconcilable descriptions of it.

(1) The first conception of what is given us in intuition is merely the consequence of the negations thus far noted. The object intuited is the absolute Unity of which the mystical philosophies and theologies of all the ages have darkly spoken. It bears, indeed, the novel name of "pure duration," but it is a mode of being from which all the ordinary attributes of time have, with utmost explicitness, been excluded. It has no "before" or "after." In it one instant is not "outside of" another instant. The ideas of number and quantity and serial order are not applicable to it. This existence, which contains, indeed, all time, yet contains neither "reciprocally external" moments nor spatially juxtaposed parts, does not seem easily distinguishable from that point

dove s'appunta ogni *ubi* ed ogni *quando*,

which the poet beheld at the culmination of his vision. And the relation of him who intuits pure duration to the nature intuited is likewise described in terms analogous to those customary in the mystical philosophies. The intuition is, no doubt, a cognitive act. But it transcends the ordinary meaning of 'knowing'; for in it, since all 'externality' of things to one another has been suppressed, one *becomes* that which one knows. "To this immediacy," says M. Le Roy, "we must accord the value of absolute knowledge, since it realizes the coincidence of being and knowing." When we return to it we return to a "moment of consciousness anterior to that work of reflection from which arises the duality of subject and object."

This first account of the content of the Bergsonian intuition manifestly offers nothing unfamiliar; and it contains nothing which could help us to understand why (for example) Bergson has become the favorite philosopher of revolutionary syndicalism. The tendency which this conception alone would seem most likely to foster

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would be a revival of 'otherworldly' mysticism. And that is an outcome which may very well follow from the vogue of the new philosophy, in the case of those who fix their attention exclusively upon this aspect of it. With Bergson himself it is an incessantly emphasized aspect; but it is not the only one, nor the most distinctive one, nor the one that has thus far most influenced his disciples. What is really distinctive of his philosophy is its transformation-scene. For this negatively characterized entity with which we have hitherto been dealing, this pure Unity, perfectly indivisible, remote from all action because untouched by those distinctions and categories which action presupposes,—this self-same entity suddenly, without explanation or transition, presents itself as pure mobility; and as time in its actual flow; and as the turbid movement of sentiency and appetition below the level of coherent thought; and as a developing, active, self-differentiating life-force. And it is these complementary and more positive descriptions of the content of the final intuition that have been chiefly fertile in practical consequences.

We turn, then, to the remaining, and more genuinely temporalistic versions of the "peculiar nature of duration and of the character of the metaphysical intuition;" and shall in each case note the moods of social, ethical or religious thought to which they seem to tend.

(2) One characteristic emphasis is upon the *absoluteness* of the mobility which is the root-character of conscious existence. M. Bergson, though he fills many other and very different rôles also, is, of course, a modern Heraclitus; and the 'immediacy' to which he would have our souls return is the universal flux about which the philosopher of Ephesus uttered his dark sayings. "Heraclitus," Mr. George Santayana has said, "describing the immediate, found it to be in constant and pervasive change; no substance, no forms, no identities could be arrested there; but as in the human soul, so in nature, all was instability, contradiction, reconstruction." And

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this, as Mr. Santayana goes on to observe, was no false description of what consciousness untransformed by thought is:

> This remains the empirical fact; we need but to rescind the artificial distinction which Descartes taught us to make between nature and life, to feel again the absolute aptness of Heraclitus's expressions. These were thought obscure only because they were so disconcertingly penetrating and direct. The immediate is what nobody sees, because convention and reflection turn existence, as soon as they can, into ideas; a man who discloses the immediate seems profound, yet his depth is nothing but innocence recovered and a sort of intellectual abstention. Mysticism, scepticism, and transcendentalism have all in their various ways tried to fall back on the immediate; but none of them has been ingenuous enough. Each has added some myth, or sophistry, or delusive artifice to its direct observation. Heraclitus remains the honest prophet of immediacy.

Bergson has evidently tried to be to our own age an honest prophet of immediacy; and Mr. Santayana, whose words require some modification when applied to the ancient thinker, has here very exactly set forth at least one element in the philosophy of the modern. Like his Greek precursor Bergson strains the resources of language in his endeavor to make clear that what is at the bottom of our consciousness is change and *nothing but* change, that reality in its true nature is simply *flux posé sur flux*.[8]

What results when this Heraclitean immediacy is made not merely the subject of psychological description or a partial element in a metaphysical synthesis, but the object of a sort of religious cult, is exemplified by M. A. Chide in his "Le mobilisme moderne." To M. Chide the "*idée bergsonienne*" represents the culmination of all modern philosophy, because it evidences at last the complete recovery from that misleading "logification" of the nature of the world and of human life, which began with the philosophers of Elea, or rather with the lawgiver of Sinai. Approximations to this insight have been made by many philosophers, especially in the nine-

[8] *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., VII, 1910, p. 388.

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teenth century. The diverse types of evolutionism to be found in the Hegelian dialectic, the Darwinian biology, the Spencerian cosmology, were all stages on the way to the great consummation, the apotheosis of movement as such. Yet none of these were wholly disentangled from "rationalism." But in our own happy day, M. Chide finds, the full emancipation is at hand, through the efforts of Bergson. At last "movement" finds its cause triumphant, or nearly so, and seeks no longer to dissimulate its true essence. "Immutability, once set at the heart of the world, becomes for modern science a simple illusion, due to categories fundamentally vitiated. . . . And the real, perceived directly in intuition and not through the medium of these falsified categories, appears as what it is, *Becoming,* beyond all logic. . . . The idea of movement has thus found its courage, and, taking leave of the Reason, gives itself up to its own essential nature, which consists above all in caprice. Proteus is God."[9]

Just what consequences follow from this faith that 'Proteus alone is God and Bergson is his prophet,' M. Chide does not trouble to tell us with much definiteness. Perhaps it is but consistent that the drawing of consequences should be left to each man's taste,—though in a religion which apotheosizes caprice, consistency can scarcely be a virtue. But some other Bergsonians (whom I know only through the summaries and citations in M. Guy-Grand's admirable little book) appear to point the moral with a little more explicitness. Thus M. Albert Bazaillas[10] bids us find in the æsthetic experience, above all in music, a sort of evanescence of the intellect and a dissolution of personality, in which the Bergsonian intuition is consummated. In this experience, in M. Bazaillas's words (which can hardly be adequately Englished), "*tout nous parle de vertige et*

[9] "Le mobilisme moderne," pp. 257-259.

[10] In his "Musique et inconscience." Paris, 1908.

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d'alanguissement." Here is "a world of the irrational, dedicated to absurdity, where nothing recalls to us objectivity or certitude, where contradiction is the rule, where there is no impulse to which Imagination does not give encouragement,—for she reigns there supreme, clear-seeing and subtle, in the place of the methods and the traditions of Thought." Again, in M. Maxime Leroy's volume, "La Loi,"[11] we appear to have the social philosophy which follows from this phase of Bergsonism. It is, of course, a social philosophy closely verging upon that of anarchism. M. Leroy laments that our modern democracies still make so much of a fetich of the idea of law in the abstract. No law ought to be regarded as rigorously obligatory; general laws should in the main be replaced by free contracts between individuals. For,—in M. Guy-Grand's phrasing,—"any rigid and stable law intended to apply to any large country, necessarily hampers life."

(3) The four remaining ways in which Bergson describes the content of his "intuition" all take some account of the conception of evolution. What is fundamental in life,—as it is represented in these passages,—is not *mere* change, but change of a definite and cumulative sort. The ultimate reality is, in this case, *not* absolute mobility, but a force with a determinate character or a prevailing direction of its own. But in the first of his evolutionary versions of the fundamental reality, Bergson still inclines to attach superior value to that which is primal and universal in this life-force. The evolutionism of Spencer had, perhaps, in the days when it was a novelty, its most significant practical effect in the fostering of a forward-looking habit of mind in its adherents; it was a new sort of chiliasm. But Bergson brings even to his evolutionism a curiously backward-looking habit of mind.[12] This is, no doubt, the conse-

[11] Paris, 1908.

[12] A peculiar fondness for words beginning with the prefix *re-* is a characteristic of Bergson's style.

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quence of a way of thinking about the object of intuition which had become customary with him before that object had been thought of very definitely in evolutionary terms. From the beginning, as we have seen, Bergson has been the preacher of a return to the 'underlying.' At the outset, this meant merely a repenetration to a supposed deeper level of human consciousness from which action and the intellect have caused most men to depart. But in "Creative Evolution," where the reality intuited usually is described as sort of blind, striving *poussée vitale,* the phrases inviting us to return to this reality often seem to suggest a reversion to that which is common to all life, and, therefore, relatively unevolved and undifferentiated. The democratic spirit has been defined by Mr. Chesterton as consisting in a feeling that the things in which all men are alike are infinitely more important than the things in which some men differ from others. There is, in the present phase of Bergsonism, much not merely to encourage such a democratic spirit, but even to widen it into a feeling that the things in which all men and all animals are alike,—and should not one in consistency add, all vegetables?—are more sacred and more important than the things in which men differ from what a more aristocratically-minded age called the lower orders of creation. Deeper than clear consciousness lies *une certaine inquiétude de vie:* deeper than intelligence lies instinct. For, "while intelligence is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life, instinct is moulded upon the very form of life itself. While intelligence treats all things mechanically, instinct proceeds, if one may so speak, organically. . . . For it does but continue the labor by which life organizes matter, so that we can never say just where organization ends and instinct begins." If, then, the chief end of man is resorption into the heart of that life which stirs in all things,—if we are to *live* this life inwardly and immediately, and not merely to behold or think or understand it,—then, by a clear implication, the promptings of

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instinct must bring us nearer to that goal than the guidance of intelligence; though even instinct, since it is also a means to action, will not lead us the whole way. The difficulty about instinct is that, *almost* reaching the goal, it is incapable of feeling the need of going farther; intelligence becomes conscious of the need but is incapable of fulfilling it. "There are things which intelligence alone is able to seek, but which by itself alone it will never find. These things instinct alone could find; but it will never seek them." This is a rather oracular deliverance. But if one is permitted to guess at the interpretation of the oracle, one must still regard it as implying that intelligence, having the inclination to seek these ineffable things, should be intelligent enough to seek them in the only way by which they may be found,—namely, through an act of self-negation and a return to instinct,—or to something still more primitive. It is true that M. Bergson himself, in reply to a critic, has denied that he has ever maintained that we ought to give to instinct the preference over intelligence. It is true also that M. Sorel has endeavored to reassure another critic, "alarmed by the danger of the popularization of a doctrine which contains, among other paradoxes, the thesis that instinct is the real source of the highest kind of knowledge." And it is, indeed, a fact that this is not the only or the final word of the new philosophy upon the nature of that underlying reality which it is so persistently prone to identify with the supreme good. For this contention, too, a precise contradiction may be duly found in Bergson's writings. But the practical effect of this procedure is no more in this case than in others already noted, to reduce both sides of the contradiction to a nullity. Those who care to follow in detail the self-contradictions of Bergson's doctrine with respect to the relation of instinct to the saving intuition, will do well to read the penetrating, though somewhat too ferocious, criticism of M. Benda.

(4) In one or two passages Bergson designates one in-

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stinct above all others as revelatory of the meaning of existence: the instinct of maternal devotion. He thus derives from the ideal of a return to the instinctive at least the hint of a genuinely evolutionary and forward-looking conception: the conception of life as significant chiefly in its transmissive function, of the passing generation as a bridge through which the race that is to be shall enter into its own. "Sometimes," he writes, "in a fleeting vision, the invisible breath that bears all living beings onward is materialized before our eyes. We have this sudden illumination before certain forms of maternal love, so striking, so touching, too, in most animals, observable even in the solicitude of the plant for its seed. This love, in which some have seen the great mystery of life, may rather, perhaps, disclose to us life's secret. It shows us each generation bending over the generation that is to follow it. It enables us to perceive by a sudden glimpse that a living being is above all a place of passage and that the essential thing in life is the movement by which life is transmitted." In this interpretation of the content of "intuition," Bergson's doctrine has manifest affinities with some familiar ethical emphases of other and older evolutionary moralists, both systematic and impressionistic; for example, with certain wholesome aspects of the Whitman cult, with a part of the preaching of Nietzsche's Zarathustra, with the aspirations which characterize the enthusiasts over eugenics. This particular moral idea, in short, is in no degree novel or distinctive in Bergsonism. And it is, perhaps, the version of its intuition which the new philosophy least emphasizes and least frequently iterates.

It is not in any of the four versions of the nature of intuition thus far distinguished that the most noteworthy practical applications of the new philosophy have found their starting-points. The two which remain to be examined are those which appear to have had the greatest actual influence, and to have encouraged, if they have not generated, contemporary tendencies of most significance.

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The consideration of these, however, must be deferred until a subsequent installment of this study.

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A STATISTICIAN'S IDEA OF PROGRESS.

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FEW convictions are more deep seated and more widely held in our modern world, especially in the United States, than the belief that man is progressing. Is the belief to be accepted and defended or is it a delusion, a mere idol of the tribe?

Before the question can be argued the nature of progress must be examined. Progress is a kind or species of change; it implies gradual alteration towards some limit. It does not necessarily imply improvement. The progress of consumption does not bring any improvement of the patient and to speak of an improvement of the disease is hardly intelligible. When Hogarth made his series of engravings on A Rake's Progress, the title did not imply that the last position of the hero in Bedlam was an improvement on the first, but merely that it was the culmination of a gradual process. Progress, then, is change towards an end and the end may be moral, immoral or non-moral. Progress depends upon the idea of what constitutes the completed series of changes; in other words, it is a subjective notion.

But scientific critics assert that nature knows nothing of ends or final causes and hence knows nothing of progress. If man be merely a part of nature, the idea of progress must be read into history and not read out of it. History, or a part of it, is interpreted in terms of progress as certain vibrations of the air are interpreted in terms of music. A measure of progress or even an argument about progress is as impossible as a measure

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of harmony. If you feel it, that is enough; if you do not, no one can help you. Some such objection to the word seems to have been at the root of a significant change in Spencer's terms. He published his essay on "Progress" in 1857. In all later writings he avoided the word, substituting for it evolution. Although the problem cannot be escaped by closing the eyes, it seems necessary to admit that progress is a subjective term implying a goal or end and so is a human interpretation of events. The end may be expressed as self-realization, or happiness, or the good, or the greatest good of the greatest number, or social service. Its objective correlates are evolution, or differentiation or, best of all perhaps, adaptation.

After thus clearing the ground, let me return to the question, Is the belief in progress to be accepted or is it a delusion? The problem may be discussed either by one whose habit of thought brings him into daily contact with the deep things of life or by one who now and then ventures a plunge into the chaos underlying his chosen bit of the cosmos. To one who belongs to the latter class, as I do, the line of approach is determined by that field of the partly known from which he sallies forth, and so the question becomes, What is progress and what are the tests of progress as viewed by a statistician?

The students in some special field, as distinguished from philosophers and moralists, who have concerned themselves with the problem, fall into three main groups: the historians, the ethnologists, and the economists. The historians have sought to trace and thus to demonstrate human progress through the few thousand years of which some records survive. The ethnologists have tried to reconstruct in broad outline the history of mankind through prehistoric ages by inferences drawn from the remains of early man and his work, or from the present or recent condition of savage man, and thus to lengthen the base line along which progress may be measured. The economists have turned to the intensive study of the present

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and recent past; they have chosen not the social telescopes of history and ethnology, but rather the social microscope of statistics. Each method has its advantages; there is no question of superiority or inferiority; but each student can use his own tool better than another's.

A statistician works or should work only with defined concepts. But he needs more than this. He must have a definition stated in terms that make it measurable. There must be units of some sort that can be counted or statistics will have none of it. Perhaps my meaning may be made clearer by an illustration. A few years ago, one to whom all branches of the English-speaking world listen with delight gave an address on the subject, "What is Progress?"[1] He concluded that "the ultimate test of every kind of advance is Happiness" and that "the test of human progress towards happiness would then be: Does the average man to-day, at the end of each year or at the end of his life, feel more inclined than the average man would have done two hundred or four hundred or six hundred years ago, to say that he would like to live the same life over again, because his pleasures in it have on the whole exceeded his pains?"

This is a familiar conception of progress and I have no desire now to question its validity. Under it the end is happiness, an increase in the amount of happiness is progress, a decrease is retrogression. In one respect the form of definition appeals strongly to a statistician; it is couched in terms of the average man. This notion is one with which statisticians have been wrestling for more than half a century, and unsatisfactory as the results have been, little as is yet known about the life and work and inclinations of the average man, statistics may fairly claim to know more about him than can be learned from all other sources of information. But happiness, the central idea of the definition just quoted, cannot be

[1] James Bryce, "What is Progress," *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. C, pp. 145-156 (August, 1907).

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expressed in units that can be counted and thus the definition does not conform to the requirements of statistics. If happiness be the test and the only test of progress, a statistician can throw no light on the question. What is true of this definition is true of all the others that have been suggested. How then can the statistical method approach the problem at all?

When no exact or direct measure of the characteristic in question can be found it is a common device to take one or more measurable elements closely connected with it. Suppose the problem were to determine the position of the United States among the countries of the world in manufacturing. As the result of different comparisons it might be found that the United States was first in the production of iron and steel, second to the United Kingdom in the manufactures of textiles, first in the manufacture of leather and its products, first in the manufacture of food preparations, etc. It would then be necessary to assign weights to the several results and by that method combine them into one series.

So in studying progress a statistician would examine its various indexes, appraise their value and consider how far the results corroborated or contradicted one another. Following this procedure, the evidence of progress upon which the economists before Malthus centered their attention is the one I will mention first. That is the increase of total population. Adam Smith put it bluntly when he said: "The most decisive mark of the prosperity of any country is the increase of the number of its inhabitants." One hundred and fifty years ago the population of Europe was about one hundred and thirty million; it is now four hundred and fifty million and the population descended from European emigrants and now living in other parts of the world is more than one hundred million. The population of the earth is almost certainly increasing; that of Europe is unquestionably increasing rapidly; the rate of increase in the United States is more rapid still.

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But is increase of numbers a test of progress? Certainly not a final and unquestionable one. No one would claim that Russia or India is progressing more rapidly than France. Yet there may be an intimate connection between progress and increase of numbers. If better adaptation to environment, or, 'more exactly,' increase in the number and complexity of the responses to environment in which life consists, be a mark of progress, as it is often said to be, and if such adaptation also tends to increase numbers, then there is ground for holding that progress is usually attended by an increase of numbers. The human race is the only one of the higher forms of life which is progressing and also the only one which is steadily and rapidly increasing in numbers. This increase in the last two centuries has been due almost entirely to the most progressive branch of mankind, the European, or Caucasian, or white race.

If progress be an increase of adaptation and adaptation results in happiness, then progress is usually attended, also, by an increase of happiness. Increasing numbers and increasing happiness may be viewed as usually, but not always, by-products of increasing adaptation and by measuring the changes in population, the only one of the three which can be measured, light is thrown upon the changes of the others.

Man derives most of his happiness from intercourse with his fellows. If numbers increase, intercourse increases at a compound ratio. There are now in the United States perhaps two hundred times as many persons as lived on the same area at the time of Columbus. The amount of human intercourse now in a year must be thousands of times as great as it was four hundred years ago. There seems to be ground for holding that happiness grows or tends to grow more rapidly than numbers.

Our first statistical test of progress, increase of numbers gives an affirmative reply to the question, Is man progressing? and Is the United States progressing?

The amount of human life on the earth may increase

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not only by adding to the sum of lives, but also by lengthening each life. Lord Acton has called the latter the compendious test of improvement. We have no trustworthy knowledge about the length of life under savage conditions or under ancient civilization. The nearest approach to it with which I am acquainted is an estimate of the length of life in Roman Egypt among the classes wealthy enough to have their bodies embalmed, an estimate based on the ages at death of one hundred and forty-one persons on whose mummies the records have been found and deciphered. With some manipulation of the figures I reach the result that the average duration of life among wealthy classes of Roman Egypt was about twenty-two years, or less than what it now is among the general population of India, and perhaps twenty-five years less than at the present time in western Europe. Evidence which I cannot even summarize warrants the conclusion that the length of human life in civilized countries is rapidly increasing and that change in this direction is growing more rapid.

In this country the length of life is still unknown. In default of such knowledge, we must turn to the only state affording this information, Massachusetts. There the length of life is forty-five years. This is probably greater than the average for the United States, because the proportion of Negroes in the United States is nearly ten times as great as in Massachusetts and the length of a Negro's life is not more than two-thirds that of a white person's, and also because Massachusetts has long held a prominent and honorable position among the states for its attention to questions of public health and longevity.

In average length of life at the present time there are many countries which surpass Massachusetts and therefore probably the United States. They include England and Scotland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, Holland, Belgium, and France. There are others, like Switzerland and perhaps Italy, in which life, while a little shorter

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than in Massachusetts, is probably longer than the average for the United States.

The second statistical test of progress, the length of human life, gives satisfactory results for the countries of western Europe. It indicates that in Europe the Scandinavian countries are most advanced and Russia least. The length of human life in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark (52 years) is almost double what it is in Russia (28 years) and more than double what it is in India (24 years). To an American, however, the answer obtained by this test is less satisfactory than that by the first. The difference to our disadvantage is due primarily not to the shortcomings of our medical profession, but to the slow and imperfect development of the public health movement in this country and the comparative weakness of the safeguards thrown by society around the individual life.

Progress is often said to require physical and social uniformity in the population of the progressing nation. The number of races and languages in Austria-Hungary and in Russia is thought to hinder improvement. Clear-sighted students of the United States regard our racial diversities in the same way, and for that reason justify the exclusion of Chinese and Japanese laborers. Many believe even that the new immigration from eastern and southern Europe is harmful. This raises the difficult question, Is uniformity or multiformity, homogeneity or heterogeneity in a population most conducive to progress? Probably no general answer can be given. Excess in either direction is harmful and the mean is golden. Whatever definition be accepted for progress, it presupposes and rests upon sympathetic coöperation with one's fellows. Either diversities so great as to hinder this or similarities so great as to make it insipid are obstacles to improvement.

Yet under present conditions both in the world as a whole and in the United States, the dangers from diversity racial, linguistic, educational, religious, political, and in-

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dustrial, seem to be greater than the dangers from uniformity. This is frankly an assumption. If it be admitted, it follows as a corollary that changes in the direction of greater uniformity, such as those to which I now pass, are an index of progress. If it be not admitted, the rest of my argument will not be persuasive.

Are racial diversities increasing or decreasing? Prior to about 1500 A. D. when the oceans ceased to be effective barriers to civilized man, the great human races were living in isolation behind the ramparts of ocean or desert and the differences between them were probably increasing. Now we may be at the opening of a period of racial convergence, due partly to the disappearance or decreasing importance of the backward races, partly to intermixture of races, partly to climatic influences. The various physical types seem to be coming more and more under similar conditions, and while this often spells disaster to the ill-adapted race, as when the American Indian is decimated by tuberculosis, yet it does reduce the diversities of experience out of which racial antagonisms arise.

In this country the changes are certainly in that direction. In 1790 the population of what is now the United States, including an estimate of the number of wild Indians, was about seven-tenths white, one-sixth Negro, and one-eighth Indian. During the one hundred and twenty years between 1790 and 1910, the proportion of Negroes fell from one-sixth to one-ninth, that of Indians from one-eighth to one-thirty-third, but that of whites rose from seven-tenths to nearly nine-tenths. The country has been growing more homogeneous racially and the change is still in that direction. Between 1900 and 1910 the proportions not only of Negroes, but also of Indians and Chinese decreased and the proportion of Caucasians or whites increased. The Negroes in the United States are twenty-four times as numerous as Indians and Mongolians combined, are increasing steadily and rapidly, and are intimately mingled with the white population.

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Their relative decrease in the nineteenth century resulted from two sorts of change. In 1790 the two parts of the country separated by Mason and Dixon's line had almost equal numbers of inhabitants. But from the start the North throve more than the South, and by 1860 had a population exceeding that of the slave states, Negroes included, by more than seventy-five per cent. During that period as a whole the southern Negroes increased faster than the southern whites and the steady decrease in the proportion of Negroes in the country was due to the more rapid rate of increase in the population of the North. But since the Civil War the difference in the rates of growth of North and South has dwindled and disappeared. In the decades 1890 to 1900, and 1900 to 1910, for the first time in our national history, the population of the southern states increased faster than that of the northern. But it is the southern whites alone who are setting the pace. During the twenty years 1890 to 1910, the increase of southern Negroes was 29 per cent. and of southern whites 56 per cent., or nearly twice as rapid. This divergence makes it likely that by the close of the twentieth century the Negroes in the south, who are now one-third of the population, will not be more than one-sixth and that in consequence the people of that section and of the country will have become racially more homogeneous than they are now.

While the proportion of whites in the United States is slowly but steadily increasing, this part of the population is becoming perhaps less uniform in physique. A marked change in the character of our immigration began about a generation ago. We may admit that the immigrants of to-day have wider physical differences among themselves and from the resident population than they formerly did. But the more important question relates to the direction and rapidity of change. Do these physical diversities continue and perpetuate themselves in children and grandchildren? Or do they dwindle and disappear? Provisional results of the first careful inves-

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tigation into this problem have recently been given to the public. They point to the following conclusions not hitherto suspected. (1) Immigrants coming to this country and living in the crowded parts of New York City have children the shape of whose head departs widely from that of their parents. (2) Where the parental type is long-headed, or dolichocephalic, the children are less dolichocephalic; where the parental type is round-headed, or brachycephalic, the children are less brachycephalic. (3) The departure from the ancestral type appears even in cases where the children born abroad have been brought to this country in early childhood; it is more marked among children born in this country and the longer the interval between the arrival of the mother and the birth of the child, the more the shape of the child's head differs from that of its parents. (4) The changes are great enough to make the difference between the shape of the head among a round-headed stock, like persons of east European Hebrew descent born in the United States, and a long-headed stock, like persons of Sicilian descent born in the United States, less than the difference between either group of children and their parents.

These results are the more surprising because the shape of the head has been thought an extremely persistent characteristic, controlled almost entirely by hereditary influences and very little by environment. Although far from conclusive, they seem to warrant at least a suspense of judgment upon that point. If they could be accepted at their face value, they would show that the process of physical assimilation of immigrants begins sooner, progresses more rapidly, and affects the whole system more radically than has hitherto been believed. A decrease of physical diversity in the American people is assumed to be a mark of progress. That diversity resulting from race has decreased and is decreasing. About that diversity resulting from immigration no answer can be had. It depends upon the comparative in-

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fluences of immigration and assimilation on the national physique. The scientific measurement of these is still in its infancy.

Passing from physical to social assimilation, I inquire whether we are becoming less exclusively an English-speaking folk. This question takes on two forms; first, are the groups of non-English-speaking people whose ancestors have been for generations in the country becoming more numerous? and, secondly, are the recent immigrants who cannot speak English transforming us into a polyglot folk? The two main groups of non-English speaking native American stock are the Pennsylvania Dutch and the Louisiana creoles. Those of the former class who cannot speak English decreased by one-half between 1890 and 1900 and are now only 20,000. The Louisiana creoles are three times as many and slowly increasing, but not so fast as the population around them. These remote linguistic islands of debased German and debased French are not likely long to withstand the persistent friction of the sea of English which surrounds and is engulfing them.

The problem of Anglicizing the language of our swarms of immigrants is far larger and more difficult. In 1900 there were about six and one-half million persons in the United States who had been born in countries where English was not spoken. But of these more than four-fifths claimed ability to speak English. No doubt in many cases that language was most imperfectly understood and was murdered in the speaking. Yet the first steps are the hardest and they had been taken. The number who claimed to speak English was about equal to the number who had been in this country eight years, so on the average it takes about eight years for an immigrant who arrives ignorant of English and usually as an adult to learn enough of our language to claim a speaking acquaintance with it.

More important still is it that of our foreign born population the proportion able to speak English was

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much higher in 1900 than in 1890. The process of teaching English more than kept pace with the flood of new arrivals. And even when the immigrant fails to learn English, his children do not. Among children born in this country of parents who came from non-English speaking countries, about 98 per cent. speak English, and in New York, where about three-fourths of the immigrants arrive, only one child in a thousand born in this country but of foreign-born parents is unable to speak English. No doubt the English is often, if not usually, poor and debased. In this as in almost every other case of assimilation, each side loses something.

What meager evidence is available seems to indicate that our population is not growing more heterogeneous, physically or linguistically, as a result of immigration.

Another menace to needful uniformity in our population and thus to progress is found by some in the illiteracy of recent immigrants. They fear that the uneducated and unambitious people of eastern and southern Europe who have been arriving in large and increasing numbers will become a dangerous proletariat. No doubt the majority of these immigrants are unlettered even in their own languages. No doubt that after they arrive they have little leisure or opportunity to gain the elements of a book education and most of them continue through life unable to read and write. But with their children the case is different. They show quite as much energy and zeal in learning to read and write as do the children of the native stock. Indeed the figures do not reveal any significant difference between the prevalence of illiteracy among children of Americans by birth and children of immigrant Americans in the same communities.

If the danger of developing a permanent illiterate class were serious, it would manifest itself in an increasing proportion of illiterates in the population. But that proportion is decreasing in the country as a whole and in all but two of the States. Perhaps the best test of the

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efficiency of the public school system in reducing illiteracy is found in the proportion of children ten to fourteen years of age who are able to read and write. Older persons are products of an ancient and in many cases a foreign school system. But children of this age are just out of school or out of the grades where reading and writing are taught. To find that with the exception of only two states in which the proportion did not change, the per cent. of children able to read and write was greater in 1910 than in 1900 is to hit upon an evidence of progress and of increasing homogeneity.

On the question of religious homogeneity or heterogeneity the statistical evidence is meager and unsatisfactory. It comes from two Federal inquiries into the statistics of churches. These show that the proportion of church members in the population over ten years of age increased from 43 per cent. in 1890 to 51 per cent. in 1906. The proportion of this population who were members of some Protestant church increased slightly and the proportion who were members of the Roman Catholic Church increased more rapidly. Whether this growth of religious diversity is more than offset by the increase of religious toleration is a question upon which the statistical method throws no light and which must be answered, if answered at all, upon other evidence.

The argument has pointed towards an increasing uniformity, racial, linguistic, educational, and possibly physical and religious, in the population of the United States and, if under present American conditions greater uniformity in these respects be conducive to progress, the argument tends to support the general opinion that the country is progressing.

But these differences are far from exhausting the list and perhaps are not the most important. The question of industrial or economic differences and their increase or decrease is not to be ignored.

Perhaps we may assume that a political democracy has not worked well unless it has been based upon an indus-

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trial democracy and that the success of the American experiment hitherto has been closely connected with the democratic nature of American industrial organization. If that assumption be admitted, the question whether the population is crystallizing into industrial groups with diverse and sometimes antagonistic interests is of the first importance for our subject.

In agriculture there is a marked increase of the two forms of tenant farming, renting for cash, and renting on shares. In 1860 six-eighths and in 1910 only five-eighths of the farms of the United States were tilled by their owners. In 1860 two-eighths and in 1910 three-eighths of the farms were tilled by tenants. This increase in tenant farming and decrease of farming by owners went on between 1890 and 1900 in every State of the Union. Perhaps in the great majority of cases the tenant farmers have risen from the class of agricultural laborers rather than fallen from the class of land owners. Nevertheless the change indicates that the advance from farm hand to farm owner is harder and takes longer than it used to do when land was cheaper and less capital was needed to run a farm. It suggests the development of economic classes and the possibility at least of class antagonisms which may be found a serious check upon progress.

In manufacturing there is no numerous class, corresponding to that of tenant farmer and in a position between the independent producer and the wage-earner. There are only two great classes, employers and employees. Nor has the discussion turned upon the increase in the proportion of wage-earners, although such a change has probably occurred. It has centered rather upon the average amount of compensation and the alleged increase of wages.

The question of determining whether wages have risen or fallen is more complicated and difficult than many who talk fluently about it imagine. To show how true this is, let the question be made specific, Did money wages

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in manufacturing establishments increase between 1890 and 1900? These dates are chosen because there is far more information regarding them than regarding any earlier or more recent years.

The United States Bureau of Labor concludes that average wages per hour in 1900 were higher than in 1890. This evidence is unquestioningly accepted by those who believe in the increase of wages. It is commonly forgotten that two other investigations of wages covering the same period were made by the Federal Government. The United States Census Bureau gathered detailed information regarding more than 100,000 wage earners in manufacturing establishments, and the figures seem to warrant the conclusion that the average weekly wage was about the same in 1900 as in 1890. The same Bureau gathered information regarding all the manufacturing establishments in the country in 1890 and in 1900 and these figures seem to warrant the conclusion that the average annual earnings of the five million wage earners in manufacturing were slightly less in 1900. One inquiry shows an increase of 5 per cent. in wages per hour, the second a stationary condition of wages per week, and the third a decrease of 2 per cent. in annual wages, all for the same decennial period. If we could suppose that along with the increase of pay per hour there had been a decrease of hours of labor per week and also of days of labor per year, the three conflicting results might thus be reconciled. But there seems to be little evidence in support of this conjecture.

To judge whether my effort to reconcile these apparent contradictions is successful, one must have in mind a few details about wage statistics. Ordinarily they are gathered from a list of establishments selected as typical or representative and with the main purpose of ascertaining the changes in wages of specific occupations. Thus the hourly wages of carpenters in the building trades were reported by the Bureau of Labor as 12 per cent. higher in 1900 than in 1890. But this method, even if it

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could be extended to include all establishments, would not provide a complete and perfect picture of wage statistics. Indeed it is mathematically possible that the average wages paid in each occupation in the United States were higher in 1900 than in 1890 and yet that the average wages in all occupations together were lower in 1900 than in 1890. To illustrate and explain this statistical paradox, an actual case may be chosen from a simpler field. The proportion of children in Arizona unable to write was a little greater in 1900 than in 1890. And yet in each class of children taken separately, namely, the native white, the foreign-born white, and the Indian and Mongolian, the proportion unable to write was smaller in 1900 than in 1890. How could the proportion be smaller in each class taken separately and yet larger in all classes together? The explanation of the paradox lies in the fact that many Indian children escaped enumeration in 1890 and that their illiteracy rate, while lower in 1900 than in 1890, was high enough in 1900 for the increased proportion of that class to mask the progress which had been made since 1890 in every element of the population.

The possibility of a similar paradox in wage statistics makes it important to supplement the Bureau of Labor method which is confined to changes of money wages in a larger or smaller number of specific occupations by a method which examines the wages of the entire wage-earning class. No such method has ever been tried for the United States as a whole, but there is something which approaches it. In 1890 and in 1900 inquiries were made by the Census Bureau of each manufacturing establishment into the amount of wages paid during the business year and the average number of wage-earners employed. From the results the average annual earnings of wage-earners in manufactures have been computed. The result is to show a decrease from $445 in 1890 to $438 in 1900. In the official publication dealing with these figures we are warned "that the attempt to

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obtain the average earnings from the census figures . . . is not justified under any circumstances." In support of this conclusion the Report calls attention to important changes of method first introduced in 1900 and vitiating the comparison with 1890. There is no doubt that these changes were improvements and needed improvements. But that they make comparisons entirely misleading is not proved. The important changes were two, one of which, if introduced in 1890, would have reduced the figure of average earnings for that year, while the other would have increased it. I do not believe that the two combined were potent enough to make comparisons entirely unsafe. Whether that be so or not, this method of securing wage statistics for all wage-earners in manufacturing establishments is an almost indispensable supplement of the representative method and when properly used gives information quite as important and obtainable in no other way. In the case before us I suggest that average money wages in manufacturing establishments may have been somewhat less in 1900 than in 1890, and that this view may easily be reconciled with the conclusion of the Bureau of Labor regarding an increase of wages in given occupations, if only it be supposed that unskilled and low-paid labor increased more rapidly than highly paid labor between 1890 and 1900. Regarding such a change we are not left to conjecture alone. A classification of the breadwinners of the United States into four grades, proprietors or independent workers, the clerical class, skilled laborers, and unskilled laborers, has been made on the basis of the returns of occupations in which they were engaged. Such a classification is very difficult and inevitably exposed to a wide margin of error. But even so, when the analysis is made under the same principles and by the same person for successive censuses, the results are comparable and indicate the probable trend of change. The study to which I refer was published before the results of the count of 1900 were known, but it has since been continued to include those

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returns. The figures Mr. Hunt has sent me from the Census Bureau indicate that the proportion of unskilled laborers in manufacturing was greater in 1900 than in 1890. The most probable conclusion is that there was a slight decrease of earnings for all wage earners and at the same time a slight increase of earnings for most of the specific occupations between 1890 and 1900, and that these two antithetic results are not inconsistent because the disproportionate increase of unskilled and low-paid labor more than outweighed the rise in wages for the specific occupations. Another important inference has been drawn. The apparently stationary wages shown by one inquiry is the result of a decrease in the proportion of those receiving unusually high wages and of those receiving unusually low wages, and an increase in the proportion of persons receiving average wages. The net result indicated by the figures of all three investigations taken together is no progress in the money wages of wage-earners as a whole between 1890 and 1900 and a hardening of the class line between wage-earners on the one side and salaried employees, independent workers, or the proprietor class on the other.

In agriculture and manufactures the lines between economic groups, like landlord, tenant, and agricultural laborer or employer and employee are deeper and more permanent than a generation ago. The growth of such diversities may be a serious menace to homogeneity and so to progress.

A disproof of progress, if not indeed a proof of retrogression, is found by some in the decay of family life and family virtues, which they find revealed if not proved by an alarming decrease of births. Regarding births we have unfortunately no direct information. In its absence a substitute has been found by comparing the number of children under five years of age with the number of women less than forty-five or fifty years of age. Such a comparison can be made for ten-year intervals between 1850 and 1900 and by the help of estimates I have car-

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ried it back to 1790. If the number of living children to each one thousand adult women in 1900 be taken as 100 per cent., the corresponding number in 1790 was 179 per cent.; or changing the method of comparison, the proportion of children to women in 1900 was only 56 per cent. of what it was in 1790. France is the European country in which a similar change started earliest and has advanced farthest. French figures of birth rate go back to 1806. The present birth rate in France is 69 per cent. of the birth rate of ninety years ago; the present proportion of children to adult women in the United States is 55 per cent. of that proportion ninety years ago, indicating that probably the decrease of births has been more rapid in the United States than in France.

This change seems to many a lamentable one and evidence of social degeneration and decay. Without denying or minimizing its grave and threatening aspects, I may venture to suggest that some such change was almost inseparable from the steady and rapid increase in the length of human life. If the birth rate had not fallen when the average span of life was lengthening, the population both of Europe and of the United States would have increased even faster than wealth or food. The standard of living would have fallen instead of rising. It is the decline in the birth rate and that only which has enabled mankind to grip and hold fast the advantages secured by industrial advance and the lengthening of human life. The danger to progress from a declining birth rate springs not from the resulting check to increase, but rather from the danger that those persons best qualified by nature to transmit qualities of social value to the next generation are likely to have few children. President Eliot's figures indicate that one hundred Harvard graduates of 25 to 30 years' standing have not more than seventy-five living sons, and the evidence from various sources shows that in the population of the northeastern states, excluding the immigrants and their children in the first generation the deaths prob-

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ably exceed the births. The United States in common with many other modern societies is apparently showing a tendency to increase from the groups with less prudence or self-control than the average and thus possibly to eliminate the most valuable lines of descent somewhat as the monastic system has been said to do.

Another menace to progress is the prevalence of divorce in the United States. Apparently about one marriage in twelve now ends in a divorce, and the increase during the forty years for which records exist has been so great that another century of as rapid change would probably see half of the marriages contracted in the United States terminated by legal decree.

The argument thus far has led to the following results:

Progress is a subjective term necessarily implying change towards some end or goal. Those who deny the existence of any ends have no right to use the word progress. If progress be merely a subjective term, statistics can throw no light on the question of human or national progress because all such ends as happiness, or self-realization, or social service are incapable of statistical measurement. Various objective characteristics of progress, like adaptation, or evolution, or differentiation, have been proposed and seem often, if not always, to be associated with changes generally regarded as progressive.

Statistics measures such subordinate characteristics as are accessible to it and are correlated with some deeper immeasurable characteristic. From the result of this measurement it infers the presence or absence, increase or decrease of the inaccessible characteristic.

Increase of numbers is far from an ultimate end. But it is an evidence of increased adaptation and also of a multiplication of human intercourse and in both ways an evidence of increased happiness. The population of the earth is increasing; that of Europe is increasing rapidly; that of the United States more rapidly still.

Length of life is not an ultimate end. But untimely

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death is an evidence of maladaptation, a great cause of unhappiness to survivors, and an economic waste. To increase the proportion of children who survive to maturity and old age is probably to increase happiness and social service. The length of human life is rapidly increasing in all civilized countries where it has been measured and probably in the United States where it has not. But in at least eight countries of Europe the length of life is greater than in Massachusetts and probably greater than in the United States.

Either uniformity or multiformity in a population may be so great as to be an obstacle to human or national progress. But under present American conditions changes in the direction of uniformity seem likely to be changes in the direction of progress.

Changes in racial types since 1500 A. D. seem to be in the direction of convergence through the decrease or disappearance of widely divergent forms, the intermixture of races, and climatic influences.

Racial homogeneity of the population of the United States is steadily increasing.

Whether the greater divergence of physical type among recent immigrants is an influence towards greater physical diversity in the total population is unknown. Slight evidence indicates that the modification of physique among the children of immigrants may be progressing with a rapidity hitherto unsuspected.

We are not becoming a more polyglot folk as the result of immigration.

We are not becoming a more illiterate folk as the result of immigration.

The proportion of church members in the adult population is rapidly increasing, and that membership is becoming more evenly divided between Catholic and Protestant.

There is evidence that economic or industrial classes are developing and the lines between them hardening.

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The proportion of farms cultivated by tenants is rapidly increasing in all parts of the United States.

The contradictory evidence regarding the trend of wages in manufacturing establishments between 1890 and 1900 is best explained by concluding that wages in most occupations rose slightly; that wages in all occupations taken as one group fell slightly; that this was due to the disproportionate increase of unskilled and low-grade laborers; that unusually high and unusually low wages were both less common in 1900, and wages near the average were more common.

The very rapid decrease of the birth rate and the very rapid increase of the divorce rate are disturbing and seem to constitute a menace to progress.

The net result is to indicate for the United States a rapid increase of population and probable increase in length of life, an increase in racial uniformity and perhaps in uniformity of other sorts connected with immigration, and at the same time a decrease in uniformity of economic status and income and a probable decrease in the stability and social serviceability of family life. Some of these indications look towards progress, others look towards retrogression. As they cannot be reduced to any common denominator, the statistical method is unable to answer the question with which we started.

Allow me in closing to abandon both the method and the problem. Here as often the indirect and unexpected results of an investigation are more suggestive than the direct results. The inquiry leads by a new path to a familiar conclusion, that the main problems which we as a people are now facing and seem likely to face are widely different from the main problems of the past.

A political democracy and educational opportunity for all cannot now be justified, if indeed they ever could, on the theory that all individuals are equally endowed by nature, but rather on the theory that democracy and universal education are selective influences whereby a modern State chooses its leaders from a larger number

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and with better knowledge of their qualifications than are possible under competing systems of government or of education. They presuppose a certain fluidity of industrial and social organization. If the lines between economic classes are deepening and hardening, as our evidence indicates, strenuous efforts must be made to preserve the institutions we have inherited. This requires a new spirit of responsibility for others, and of social service, a new realization of our debt to past generations and of our obligations to the future. The changes in this direction are numerous and important. The public health movement emphasizes the responsibility of society for unsanitary conditions and its duty to restrain the liberty or license of some individuals for the common good. The conservation movement emphasizes the communal ownership of the unappropriated resources of the United States and society's duty to obtain a larger share than hitherto of the proceeds from these resources and to minimize waste even at the risk of putting a break now and then upon industrial expansion. The movement for shorter hours of labor, better conditions of employment and higher wages, while it likewise may check the rapid accumulation of wealth, claims to more than offset that evil by contributing to a juster distribution of the proceeds between various industrial groups. The growth of an interest in ancestry, exaggerated if not absurd as some of its forms may be, emphasizes the dependence of each person on his inheritance from the past, his responsibility to transmit that inheritance unimpaired to the future, and the primary importance of the family in all permanent social life. The increasing study of the political and industrial systems of foreign countries and the growing attention paid to the results of these studies is an indication of the rapid approach of American conditions towards those of western Europe.

The economic problems of present and future importance are less exclusively those of production and more

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largely those of distribution; the political problems are those growing out of an effort to harmonize our recent industrial changes with American political traditions and political theories.

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THE PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

JOHN M. MECKLIN.

SOMEWHERE in his interesting book, "Saint Augustine and his Age," Mr. McCabe remarks that in writing his Confessions Augustine was guilty of a "foreshortening of the psychic perspective." By this he means to say that the theologian has read into the comparatively innocent deeds of his boyhood his later and sterner conceptions of human nature, and the result is a distortion of the actual facts. A process very similar to this may be traced in many of the modern interpretations of Christian ethics, where the moral ideal is interpreted in terms of the theoretical and formal elements of Greek or modern ethics, and a fundamental identity both as to form and content is assumed to exist between them. We are told that "the advance of Christianity upon Paganism does not consist in a 'reversal of all the moral values of Paganism,' in the absolute condemnation of its fundamental principles. It is the fulfillment rather than the negation of Pagan morality: there is an identity beneath all the difference; . . . an identity of essential spirit and point of view. Develop the deeper implications of Pagan morality and you have the Christian morality."[1]

This assumption of "an identity of essential spirit and

[1] Seth, "On Certain Alleged Defects of Christian Morality," in the *Hibbert Journal*, VI, p. 116.

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point of view" between the Christian and the Greek or modern ethics can only be made by means of a foreshortening of the historical if not of the psychic perspective. It ignores the social and national background of the Christian ideal and the subsequent advances in ethical thought. It has given rise to much of the hostile and unsympathetic criticism of Christian ethics in recent times and explains the difficulties experienced by modern expositors in bringing the paradoxical, almost anti-social, utterances of Jesus into harmony with modern thought.

One of the most attractive of the recent interpreters of Christian ethics recognizes a certain aloofness, a conscious detachment, on the part of Jesus from all social problems. He refuses to be a divider of property or to suggest remedies for existing political ills. He moves through the social issues "with a strange tranquility, not as one who is indifferent to them, but as one whose eye is fixed on an end in which these social problems will find their own solution."[2] The moral life has for Jesus but two poles, God and the individual, and when he does touch upon social problems, such utterances are rather the 'by-products' of his thought and never form an essential part of his message. This is a clear statement of a fact that must impress itself upon the mind of every unprejudiced reader of the Gospels.

But when the same writer finds in this very aloofness and otherworldliness of Christian ethics grounds upon which to base a claim for its universality and efficiency in the solution of social problems, it is a question whether he too is not guilty of a foreshortening of the historical perspective. For he presupposes that the lofty moral idealism of Christian ethics, with its transcendental conception of God and his kingdom, still recognizes the moral potentialities of man's social and political relations, and only appears to ignore them because it "is fixed on an end in which these social problems will find their own solu-

[2] Peabody, "Jesus Christ and the Social Question," p. 78*ff*.

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tion." Jesus "sees into life by seeing over it." Does this, however, not read into Christian ethics the results of a monistic ethical idealism which includes God and existing society in the same moral order and makes them subject to the same moral values? Does it not ignore such radical utterances as "My kingdom is not of this world," and the many passages in the Gospels which imply a reversal of existing moral values and the institution of an entirely different moral order? The underlying assumption here, and one hardly tenable, is that the attainment of the ideal was conceived of in the mind of Jesus as a gradual growth and development, the result, in part at least, of individual effort and implying that man's social and political relations have an inherent moral value of their own. Such an ideal was, on the whole, entirely foreign to the thought of late Judaism.

Perhaps the most successful of the recent contributions to the understanding of the early Christian ideals have been those that have sought to interpret them in terms of the prevailing moral and religious conceptions of the time. They have shown conclusively that, so far as form and language are concerned, the teachings of the Gospels are to a large extent colored by the eschatological ideas of late Judaism. The ideal of Christian ethics is not distinctly anti-social nor is it pathological, as the followers of Nietzsche and Feuerbach would have us believe, but it is otherworldly. For we can hardly deny that a fundamental contrast between the present and a future world runs throughout the teachings of Jesus. He expected with his age, that the world was facing a speedy dissolution which might come at any time, and perhaps within the present generation, that this would be effected by an exhibition of supernatural power involving the destruction of heaven and earth, that this would be followed by a blest and eternal order, in which sin and suffering and conflict, together with all the moral values they condition, would be done away forever and the trans-

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cendental values described by the phrase "the kingdom of God and his righteousness" would prevail. Hence the frequency of such statements as "My kingdom is not of this world," "Resist not evil," "Lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven," etc. Hence the instructions as to love of enemies rather than friends, giving and lending, the avoidance of anxious care for the morrow, the rigorous teachings as to wealth and filial obligations, and the lack of any positive moral valuation of many social and political relations. These are not treated as entirely insignificant, but rather as occupying a position upon the periphery of the moral ideal which is essentially otherworldly.

It is customary to offset these otherworldly elements with sayings that are more worldly and social in tone, and such sayings are not lacking in the sources; but to explain the great mass of material of a distinctly eschatological nature by saying that it is paradoxical and extreme and does not form an essential part of the Christian ethics, is, to say the least, to do violence to our sources and open the way for every kind of arbitrary and subjective interpretation of their meaning. These otherworldly ideas show us most conclusively that Christian ethics, whatever other elements it may have contained, approached the problem of the moral ideal from the standpoint of contemporary Jewish thought, which held that the world had grown old and that nothing of permanent value could be produced by human effort. The world-weary tone of late Jewish thought is lacking, to be sure, but the ideal is still sought, not in this world, the fashion of which passeth away, but in another world of transcendental values. The demand is for a new birth, a new beginning, an entire break with the old order of things,—"und so lang du das nicht hast, dieses Stirb und Werde, bist du nur ein trüber Gast auf der dunklen Erde."

The comprehensive statement of the ideal is in the words "the kingdom of God and his righteousness." An

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atmosphere of the supernatural surrounds this ideal as is evinced by the passages in which the casting out of devils, the healing of diseases, and other exhibitions of divine power are intimately associated with the coming of the kingdom. The righteousness of the kingdom describes the character of those who are fit to occupy a place in this transcendental sphere. The criterion of values is also transcendental since it is found in the nature of God. To be perfect is to be like him. Because of the surpassing nature of these qualities, they are not to be won by human effort, but are the result of divine grace and therefore conditioned upon the divine will. The injunction to 'seek' the kingdom does not refer so much to the possibilitity of attaining the ideal through individual effort as to the diligent cultivation of the frame of mind which will be most congenial to the coming kingdom. In fact, those who are perhaps inclined to push the eschatological elements to extremes affirm that the Sermon on the Mount was intended as a sort of *Interimsethik* or temporary injunctions to tide over the short period before the coming of the kingdom. It is insisted that its teachings as to meekness, nonresistance, service, the neglect of earthly cares, etc., were not intended to be the guiding principles of a permanent social order such as we have in modern society, but were essentially provisional and designed as a preparation for another existence. Since the attainment of the ideal must wait upon the intervention of supernatural power, the utmost man can do is to cultivate the frame of mind that will place him most completely in sympathy with this other life when it comes.

We may perhaps sum up the eschatological elements in Christian ethics as follows. The complete attainment of the moral ideal is made contingent upon the coming within the near future of a supernatural world-order in which perfection or likeness to God is to be guaranteed by the rule of God in each heart. Here the emphasis is to be placed upon the rule of God and not upon those

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ruled. Nowhere is it expressly stated that the attainment of the ideal is dependent upon or is the outcome of social and political relations. Jesus does not say that the coming of the kingdom is mainly conditioned upon the active efforts of his followers. The fact that it was thought possible for the kingdom to come before the hurried preaching tour of the disciples through the cities of Judea was completed would seem to prove the opposite. The moral ideal is not thought of as a task each must fulfill, in part at least, through his own efforts. It is a hid treasure, a pearl of great price, a gift, never one's own creation. The reason for this is the radical difference between the moral values of actual life and those of the true or transcendental sphere. Socrates's magnificent picture of the laws of the other world continuing and completing the work of their brothers, the laws of this world, could hardly have found a place in the Christian ethics. For the world's work never coincided exactly with the service of God. The spheres did not overlap. On the other hand, the nature of the moral ideal demanded that they should be kept as far apart as possible. "Render therefore unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and unto God the things that are God's." It is very much to be doubted whether Jesus ever conceived of the great principle of evolution except as illustrated in the simple facts of nature around him, and certainly to attribute to him a philosophy of history embracing generations and ages of growth and development and having as an ultimate goal the highest moral and spiritual elevation of the race is to bring in a notion entirely foreign to the Jewish mind. Furthermore, it introduces a strange and inexcusable contradiction into Jesus's language, for it makes him describe the attainment of the ideal now as dependent upon an event that is imminent, catastrophic, and supernatural in character, and then again as a process initiated in society, furthered by man's efforts and standing in organic relation to this world.

In the light of these conclusions we are able to state

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the problem of Christian ethics. If the Christian ideal was expressed in the terminology of the Jewish apocalyptic ideas of the time, a fact that can hardly be denied without doing violence to the records, and if it contemplated nothing beyond the horizon of these ideas, then it must be national in character and without any claims to universal validity. If the teachings of Jesus were spoken with the firm conviction that a few more years, or at most a generation, would witness the utter destruction of heaven and earth, followed by a palingenesis in which the existing moral order would be abolished, how can we take these sayings in their original setting and with their original meanings and apply them with confidence to the problems of modern life? Or have we the right to select such utterances as seem to lend themselves to a social and worldly ethic on the ground that they give us the essence of the Christian ideal, and ignore the eschatological elements which are also present and must condition every interpretation of the Christian world-view? Is it not true, as a matter of fact, that in applying Christian ethics to our modern problems we must universalize and change it so that its original meaning and intent are largely lost?

Luthardt, the Leipzig theologian and writer on Christian ethics, seems to have felt the force of this difficulty so strongly that he confessed any attempt to maintain a social order on earth in the original sense of the Christian ideal would be the "proclamation of absolute anarchy."[3] The worldly ethics insists that the moral life is a struggle, "ein Kampf ums Recht." The welfare of the entire social order depends upon the readiness of the individual to defend his rights and those of others. The refusal of one man to defend his rights may not affect the final issue, for he profits by the courage of the others. But were all to follow his example the results would be disastrous. In the traveling Englishman

[3] Luthardt, "Vorträge über die Moral des Christentums," p. 136.

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who resists the extortionate demands of landlord or cab-driver, von Ihering saw the explanation of the moral strength and greatness of English civilization.[4] How, then, is such an ideal which insists upon a healthful amount of self-assertion to be reconciled with an ethics demanding complete self-abnegation? Do not such expressions as "Resist not evil," "Take no thought for the morrow" and the command to seek an ideal that is essentially otherworldly imply a complete reversal of existing moral values? In fine, if the alternative forced upon us by Christian ethics is a choice between a stern and lofty idealism which insists that we set our affections entirely upon the things that are above, that we cultivate homesickness for an eternal city, and pray "let thy kingdom come," "let this world pass away," and a moral ideal that gives to all the rich and varied moral potentialities of life their proper place and approaches the moral problem from the standpoint of the actual rather than the transcendental,—if this is the alternative, I think few would hesitate in their choice.

That such an alternative is suggested by the language of the Gospels cannot be denied. It became more and more pronounced until the ethical ideals of the early centuries of Christianity were almost entirely dominated by the eschatological point of view. This could hardly have been possible did the idea not find some support in the early Christian sources. It is then a fact all the more worthy of remark, that this dualism between the worldly and the otherworldly does not seem to have existed in the thought and life of the author of the Christian ethics. It seems paradoxical that one who in his teachings placed the ideal in a world of transcendental values should still recognize by both word and deed the moral worth and dignity of this life. Such is, however, the case, and in spite of the rigor with which Jesus insisted upon the supremacy of his otherworldly ethics, we

[4] Von Ihering, "Der Kampf ums Recht," p. 45.

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find him mingling freely with men in their social relations, emphasizing the immediate and intrinsic moral value of the good act, and cherishing a poetic delight in the beauties of nature. He is lacking in many of the hall-marks of the genuine ascetic, and his belief in the doom threatening the world did not rob him of an unmistakable joy in life. The strongest evidence of this fact is found in the criticisms of his enemies who saw in him the "glutton," the "wine-bibber," the "friend of publicans and sinners."

The problem of Christian ethics is concerned then not so much with the statement of a world-view as with the interpretation of a life. If the paradox in the Christian ideal is to be explained at all, such an explanation must be sought in the life and personality of its author. What that life was in its essence, we shall probably never know, owing in part to the fragmentary nature of our sources and in part to the mystery that is always associated with genius. Says a recent writer: "Just as the facts of life, of artistic inspiration, or of the indomitable energy of great statesmen and nations present to the scientist, the art critic, and the historian ultimate data which they can explain no further, but must simply accept, so the student of religion, when face to face with this unique religious consciousness, must acknowledge it as an ultimate fact which he may not further analyze nor understand, which he may in some imperfect way sympathize with but cannot master nor explain away."[5]

The mystery and the greatness of this personality appear in such language as "I and my Father are one," "All things are delivered unto me of my Father: and no man knoweth the Father save the Son." Such words must be the purest effrontery or they must presuppose a depth of religious and moral nature of the profoundest character. They imply that in the religious experience of Jesus the world of transcendental values described as

[5] J. Weiss, "Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes," S. 176.

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"the kingdom of God and his righteousness" was felt to be realized in his own life. The greatest achievement of late Jewish thought was its conception of God. But the loftiness and intensely otherworldly nature of this conception made it the despair of Jewish piety. The power was lacking to vitalize it and make it a real force in morals and religion. The tremendous significance of Jesus as a moral and religious genius lies in the fact that he made this transcendental idea dynamic in life and conduct. Faith in a divine Father was for him more than an intellectual matter. It was an abiding consciousness of oneness in spirit and purpose, a conviction of complete sympathy with the divine mind, of kinship in character and will. That a life could be lived in such an atmosphere is to us inexplicable, and the consciousness that his inner religious experience differed so widely from that of the ordinary man was doubtless the psychological foundation for the unique claims Jesus made for himself. We may seek to find parallels to this unique religious experience in the pneumatic phenomena of late Judaism and early Christianity, or we may try to account for it in terms of feeling, which, we are told, underlies all life and lends it its ultimate significance; but we can hardly explain it away.

"Every great man, every genuine man," we are told, "is by the nature of him a son of Order, not of Disorder." Jesus is no exception to Carlyle's dictum. It is true that he clothed his ideas in the language of the time, but the problems of late Jewish thought found their solutions unconsciously in the inner harmony of his own religious experience. The stern dualism between the ideal and the actual, the otherworldly and the worldly, which crushed the life out of Jewish morality, did not exist for him. He made use of the eschatological expressions of the time in describing the ideal, while he showed, both by word and deed, that the ideal he preached was a reality in his own life. The beauty and poise of Jesus's nature, which we can feel better than we can describe

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or analyze, were due to this happy union of the ideal with the actual. Even the hard, almost ascetic utterances, which admit of no exceptions, do not offend because we feel them to be the natural expressions of a soul entirely at one with itself.

In the same way, the surpassing idealism of the Christian ethic finds its ultimate explanation in the religious experience of Jesus. For a soul at one with itself must find expression in a world-view that has no contradictions. This we find to be the case with Jesus. God and the sphere of values He represented were supreme for him and they contained no dualisms, and admitted no antinomies. "Never, in the life of a human being, has God been so real as here. So far as we can see, religion was the whole of life for him. In all his words, he directs his own soul and those of his hearers to God. In every stage of life, even the severest, he escapes to God and harkens to His voice. Every joy becomes a thanksgiving, every calamity a surrender to God's will. His whole nature is ever intent upon the highest and the ultimate. There is no relaxation, no trifling, no busying of oneself with things of subordinate interest."[6] It is in the light of this ideal and unified world of absolute values with its two phases, God as the loving Father and God as the Judge, that we are to interpret the lofty idealism of such utterances as those found in the Sermon on the Mount. It explains for us the surprising reversals of existing values. For example, it enables us to understand why the work and effort necessary in the provision of food and raiment have no intrinsic moral value of their own. To one who seeks first the true values, "the kingdom of God and His righteousness," these things will come as naturally as food and shelter come to the birds of the air or moisture and sunshine to the lilies of the field. They are 'added' and have no place in the ideal. We are to give alms or love our enemies independently of

[6] Bousset, "Jesu," p. 47.

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consequences just as God makes the sun to shine and the rain to fall upon the just and unjust alike. He gives us the measure of values. These values are phrased in superlative, even transcendental, terms and the vast sweep of spiritual vision tends to make us lose the proper perspective in our estimate of personal rights, property, family and political relations. As the painter attains the proper proportions in his picture through the careful manipulation of the objects in the foreground, so we approach the problem of the formulation of ultimate moral values in terms of the immediate relations with which social justice deals.

Jesus's inner harmony of soul to which we have alluded saved him from the danger of the distortion of the moral perspective which is always present in such an ethic of superlatives. His superb moral balance enabled him to rise above the implications of the terminology in which he cast his teachings, and in this universality and catholicity of his nature is to be found the secret of his eternal appeal to the hearts of men. But it was inevitable that his followers, men cast for the most part in a far less heroic mould, would become keenly aware of the great gap between the ideal and the actual latent in Christian ethics. Hence they came more and more to renounce all attempts to attain the ideal by their own unaided efforts and to seek assistance from other sources. This naturally took the form of faith in Jesus himself where faith at first meant little more than the attempt, through sympathetic study and imitation of the life of Jesus, to induce the lofty religious and moral atmosphere which would make the attainment of the ideal possible. As the early enthusiasm waned, this degenerated into the artificial faith-ethic of theology. Ethics itself became the handmaiden of theology, while the ethical dualism still persisted.

The ethics of Jesus is the final working out of the logical implications of the ancient Hebrew theocracy. As the social and political setting in which Jewish moral ideas first took shape disappeared or lost its significance

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with dispersion and captivity, men were forced to fall back upon a more subtle and spiritual bond, and hence the prevailing otherworldly and eschatological nature of late Jewish thought. The Jewish genius by virtue of oppression and denationalisation was thus forced to find citizenship in a kingdom of universal and therefore indestructible moral and spiritual values. Hence the inevitable blending of the moral and spiritual so that we have in the ethics of Jesus something like a final statement of the moral ideal in terms of religion. The ethics of Jesus belongs therefore to the overlapping things of human life. Its magnificent onesidedness is a challenge to the critical spirit as well as a pitfall to the moral or religious enthusiast. It presupposes a thoroughly religious nature and where this is lacking its appeal will be scarcely understood. Its weakness perhaps lies not in ignoring but in failing to emphasize the moral value of the immediate social situation. The modern no longer lives in a world of thought that reckons upon the imminent and catastrophic close of the present world-order and the introduction of another in which existing moral values shall be entirely reversed. The progress of civilization has taught us more and more to stress the moral importance of life's daily tasks. The line once sharply drawn between the supersensuous sphere of eternal values and this earthly life is becoming ever fainter and harder to trace, and the conviction grows upon us that out of the dirt and sweat of this work-a-day world may arise after all "a god though in the germ."

JOHN M. MECKLIN.

LAFAYETTE COLLEGE.

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THE SOCIOLOGICAL ERA.

M. E. ROBINSON.

THE fundamental equipment of the social engineer who seeks to adapt the individual to society and society to the individual is a knowledge of human desires, for these are the forces of which everyone's actions are the resultant. The leading discovery he will make in the pursuance of the quest is, that most people are trying to desire other people's desires, and that this process entails much waste of energy and complication of social problems. That is to say, if he is a Frenchman, he will make the discovery. British men of science are seldom either quick enough as observers or subtle enough as thinkers to do original work in psychology, which a good many of them vigorously contemn.

The truth is that John Bull sees solidity wherever he goes because he himself is solid, and makes, or used to make, solid things; just as melancholics think the world is gloomy because they are, and children will give a grown-up friend a birthday card representing a crude animal or a group of gay little revellers because that kind of picture appeals to themselves. Now human character is anything but solid. As a rule it is a shaky, theatrical structure that produces the illusion of authenticity in the casual spectator, but dissolves like a scenic make-believe before the keen gaze of the psychologist. M. Dromard, the exponent of sincerity, compares himself, as a student of character, to a connoisseur who should admire a handsome building, bold in architecture and massive to the eye, but is startled to find, on closer inspection, that no small part of its framework is composed of wormeaten timbers, mouldering walls, and extraneous ornaments. He detects but few 'opposable' elements, genuine aptitudes, and effective tendencies in people. His

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explanation is, that everybody is constantly imposing himself on everybody else.

> Everyone tends to regard his own life as quite an essential part of life as a whole; and in order to satisfy himself on this point he forms a very characteristic idea of the world at large as a sphere, all the movements of which revolve round what he himself deems good. A priest naturally thinks that a day devoted to prayer is a well-spent day; a soldier will tell you quite seriously that one's life is supremely useful if it is employed in running the risk of losing it, and in taking away other people's lives; the merchant will have little difficulty in believing that following the ups and downs of the market represents the best possible account which a human being could give of himself, and that compared with the most insignificant transaction on the stock exchange, the masterpiece of a master artist is a bagatelle and a mere amusement; a woman of the world who has performed her toilet and rattled through several silly conversations in quite a number of drawing-rooms, doubts not for a moment that she has done some useful work, and never dreams that there is anything better to do in life than doing nothing.

In the twentieth century, which is to be the sociological era, priest and soldier, trader and poet, idler and worker, will discover one another. But let them look for no infallible guidance on the path of their inquiry. In the field of psychology every student must be an explorer, and something of an artist; for investigating it is like journeying through a land of surprises the features of which alter in correspondence with the permanent character and passing moods of every traveller who ventures into its intricate wastes and wilds, or lingers to look at its peaceful plains and cultivated gardens. No man is the same to any two other men; and no one can predict what others will be to us, or what we shall make of them for ourselves.

When everyone is a Nansen or a Columbus in this magic region of the mind, no one will ever utter a word of praise or blame about anyone else, and pride and shame alike will pass away. Then the world will be a vastly more interesting and enjoyable place than it is now, for it will present infinite variety and yet be perfectly peaceful. At present we all go about expecting others to be like ourselves and morally disapproving of them if they

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are not. A very sociable person who makes generous demands upon his friends and consciously or unconsciously gets a good deal out of them, will say to a reserved and retiring comrade who has a kindly and unselfish nature, "*I* don't shut *myself* up. I think it makes one selfish and narrow." And the latter will answer, "*I* don't dissipate *my* attention. *I* want to get some work done." The simple truth is, of course, in the first case, "I like society"; in the second, "I like solitude."

Again, the late Viscountess Harberton used to go out in a knickerbocker suit which was neat and comfortable, if not artistic; and people used to say, as she passed by, "How unwomanly, how vulgar she is!" What they should have said was, "How unlike me!" As a matter of fact, she was extremely modest, and very capable as a wife and mother; and she had the straightforward independence of an unspoilt child. Women who wanted to adopt the skirtless garb themselves would say, when they saw her wearing it in the street, "How courageous!"

In two of the most important departments of thought and action, politics and religion, reasoning is almost invariably of the type illustrated in these two examples, from which it appears that truth consists in human desires realizing themselves. Each man creates it for himself and like himself; and as he passes through the secular changes to which all living creatures are subject, so truth undergoes the regular processes of growth, culmination, and decay by which it adapts itself to him, who is neither animal nor angel, but simply man. The biologist imagines that eugenic perfection would necessarily constitute a fine race of men. But he would find it disappointing compared with the results brought about by the fierce patriotism of the German and Italian, the Welshman and American of to-day; for there is a will element in race-building without which scientific sufficiency would be

> As fruitless as a stream which still
> Slips through the wheel of some old ruined mill.

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Darwin and Huxley, Chopin and Schumann, Nelson and Stevenson, did great work because they liked it, not because they were among the objectively 'fit.' They never allowed themselves to be paralyzed by

> That frost of fact by which our wisdom gives
> Correctly stated death to all that lives.

Men of meaner powers trust their desires less faithfully and follow them out with less persistency. Canon Liddon, for instance, went through agonies of self-teasing every time an appointment was offered him; and on one occasion he actually wanted his Bishop to command him to accept the proffered promotion. He was forever seeking some truth-outside-himself which wasn't there. It never occurred to him that the truth so far as he was concerned could be actualized only by himself, and only by experiment. And so he was constantly striving after some duty which might enable him to escape self-determination, some convenient system of ready-made decisions which would spare him from perplexity, and yet be very respectable. No wonder Gabriel Tarde, observing self-deceptions of this nature, described duty as a device for evading responsibility for non-success in any undertaking, whether of charity or self-help. The Canon, able but diffident, was prevented from seizing opportunities not by a dead weight of moveless fact, but by his own wish and will.

Similarly, it is by the will of the community that social diseases exist. Insanity, alcoholism, dishonesty, prostitution, brutality, class hatred, all could be abolished by a people who really intended to get rid of them.

It is by choice, again, and not by destiny, that women are not soldiers. Wherever they have received a military training, as in Brittany and England in early times, and in Arabia and Abyssinia, South America and the Antilles, Dahomey and Uganda, they have done themselves credit as warriors. During the Polish Insurrection of 1863 numbers of women fought heroically on many a battle-

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field; and one of them, Mlle. Postavoïtow, won a high position of command: and in the French Revolution Olympe de Gouges, Pauline Léon, Mme. Feurier and other women leaders brought together hordes of warrior women who did excellent military service. Women do not want to go to war in this age and this country because the whole circumstances of their lives have made the profession disagreeable to them.

Circumstances, personal and ancestral, so differentiate one human being from another, that no one, by rights, can be compared with anyone else, and that everyone is lovable to someone. In many circles of intellectual folk at the present time, Becky Sharp, in all probability, would not be wicked or unnatural, but beneficent and amiable; while the Madonna type of woman, seemly as it is in most other circles, would be depressing and unlovely. Mr. William McDougall has expressed an admiration of the latter which has led him to regard the maternal instinct as the source in general of the highest joys and noblest virtues of humanity, and in particular of the impulse to deal out equity to others. And yet he notes that a mother will be indignant if anybody insinuates that her child is not the most beautiful object in the world. But suppose it is ugly—to others. If she acts all her life as if it were beautiful, is she likely to do justice either to the child or her neighbors? We smile at the mother who told the schoolmaster that she had not quite decided what her son's career was to be, but she thought she would like him to become a cabinet minister, or perhaps a judge or a newspaper editor. If we realized all the confusion, corruption, and injustice which emanate from such preconceived notions, we should be more inclined to cry. How many a child would be deeply thankful if he need not hide his real difficulties and failings from his mother! How many a clever but shy girl would be glad if she could tell her meek-spirited mother that she wanted to be an astronomer or an engineer! How many a frank, good-natured boy, clever in quite other

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ways, would rejoice if he could tell his proud-spirited mother that he would give anything to be a tradesman or a gardener!

As a rule the woman's experience of the world is so narrow, and her imagination so limited in consequence, that she has no understanding of the varied media in which her children live, either at school or in business, and therefore, as Mr. McDougall admits, can offer them no sympathy. Most readers will remember Mr. Arnold Bennett's fine study of a mother and son in "The Old Wives' Tale"; and how on one occasion the former fervently thanks a youth who in reality has taught her boy no small amount of iniquity, for his benedictory friendship to her family.

Very often women have a definite logic of conduct, nonconformity to which they regard as wicked. Now M. Paulhan has observed how readily we all acknowledge the necessity and propriety of actions and events simply because they have happened, and how easily, if we discover that they did not really take place, we come to believe in the eternal necessity of what actually did happen. The experiential conditions of thought and conduct make a substantial difference between the logic of one man's behavior, with the system of opinions that are consonant therewith, and that of another; insomuch that anyone who does not possess the somewhat rare gift of catholic sympathies must have extensive sociological knowledge to understand how the subjective and the environmental factors are related to one another in the acts of others. By those elements, which are variable, their conduct and convictions are completely determined. Therefore the fact that a man is churchman or nonconformist, conservative or socialist, Englishman or Japanese, ought to be the source of neither hauteur nor humility to him, but of pure, childlike pleasure. No action or belief can be wrong in the sense that it is unnatural or could have been otherwise under the circumstances, though it may be wrong according to the onlooker's interpretation.

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Thieving is quite right as far as the thief is concerned, for there is no disposition that is inherited so surely as that of stealing. Almost without exception, children whose parents have this characteristic,—which is a survival, no doubt, from an age when robbery was honorific—will instinctively lay their hands on other folk's property if they can by any means get the opportunity. As far as possible, therefore, society should withdraw all such opportunity; and should see to it that born thieves have no descendants. As Novicow has remarked, a theft must be the work of two parties at least, the thief and his victim. If the latter is not as clever in protecting his goods as the former is in securing it, he must expect to be robbed. The miseries from which the community suffers are due almost as much to the stupidity, ignorance, and carelessness of 'the innocent' as to the cunning of 'the guilty.' Children should be taught that everyone they meet may be a swindler, or some other kind of scoundrel, just as he may be the most beneficent person in the world; and that if it is the knavish and sinister part of his nature that comes into play in his dealings with them, the 'fault' is partly their own. Conversely, they should learn to feel no resentment if they see that others have taken precautions against them which amount to an impeachment of their character; for if all the devices that human ingenuity could contrive were brought into requisition to prevent or defeat evil, it could not exist. Moral indignation is one of the most fruitful sources of the sin and suffering of the world, since it drives infamy beneath the mask of hypocrisy and into the secret infernos of society where alone it can flourish. The study of human character is difficult in the extreme; and to expect that everyone we come across shall know us so thoroughly as to be convinced of our goodwill and honesty, is to require that he shall have mastered it to the minutest detail.

The only certainty we should look for in the wonderful story-book of social psychology is the greatest possible

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variety and the most exciting adventures. The great value of M. Paulhan's studies in psychology consists in his classification of 'characters' according to the way in which their component parts are associated in the balance of the whole. That principle enables him to put order into a set of observations that of necessity are extremely diversified, and to see that no two characteristics, such as frankness and sincerity, calmness and accuracy, cruelty and cowardice, are ever invariably found together. Let us discard the rigid apparatus of judgments and comminations, rewards and punishments, which we all carry about with us to avoid having to be independent, courageous and observant, and we shall have what Mr. McDougall terms primitive sympathy. Our minds are the theatre of a ceaseless reverberation and reflection from what we see and hear. Smile answers smile on the faces of the friends and the strangers we meet, and frown answers to frown; and sunshine calls forth gladness in the heart, while tempest inspires fear and melancholy. The appeal to sympathy, indeed, is made by suggestion, an instrument for utilizing the desire forces of the people for good which has a potency as fremendous in the psychic as the dynamo and the steam-engine have in the physical sphere. If men and women used it freely, they would be as charming and fresh as the child with the Christmas card; and wiser withal, for suggestion can be employed aright only after careful observation and analysis. Find out the particular kind of suggestion to which a given individual will respond, and you will be able so to manipulate his attention that nothing base or mean ever enters into his thoughts and gets translated into conduct. It is only in cases of insanity that the mind runs persistently on unwholesome topics.

To take an example of educational suggestion,—a boy loves piano-playing and neglects his lessons for it. The father, tyrannically moral, forbids him to touch the piano: the mother, timidly moral, sometimes allows him

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to, but with protests. In other words, the latter suggests 'ought' to the boy, the former 'must.' His mood is hostile to both, and the suggestions undergo a Hegelian conversion which turns them respectively into 'shan't' and 'won't.' Then the child feels that his self-respect is involved in maintaining his position, and a wearisome war sets in between him and the parents. But suppose they had said, when he first began the piano-playing, "Yes, music's lovely. We'll have a tune first, just a little one, to put you in a good temper, and then you shall do your lessons. And you'll do them well because the playing will have given you such a lot of energy, and you'll feel so brave and manly for having made yourself attend to the lessons when you wanted to play. Then you might play a little afterwards to reward yourself. Or would you rather do the French and algebra first and have the reward afterwards?"

By making suggestions like these, implying some imaginative enjoyment of his pursuits on their part, and by enlisting his interest in what brings him the satisfaction of self-esteem, the parents could not only train the boy's will and make him like doing right, but also teach themselves what his native disposition and endowments were. Sooner or later faithful observation and unobtrusive coöperation with him would bring them down to the bedrock of his character. In all probability they would not find the music there. But if they did, if it were not a passing fancy, but a genuine passion that sustained his attention and called forth spontaneous efforts from him, they would have to treat it as one of the primal desire forces which, whether they bring weal or woe, poverty or wealth, can never be changed or diminished, though they may be guided into desirable channels.

There would not be much evil in the world, or much of the slackness and sentimentalism that the public policy of the day is instilling into the working folk, if wrongdoers and malcontents alike were dealt with on the assumption that they meant to do right, and the only ques-

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tion were how to attain that end. Sermons and moralizations, punishments and reproaches will be useless where an employer or teacher might achieve excellent results by saying, "Oh, I know how you could have done it," or, "Let's see how you forgot and can make yourself remember next time." Many a labor dispute might have been avoided if the capitalists had met the very first application for a minimum wage that was put before them not by opposition, which directly suggests corresponding opposition, but by some such reply as this: "We have never dreamt of the possibility of such a thing, and naturally it seems utterly impracticable to us. We will study the matter closely. And you too go away and think about it. Afterwards, if you still want it, let us adopt the minimum wage by way of experiment, do our best to make it a success; and if it answers, put it permanently on trial." Failing such agreements, employers and politicians have had to become extremely deferential to and laudatory of the workman. They must never insinuate that, like any common rich person, a laborer could possibly be incompetent, or produce a family of defectives who ought to be confined in colonies, or commit any other unsocial act.

As the light of the sociological era broadens from dawn into day, the members of the different social classes will regard each other with interest and appreciation, and feel that vainglory and guilt alike have passed from the earth as a nightmare glides away with the darkness. The women are dull of intellect because the real springs of their desires, which are not always, perhaps not often, centred in sex, or in wifehood and motherhood, are seldom discovered. But there will be no dullness, even among women, in a world where all are free to express their joy in whatever interests them unrebuked, and where everybody will acquire some skill,—at school, it is to be hoped,—in diverting the thoughts of others from all such joys as are truly harmful to society. Even the common routine of the day's work might be entertain-

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ing if everyone made perfect sincerity possible for everyone else. Thus a couple of strangers might meet in a restaurant and initiate a conversation in this way: A. I'm rather a talkative person and hate an unsociable meal. Will you let me talk to you? B. Yes, by all means. I'm sociable, too. But I don't like the look of you at all. A. Oh, that's interesting. I *am* rather a shabby-looking man; and ugly too, they tell me. I wonder what sort of people attracts you, and how you came by your standards of beauty and goodness and so on. Do you find that faces which you didn't like at first afterwards become agreeable to you?

Then each conversationist would tell the other scraps of social history which were quite new to the other, and anything but insipid. We all miss a good deal of both knowledge and amusement by rendering life spectacular and insisting on making all our acquaintances pretend to resemble or correspond to ourselves. There is twenty times more originality in ordinary men and women, and twenty times more virtue in extraordinary ones than we ever make use of. Many and many a great man has been prevented from giving of his best to the world by the sense of "isolation drear and deep" which their contempt and neglect have impressed upon him, only to give place to extravagant admiration when his day's work is done, and he is beyond the need of human sympathy and goodwill. "When I was poor and sick and hungry," wrote Heine in a moment of deep discouragement, "there was one brave man who stood up to defend me; and one kind hand was stretched out to help me. That man was myself, and that hand was my own."

If men did not cherish so tenaciously the absolutisms and misoneisms which are really egotisms, their own curiosity would lead them to take an interest in the man who shows some originality; and self-assertion on his part would be needless. Sympathy guided by sociological knowledge, indeed, would make all unpleasant forms of self-assertion unnecessary, and cut the social ground

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from every kind of lie which hides the causes of human sufferings—lies told by preachers and orators, merchants and financiers, biographers and historians. All the ills that accrue from competition and the rush for riches, from 'conspicuous wealth' and 'conspicuous leisure,' would vanish. There would be no despised occupations and no downtrodden toilers; and the nervousness of the age of self-advertisement would pass away like a feverous dream.

It is again to the imagination of M. Paulhan that one must appeal by way of pleading the possibility of the sociological era.

> It is not at all impossible that a civilization may come into being in which all the ideas and sentiments that now constitute our conceptions of right and duty, of responsibility and moral sanctions, may disappear. Their very names might be forgotten; and a civilization might arise in which no mention was ever made of right or duty, authority or responsibility, nay of morality itself and of good and evil. Nevertheless would there still be series of coördinated phenomena, systematizations and harmonies; doubtless also, discords and incoherences; and problems which would be none the less problematic for having presented themselves in fresh forms. Preferences there would always be. And the chances are that a society in which morality was never discussed at all, actual conduct would be more 'moral' than it is among peoples who are constantly talking about questions of morality. We should always be able to construct a system of values in such a community, and weigh its elements against one another as contributing more or less to the establishment of more comprehensive ends, loftier ideals, and more progressive ideas.

In all the nations to-day a deafening clamor is arising for mental expansion and individual development. And nothing can still that strife of tongues and restore the calm in which alone great public problems can be solved, but the realization that whatever his particular desires may be, everyone's general desire is not to thwart his neighbor, but to get good for himself: and this good is so different from that of every other man, that it need not be achieved at another's expense. It is not beyond the power of science to devise a social mechanism which makes a just provision for the wants of all. But the desire to see "the glory of a nature satisfied" in every face,

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and to communicate one's own gladness to others, must always be the driving force that creates and works the machinery. And as the spirit of domination gives way to the spirit of primitive sympathy, that force will grow stronger and stronger, and more and more effective. The discords between man and man are superficial, noisy, and ephemeral; the concord is fundamental, quiet, and lasting. Social antipathies "are sovereignly unjust, for all the parties are human beings with the same essential interests, and no one of them is the wholly perverse demon which another often imagines him to be. Both are loyal to the world that bears them; neither wishes to spoil it, neither wishes to regard it as an insane incoherence; both want to keep it as a universe of some kind; and their differences are all secondary to this deep agreement."

M. E. ROBINSON.

LONDON, ENGLAND.

IS IT MUST OR OUGHT?

EZRA B. CROOKS.

AT the last Spring meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, held at the University of Chicago, the question which elicited most warmth in discussion was the one proposed above. Each of the principal protagonists said in summing up that it was his custom to ask of his students in the beginning of the ethics course, "What do you want?" When the unpragmatic one confessed this, the evident sentiment was that he had given up all sanctions of authority and in effect joined the enlightened ranks of the present day ethical relativists. In this meeting all things idealistic were as the green things of Pharaoh's Egypt; what the pragmatists left the realists ate.

But I am wondering if the case is as serious with idealistic ethics, and with idealism in general, as the climate

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of recent philosophical meetings would lead one to suspect. May not the idealistic teacher of ethics say to his disciples, without losing his ground, "Find out what you want and this will be the ground of obligation for your action"? Yes, he may ask this question as sincerely as any pragmatist. But the idealist will know that the school boy is not just then prepared to answer that query as to what he wants. No, nor can any man answer straight off that question of wants. The pragmatist seems to think that he can. 'Want' would be, I think, for him just the complex of present desire. Of course, the school boy is able to mention what his present resultant desire is. Then the relativist would say to him, "Very good! Now you *must* fulfill the necessary conditions if you are to realize that desire." This view is simple enough to be sure even for those who like to speak of the mechanics of consciousness. "If your ideal is to possess a million dollars, then you *must* do such and such things." "If you want to go to heaven, then you must do such and such, perhaps, other, things." But if the man answers that he does not care about going to heaven, then the heavenly course of conduct is not binding on him. So here the ideal of conduct and its 'must' is relative entirely to the 'if.'

This 'if' for the relativist need not, of course, be a trivial expression of whim, but the 'want,' however solemn it may be, is an affair of the present. No obligation is upon the chooser except such as he now recognizes. He chooses freely on the authority of his present character. The character that he is to be does not decide, nor influence, what he is to do to-day. Let us eat and drink and be merry to-day, for what we are to be to-morrow is not yet. This is to make the present and its reality the sole test of right. If the moral situation is concerned with the present only, then indeed is a 'must' alone possible and no 'ought.' The must has to do just with the present and its *modus operandi* of carrying a purpose into execution, and it is only equivalent to say-

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ing: *this,* in order to be, demands *that,* as its condition. Must then belongs strictly to the descriptive sciences, and if ethics is to be more than a branch of biology, namely that branch concerned with social conduct, then we must introduce a meaning into the process which goes beyond a mechanical causation, *i. e.,* the ought motive of normative science. The moral question does not ask what you are to do if you are to get what you want (what is to be done *if* the present want is to be met), but it seeks to know what is the right of a proposed case of conduct, and does not care at all whether its ought pleases either the nature of things as they are or the present want of desire.

The idealist knows that to ask the student what he wants is to ask him more than he can answer. No one, however profoundly he may understand his own need, is just now able fully to tell what he wants. This human want is progressive. Let us suppose that to-day we are able to form a wish to match our present need, and that to-morrow that wish is completely fulfilled,—well, then, to-morrow we would be just as little satisfied as to-day we are.

This inability to take more than the most transient satisfaction in the fulfillment of any desire is a profoundly significant fact of human life. Such lack of capacity to be long pleased does not result from mere whimsicalness, but suggests that a present desire and its satisfaction are far from the whole story of human want. One might phrase it in such out of date language as this: a desire can gets its satisfaction, but the desirer is never satisfied. In each such situation of desire and its satisfaction there is an unsettled element which reappears as a new expression of desire. The naturalistic ethicist may say that this dialectic,—desire, satisfaction, dissatisfaction,—simply describes the drive and go of the natural evolutional process. Yes, but if that 'natural process' is a something in itself, *i. e.,* something more than a mere summation of present states of desire in

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the individual, then it is not fully described by the 'what you want' of the individual. It has as much authority as it has continuity, *i. e.,* inner connectedness. By speaking of authority here I mean that anything which has character, whether an individual or a process, has some rights over its future, *i. e.,* over its next succeeding course. To be sure one can say: "if this individual is to do or get X, then he *must* do Y, *i. e.,* fulfill the necessary conditions." This is to look at the problem from the side of description, which is, indeed, one of the necessary ways of studying the problem of behavior. But when we are in the spirit of description, our mood is entirely scientific and we are cold and indifferent to the *if*. If this puppy is to be a part of the circus, it must learn this trick. If this baby is to live, it must take nourishment. If this woman is to be respectable, she must be virtuous. But in the actual living of life the 'ifs' are not so indifferent as this; on the contrary, upon these 'ifs' hang the very issues of life and death. Just to the extent that the individual has character, meaning, worth, there enters the element of demand. There are vested interests now with the usual persistent rights of such interests. Each being has as much sacredness as it has character or meaning. Now the ought is born out of this sacredness of character and is meant to protect this vested interest. We are never indifferent here as to which way the *if* shall go, and this is because all the value and meaning in the being demands that the decision shall be in favor of the preservation and continuance of this being. There is as much ought in any decision as there is value at stake.

Let us illustrate. In a system, such as that of the sun and its planets, we could say that the transit of Venus *ought* to take place. The ought here would mean that, unless it does, the solar system would lose its inner coherence and be broken up. In such an introduction of chaos there would be great loss of value, and I do not mean that just the human world of values would be de-

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stroyed, but rather that the beauty and harmony of this system would be lost. And such a loss there *ought* not to be. So Venus *must* be on time. But immediately the question arises, *ought* for what or in respect to what? Ought implies authority. Now in respect to what authority *ought* Venus to be on time? In respect to a higher system which needs the solar system. And this? Well, this in respect to the system of systems, in which dwells all the beauties and harmonies of the spheres. If Venus fails the solar system, then all this universal agreement is lost, at least as this harmony is now constituted. So there is as much demand upon Venus's promptness as there is value involved. The importance of an act is the measure of its ought.

Ought also implies responsibility, and this means freedom to do the act mentioned. The freedom and responsibility that we talk about in morality is always thought of as a quality of personality. In fact, we define freedom and personality reciprocally. A person is an autonomous being, and the appearance of self-directed activity is the first hint of personality. There seems no reason for changing this identification, but how then can Venus be said to possess an ought? It is many centuries since the mightiest of planets was believed to be a person. Just at present we will leave the question by saying that responsibility is involved here, but that it does not belong to Venus in particular.

Let us experiment with the case of the puppy destined for the circus. Is it not a cruelty to spoil the world of his gambols by introducing into it this harrassing ought? Perhaps it is so, but if there is to be a world of performing dogs, then his puppyship will have to be brought to sharp account. Yes, it is sure to be answered. *if* there *must*, but where is the *ought?* In the first place, I believe that the *ought* may reside in the world in which dogs live and move and have their being. How badly does this world need performing dogs? This need will measure the ought, and if there is no need, there will be

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no ought. But the question still remains as to who owns the ought. Does it attach to the poor little puppy or does it inhere in his world? Certainly here the including world owns the ought just because it possesses the need. Only in so far as he is a fragment of that world, does the puppy share the ought and the need. But that world is also one of children needing amusement and of elders who need to take the children to be amused. So the world in which the puppy moves is a great world as measured in terms of its poor little importance, and thus the puppy all but escapes any participation in the ought by its very inconsequence. But it does not quite escape, for there is some investment of value in the puppy which raises just expectations. Mayhap it was carefully bred from performing ancestors and has especially fitting individual characteristics. In so far as this inheritance and these characters serve to give the puppy individual definition in the direction named, just to this extent they serve to fasten on him obligation to act up to his part. To be sure, the puppy is not oppressed by much obligation, but then he has not much character either. But has he any personality? If not so, neither has he a rag of *ought* to be his very own.

Now let us see about the baby and its ought to eat. One hesitates to say that the situation here is not different from that of the other little animal. Whatever difference there is, however, for our present purposes, is a difference in investment, that is, value of character. We believe, of course, that there is more at stake in the baby than in the puppy, more of evolutional value coming out of its past and potentialities in its future. The investment of value in the baby's life engenders the 'ought' of its preservation. This child's life needs to be preserved, therefore the necessary means ought to be used to preserve it, *i. e.*, food should be taken. In the case of a baby we can't merely say, "if it is to survive, it must take its natural sustenance" and believe that we have done more to the problem involved than to repeat

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an empty platitude. Yes, if the little face were pinched and drawn by starvation, surely only one of a dull and insensible heart could be guilty of such a platitude. There is a driving urgency in such a case which does not stop short of saying that something ought to be done. This amounts to saying that taking into account all elements of this situation and the interests that they involve, we cannot refrain from judging it as incomplete and intolerable to our sense of rightness. The demand arises for the factor which would save the values which are going to waste in this situation. This demand for the solution is the ought, and that this feeling of oughtness is present in every vital human situation will not be denied. This is not a mere appeal to emotion. To be sure, such a situation does appeal to the feelings, it also appeals to the intellect, *i. e.*, we judge it to be unfitting or wrong for a child to suffer starvation, and it likewise moves the will, for what normal person does not feel impelled to do something to change such a pitiful situation? This simply means that our whole personalities affirm and back up an ought, or rather here, an ought not, of such a tragic human situation.

But again we must ask to whom the ought belongs, and the answer here, as in the case of the other little animal, is that it does not belong in particular to the baby. That ought belongs to the whole situation, to the immediate family, to the community, to the human race, yes, to the very structure of the universe itself. The baby's part in this responsibility cannot be personal unless the baby is already a person.

And now, as to the woman, can more be said of her than that if she is to be respected, she *must* be virtuous? I affirm as my thesis that she ought to be respectable, and that she personally and particularly owns the ought. But let us reduce this personal responsibility as much as we can. The woman is not responsible for all of that ought. Her family shares in it to the extent of a clean inheritance and a good training. The community shares

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in her ought to virtue, at least to the extent of a wholesome social atmosphere, and this would include a chance to make an honest living. The world in which the human race moves and has its being participates in this ought to womanly virtue, for evidently the nature of the woman must be such as to make continence a possibility for her. Every honest element in the situation then wants virtue in this woman's life, and every one of these elements shares in the obligation to produce virtue there. It is futile to try to measure just what per cent. of this total responsibility for a virtuous life belongs to the woman individually. This will vary according to the degree of development of the character of the woman. It cannot be denied that the woman has a very considerable part of this responsibility if she is a moral agent at all. And that she individually owns part of this responsibility is accounted for by the fact that she is not entirely explained by the environment, which is the same as saying that she is a person.

The problem of moral responsibility reduces every time to the question of personality. In what sense is a man a person? Answer that and I will know what you mean when you talk of a moral act. If a human individual is a section of the landscape and nothing more, then indeed is his activity fully described by a *must,* and no *ought* can be forced on him. This is the mechanistic or naturalistic theory of human conduct and means, of course, that man is no more free or self-directed in his behavior than is the rest of the landscape, *e. g.,* than the capering puppy, the growing trees, or the inactive stones. Nothing is gained here by beclouding the issue by dodging behind an ambiguous phrase, as *e. g.,* "Man acts according to his nature." No, if man cannot act or refrain from acting, determined by nothing but the power of his own free choice, then we can properly only say of his behavior that it is the activity of the forces or laws of nature in this creature. It is ambiguous to speak of man acting according to the laws of his own nature, and being

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thus free. The very question is as to who is the primary actor. If man cannot on occasion commit or refrain from committing himself to a certain specified law of nature, as *e. g.*, whether he will permit gravity to help him down from a wall or whether he will decline this aid and compel this force to help him keep his place on the wall, if, I say, man has not at least sometimes this mastery of the situation, then he is no free agent and so indeed has no individual responsibility for the solution of any situation. Of course, this is not to say that man can order the laws of nature around, for they continue to act, within and without him, no matter what his state of will may be. But it is to say that if personality is anything beyond mechanism, then a person has in and of himself, at the very least at some time, the power of selecting which law of nature shall work on or for him. If this is not the case, then the moral problem disappears entirely, for then there is no such thing as responsibility.

What is the sense, if man's behavior is entirely mechanical, of saying to a class of such creatures, "If you desire X, then you must do the things which are necessary to get X"? The 'yous' addressed might as well be so many yews, for all the difference the advice will or can make in their behavior. The partisans of the must and no ought doctrine might better, it would seem, drop the word ethics altogether, for they certainly mean something entirely different by their use of it from what has been meant by it in the history of that discipline. To avoid confusion, it doubtless is advisable for those who have liberated themselves from all sanctions to limit themselves to speaking of the behavior of the human species. Such terms as conduct, morality, ought, merit, reward, punishment, evil, good, better, worse, and their like were coined by an entirely different way of thinking to express a definite interpretation of human activity. No good reasons have been advanced for changing the fixed usage in respect to these words.

All this advice to the instrumentalists savors of the

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usual orthodox invitation to heretics to read themselves out of desirable company by adopting some more than suggestively unpleasant sobriquet. But after all now, why do instrumentalists and other materialists keep on entitling their books "Ethics" of this and that? When one undertakes to be a professional philosopher, one owes something special to consistency.

Of course, the retort upon such an attitude as is here taken is at once at hand. Where then do you find the ground of obligation? If I felt constrained to answer straight back, I would say that, in general, it is in personalized will. In particular, responsibility inheres in character. The finer and the stronger the character, the greater the responsibility. According to the conception here used, character is private to individuals, and personalized will is the constitutive principle of character. Whatever the final principle of reality may be for itself, it is, I believe, best described for us as intelligently directed will power.

Our situation seems to be about as follows: (1) As organism we are able by sensory activity to delimit ourselves, at least dimly, from our environment; (2) as something seemingly different from organism, or at least something more than sensory activity of organism, we are able to represent past experiences to ourselves and also to project ourselves into future or different circumstances. In defining personality, the feeling of otherness and memory activity have been emphasized, but this other power of imaginative projection is no less important. In fact it seems that it is just with this ability to picture ourselves as in another situation than our present one that the ethical consciousness arises. It is just the comparison made of what we now are and where we are with what we might be in a different situation with other relations that gives the push to moral effort. For it is only as this push is interior and self-consciously initiated that it is moral. If it were set in motion from without, it would be mechanical causation.

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The bottom facts of the moral situation are an awareness of myself together with an imaginative presentation of myself as different from what I now am, plus the volitional power to effect the change. This is enough capital to constitute a morally responsible person blessed with an ought. The ought is on hand as soon as there is a person there to act. But to which one of these three original elements of personality, *i. e.*, self awareness, imaginative presentation of self as different from its present reality, and effective volition, does the ought principle belong? I believe it is to the imagination. Awareness or self-consciousness is no doubt the primitive matrix of personality and volition is its necessary driving force, but it is the imagination that is the creative power. Imagination has two functions, that of representing in consciousness perceptions or images of past experiences and that of creating images which in their present forms have never been in our consciousness before. These latter created images are original only in the sense that they are new combinations of old experience images. Both of these activities of the imagination are significant for morality. The power to recover our past means the awakening of conscience. It is this seeing myself of past experiences in unfavorable relation to my present concept of myself that arouses my disapprobation, that is of that past active self. And condemnation of self is, I believe, the root of conscience.

This unfavorable viewing of self arises also in another manner. We are not only able to recover images of ourselves in past experiences, but we are also able creatively to image ourselves in relations which have never yet been maintained in one experience. We see ourselves as we might be. This possible self is almost in every case a better self than our present self. Thus is aroused disapproval of the present self and conscience is awakened. And again, conscience is negative, for it speaks of what we are not. The creative imagination gives me a glimpse of my personal ideal, or at the least, it reveals to me a

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self possessing qualities which I have longed for, but as yet have never possessed in a single experience. This imaged self, an improvement on myself, makes me dissatisfied with the self which I now am and so awakes conscience. It is being conscious of what I am not that makes me a moral being at the beginning. Again, conscience is a negative voice.

But sometimes it is consciousness of what we are not yet that arouses conscience, as, for example, when we awaken to the strength of a bad habit and recognize that we are about to become its slave. Here it would seem that the voice of conscience were positive, telling me what to do, *i. e., to cease* the evil custom. But I think this is not the case for it is the thing which I am not now, but about to become, which startles me, and conscience says, Do not be that loathsome thing, and awakens fear and disgust and so saves me. Thus still the conscience is negative, and this special case of its activity proves to be no exception. The productive imagination is at work here, combining elements from our experience with observations of other experience, thus presenting us an image which shocks our present sensibilities.

The ought here, to be sure, is an ought not and arises out of an uncomfortable feeling which in its turn is aroused by the awareness of a contrast between our conception of what we are and an imaginative presentation of what we might be. The moral judgment follows the comparing of these concepts and takes the form, This is less pleasant and worse than that, the 'this' being our present and the 'that' our imagined self. I say 'less pleasant' rather than more pleasant, because it is just the feeling of lack in ourselves that is that discomfort out of which, on its lower side, arises morality.

But this arousing of the conscience by an image of a self which as yet we are not, either of a better or of a worse self, is an activity which demands further scrutiny.

Up to this point it is, I think, clear that our acceptance of the ought, or rather, the ought not, arises directly out

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of our feeling of personality, that is, from our present self-consciousness. I say "our acceptance of the ought, or ought not," for after all, no one ever doubts it except in moments of super-sophistication. Each one of us acknowledges as much obligation in his acts as he estimates value in his character and in the characters of the others whom his acts affect. This ratio certainly holds in our unobstructed practical lives. Even the enlightened ethical relativist does not doubt, when he is in the business of living, that in every act he owes something to himself and to the other selves about him. Now, if we have analyzed rightly, the feeling of ought is a phase of the feeling of personality, that is, of selfconsciousness. Self-consciousness is not just a vague sense of being there. Life is motor, and self-conscious life is a succession of conscious adjustments to changing circumstances. In every one of these adjustments the person feels the draw of the ought.

I know that it is answered, Yes, '*feels*,' but *is* there an ought? This feeling of oughtness may be nothing but an illusion, even if it is universal, which would be hard to prove, and at the most, this sense of obligation could be explained as an emotional tone of function in the organism indicating to it what it *must* do in order to make a proper adjustment.

Such an answer is satisfactory for descriptive psychology, but not for ethics, for ethics is yet within the sisterhood of philosophy, and its most fundamental task is to explain just this prescience of the self-conscious organism in finding prosperous adjustments in its social environment. In this case the organism is not adjusted to the environment, but self-consciously adjusts itself to the environment. If one denies this and says that the self-consciousness is an illusion or that it makes no difference, he is simply making announcement of materialistic faith, and the fight is then best transferred to the question of personality or, better still, to self-consciousness itself. Until this new kind of ethicist, who is ambitious to be

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solely a functional psychologist, has arrived at some consistency in formulating his dual points of view of human conduct, descriptive and normative, we need not take him too seriously nor abandon the self-directing person of immemorial thought.

But let us return to a really serious problem in our analysis of the ethical self-consciousness, *i. e.*, the negativity of the voice of conscience. The last form of this negativity considered was the case in which the productive imagination arouses the conscience by presenting us an image of what we are not yet, but may become. I think we get a hint here of how the ethical voice becomes positive. This act of imagination is after all pretty highly rational, for the seeing myself in relation to that image of a possible future self involves a wide span of comparison as well as judgment of value. Widen the span of comparison and repeat this image until it becomes the embodiment of a principle, and then we have a positive basis for ethics, *i. e.*, definitely formulated principles of conduct. Now it is only the reason that can reveal to us principles of uniformity in experience. By itself reason is not productive, for all richness comes out of sensibility by way of the imagination, yet without reason all is blindness. It reveals to us meanings in this great jumble which we call experience, and it does this by pointing out to us the relation of this item to that and thus bringing us to knowledge of principles of uniformities or laws. This is just what has happened in the formation of ethical laws, for here uncritical moral experience furnishes the stuff in which reason discovers the laws of ethical conduct. And unlike the conscience, which deals with but particular cases, the reason can state her commands positively, for she bases her formulations upon vast numbers of instances of conduct. The sanction for her commands is as great as her insight into right relations between persons is true. This sanction arises here, as it did in our other investigations, out of the value of personality, but the person is now con-

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sidered not as a separate unit, but in his social setting. A person is larger than his self-consciousness, and it is reason's ethical task to discover and take into account these unconscious human relationships. The conscience directs our attention upon ourselves, being something like a sore finger,—telling us where not to touch after we have touched. But the reason is able to point the path of conduct that I ought to take, for it grasps the total meaning of my character in its present human environment. The reason can do this because it is able to take into account the value and claims of the other personalities concerned. But reason also goes back of the present and by the reproductive imagination or memory makes use of our past experiences in determining what course of conduct is most fitting for us. And still more than this, reason can go in the other direction and construct the future with its probable demands upon us and thus prepare us for action. This last is done not by conjuring up what might happen, but by foreseeing the probable event and analyzing out of that proposed act and its consequences the principles of human relationship involved. It is usually a concrete act which we are contemplating, and to reason only can we appeal as to what is best to do. It is better said that reason simply assumes charge of our conduct in all such cases and ventures the decision. Conscience follows after and complains if reason has made a mistake, and sometimes grumbles anyway. This all comes by reason's possession of authority, through its knowledge of the principles of conduct, *i. e.*, through its understanding of the meaning of personalities both social and individual.

Of course, reason sees the steps which are necessary to carry the act into execution, and so it has a 'must.' A 'must,' in this sense, is something which conscience never had, and so the ethical relativist rules out our old monitor entirely. But reason has also its ought, as well as joining conscience in having an ought not, for it and it alone takes account of the values involved when a

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human being acts. And as reason is ready with a plan to save these values in action, its ought is positive. We agree with old Epictetus, the Stoic, that 'the reasoning faculty' is chief among the faculties of men. It "alone is found able to place an estimate upon itself" and is the only "faculty which contemplates both itself and all other things."

This account gives a high place to reason in the ethical situation. It is for all the sole director as to what positive, forward course to take in conduct, and for the most enlightened it is the final court of decision as to negative cases of conduct, *i. e.*, things one ought not to do. What I have called the reproductive imagination is of vital value in finding our right direction, for by it we are able vividly to construct the end or result of our present course of conduct. It is our prophetic insight by which we get warnings of judgment to come, and also from it come our glimpses of the ideal which may be. The conscience has its work to do, but its span is just the act under consideration, and of this act it says nothing until it is done and over with. Conscience never approves except in so far as its silence may be construed by us as approval. Its disapproval is the warning sting of unsuccessful experience. Conscience is a voice out of our past protesting against the repetition of ancient follies, a sort of summation of all the smarting experiences which our primitive nature has received in its past rebuffs.

The warnings of conscience and of the imagination alike, as well as the precious flashes of imaginative insight, would come to little or to naught if they were not gathered up and bound together in one continuous act of interpretation. When this act of interpretation of the ethical situation arrives at true knowledge, the 'must' of conduct appears, *i. e.*, we know what is to be done if a certain ethical result is to be produced.

But this act of interpretative insight goes further than practical knowledge and reveals to us the relation which

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this proposed act or course of conduct bears to our entire personality taken in the setting of our total relationship. Or better said still, this great thing is what that ethical insight would do if it were a perfect revelation of the meaning of my personality and of my world. Of course, the insight is not perfect, but, such as it is, it is the best we have and it is the work of the reason. Out of this imperfect insight into the meaning of my personality, as set in the great human world, grows the majestic ought,—my ought, society's ought, yes, and hints as to the very obligation of the Universe itself,—for this insight reveals the values involved. Reason forces on me, by its discovery and interpretation of the facts of my personality and its world, an ought to act whose obligation is as great as is the unity and significance of my character.

So it is all right to ask students, or just common men, "What do you want," if by this all understand that we are setting them no less a task than the understanding of their own personalities, the interpretation of their human world, yes, and the viewing of both these sets of values in a universe where values are finally secured. This is a very great deal to ask from beginners in ethics, but nothing less can be asked if anything important is to result from their study.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

ETHICS. By G. E. Moore. London: Williams & Norgate; New York: Henry Holt & Co. [Home University Library Series.] Pp. 256.

Probably most readers of Mr. Moore's "Principia Ethica" (1903), remembering that the objects of that work were to discover and establish the fundamental principles of ethical reasoning and to answer the question, What things are good in themselves? will think, when they take up this little book, that they can predict the sort of thing they will find between its covers. But they will be wrong. It is not a *précis* of the leading ideas inseparably connected with Mr. Moore's name. It differs strikingly from the "Principia," both in its form, in its general attitude towards the subject, and in the nature of its arguments.

Mr. Moore first carefully states a theory, more or less corresponding to historical Utilitarianism, which tries to answer the question, What characteristic is common and peculiar to all voluntary actions that are right?—'voluntary actions' being defined as "those which we *should* not have done, *if* we had *chosen* not to do them." The answer is that, it being possible, theoretically, to arrange all actions in a scale according to the total quantities of pleasure and pain that they cause, "a voluntary action is right whenever and only when the agent could *not*, even if he had chosen, have done any other action instead, which would have caused *more* pleasure (in a certain defined sense) than the one he did do." Chapter II deals with the second part of this theory, which says that the above characteristic of a right action is not merely a criterion, but that a right action is right *because* it produces, in the sense defined, more pleasure than any possible alternative. The importance of this step lies in its involving something that is not involved if quantity of pleasure caused is merely a criterion of rightness,—namely, that actions which produce the maximum of pleasure will be always right, no matter what their other effects may be as well. It is to be observed that, according to this second step, such actions will be right under any conceivable circumstances; and also that to

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assert this is equivalent to, if not identical with, asserting that any effect or set of effects which contains more pleasure is always intrinsically better than one which contains less, a unique position thus being assigned to pleasure and pain in relation both to right and wrong and to intrinsic value.

Mr. Moore does not stop to indicate how far he agrees or disagrees with this theory, but goes on to consider, in Chapters III and IV, some objections which may be brought against its two parts. The first part of the theory implies that one particular action can't be both right and wrong; and the first set of objections considered (Ch. III) are those which contradict this implication,—namely those forms of the view that, when we assert an action or class of actions to be right or wrong, we are making an assertion about somebody's feelings, which imply that one and the same action may be both right and wrong; and, further, the view that moral judgments are merely judgments about somebody's thoughts or opinions. Mr. Moore himself would say that it is self-evident that one and the same action can't be both right and wrong; but he also refutes here very clearly and thoroughly the various considerations that may lead people to maintain the contrary. Then, in Chapter IV, he passes to the views which, while admitting that one and the same action can't be both right and wrong, assert or imply the falsity of the second part of our theory,—that part of it, namely, which (to put it compendiously though inaccurately) says that a right action is right under all conceivable circumstances, and that what is intrinsically valuable is so under all conceivable circumstances. Here we get the refutation of all views which make the rightness of an action consist in the attitude of some non-human being (God, the Practical Reason, or the True Self) towards it, by way of willing or commanding, and also the refutation of those views that make the intrinsic value of a thing consist in the fact that somebody has some special feeling, such as desire, towards it. What must be admired in this discussion is not merely the clearness and beauty of the arguments against the various views considered, but the ingenuity with which it is shown that these views *are* fatal, in various respects, to the several parts of the theory of Chapters I and II. I know of no philosophical writing comparable to Mr. Moore's for this sort of merit.

So far we are on fairly firm ground. In Chapter V, we reach

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the objections that may be made to our theory on the ground that the rightness of an action cannot depend on its *actual* consequences; at least one of these is formidable, and though Mr. Moore thinks that perhaps none of them are fatal, I do not feel sure that he is right. The first two, indeed, (1) that we are obliterating the distinction between duty and expediency, and (2) that it may sometimes be our duty to do what will not produce the best possible results, on the ground that certain kinds of action ought *always* to be omitted or done, and hence ought to be done or not whatever the consequences, do not give him much trouble. It is otherwise with the next two. It is certain that (3) our moral judgments often are, and rightly, influenced by considering what a man's motives were; and hence it is plausible to suppose that right and wrong depend, not solely on the total results of actions, but at least partly on their motives. I think it must be admitted that the plausibility of this is, at any rate, diminished by what Mr. Moore proceeds to point out. He points out that the fact that motives ought to influence *some* of our moral judgments does not contradict the principle that right and wrong depend solely on results: this principle is not contradicted either by our holding that some motives are intrinsically good and bad, nor by our holding that good motives have a general tendency to produce right conduct, nor yet by the fact that motives are relevant to the question whether the agent deserves moral praise or blame. Provided an action is done from a good motive, it may be our duty to praise it more highly than one which, though it actually had better results, was done from a bad motive; and this is not inconsistent with holding that nevertheless the former action was wrong and the latter right. And finally (4) this distinction between an action that is right and one that is morally praiseworthy may perhaps be a sufficient reply to the objection that, since we can never know for certain what course *will* produce the best results, the rightness of an action cannot depend on *actual* results, but must depend on the *probable* results, or on what the agent had reason to expect. This was Mr. Russell's view in his "Philosophical Essays," and I am not sure that Mr. Moore did not himself give some countenance to it in 1903. Now, however, his suggestion is that we may avoid it, though at the cost of a paradox. We may admit that, if a man did not choose the course which he had every reason to think would

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turn out best, he may deserve moral blame, and yet we may hold that even in that case he may have done his duty, since the course he did choose did, in fact, produce the best results. If it be said that it is too fantastic to define 'duty' in such a way that, consistently with the definition, we can say that a man deserved strong moral blame for doing his duty, we may reply not only, as Mr. Moore does, that there is nothing self-contradictory in this, but also, I think, that the question is largely one of convenience. It is a great theoretical convenience to have a single perfectly clear mark, such that whatever actions have it are right, and only those actions. The admission of the notion of probability or reasonable expectation opens the door to a flood of complications, and we are forced, for instance, to allow at least two fundamental senses to the word 'right.'

In Chapter VI, on Free Will, those objections are discussed which urge that right and wrong depend not on actual results, nor yet on what the agent can know, but on what he can do. This is the most novel part of the book; there was nothing corresponding to it in the "Principia," and it is the best exposition that has ever been given of the bearing of the free will controversy on Ethics. Mr. Moore's tentative conclusion is that perhaps we have free will in a sense which does not conflict with the dependence of right and wrong solely on consequences. The facts to be reconciled are these. Right and wrong evidently depend not merely on what we can do *if* we choose (as our theory has supposed), but on what we can do: an action which we *could* do, *if* we chose, may nevertheless be one which we can *not* do. But, according to the principle of causation, everything is necessarily caused by something, and therefore nothing ever could have happened except what did happen, and no one can ever act otherwise than he does. It seems to follow that no one can ever act rightly or wrongly. On the other hand, it is certain that we sometimes could have acted differently had we chosen; this is certain in the sense in which it is sometimes certain that, of two events which did not occur, one was possible and the other impossible. For instance, this morning I neither got out of bed at seven o'clock nor walked thirty miles in an hour; and, in the sense in which I *could* have done the former act and *could not* have done the latter, it is certain that we often could have acted otherwise than we did. So strong

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is this certainty that the principle of causation itself seems less certain, and if, of the two, one had to be given up, it might be the universality of causation. But Mr. Moore suggests that neither need be given up; that the conflict may be purely verbal, depending on an ambiguity in the word 'could'; that, in fact, when I say that I 'could' have got up at seven, whereas I didn't, I merely mean that I *should have* done so had I *chosen*. There would thus be no conflict with causation. If it be said, "Granted that we often should have acted differently had we chosen differently, still we haven't free will unless it is also true that we could have chosen differently," it may be replied that here again there are two different senses in which we *could have chosen* what we didn't choose, and that neither contradicts causation: "we could have chosen" may mean merely "we should have chosen if we had chosen to choose" (the old sense over again); and often we cannot know for certain *which* choice we *shall* make. This analysis gives us a number of facts, all consistent with causation, and no one can feel sure that, taken together, they do not amount to the assertion that we have free will.

In Chapter VII, after disposing of egoism, which implies that an action may be right or a duty, so long as it produces the best effects for the agent, even if its total effects are not the best possible, Mr. Moore comes at last to the points in which Utilitarianism is certainly wrong. It is wrong in holding that certain kinds of consequences are intrinsically better than others: consequences containing more pleasure are not better than those containing less. It is not even likely that quantity of pleasure is a correct criterion of right and wrong. Nor is it true that intrinsic value is always in proportion to quantity of pleasure, though probably no whole can have any intrinsic value unless it contains some pleasure. This brings us to a short statement of what, in the "Principia," was called the principle of organic unity. No classification of intrinsically good things is given, but two characteristics are mentioned as common (though not peculiar) to them all: they all contain both some feeling and also some other form of consciousness, and perhaps also some pleasure; and they are all complex. Finally, there are some remarks on the necessary distinctions as to good as a means and good as an end.

On the whole, the book produces so different an impression

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from the "Principia" that a careless reader might suppose that Mr. Moore's attitude towards ethics had completely changed in the last nine years, and it is therefore worth pointing out that his opinion does not seem to have changed as to any of his main conclusions. The only such change I can discover is on a point of minor importance: in 1903 he thought that the existence of a beautiful inanimate thing quite by itself might be some slight good ("Principia," p. 83), whereas he now thinks "that no whole can be intrinsically good unless it contains some feeling towards something" (p. 167). At the same time most of his positive views do seem to be held with less confidence than in 1903; a feeling pervades the book that the opponent's case can be made much more difficult of attack than then seemed possible. And it must be insisted that this involves a great gain: increased perception of difficulties has led to greater caution and subtlety in the selection of arguments, which, many of them quite different from those used in the "Principia," are all stated with an almost miraculous clearness and simplicity.

SYDNEY WATERLOW.

London, England.

THE TRUTH OF RELIGION. By Rudolf Eucken. Translated by W. Tudor Jones, Ph.D. London: Williams & Norgate, 1911. Pp. xiv, 622.

This is a translation of Professor Eucken's most important contribution to the study of religion, "Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion," originally published in 1907 and since repeatedly reviewed and enlarged. When the difficulties of an adequate rendering of such a work into another language are fully considered, the translator may be congratulated on the general accomplishment of his task. Yet the latter half is so much better than the first that one is bound to infer the acquisition of an increasing skill with practice and to regret that the earlier portions of the translation had not been subjected to a revision after such skill had been acquired.

Religion is for Eucken the supreme human fact. It might seem indeed at first sight as if his whole philosophic system had been elaborated solely with a view to the defense of religion. Yet a closer study of his work reveals how unwarranted such an assumption is. The facts on which he founds his view

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of human nature are primarily independent of religion, even if it is only in and through religion that they attain their full scope and significance. These facts may be briefly stated thus. Man, the individual human unit, is a part of nature. He is the effect of a given series of causes which are the subject-matter of the knowledge that is gained by observation and experiment, even though that knowledge has not yet succeeded and may never completely succeed in enumerating the causes. But if man were nothing more than this, his whole history would be inexplicable. For that history witnesses to an original self-subsisting whole in man which is therefore unanalyzable. There is no other way of accounting for the irrepressible effort of man to create a unity out of the confusion within him and without. He does not respond merely mechanically to his circumstance. Neither does he merely control it in the interests of his limited and isolated self. His most sustained and permanent effort has been to control it in the interest of the whole which he may never be able to attain, but which none the less he never ceases to seek. All human culture and civilization are the expression and result of this effort. They cannot possibly be explained as the chance outcome of an indefinite number of human efforts each of which is tethered to its own limited needs. All in human civilization that is due to such effort is subject to immediate ruin and decay. It is of the things that are continually passing away. But there is something which does not pass away, which cannot be shaken. It is the permanent spirit which informs civilization, which enables it to endure throughout all revolutions and often to emerge from them purified and renewed for further and higher achievement. This spirit is represented by the quest of truth in which the most diverse intellectual aptitudes are guided by the belief in—perhaps I ought rather to say the vision of—a single significance in reality. It is represented by the inspiration which urges the artist to capture a singleness in reality more adequate, to our seeming, than that which the intellect at its best can achieve. It is represented above all by the desire of and the belief in a vital human unity which have inspired the highest activities of man throughout all the ages.

Now this quest of the whole to which man has so consistently devoted himself implies the prior existence in some sort of the whole in his own nature. To this share in the wholeness of

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reality which distinguishes man, which indeed constitutes him, Eucken gives the name of the Spiritual Life. Man's history is the history of the struggle of this Spiritual Life to establish itself with ever increasing certainty and permanence against all the opposition and distractions of his impermanent nature. But this struggle depends in the last resort for its hopes of success on man's complete consciousness of the Spiritual Life in himself and of its dependence on the Absolute Spiritual Life which encompasses all reality. In other words, religion, as the fullest activity of the Spiritual Life in man, far from being a dispensable adjunct, is the necessary form of his perfected life. Man's characteristic life has not even begun to be realized until it has reached the consciously religious stage.

From this view of religion its universal affirmations receive a new significance and value. The dualism which underlies such terms as revelation and grace is justified as the only sufficient explanation of the fullest human experience. But it is also robbed of the crudity with which it is held in popular religious belief. The self-subsistent wholeness of reality which appears within the world of experience as the Spiritual Life in man must necessarily be conceived as of another order than that world. Yet it is only as it enters into that world, subduing and transforming it to its own purposes, that it can be known to us. In us the Spiritual Life is fighting for its antonomy. We are the responsible instruments of its victory or of its defeat. We can know it because it is in us, because we are fundamentally constituted by it. But we can also fail to know it because we may have allowed it, instead of transforming to its purposes the immediate demands of mere nature, to be transformed by them to their purposes. The supreme rôle of religion is just to enforce and sustain this claim of the Spiritual Life to autonomy in man. Revelation is involved in the increasing consciousness, grace in the active recognition and effectuation, of this claim.

It will be seen that for Eucken the key to reality is to be found in man. Yet if he would adopt the Protagorean maxim that "man is the measure of all things," it is with a profound difference. He would accept it in no merely pragmatist or humanist sense. Not to man the actual creature of history, but to man the destined master of history, not to man's instinctive and self-centered activity which is dispersive and in the end destructive of reality, but to such activity as helps to establish

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in each individual life a self-subsistent wholeness of reality and to extend its sway throughout the whole area of life, does he turn for the ground of a satisfying philosophy. The self-subsistent whole of the Spiritual Life is immanent in man as a general possibility, as the universal constituent of his essential nature. But only in a few outstanding members of the race has it actively realized its possibilities and achieved its true destiny.

Here arises the distinction between what Eucken calls Universal and Characteristic Religion. Since the Spiritual Life is the foundation of all that is distinctively human, revelation and grace are in some sense universal. But it is only through the influence of outstanding religious personalities that they become in any sufficient sense effective. In such personalities the active claims of the Spiritual Life, nay its very existence, become able to enforce their undeniable presence and authority. Characteristic Religion is therefore, in spite of its inevitable tendency to narrowness and exclusiveness, higher in the scale than Universal Religion. The latter is but the framework which the former fills in with a living content. Not only does the fact of the Spiritual Life become for the first time urgent through Characteristic Religion, but through it also is revealed clearly the cost at which that life achieves the mastery of nature both within and without. Above all, through it religion becomes a social achievement, an actual human unity founded in the Spiritual Life and witnessing to the essential transcendence of all accidental human diversities.

This is the kernel of Professor Eucken's conception. From this as a constant center he surveys and analyzes all the various forms of human activity. His work perhaps lacks due compression. So anxious is he to make his analysis complete that it becomes unnecessarily diffuse and repeats itself almost to weariness. But after all there is hardly a page but rewards us with its flash of insight to which we return again and again for its illuminating force. The book is on the whole far and away the most convincing defense of religion and the justest exposition of what religion is which the modern mind has yet produced. It does justice to every aspect of religion, to the human closeness and intimacy of its popular conception as well as to the abstract remoteness of its theological speculation. The anthropomorphism of the one witnesses to and preserves the human intimacy of the Spiritual Life, the closeness of per-

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sonal relations between it and ourselves. The abstractness of the other affirms and enforces the irreducible otherness of the Spiritual Life over against the world of nature, both within ourselves and without. But if it justifies both, it also insists on the dangers to which both are exposed. The anthropomorphic element in religion tends to assimilate the truths of religion to even the pettiest and most variable of man's experiences in time. The speculative element, on the other hand, tends to make of those truths mere empty frameworks of thought without any substantial content of life.

It may safely be said of Professor Eucken's book that it marks an era in the appreciation of religion. We are passing through an epoch of religious revolution when none of the customary and traditional forms in which religion has established itself among men can be regarded as sacred and intangible. At such a moment of crisis this book will prove one of the most trustworthy of guides as to what may pass and what must remain, under it may be renewed forms, in the reconstruction which is coming, and which only an enlarged and deepened religious life can prepare.

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The Interpretation of Religious Experience. The Gifford Lectures for 1911-12. By John Watson, LL.D. Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons, 1912. 2 Vols. Pp. xiv, 375; x, 342.

This book is an attempt to establish religion on a firm metaphysical basis. The first volume is taken up mainly with considering the influences of philosophy upon the evolution of religion, and in particular, of Christianity. Starting from Plato and Aristotle, Professor Watson traces the history of philosophy, showing how the failure of each system in some particular to supply the understanding with a satisfactory formulation of the nature of reality, leads on to the creation of a new system to supply the deficiencies of the previous one, this new system being doomed in its turn to be rejected as inadequate and superseded by some other.

It must inevitably happen that any review of other systems of philosophy will be colored by the private metaphysical views of the writer. Professor Watson, being much influenced by

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Hegel, finds throughout the whole history of philosophy a continuous effort of the understanding to grasp reality as a self-dependent whole, and to find some one formula or what he calls 'principle' which shall satisfactorily sum up its perfect unity. He proceeds to show how each successive system has had to be rejected in turn because it failed to do this, which he takes to be an ultimate postulate of the understanding.

His exposition of the various philosophical systems themselves seems to me clear and as sympathetic as can be expected from any philosopher who has finally made up his mind as to what the real truth is. The statement of the position of each seems to me to be impartial and accurate: it is too much to expect that the criticisms of any one school of philosophy shall not seem to unbelievers to arise sometimes from an external and superficial view of the philosopher's real meaning, and so to miss the point.

In Volume II, Professor Watson enters upon the constructive part of his task. "The possibility of constructing a philosophy of religion," he tells us, "presupposes these two principles: firstly, that the universe is rational; and, secondly, that it is capable of being comprehended in its essential nature by us." To be rational and intelligible, according to Professor Watson, involves being three things: (a) "an absolute unity" as contrasted with a mere aggregate. "An aggregate is not a unity because it implies the *separate*[1] and *independent* existence of particulars which have no *necessary connection* with one another." The unity of a whole "cannot depend upon the arbitrary choice of a conscious subject but must belong to the object itself." (b) Self-differentiating. "The unity cannot be a dead, unchanging identity, but, on the contrary, it must express itself in an infinity of changes. These changes, however, must be *due* to nothing but itself." "An absolute unity in virtue of its very nature must differentiate itself in its parts, and this differentiation is therefore no *accident*, but the expression of what *is* and *must be*." (c) A coherent system. "Every element in the whole must be related to every other so that any change in one element will involve a correspondent change in all."

It is assumed, then, that we cannot construct a philosophy of religion unless the universe is rational and intelligible accord-

[1] Italics all mine throughout.

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ing to the above definition. In Professor Watson's opinion, however, it must be; otherwise no true judgment about experience would be possible. "If knowledge is to begin or develop, it can only be under the presupposition of the rationality and intelligibility of the universe." His ground for this statement is that our knowledge of universal laws cannot be got from the enumeration of any number of particular instances, but involves a fundamental presupposition which cannot be arrived at empirically and yet without which we have no ground for passing by inference with the help of our universal laws from what we know to what we do not. This principle he imagines to be nothing less than the rationality and intelligibility of the universe. Here, to my mind, he makes his first grave mistake. It is unnecessary to go into the question as to what is really the principle on which induction rests. It is sufficient to point out that whatever this principle may be, it is merely hypothetical, that is, it makes no assertion about what reality is, or is not. All that it says is that *if* there is any similarity between any two things or series in so far as we know them both, this gives some probability that further analogies will hold between them. This does not affirm that all reality can be formulated into universal laws: some such principle as the above could still hold even if there were as a matter of fact no two things in the least similar to one another and each thing followed a completely unique law of its own. It could hold even if there were no things at all.

Professor Watson, however, is satisfied that the possibility of true knowledge demands the assumption of some principle which asserts the unity, self-differentiation, and coherence of the universe: he next goes on to discover what this principle is. Tracing the gradual growth of scientific knowledge, we find that it develops by subsuming less general disconnected laws under more general ones. The mind, he thinks, will never be satisfied until it has reached one all-embracing law which shall contain all the others within it. We do not create laws, we discover them: they really do unify their instances. For this reason Professor Watson seems to think they may be looked upon as creating their instances, themselves enjoying an eternal reality outside time and space. "Laws," he says, "constitute the life and meaning of the word." This supreme principle, whose discovery is the ultimate goal of science, unifies, dif-

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ferentiates itself into instances, and forms them into a coherent system. It therefore turns out to be identical with that principle of the rationality of the universe whose existence was held to be demanded by the possibility of true knowledge.

This supreme principle is therefore real, and he calls it God. Laws, he says, are nothing without their instances, nor instances without their laws: God, therefore, necessarily manifests Himself in the universe and it is inseparably dependent on Him. In Volume II, Lecture Six, we learn the nature of this principle. "All stages of experience are gathered up and concentrated in the moral life: . . . it *is* the whole of life since nothing can fall beyond it." "Spirit," and by this he means the moral law, "is that which constitutes the principle of unity manifested in nature, in man, and in the universe as a whole." "The world becomes for us a cosmos, an orderly and coherent world, only when it is conceived as a manifestation of Mind. . . . A law of nature, a law of society, is redeemed from arbitrariness only in so far as the human mind is able to grasp the principle which gives it meaning: and that principle can be nothing else than a phase of the eternal Mind."

This unifying principle, then, is the moral law and is completely good. This is the same as saying that God is completely good and so is the 'true' nature of the universe whose law He is. Man strives to realize the moral law, therefore it is his 'true' nature. In so striving he follows his 'true' nature and is therefore free and 'acts.' When he 'acts' he can do only relative evil, arising from an imperfect comprehension of the universal moral law which is the law which unifies and so may be said to create the universe; in other words, God's will. In following this moral law man acts according to his universal nature, and so is one with God's will, in so far as he clearly understands the moral law. In following his natural desires as an individual he does not act freely, but is compelled mechanically, like a star falling according to the law of gravitation. Man sins by willing a natural desire which is incompatible with his 'true' self. So Professor Watson explains sin: but I do not see how it could be accomplished, on this theory, try as a man might. His 'true' self always wills the universal moral law, in so far as he understands it, and only his 'true' self can will at all. Any other form of desire is really mechanical compulsion, because it belongs merely to the individual. It therefore seems to be

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impossible to will a natural desire, and so to sin. All that is left of evil is the relative kind: when a man wills the moral law misunderstanding it.

Briefly, then, Professor Watson's metaphysical basis for belief in God is that all lesser universal laws point to there being one all-comprehensive law which reason demands. Such a law must further be an actual reality, since to presuppose the absolute unity of all reality is the only alternative to skepticism. Inspection discovers this all-comprehensive law to be the moral law. This law is absolutely good and may be said to create everything which it includes: we have therefore every right to call it God. To me the result of all this is to show that Professor Watson is in a terrible state of confusion about the nature of of law. The laws of science and all the laws by which we systematize experience are simply accounts of the way in which changes *do* occur. Laws may refer to unique series of changes, or, if several things change alike, they may include a great number of instances. If they did presuppose any universal law about reality, it would be one of their own kind. The moral law, on the other hand, is admitted to be ideal, in the sense that it is not an account of how things *do,* but how they *ought,* to behave. To say that such a law unifies reality conveys to me no intelligible meaning. Reality does not even act in accordance with it, since if it did, there would be no discrepancy between what ought to be and what is. Again, to call such a law man's 'true' nature seems equally meaningless. His 'true' nature is the law according to which he *does* act: admittedly this is not the moral law. Even supposing it were admitted that man has a universal nature, distinguishable from his individual one (and I think this notion is mixed up in Professor Watson's thought, arguing to it along the Kantian lines, from the strong similarity between the experiences of different individuals), still in any case the 'true' law of this universal nature would be one according to which all men *do* in fact act, and not the moral law.

So far as I can see, therefore, this metaphysical proof of God's existence falls to the ground, without there being any need even to raise the controversy between Monism and Pluralism. Even if it were proved beyond doubt that the universe must be one and not many, this fact could not give any support to religion along the lines here suggested.

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If space had permitted, I should have liked to have added some further criticism of what seems to me to be the loose way in which Professor Watson allows himself to use such words as 'possible,' 'inseparable,' 'independent,' 'necessary,' 'real,' 'true,' 'accidental,' etc. But the fatal objection to his philosophical thinking seems to me to be his failure to grasp the meaning of law and causality. Confusion over these has been a stumbling block for philosophy for a very long time; it is a most troublesome problem, and greatly aggravated by the thought which has already been bestowed upon it, but the chief light which the present book throws upon it is as an illustration of the fatal effects of failure to disentangle it.

I am well aware of the superficiality of criticism which destroys without any attempt at building up again, but this is hardly the place to enter upon such an undertaking even if I were qualified to attempt it. The problem which Professor Watson attacks is, I think, one of growing interest to people at the present time, and, though I cannot pretend myself to feel satisfied with the solution which he offers, I am sure that this book will be of interest to all whose minds are occupied with the effort to find some rational justification for faith.

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THE BEYOND THAT IS WITHIN. By E. Boutroux. Translated by Jonathan Nield. London: Duckworth & Co., 1912. Pp. xiv, 138.

This little volume contains, besides the essay which gives its title to the work, translations of two addresses by M. Boutroux, one on "Morality and Religion," the other, delivered before the Bologna Congress of 1911, on the "Relation of Philosophy to the Sciences." All are pleasantly written and exhibit a sane and wholesome, if not a particulary profound, strain of thought. Of the three the title-essay is, in the present writer's opinion, the least striking. With its general thesis that, whereas positive science, concerning itself with the relations to be discovered among phenomena, never arrives at a true Infinite, such an Infinite is actually found in the inner life of the soul as it manifests itself in Art and Religion I find myself wholly in sympathy. And every now and then one has the pleasure of

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finding here, as is usual in M. Boutroux's work, a singularly happy epigrammatic formulation of some of those truths about life which the one-sided intellectualism of positive science is always trying to ignore. Thus, *e. g.*, p. 17, "those who take for their motto: *ab actu ad posse* are the men who show themselves able," or again, p. 25, "while nature says: *nemo ultra posse tenetur*, the maxim of religion is: you ought, therefore you can." This is perhaps not exactly pragmatist philosophy; for it can be held in entire independence of the peculiarly pragmatist theory of truth. But it is, perhaps, something better, ripe and wholesome *Lebensweisheit*.

Yet I should not like to support all M. Boutroux's arguments in favor of the view that study of the connections in the phenomenal always leads to the indefinite regress. *E. g.*, we are told at p. 5 that "one moment A is only given in connection with an anterior moment B and a posterior moment C and so to infinity." It seems to be inferred from this that we cannot *think* of a first or a last moment of time, that we can only think of time as indefinitely stretching in two directions. I confess that the consequence is not clear to me. I do not see how to infer from the fact that the moments of my life have each a moment before and a moment after them the conclusion that there can be no moment with no antecedent, and no moment with no sequent. So the statement that "any number whatsoever allows (is this a mistranslation?) at once the entire sequence of numbers" is a little dubious. The illustration given (4 is 3+1 and it is also 5—1) suggests that 'number' is taken to mean 'natural integer.' But there is certainly a first term of the series of integers, which has no "number that precedes it." If 'number' means 'real number,' there is the fuller difficulty that not only is there a *first* real number (*viz.*, 0), but that no real number has an immediate successor, just as no mathematical moment of time has a next adjacent moment.

With the main argument of the second essay, that faith, hope, and love as relations to the hyper-phenomenal lie at the root alike of living religion and living morality, and that morality is consequently not destined at some future date to expel her natural ally, religion, from human life, it would be hard to disagree. I recommend the study heartily as a reply to those theorists, more common on the continent of Europe than among ourselves, who can see nothing in the great his-

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torical religions but enemies from whom morality must 'emancipate' herself.

The third essay is the only one of which the French is known to me. It is an able defense of the claims of philosophy to have a perennial value against those who urge that her work, valuable enough in earlier days, is now definitely superseded by that of positive science. The main line of argument is that the positive sciences, from their own nature, can aim only at harmonizing and connecting the data of man's observed world. The task of harmonizing the observing and striking subject himself with the observed world, always remains over when science has done her work, and it is this harmonization of the sciences with life which is the function of philosophy.

A word on the translation. I have only been able to compare it with the original, as I have said, in the case of the third essay. There are certain obscurities in the former two which I suspect to arise from imperfect rendering. I have given one example already. In the third essay the author's drift is correctly preserved, but the elegance of his style has suffered badly at times from the translator's habit of toning down or replacing striking and opposite metaphors, and in one or two places the sense is perverted by actual mistranslation. I may note that *'actuel, actuellement'* are made to lose their force by such renderings as 'real.' M. Boutroux says, in his opening sentence, that the question of the relation of philosophy to the sciences is not modern only, but *actuel.* This does not mean merely 'real,' but 'living,' apposite to the present day. So (p. 112) when M. Boutroux says that in this scientific age philosophy is *actuellement* reviving, he means something more than 'actually'; he would say that philosophy is *at this very moment* reviving. The standing translation of *biais* by 'bias' is unfortunate, as the English word implies, what the French word does not, a prejudiced and inaccurate point of view. Again I feel pretty sure that on the several occasions on which reference is made to the *objects* of philosophy, the meaning is not, as Mr. Nield supposes, the *aims* of the study, but the *objects* which it investigates. When (p. 107) M. Boutroux deprecates treating philosophy itself as a collection of positive sciences, urging that 'philosophy' as a mere collective name for 'scientific' psychology, 'scientific' ethics, and the like, would have little more than a *valeur d'étiquette,* it is a pity to replace the metaphor "would

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have little more value than a label" by the tame expression, "would have little more than a formal value," whatever that means. (I fear the translator took *valeur d'étiquette* to mean something connected with etiquette in our English sense of the word.) A similar error spoils a piquant metaphor on p. 113. The author observes that he does not propose to argue directly for the legitimacy of philosophical studies without any reference to the achievements of positive science, but rather to show by an examination the conditions of scientific investigation themselves that science presupposes postulates which can only be justified by an appeal to something other than positive science. If we examine the claims of philosophy, without starting with such a consideration of the character of the sciences, we shall expose ourselves to the objection *dite de la question préalable*. This is, of course, a metaphor from parliamentary procedure, meaning "the objection known as the 'previous question.'" The meaning is that it would be open to opponents to "move the previous question," *i. e.*, to decline to consider our argument altogether. Mr. Nield renders "the above-mentioned objection of a preliminary question," thus mistranslating the word *dite* and making the point of the sentence barely intelligible. An instance or two of sporadic and pure blunders. M. Boutroux does not say (p. 104) that Comte's view of the place of philosophy "seems fairly adequate." His whole point is that Comte's view is *not* adequate. What he says is that it *seems* so, *à beaucoup, i. e.*, "to many persons." Nor does he say (p. 128) of art, morals, and religion, that they "depend not only on external reality, but also on the kind of existence and on the value that pertain to them." What he does say is that reason seeks to discern and define the relation which connects with given and visible reality these three specifically human worlds of which eternal reality is merely the prop, and likewise (to discover and define) the kind of existence and the value which pertain to them." Mr. Nield has hopelessly missed both the grammar and the sense of the sentence. I could quote other instances of equally bad renderings, but those given are enough to show that M. Boutroux has expressed himself far too highly about the merits of his translator in the opening words of his "Author's Preface." I regret that more care has not been given to the correct printing of Greek citations.

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CONCERNING CONSCIENCE: STUDIES IN PRACTICAL ETHICS. By H. Jeffs. London: James Clarke & Co., 1912. Pp. viii, 284.

Under a somewhat repellent title Mr. Jeffs has given us a thoroughly good book. It may be described as a discussion of the attitude which a Christian should take up with regard to the moral problems which occur in social, professional, and business life. The ethical standpoint is uncompromisingly Christian, though matters of doctrine are carefully avoided,—in fact, the book is remarkable for its tolerant attitude to differences of opinion on non-moral questions. Though his sympathies are evidently Protestant, the author fully recognizes the defects of Protestantism, and speaks very plainly about the negative character of the 'Nonconformist conscience,' and the failure of Protestanism to supply a "systematic and continuous practical training of the Christian conscience." The chief value of the book lies in its insistence on the social nature of conscience, and on the duty of Christians to bring the spirit of Christ into every department of life. The author illustrates by forcible instances how hard it is to be at the same time a good Christian and a 'good business man,' and yet how absolutely essential it is, if Christianity is not to be a mockery, that business should be ruled by Christian principles. The same applies to the various professions, such as medicine, law, and journalism. With regard to journalism, the author might have spoken much more strongly than he has done. Not only is the party journalist practically bound, on pain of losing his job, to support his party in all things, but he may spend years writing articles in support of the party to which he does *not* belong. Then you have the ludicrous spectacle of a man speaking in the afternoon at a meeting in support of a Liberal candidate, and in the evening writing a political article for a Conservative newspaper. This is, perhaps, not so bad as it sounds, as people are beginning to recognize that the party system has become little more than a game, in which journalists take part no less than politicians. Mr. Jeffs might have given us a chapter on the political conscience, the unhealthy state of which is one of the worst features of the present time. This is a sane and broad-minded book, and can be warmly recommended.

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London, England.

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A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS: GREEK AND MODERN. By R. A. P. Rogers. London: Macmillan & Co., 1911. Pp. xxii, 303.

This work claims to give an historical account of the main ethical systems of classical and modern times in a short compass. It is intended mainly for students and does not pretend to enter into very great detail. The purely historical part is prefaced by an account of the kind of problems with which ethics has to deal; and each system that is described is criticized shortly by the author. As the title implies, mediæval ethical theories are hardly touched. On the other hand, the number of modern ethical systems described is large. I think perhaps the author devotes a disproportionate space to Hegel and Spencer. There is indeed little to object to in his account of Hegel's philosophy, but it could hardly be expected to make such a difficult system intelligible to the type of reader for which the book is intended. Spencer again hardly seems to deserve the attention which he gets here and in other English books. Surely we can be content to treat him now as an exploded superstition.

In criticizing other systems Mr. Rogers naturally betrays something of his own ethical opinions. I take it that in the main he inclines to Green and self-realization; 'sublime' seems to me a somewhat disproportionate adjective to apply to Green's metaphysical system even by one who accepts his ethics. Some statements of the author seem open to criticism. He says on page 7 that what is consciously approved by a person is good when considered by itself alone apart from its possible interference with other desires. Surely a bad man's approval of a bad end does not make that end good even though it does not interfere with the man's other desires. On page 89 Mr. Rogers seems to be a little hard on Epicurus in saying that his "artificial doctrine of free-will" was "plainly invented to avoid the unpleasant feeling that we are not free." I should have thought that since some uncaused changes are necessary for the physics of this school, nothing more was needed to account for their accepting the common belief that there are uncaused volitions.

In a note on page 196 Mr. Rogers says that Kant only intended the Categorical Imperative to show that self-love is not the universal criterion of morality. I do not see that this helps the principle. What contradiction to self-love is there in re-

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fusing on selfish motives to develop one's talents; since presumably this means that one loves the self with undeveloped talents and whatever goes with them better than the self with developed talents and their accompaniments? On page 206 there is an argument that seems unfair to Kant's theory of the Summum Bonum. Mr. Rogers says that if happiness be a morally indifferent end, virtue cannot be improved by rewards. I do not think this is a conclusive objection to Kant's position. It might be the case (*a*) that the best thing is happiness + virtue; (*b*) that happiness alone has no value; and (*c*) that you cannot attain any virtue if you aim at happiness. The best result possible would be attained by your aiming solely at virtue and God supplying you *ab extra* with happiness.

On page 253 occurs what seems to me a mistaken argument against Sidgwick's Utilitarianism. It is argued that from "all good contains pleasure" the hedonist infers that good and pleasure are identical, and thus becomes liable to Plato's objection that good would be a self-contradictory concept, since different pleasures may clash. But no hedonist need hold, and Sidgwick certainly did not hold, that good=pleasure; he held that pleasures only are good, and are good in proportion to their pleasantness. And then the alleged contradiction comes merely to this, that the possession of some goods is incompatible with that of others; certainly not a peculiarity of hedonism.

Mr. Rogers is much exercised about the reconciliation of self-love with benevolence, and thinks that this is impossible with hedonism. He holds (p. 255) that if what is good in general is pleasure, my good must be my pleasure. In that case benevolence and self-love must conflict where my pleasure conflicts with other people's. Mr. Rogers thinks it absurd to give up the principle of self-love; hence the only solution is to prove that good is of such a nature that my good and other people's are identical. It comes to me that it is no solution of the ethical difficulty to prove that the nature of the existent universe is such that my good and other people's always must coincide as a matter of fact. This appears to me what is attempted by moralists like Green. The ethical difficulty could only be removed by showing that my good and other people's are strictly identical in any possible universe, that they are in fact two names for the same thing. And this seems to be clearly false. But I differ from Mr. Rogers in thinking that we must keep the

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maxim of self-love. It may very well be our duty to make a real sacrifice of our own good for the sake of goodness in general; and there is no psychological impossibility in doing so.

I have noticed two misprints. On page 229 'Rationalists' is printed when 'Naturalists' is meant. And on page 262 'the *un*conscious subject' should surely be 'the conscious subject.'

C. D. BROAD.

University of St. Andrews.

MODERN PROBLEMS. By Sir Oliver Lodge, F. R. S., Principal of the University of Birmingham. London: Methuen & Co., 1912. Pp. 320.

These "essays on debatable subjects," as the author calls them, deal largely with social questions. With his practical views I find myself in all but complete agreement, both as regards spirit and details. Put in my own words, his position is that the freer and fuller life of the individual is the end of social life, and that this is to be attained not by restricting, but by developing State-action all along the line. This I also am content to accept as a working faith. What seems to me lacking is some theoretical doctrine that would raise it above empiricism. As illustrations of such a body of doctrine we may take, for example, Philosophical Liberalism, Positivism, or Socialism. Each of these, for those who can adopt it as a creed, furnishes some generalized basis of action. Instead, Sir Oliver Lodge has only the appeal to 'Christianity' in the sense of the ethical ideal implied in certain selected precepts of the New Testament not at all peculiar to Christianity, but common to pagan and Christian moralists in the second century of the Roman Empire. So in politics when he means the ideal State, he speaks of "the ideal Christian State." But in reality this, if we go to documentary authority, is not at all a combination of the best features of modern Liberalism and Socialism, as many imagine: it is the theocratic 'City of God,' where "every soul which will not hear that prophet shall be destroyed from among the people" (Acts, iii, 23). Its maxim is not modern toleration, but exclusion from civic intercourse for those that will not "hear the Church." And the Church is a corporate body having power to declare doctrine : "no prophecy of Scripture is of private interpretation " (2 Peter, 1, 20). In such a city, Sir

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Oliver Lodge would have found that the exercise of what Matthew Arnold called "the imaginative reason" in a direction seeming to theological censors to smack of "paganism and polytheism" brought with it more disagreeable social consequences than any that are now possible for the most outspoken heretic.

Of course I do not suppose that modern educated Christians, even when they are Roman theologians, draw the logical deduction from such passages except "as a speculative opinion" not intended for use. (I remember that in a case in the law courts one of them put it in this way.) But, to leave aside claims no longer seriously taken by the world, and simply looking at the Christian documents as a whole from the side of politics, I think the conservative can make out a better case than the reformer. Lord Hugh Cecil, in his interesting primer of Conservatism, shows himself not only sincere but a good tactician (at least intellectually) in his appeal to the New Testament on behalf of his political creed. Liberal publicists describe him as 'mediæval'; and in his view of the State he is in fact more mediæval than Dante; but this is because he has gone back from the elements of Aristotelian humanism that had permeated the scholastics of the second period and their great disciple, to the genuinely religious pessimism that regarded all men as naturally corrupt and only individually redeemable by supernatural grace, and the State as a mere coercive power to prevent them from robbing and murdering one another. Lord Hugh Cecil's own view, I would point out, includes an element of humanism in the theory of national 'vocations,'—a conception which, though borrowed by him from religious usage, goes back to pagan philosophy. Each nation, he holds, has the duty of preserving its existence from a conviction of its own value for some end of civilized life: but this is hardly a view that would have found much response among the early Christians. Their "public spirit" (as Sir Oliver Lodge calls it) was apt to take a form that statesmen regarded as 'incivism,' such as the refusal of military service to the secular empire, and the determination to 'obey God,'—that is, the officers of the Church, rather than 'man,'—that is, the officers of the State.

Finally, however, I am willing to admit that no one, reformer or conservative, can in constructing a scheme of thought accept everything in so varied a collection of documents as the New Testament without selection. The law of contradiction forbids it.

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To stress laid on the Christian pessimism regarding 'the world,' Sir Oliver Lodge might reply by quoting a text (which exists) favorable to evolutionary optimism. All that I maintain is that this is not historical Christianity.

T. WHITTAKER.

London, England.

THE TASK OF SOCIAL HYGIENE. By Havelock Ellis. London: Constable & Co., 1912. Pp. xv, 414.

PROBLEMS IN EUGENICS. Papers communicated to the First International Eugenics Congress held at the University of London, July 24 to 30, 1912. London: The Eugenics Education Society, 1912. Pp. xvii, 490.

In order to form a judgment on the present position of Eugenics, it may be well to recall Sir Francis Galton's definition of it (cited by Major Darwin) as "the study of the agencies under social control that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations." What then in the main ought this control to be,—predominantly legislative or depending on opinion? To this a perfectly clear answer can be given, partly by inference from the result of a representative eugenics congress, and in part explicitly from Mr. Havelock Ellis' hopeful and interesting work. The answer is that the controlling agency must be in the end opinion, and that that opinion, to be sound, will have to be based on much more knowledge than we at present possess. Many rash conclusions, especially pessimistic ones, can be refuted; but (as several contributors of papers to the congress definitely say) there is little that can at present give guidance. In any case, the papers generally are too inconclusive and mutually contradictory to induce the race to put its destiny straightway under the direction of biological experts.

I have called Mr. Havelock Ellis's book hopeful. Its hopefulness finds expression in the preface. "If it were not the mission of social hygiene to bring a new joy and a new freedom into life, I should not have concerned myself with the writing of this book." His general conception of eugenics brings with it substitution of the ideal of quality for that of quantity. Civilization, he finds, "excludes a high birth rate: there has

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never been any exception to that law, nor can we conceive any exceptions, for it is more than a social law; it is a biological law" (p. 323). Thus in the result he coincides with Spencer in asserting a necessary "antagonism between individuation and genesis"; although he recognizes that the agency has been in part deliberate intention. This he would not reject, but organize in view of the social ideal; leaving the decision, however, finally to the knowledge and conscience of the individual. The huge masses desiderated by capitalism and militarism may seem a worthy end to the ecclesiastic, but they do not to the humanist. And life of high quality, in which a low birth rate is compensated by a low death rate, need not fear to be overwhelmed by populations of the opposite type (such as that of Russia),—which, moreover, will themselves change their type in conformity with the biological law of progress.

Among the varied discussions in the book I may mention the chapters on the woman's movement as especially timely. While sympathizing with expansion as distinguished from restraint, the author holds that "the path of progress lies mainly in the direction of a reform of the present institution of marriage," and not in permitting the alternative arrangements suggested by some thinkers (pp. 108-9). These thinkers, I would note, if democrats, do not seem to perceive that the result would be a substitution of legalized castes for equality.

The best panegyric on the book is to say that it conforms in spirit to the following sentence from the last paragraph but one: "It is only in the unextinguished spark of reason within him that salvation for man may ever be found, in the realization that he is his own star, and carries in his hands his own fate." Individualists and socialists who can agree on that may, we need feel no doubts, hope for reconciliation of their aims in some ultimate achievement.

T. WHITTAKER.

London, England.

PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIME. By Thomas Holmes. London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1912. Pp. viii, 88.

The author of this little book, who is secretary of the Howard Association, has been for twenty-five years a police court mismionary in London, and therefore speaks with authority on

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the subject of crime. The title is somewhat misleading, as the author has little to say about psychology except in the first chapter, and his general conclusion is that psychology cannot help us much in the study of criminals. In this I think he is wrong; but with his strictures on much of the so-called 'criminal psychology' it is impossible not to feel a warm agreement. It is high time that the belief in a special criminal type, with a mentality differing from that of ordinary men, were exploded. Criminals are found in all classes of society, and are of every possible physical and mental type; each one of them presents a unique study for the physician, psychologist, and sociologist alike. As to the causes of crime, Mr. Holmes rightly attaches great importance to disease and physical degeneracy. The fact, for instance, that during 1910-11 in three prisons alone one hundred and fifty-five epileptics were undergoing imprisonment, ten of whom were sentenced to penal servitude, is, as he says, one which demands attention. Another important matter on which great stress is laid is the existence of physical causes of many of the crimes committed by poor married women, such as theft and cruelty to children. Such women, as the author says, "demand pity instead of punishment, the doctor and the nurse instead of the governor and the warden." Only when the poor have the same opportunities of adequate medical care as the rich will the causes of crime be seen in their true light, and the idea of the poor as 'the criminal classes' die out. The author's remarks on the reasons why prisons fail are admirable; he points out that, while to an educated and refined man prison may be a place of intense suffering, to another it may be merely dull and monotonous, while to a third it may be a place of comfort and rest. There is little doubt that to no one can it be a source of moral strength; for that is never developed by monotonous routine and absence of temptation.

The whole book it written with moral enthusiasm and a large-hearted humanity. It is a pity, however, that it should appear as if the author were attacking psychology, when what he is really attacking is only a misapplication of psychology. A knowledge of human nature, and not of text-books, is what every really competent psychologist possesses; and this is essential to anyone who wishes to understand and help criminals, whether he be priest or physician. This book is itself a valuable contribution to the psychology of the subject; it represents the con-

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clusions of a sympathetic and experienced observer on a problem of the most urgent importance, and this, together with its compact form and cheap price, should ensure that it is widely read.

J. B. PAYNE.

London, England.

MÉCANISME ET LIMITES DE L'ASSOCIATION HUMAINE. By J. Novicow. Paris: Giard & Brière, 1912. Pp. 113.

This little book, which forms a number of the *Bibliothèque Sociologique Internationale,* sets forth in an interesting way the social philosophy of its author, the late M. Novicow, long and favorably known as a leading Russian publicist. M. Novicow aspires to make sociology very simple. He finds that the fundamental fact of human association is what he calls "exchange," but what has often been called by other sociological writers "reciprocity of services." He finds that such reciprocity of services underlies all the phenomena of group life. Quite rightly he also finds that the same factor is fundamental in life itself. "Exchange," therefore, in the sense of M. Novicow, produces, not only association, but life itself. Over against this phenomenon of "exchange" or mutuality of services is the phenomenon of "spoliation," that is, the taking or receiving of something without rendering an equivalent. Just as exchange produces life and society, so spoliation produces social disintegration and death. The fundamental fallacy in sociology and in ethics is that spoliation can produce anything other than death. Upon this basis M. Novicow goes on to build up a very wholesome, even though somewhat narrow, social philosophy.

In criticism it may be said that the idea which M. Novicow exploits is not at all new in sociological literature. Reciprocity of services has been recognized by many sociologists to be fundamental in the social life. It is difficult to see what advantage our author has gained by taking such a word as "exchange," which has acquired a technical economic meaning, and extending it to include all of the constructive phenomena of life and society. The conception itself, moreover, is so broad that its scientific utility is doubtful. It would seem that the conception of mental interaction or of psychical interdepend-

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ence is much more satisfactory from a scientific point of view in approaching the problems of our social life.

Finally, it is regrettable that M. Novicow has seen fit to mix up with his "exchange" philosophy of society a hedonistic psychology and ethics. He says (p. 11): "All exchanges go back in the last analysis to exchange of pleasures (*jouissances*). Now, pleasure is the condition even of life. Life is, therefore, pleasure and pleasure comes from exchange, and, therefore, life comes from exchange." This shows very well the radical defect in M. Novicow's social philosophy. It is altogether too simple. Had he made human nature more complex than is indicated by such a simple hedonistic psychology, he would also have seen that human social life is much more complex and cannot be wholly explained in terms of the mutuality of services, especially not if by services we mean subjective appreciations of utility.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.

University of Missouri.

VOM GEISTIGEN LEBEN UND SCHAFFEN. Von Carl Becker. Berlin: Hugo Steinitz, 1912. Pp. 164.

The purpose of this little book is to describe all the factors, in all their forms, which make the life of the modern person what it is. The author first gives a psychological analysis of the individual consciousness, laying great stress upon unconscious elements and the involuntary character of much of our experience. He has contrived to give a short sketch of his views without being too abstract, but we cannot take it as scientific psychology; it is rather a groundwork for the more suggestive part of the book. Accordingly, he turns to the development of the moral concepts, resulting from the working of the spiritual factors already discussed in a society. He defends our 'freedom,' which resides in the judgment of the understanding. Finally, he discusses our modern points of view, such as the common *Weltanschauung* of science, and analyzes the beautiful and sublime.

There are many references to the histories of various nations, to the most prominent intellectual developments, and to art and genius: combined with the easy character of the essay, this should make it interesting and suggestive to the ordinary reader.

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But the book makes no new contribution to thought, and does not at all seek to meet the objections to its special doctrines which the writer must have anticipated. It is popular, rather than scientific.

R. SMITH.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

FORMAL LOGIC: A Scientific and Social Problem. By F. C. S. Schiller, M.A., D.Sc. London: Macmillan & Co., 1912. Pp. xviii, 423.

In this book Dr. Schiller paves the way for the task which was foreshadowed in "Humanism,"—the reform and reconstruction of Logic. The book is entirely polemical and destructive, being "an attempt to expound the traditional doctrine strictly, in its dependence on its fundamental assumption, *viz.*, that it is possible to study the *formal truth* of thought irrespective of its truth in point of fact, and to show that this fundamental abstraction everywhere leads to failure, failure both to account for the procedure of human thinking and failure to attain even formal consistency." The result is somewhat disappointing. In the first place, as Dr. Schiller himself hints in the preface, there is little in his criticisms that is wholly new. The formal logic which he is attacking has been long dead, and it is doubtful if there is a single teacher of logic in Great Britain who would be found to defend the traditional views in their entirety. The fact is that it will probably be difficult for anyone unfamiliar with the atmosphere of Oxford to appreciate the book fully. In Oxford, Aristotle is still regarded with a superstitious reverence, and each topic is approached with the presupposition that his view will be found to be the soundest. Moreover, there is an unfortunate tradition in Oxford by which the student of philosophy is expected to pass an examination in "Formal Logic" before he begins to study logic proper; the result is that the lecturer has to do his best to make out a case for the formal doctrines, with the uneasy feeling that the less able of his pupils will later on become hopelessly confused, while the abler will have to unlearn a great deal that he has taught them. The difficulty is felt much less by teachers in other universities, who are able to treat the subject as a single whole. Even they, however, will find much to sympathize with in many of Dr.

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Schiller's strictures. It is surely time, for instance, that the ludicrous and misleading practice of analyzing every judgment into subject, predicate, and copula were abandoned; the supposed necessity for recognizing a separate copula has done much to obscure the theory of judgment. The amount of space devoted to the Categories and Predicables, to Definition, Division, and Classification, is another indication of the Oxford origin of the book; the Aristotelian doctrine still has a prestige in Oxford which it possesses nowhere else.

A detailed examination of the logical points dealt with would be out of place in this JOURNAL. Dr. Schiller has certainly established his main contention,—that (to use his own words) "it is not possible to abstract from the actual use of the logical material and to consider 'forms of thought' in themselves, without incurring thereby a total loss, not only of truth but also of meaning." He underrates, however, the value of formal logic as a test of consistency in thought, and attributes to it claims which it does not make. It is difficult, for instance, to see on what grounds he asserts that formal logic defines *all* judgment as true, simply because they claim truth. Any judgment that is actually made certainly claims to be true, but logic is only concerned with what will follow if it *is* true; I know of no logician who asserts that a judgment is true because it is made, and I cannot attach any meaning to the expression formal truth which Dr. Schiller uses. Again, it is surely a misrepresentation to say that, according to formal logic, inference *is to be* logically necessary, all proof *is to be* coercive. Logic does not attempt to terrorize; it simply recognizes the fact that there are certain inferences which *are* irresistible. These, however, occur mainly in such departments of thought as mathematics, and the mistake of formal logic lies in attempting to apply to all human thought forms which are only suited to thinking of a quasi-mathematical type. Formal logic has undoubtedly had a bad effect on science, religion, and politics, and the most valuable chapter in Dr. Schiller's book is that in which he points this out. The syllogism in particular has had a most baneful influence; the attempt to deal with a practical situation by applying a major premiss has led to untold evil, and is the never-failing resource of the dogmatist, the pedant, and the coward. Every situation is in fact unique, and requires a unique act of thought, in which only what is relevant shall be utilized, and that in the one way

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which the situation demands. No actual thinking is carried on in the hard-and-fast way which formal logic assumes, and in pointing this out Dr. Schiller has done a good service. While one cannot help feeling that many of the author's chimeras are imaginary, and that formal logicians (if such beings exist) are not quite so much the slaves of their doctrines as he believes, it is at any rate true that those who are forced to teach the subject are almost bound to become a little hypocritical, and that they ought to be grateful for his pungent criticisms.

J. B. PAYNE.

London, England.

NIETZSCHE ET LES THÉORIES BIOLOGIQUES CONTEMPORAINES. By Claire Richter. Paris: Mercure de France, 1911. Pp. 243.

The main object of this book is to show two things: First, that Nietzsche was preoccupied to a considerable degree with modern biological theories (he had repeatedly expressed the desire,—which, however, was not fulfilled,—to spend about ten years at Paris, Vienna, or Munich in the study of the natural sciences, p. 11). Second, that he was a Lamarckian, not a Darwinist; in other words, that he believed in transformism, but not in selection (thus he was right when he protested against those who, on account of the term *Superman*, called him a Darwinist, but he did not know himself that he was a Lamarckian, *S'il est darwinien sans le vouloir, on peut presque dire qu'il est lamarkien sans le savoir*, p. 9).

In the *Introduction* (pp. 5-43) the author gives a sort of catalogue of Nietzsche's reading in biology and physiology: *Lange* ("Gesch. d. Materialismus") introduced him to the modern natural sciences; he also knew Darwin, Haekel (whom he dislikes heartily), Rutimeyer (his friend, who is a decided Lamarckian), Naegeli (also a Lamarckian), E. von Baer (whom he calls "the great naturalist"), O. Schmidt, Schneider, Espinas, W. Roux, Rée, Rolph; among English authors, he was acquainted, directly or indirectly, with Spencer and Paneth ("Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development").

Some assertions in this chapter seem to contradict others in the body of the book. For example, on page 12 Mlle. Richter says that Nietzsche kept on to the last with his scientific studies, after having given up others, while in many chapters, as will be

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seen presently, she points out that Nietzsche gradually gave up his scientific theories. If the author had said that he continued studying the natural sciences *even though he had* become more and more skeptical about their value, we might agree; but the contrary seems to be implied. Science is said to be *"une dernière amie fidèle à laquelle il s'accroche désespérément après le grand écroulement de la plupart de ses convictions, de ses admirations, de ses vénérations"* (p. 12).

The first three chapters are devoted to the so-called Lamarckian theories of Nietzsche. Mlle. Richter shows that Nietzsche believes in evolution; and in the eyes of Nietzsche the true founders of evolution are Lamarck and Hegel (p. 49); in "Zarathoustra" he speaks of paths mankind has traversed "from worm to man" (p. 58). But he does not believe in selection. "To claim that the species progress is the most unreasonable affirmation in the world." "Every sort of foundation is lacking to that theory" (p. 53). Moreover, Nietzsche believes that life had no beginning but is eternal (p. 55); that each individual recapitulates in its development the evolution of the species (p. 57); that man and the monkey represent two parallel branches of a common ancestor (p. 61); that mankind might revert to its former animal state (p. 63). Then Nietzsche lays especial stress upon the theory that the mind as well as the physiological organism has undergone evolution (p. 65); but the author does not tell us whether Nietzsche maintains here also that change only and not improvement has taken place,—thus omitting a very interesting problem. Finally we hear that instinct also evolves (why the author treats of instinct after mind is not very clear to me). (Pp. 66, *cf.* chap. II, 89 *ff.*, chap. III, pp. 102-106.) At the end of his life Nietzsche becomes quite skeptical with regard to real proofs of the evolution theory (p. 70).

Nietzsche shares the commonplace view that man is less adapted to his *milieu* than animals (p. 78); moreover a complete adaptation, as Spencer wishes it, would not be desirable for man, because it would destroy initiative (p. 86). The important idea is that just as an animal assumes the color of its environment for self-protection, so man adapts himself to his *milieu's* opinion in order to avoid trouble (p. 81). In later years Nietzsche likewise has doubts with regard to the adaptation theory (p. 90). Following O. Schmidt, Nietzsche shows

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great faith in "progressive" heredity (p. 99; is not the word "progressive" here misleading?). Man's character is the sum of ancestral opinions and feelings (p. 107). But here, again, a more serious study of the matter causes doubts to arise in his mind (p. 110).

The three following chapters discuss Nietzsche's attitude towards Darwinism or selection. And here we cease to understand the author. She explains that Nietzsche despises and attacks Darwinism; and yet it is evident from her quotations that Nietzsche makes abundant use of this very theory,—to such an extent that one may very well doubt whether the sharp distinction made by Mlle. Richter between Lamarckism and Darwinism is at all felt by the German thinker. She too readily takes Nietzsche's word for his claim that he is not a Darwinist; it frequently happens that when a man has a theory greatly resembling that of another, he emphasizes the slightest differences in order to produce the illusion of greater originality for himself. It seems, after careful reading of these pages, that the difference between the two men can be reduced to this: Nietzsche (inspired possibly by Rée and Rolph) replaces the struggle for mere preservation, or existence, by a struggle for a higher form of life, or, as he expressed it elsewhere, by the struggle for power; but since Darwin claims that the fittest survives, the idea of a higher life is also implied in his theory. In the conclusion of the book (p. 234) the author says: "*Nous ne disconviendrons pas d'une influence de Darwin sur Nietzsche, mais relative seulement à la théorie de la sélection;*" but she started from the very notion that selection was the specific doctrine of Darwin as contrasted with Lamarckism; then why maintain that Nietzsche is not a Darwinist?

In Chapter V a similar criticism suggests itself. Darwin studies natural selection; Nietzsche is more concerned with artificial selection, because he deals with the problem in its relation with humankind and thinks (with Spencer) that the law of natural selection in man is tempered by various circumstances. But, after all, does not Darwin's theory of selection imply, most decidedly, the elimination of the weak? and is not this very elimination of the weak the great goal for Nietzsche (and Spencer)?

Besides, did Darwin ever absolutely deny the possibility of artificial selection? I would not like to be too positive about it; but even if he did, it cannot be said that such a view is neces-

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sarily implied in the theory of selection. Therefore, even Chapter VI, which deals especially with Nietzsche's ideas of marriage by artificial selection, can hardly be said to be anti-Darwinian.

Chapter VII suggests a relation between the recent discoveries of de Vries and some of Nietzsche's theories; the latter would have found inspiration in Naegeli, who is well known as a precursor of de Vries. The notion of the accumulation of energies bringing about an abrupt change, or revolution, needs, however, hardly to be traced to de Vries; for in history the theory was commonplace long ago; it was new only in biology, where premutation periods and apparent revolutions were thought not to take place. The interesting suggestion is made in Chapter VIII that the notion of the *Superman* first appears in Nietzsche just about the time when Dühring's "Wert des Lebens" was published; and everything goes to show that Nietzsche read the book with keen interest. Now Dühring expresses very plainly the idea of a new species of humankind which will, by evolution, follows ours: *eine veredelte, erheblich anders ausgestattete Gattung* (p. 204). Unfortunately the author does not go into the subject, and instead, fills his last chapter with discussions of various secondary subjects, such as whether Nietzsche conceived the *Superman* as a new "biological" species or not. It seems that he did (p. 224).

There are in this work a good many facts well worth knowing, therefore I have thought it best to give a summary of its content. The idea of making just such an investigation of Nietzsche was excellent. But from a philosophical standpoint one is somewhat surprised at the way it was carried out. The author takes up gravely various biological theories and tells us whether Nietzsche agreed with them or not. That does not interest us in the least. Nietzsche was not a natural scientist, and his opinion, if he has expressed any, would not count,—as he cannot know. If her purpose was to compare opinions, the author,—a truly feminine mind,—has started her investigation at the wrong end: instead of asking what Nietzsche thinks of scientific theories, she ought to ask what scientists think of Nietzsche's application of those theories to philosophy.

Had this attitude been adopted, many problems would have been dealt with more profitably. Moreover, many others might have been dispensed with altogether. The question, *e. g.*, whether

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Nietzsche was a Lamarckian or a Darwinist is,—at least in the way the author formulates it,—secondary, and by no means important enough to determine the principle of the division of chapters,—particularly since the attempt to adhere to this principle proves so very unsatisfactory. Again, whether or not Nietzsche observes the 'biological' distinction made by Darwin between evolution and selection would be of value only in case it had any bearing on his philosophical ideas,—which, I think, is hardly the case. Nor are we interested in the problem whether the *Superman* will, or not, be a new *biological* species; the definition of species is subjective anyway; and since Nietzsche is not an authority in this field, whatever he says about it need not be discussed.

Of paramount importance are the inquiries into the *philosophical* theories suggested to Nietzsche by *biological* theories. Of these we hear very little in the work under consideration. Of course, the general ideas of transformism, evolution, and selection are too much in the air to count much, and it would probably be impossible to trace precise relations with any special work. One of Nietzsche's theories would lend itself to such an investigation, it seems (see above, on chap. VIII), and this one is not worked out thoroughly at all. I would almost be willing to give the whole book for one good chapter on that point.

ALBERT SCHINZ.

Bryn Mawr, Pa.

PHILOSOPHY AS A SCIENCE. A Synopsis of the Writings of Dr. Paul Carus. Chicago: The Open Court Company, 1909. Pp. ix, 213.

This volume contains a sketch of the philosophy of Dr. Carus, occupying twenty-eight pages, a publisher's catalogue of his works, with descriptions and press notices, and summaries of editorial articles published in *The Open Court* and *The Monist* from 1887 to 1909. It is a noteworthy literary output, both quantitatively and in point of quality. There are forty-nine titles of books and booklets. Many of them are indeed little more than pamphlets; but together they represent some four thousand pages of text. There are nearly a thousand editorial articles; and though many of them are brief, and many have

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been republished in the books, they probably add four thousand pages more of original work. A great variety of subjects are touched upon in these publications. Dr. Carus writes, apparently with equal facility, on mathematics and natural science, history and philology, Biblical criticism and classical poetry, Taoist, Buddhist, and Zoroastrian lore, metaphysics, ethics, and psychology. He has edited and translated Chinese works, with the assistance of Teitaro Suzuki, and written Buddhist stories, satires and poems. Yet he is absolutely right in saying, "a sympathetic reader of my books will find that, in spite of the great variety of subjects which I have treated, all my works constitute an organic whole and are subordinate to a general plan."

It is this impression of a high purpose, a broad outlook upon life, a restless search after truth, and a rational demand for an all-embracing synthesis of thought, that makes even the critical reader forget, in his admiration, much superficiality, inaccuracy and haste that would otherwise disturb him. Long practice has made Dr. Carus a master of one exceedingly difficult art, that of creedmaking. Few men are his equals in the power of presenting, in a brief and lucid statement, the salient points of his philosophy of life. From time to time he takes an inventory of his spiritual possessions. On several occasions he has made summaries of the tendency and scope of his work as a thinker and a public teacher. Such periodical formulation of the individual creed is of great value. The faster a man travels from position to position toward ever receding intellectual horizons, the more desirable it is that he take note of where he is. Many a scholar delves so deeply into his specialty, many a philosopher even becomes so absorbed in a small branch of his subject, that he cannot see the forest for the trees, cannot attain a large and independent view of the world. So far as the most essential points of Dr. Carus's philosophy are concerned, the present writer finds himself in such hearty accord with him, that he takes genuine pleasure in commending this admirably written sketch. A good photograph of Dr. Carus, with a Chinese classic in his hand, fittingly accompanies the little volume.

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THE TEACHING OF PHILOSOPHY TO PASS-MEN. By Harold P. Cooke. Cambridge: Heffer, 1912. Pp. v, 18.

Mr. Cooke begins this useful and suggestive pamphlet by asserting that at the present time there is, as a result of the growing complexity of life, an eminent need of what he calls "sobriety of mind," "the power of grasping the central issues, of disregarding the irrelevant and trivial." And he lays it down at the outset that "some form of philosophical training, *if satisfactory in form and treatment,* is more likely than other forms of training to cultivate this sobriety of intellect." But the teaching of philosophy to the Pass-men, who form so important a part of the students of our modern universities, suffers, Mr. Cooke urges, from two grave defects. "First of all, philosophical teaching is far too remote from the minds of the pupils; and, secondly, it commonly bears the note or character of continuous lecturing." Thus, for example, in ethics the Pass-man is often given Plato's "Republic" to study, a work which, as Mr. Cooke well says, "demands for its adequate appreciation a knowledge of Attic civilization, of an unfamiliar tongue, of ethical terms of diverse scope and associations from those that are commonly employed to-day."

The result of the remoteness of the subject-matter, and of the manner in which it is taught, is but too often that the student 'crams' the notes he has taken down, and reproduces them in the examination, without any grasp of what it all really means.

Mr. Cooke proposes a remedy for both these defects. He urges that, in accordance with modern psychological principles, and following the example of the great Greek teachers of philosophy, the teaching should connect itself most closely with what is already known to the students. "Are we not driven to conceive," he asks, "that the *modern* Socrates, the *modern* Plato, would begin their instruction in ethics with an inquiry into current ideas of right conduct, of what is good and of what is bad, and would take their texts from the national poets?" Mr. Cooke would have the modern teacher follow the example of the Greeks, too, in imparting instruction largely by conversation.

The second part of this pamphlet consists of an excellent discussion of objections which might be brought against his two

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proposals. But I cannot help thinking that Mr. Cooke largely underrates one practical difficulty in the way of teaching by conversation. Mr. Cooke admits that it could not well be carried out with classes much above twenty in number; but suggests that in such cases the classes should be subdivided. Now in many modern universities the Pass courses in philosophy are attended by classes of over one hundred. And it would be impossible to ask the professors or lecturers, who are often overworked at present, to increase their labors five or sixfold.

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

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THE INTERNATIONAL
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JULY, 1913.

THE PLACE OF VOLITION IN EDUCATION.*

SIR WILLIAM J. COLLINS.

I AM afraid that it was with a rash precipitancy and an undue self-complacency that I accepted the flattering invitation of your indefatigable Secretary to deliver this year the annual address to your League. I ought to have reflected that unlike your orators of preceding years I could bring but scanty equipment to so formidable a task. I can neither lay claim to their philosophic erudition nor to their didactic experience. I trust that I have shown when occasion presented, a sincere if somewhat intermittent sympathy with the objects of your League, a sympathy which I hope has sometimes led to practical results. As a teacher my direct experience has been limited to medical students, who are generally, though I think unfairly, regarded as unpropitious material for the art of the moral reformer or as imperfectly profiting by the efforts lavished upon their moral amelioration. True, as the first Chairman of the Education Committee of the London County Council, it was my privilege to become acquainted, administratively, with the labors of some twenty-five thousand teachers upon whom devolved the physical, mental, and moral education of some eight

* Annual Address to the Moral Education League in London, February, 1913.

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hundred thousand London children in provided and non-provided schools. It fell to my lot to listen to some of the religious instruction given in Council schools. I witnessed then and subsequently in the House of Commons the excitement which discussion upon religious education was calculated to arouse in representative bodies, and I became aware of the unholy passions let loose by any proposal to modify the syllabus of religious instruction promulgated for the use of the schools. So much so that a religious syllabus, inherited by the London County Council from the School Board, but which had been periodically subjected to revision, has become more or less stereotyped. It was even inserted in a Government Bill as a schedule and was in a fair way to be canonized for all time as the State conception of what religious education should include and exclude.

I recall the fact that in May, 1906, at the instance of your League, along with the late Mr. Pickersgill and Mr. Gooch, I waited upon Mr. Birrell, then Education Minister, in one of the little rooms in the House of Commons off Star Chamber Court, and I remember how we then and there convinced that genial soul of the desirability of including within the Code some provision for instruction of a moral and civic character. Such provision has accordingly been made in the Code since the year 1906.

Again I recall a debate in the House of Commons on March 16, 1909, when I seconded the motion made by Mr. Gooch in these words: "That in the opinion of this House provision should be made in the Code for moral instruction to be efficiently given in every elementary school, and that the regulations for the training of Teachers should be so amended as to secure that they are adequately trained to give such instruction." The Debate followed on the heels of the Great Naval Scare discussion, and possibly the temper and judgment of the House had been unsettled by the unfortunate exhibition then made. Any way, several of the speeches delivered that night were full of misconceptions as to the inten-

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tions and purposes of those who urged that greater attention should be given than heretofore to systematic moral training in our schools.

The motion was met by an amendment the mover and seconder of which professed to see no meaning in our motion unless it were one of covert hostility to religious instruction. Another speaker regarded our proposals as representing amiable but impossible ideals; a fourth understood the proposal to be, as he infelicitously put it, that one hour should be devoted to moral and all the rest to immoral instruction. A fifth professed to regard the motion, if not inspired by a Machiavellian desire to uproot all religion, as an elaborate method for making teachers into machines for the manufacture of prigs. Even Mr. Runciman, then Minister for Education, failed to grasp our object, for while he "offered no opposition to the motion on the paper," he deemed it not superfluous to warn us that "morality was not to be taught by any scientific classification of the moral virtues." When in the following May at your League's request, I introduced a deputation to Mr. Runciman, I again felt, owing no doubt to my own default, that the President of the Board remained either unimpressed or unconvinced by the representations which had been made to him.

I cannot help feeling that some of the passive *inertia* as well as the active suspicion and hostility with which your movement has been confronted is due, at any rate in part, to a misapprehension, or an erroneous prepossession, as to what is meant by moral education and training, and as to the methods by which it is held that such culture may be fostered.

It may be owing to ambiguity of the terms employed that some critics appear to view moral educationists as fussy faddists, self-righteous intermeddlers, or prudish puritans. That such an obsession exists in the minds of many worthy and conventional people I have no doubt whatever. Morality is not colloquially regarded as the science of conduct. "Definitions," said John Hunter,

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"are of all things the most damnable," and I do not propose to attempt any. It might be said of morality, as it has been said of Time, "I know what it is when you do not ask me." It is because I think we might disarm some of our critics by what may appear a less ambitious, but I believe not less effective approach to what we have in view, that I have ventured to group my discursive remarks under the title, "The Place of Volition in Education." Before proceeding further, however, I would like to refer to and estimate at its proper value that other great source of misapprehension and misrepresentation, *viz.*, the relation of moral education to religious education. I said in the House of Commons, and now repeat, that:

> I should be the last to deny that religion gives force and color and sanction and sanctity to all moral instruction, but there is a large gap which is not filled up at the present time. With hygiene on the one hand and religion on the other there is a large intermediate realm occupied by such instruction as cleanliness of body and mind, orderliness, punctuality in performance of duties, good manners, fortitude, kindness, self-respect and self-sacrifice. These form an ascending series. If on the one hand you assert that moral instruction has its base in the physical and physiological, you must also admit that on the other hand it has its crown in religion.

To separate morality from religion then in the minds of religious persons would be as impossible as to separate the shadow from the substance. But what is the position which religious education occupies in the schools of the State? Is it given in all public schools with such efficiency, such unrestricted thoroughness and in accord with the faith alike of the parents and the pedagogue, as to supersede and render superfluous any systematic endeavor to raise the moral ideals, to encourage the exercise of the will and to cultivate those civic virtues to which all render homage and to which no denomination is repugnant? Let us look at the facts.

In the first place, the giving or withholding of any religious instruction at all in publicly provided elementary schools is entirely at the option of the local education authority. If religious instruction of any kind be

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given, the Conscience Clause empowers a parent to withdraw his child from it, while such religious instruction as is vouchsafed comes under the restriction of the Cowper-Temple clause. That clause enacts that no religious catechism or religious formulary which is distinctive of any particular denomination shall be taught in the school. From this it would appear to follow either that no religious formulary may be taught, or that only such formularies as are deemed by the Board of Education or the Courts to be held jointly by two or more denominations may be taught in State-provided schools. The Board in the past have held that the Church catechism in its entirety is forbidden, but that the Ten Commandments, the Apostles' Creed, and the Lord's Prayer may be taught under the limits of the Statute. When I inquired of the President (June 2, 1908) whether the Board regarded the Nicene Creed and the Athanasian Creed as falling within the undenominational religion authorized by the Act as well as the Apostles' Creed, I was referred to an illuminating answer which stated that the Board now possess no power to determine authoritatively the legality or otherwise of the teaching of any specified formulary in Council schools. Such power, since the Education Act of 1902 became law, is held to reside wholly with the Courts of Law.

Following the example set many years ago by the London School Board, the practice of many local education authorities has been to require that the Bible be read and such explanations and instruction therefrom in the principles of the Christian religion and of morality be given as are suited to the capacities of children, provided that no attempt be made to attach children to any particular denomination.

As regards the efficiency of such religious instruction as is thus given, at the option of the local authorities under such restrictions and provisos, it is to be remembered that by Section 7 (3) of the 1870 act, it is enacted "that it shall be no part of the duties of His Majesty's

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Inspectors to inquire into any instruction in religious subjects given at such schools or to examine any scholar therein in religious knowledge or in any religious subject or book."

Such, then, are the arrangements for imparting religious instruction to the majority of children, at least some three and one-half millions, in the public elementary schools of this country. It was a well-meant but ill-contrived attempt to include religion and exclude dogma,—a problem which, Mr. Gladstone averred, had not been solved by any State or Parliament. It is doubtless due to the confidence justifiably though blindly reposed in the teachers that such a system has worked as well as, and with as little friction as, it has done. The attempts made in 1906 and 1908 to amend the Education Acts failed, and there does not appear to be any urgent disposition to renew the attempt to remove the grievances which offend the consciences of many, even in the notorious case of the so-called single school areas. It is claimed that Cowper-Templeism represents the "Common Protestantism" of England, and that it consists with the faith of many Churchmen and Nonconformists alike. But modern Nonconformity differs from that of 1870, and no longer accepts the views then held by the late Mr. Richards, when he said, "If I know anything of the principles of Nonconformity, one of the most fundamental and universally acknowledged by them is this,—that it is not right to take money received from the general taxation of the country and apply it to purposes of religious instruction and worship."

In the "voluntary" schools on the other hand, where some two million children receive their education, religious instruction may be given which is coterminous with the whole faith of the teacher and in full accord with the doctrines of the denomination which founded the particular school. The grievance here is that for their maintenance money is taken compulsorily from those who do not share that religious belief, but may

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regard it as erroneous and even as harmful. The emphasis laid upon distinctive doctrine in such school, which is indeed its *raison d'être,* must tend to set less store upon those moral qualities upon which all unite, than upon the dogmatic teaching which divides, the denominations. When, as Chairman of the London Education Committee, I dropped in casually to Council schools in various parts of London, I found that Cowper-Templeism in practice might often cover little more than information regarding the history and geography of Palestine, while occasionally it might embrace the singing of a hymn highly charged with doctrinal implications. From what I am told by some who are responsible for religious instruction in non-provided schools, I gather that dogmatic and strictly denominational instruction in them is carried to its fullest development. The net result of the present dichotomy of the schools, due to the religious difficulty, is that the teaching of so-called morality in provided schools is apt to be imperilled by fear of encroaching upon the undefined but prohibited formularies, while in non-provided schools such primal importance is attached to their distinctive formularies as often to operate to the detriment of systematic cultivation of those moral principles which unite rather than divide the contending sects.

It is worth while to consider for a moment why it is that certain moral teaching, like the ordinary code subjects, can be given in the schools with general approval, while certain religious teaching cannot. The difference in the two cases is one rather of degree than of kind. I endeavored in the House of Commons during the discussion of the so-called "secular solution," when proposed in 1906, to point out what I conceived to be the true explanation, though the House is perhaps scarcely the place for metaphysical arguments.

Any thoughtful person must surely recognize that in every science, sooner or later, the mind is brought up against what have been called the *à-priorities* of knowl-

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edge. In natural science such as biology you cannot go far without being confronted with the problem of 'vitalism,'—of life, its nature and its origin,—which has been so differently expounded and explained by the Church Scientific at different epochs of philosophic thought. In the physical sciences you may perhaps penetrate deeper, but there comes ere long the question of the nature of matter and force. In psychology the great mystery of consciousness confronts us, idealism and materialism compete for our acceptance, while if we speak of epistemology, the science of sciences, the *whence,* the *why,* and the *whither* encompass and obscure the margins of all that positive knowledge which an army of specialists in each of the sciences is ever seeking to increase and to systematize. In all branches of knowledge we readily accept as common ground certain *axiomata media* upon which we build as accepted *data.* This is also true of ethics, although there is the great mystery of the moral sense, of conscience, on which contending schools have waged and will continue to wage a wordy warfare.

In the case of *religion,* on the other hand, which tells of the ratio of the finite to the infinite, these *à priori* questions necessarily meet us *in limine* and are clamant for answer before we pass on our way to further study. No *axiomata media* will here suffice, the common territory is reduced to the smallest dimensions, to a vanishing point, the contending sects are ready with their own and several dogmatic answers to all the *à-priorities* and, while it may be possible for a certain collection of sects to find a common denominator which may suffice for the group, there is always the possibility of some uncompromising creed requiring that its doctrine should permeate the whole teaching secular and religious alike, and demand an atmosphere which shall be all its own. I recall the case of a learned divine who maintained that even a subject like bacteriology bore a different complexion when taught by one who professed the faith which he shared from that it might assume when expounded in the

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laboratory, say, of an agnostic. Such views as these which culminate in the demand for an *atmosphere* all their own are, I submit, but a recognition in an extreme and unlimited degree of the fact of the relativity of all knowledge and of the dependence of the whole upon, and the permeation of the whole by, *à priori* and fundamental considerations which receive differential treatment by different varieties of religious experience. If logical and complete recognition and liberty are to be accorded to each and every type of religious atmosphere, then, in a country with many different religions, compromise fails and a national system of education crumbles to pieces.

Without pursuing this theme further, I think enough has been said to show that, so far from "moral instruction and training" being antithetic to religious education or to religion itself, it would be truer to say that moral instruction has itself suffered from the scientific agnosticism which for the latter half of the last century held such sway over the minds of the learned, and which so profoundly influenced professional teaching.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the domination alike of our pedagogy and our penology,—for both are or ought to be educational,—by the philosophy of Bentham, of the Mills, father and son, and of that form of it with which many of us were indoctrinated from the pages of Alexander Bain.

In an address I gave in 1905, I endeavored to trace some of the results which have flowed from the acceptance of, or reluctant and overawed acquiescence in, the tenets of that self-complacent and self-assertive school. While in psychology it stood for the experience philosophy, in morals it was necessitarian and hedonist. Such teaching paved the way for the cruder developments of materialism and determinism. "Man is what he eats." "The brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile." "Without phosphorus there is no thought,"—were the engaging watchwords of this pontifical school of scien-

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tists. In the apotheosis of Science as the only knowledge worth having, the humanities were thrust into the background. As the author of "Vivian Grey" happily put it at the time: "In the present day we are all studying science and none of us are studying ourselves. This is not exactly the Socratic process; and as for the γνῶθι σεαυτόν of the more ancient Athenian, that principle is quite out of fashion in the nineteenth century." That generation needed the reminder of Matthew Arnold of the consequences which must ever await those who would thus divide up the circle of knowledge. We find in his writings an explanation of the intellectual impotence and moral ineffectiveness which mark the exclusive pursuit of some one science, or rather of science itself exclusively. He said: "Neither humanists nor realists adequately conceive the circle of knowledge, and each party is unjust to all that to which its own aptitudes do not carry it. The humanists are loath to believe that man has any access to vital knowledge except by knowing himself,—the poetry, philosophy, history which his spirit has created; the realist that he has any access except by knowledge of the world,—the physical sciences, the phenomena, and the laws of nature." But be it remembered, "the study of letters is the study of the operation of human force, of human freedom and activity; the study of nature is the study of the operation of non-human forces, of human limitation and passivity. The contemplation of human force and activity tends naturally to heighten our own force and activity, the contemplation of human limits and passivity tends rather to check it. Therefore the men who have had the humanistic training have played, and yet play, so prominent a part in human affairs, in spite of their prodigious ignorance of the universe, because their training has powerfully fomented the human force within them." What we have since learned of the transmutation of forces, the mutability of species, the evolution of the once 'unchanging' elements has given us a dynamic in place of a static

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conception of the universe as the theater of action of force, of will,—of the realization of idea.

Science, by disclosing the methods whereby the phenomena with which it deals have developed, and in synthesizing into generalizations the *modus operandi* of their interactions has, as Martineau says, shown us how "these physical pursuits followed into their haunts run up into a series of notions common to them all,—expressed by such words as *law, cause, force*,—which at once transfer the jurisdiction from the provincial Courts of the special senses to the High Chancery of Universal Philosophy." The old school of materialism and determinism, which less than a generation ago appeared so unassailable, has in fact been snowed under by the accumulating discoveries which Science herself has brought to light. The last effort made by its disciples was to vouchsafe a doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism as a sufficient explanation of the mystery of mind and matter. Content to allow that between matter, with its characteristic of extension, and personality, with its characteristic of consciousness and volition, no thinkable point of convergence or contact could be detected, they are prepared to take refuge in this *ignoratio elenchi*. Wundt, who is generally invoked as authoritative on such doctrine, sets out indeed by brushing aside metaphysics, but when we arrive at his final conclusion of the whole matter we find him asserting that "mental phenomena cannot be referred to bodily as effect to cause. . . . Personal character is the ultimate cause of volition," and that on such questions our 'appeal' must be not to physiology, but "to metaphysics for an answer." When I presided at M. Bergson's lecture in London last year, I was not surprised to find that the author of "Creative Evolution" denounced the hypothesis of psycho-physical parallelism as totally inadmissible.

Now John Stuart Mill, with the utmost candor, admitted that the doctrine of *à priori* principles is one and the same, whether applied in the mental or the moral sphere,

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whether applied to the knowledge of *truth* or that of *duty*. If you are *à priori* in physics, you will be so in ethics. The metaphysical method, accepted in the one, will not be rejected for the other. The same general tendency of thought applies to 'what I am' as 'to what I ought to be,' —to the explication alike of *consciousness* and of *conscience*. The experience philosopher will be a necessitarian in morals and a utilitarian in ethics, while the *à priori* school will stand for free-will—a moral sense—and vouchsafe a rule for conduct—apart from the pursuit of pleasure.

If with the author of "Literature and Dogma" we regard conduct and character as making up three quarters of life, if we agree that if a man is to be a knave, he had better be a fool also, how relatively high a value must we accordingly concede to volition in any complete educational system.

Beccaria, from whom Bentham derived his greatest happiness formula, held that "the philosophy of the heart is above that of the intellect," and the store which he set upon the emotions alike in forming and reforming character has met a response in the minds of all thoughtful philanthropists; yet Beccaria himself had occasion to lament that the enlightenment of a nation is at least a century in advance of its practice.

Unless we recognize in each personality a voluntary coöperation in the architecture of his or her own character, that is to say, a will free to choose the higher in the presence of a lower, and fortified by faithfulness to the better choice, a self-conscious power actuated by ideals which transcend the merely prudential motives of appetite and sense, a will which translates I *must* into I *ought* in the pursuit of disinterested good, our efforts alike in educating the child, in rehabilitating the erring and in reforming the criminal must ever be foredoomed to failure.

The blighting influence of the determinist and utilitarian doctrine has led us to adopt the proffered acquisi-

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tion of some material good or the apprehension of some material deprivation as the regimen of the school and the routine system of a reformatory or prison.

Hedonism and necessitarianism, I have often urged, will prove false guides and uninspiring mentors in fostering the growth of character in the young or in bringing about any social amelioration, though they pursue the paths of despotic philanthropy, invoke torture as part of judicial punishment or adopt other Draconian methods so much in vogue in certain esoteric circles. Such methods which may generally be found at the bottom of our penitentiary philosophy are, or ought to be, as much out of date as Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon at Millbank. There are those who are apt to regard delinquency as a disease and following the pretty conceit developed by Samuel Butler's genius in Erewhon would reciprocally regard disease as a crime. There are indeed 'borderland' cases in which the mad and the bad run insensibly the one into the other. I think it was Paget who, when referring to a hystero-epileptic who could not move her limb, said with felicitous epigram, "She says, 'I cannot,' it looks like 'I will not,' it is 'I cannot will.' " Yes, indeed, it is true of many imbeciles, degenerates, drug addicts, and 'feeble minded,' whom the legislature finds such difficulty in defining and dealing with, that they are suffering,—if one may use such a collocation of term,—from a disease of the will. They are often profuse in promise, but inept in performance; "I will if I can" is ever on their lips, but the "can if I will" involves a tension to which they are indisposed or unequal. Like the younger of the two sons who said, " 'I go, Sir,' and went not," there is often no go in them.

It has been well said that no one is truly educated unless he is able to do what he ought to do, when he ought to do it, whether he wants to do it or not, or as a yet older authority puts it, he who is master of himself is master of a king, but he who is a slave to himself is the slave of a slave.

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The mental philosophy so long current has insisted that volition is one of a trinity of functions or properties of mind,—the other two parties in this triune arrangement being the intellect and the feelings (the latter comprising sensation and emotion). Yet how valueless is such an attempt to dissect up personality. In the sphere of the intellect the influence of volition operates in fixation of the attention, which facilitates memory when otherwise the routine of repetition would have to be invoked to increase the conservation of a perception. Again in the recognition of resemblances and of differences, which together with retentiveness are regarded by Bain and his school as the prerogatives of the intellect, how great a part does volition play in concentrating thought on such phenomena.

In the realm of the emotions again how potent is the action of volition,—the policing of the passions,—the formation of habit, the discipline derived from the voluntary acceptance of inconvenience, of discomfort, of the disagreeable in pursuit of ulterior good.

The ancient philosophers in assigning the mastery to the intellect appeared to minimize the influence of the will. Ecclesiastics like the later exponents of 'necessity' found no place for it in their doctrine of predestination. Kant, however, in the region of the unconditioned gave free play to volition and though

> binding Nature fast in fate
> Left free the human will;

while contemporary psychology has come to regard freedom of choice as the prerogative of a man's whole personality, "a man's total reaction upon life."

As we incline to a more idealist interpretation of the universe, and speak of the relation of self-consciousness to the universal consciousness and view the world as will and idea, we render to volition as the dynamic of personality the place and power to which it is entitled and from which it was so long dethroned.

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We may, in the words of Kant, hold that the "*will* is a kind of causality in living beings, so far as they are rational, and freedom is the property of this causality in virtue of which it acts independently of extrinsic determining causes, while the causality of all non-rational beings has the property of Nature-necessity whereby they are determined to activity by the operation of extrinsic causes." Translating this thought into the language of education, we may agree with Thring that "the most essential part of training is a certain freedom of choice, by which self-management, self-control, and power to resist is fostered." It is curious that while in so many relations of life that blessed word compulsion is increasingly invoked,—to a degree which even tends to bring law into disrespect by reason of its fussy and sumptuary invasion of territory from which it has been the endeavor of reformers to warn it off,—in the elementary school the recent advocacy of the Montessori method has formulated a plea for the liberty, if not indeed for the autocracy, of child individuality. Our forefathers used to say, "Go and see what the children are doing and tell them they mustn't," whereas the latest cult would subordinate the teacher to the child in obedience to the doctrine, "Enquire what the child demands and let him have it." As a legitimate protest against the "pump and bucket" mode of education, this is doubtless to the good, and the old notion that all education is but contact with a superior mind must yield to a sane employment of the heuristic method. But surely procedure according to principles, which the mature mind and experience of mankind have elaborated, can be of infinite service in training the agent of choice, in cultivating fixity of purpose, in raising high ideals and, by a graded scheme of moral education, help to evolve, not merely a good animal, but a good man. In training the young mind toward self-discipline, not by compelling obedience, but by winning it, lies the secret of true education.

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In the report of the Committee which in 1895 inquired into our Prison System, there is a quotation from a conversation that the late Michael Davitt had with an intelligent habitual criminal in Dartmoor in which the latter said: "Unlike you I had no moral training,—I am a product of your civilization, you allowed me to grow up with my animal instincts uncorrected, and then you send me to prison for exercising them." So recently as 1909 the Home Secretary told the House of Commons: "The prison authorities now have no responsibility for the prisoners' moral condition or future welfare put upon them by the law, and they are not bound to turn them out better men than when they went in," and it was accordingly not surprising that he added that "statistics show that with every conviction the probability of return to prison is increased." This reads very like the words used by Samuel Romilly one hundred years earlier when he began his beneficent campaign, *viz.:* "that those confined in common gaols return to society much worse than when they were first withdrawn from it," due in his opinion to the neglect of the wise and benevolent principles which the late John Howard had then been industriously promulgating.

I know there is a modern school of fatalistic criminology who affect to regard a proportion of the population as degenerate from birth, as anti-social, vicious by nature and instinct, and predestined to a life of crime. These they would permanently segregate for the benefit of the rest, if indeed more drastic treatment be not prescribed. While fully admitting that there are those who bear the physical stigmata of degeneracy and imbecility, it is no easy task to establish a competent tribunal to adjudicate upon the more obscure cases at the other end of the scale. The wonderful results which have followed patient working on the moral plane, the transforming influence of a great affection, the personal magnetism exerted by a friendly guide, the marvels of 'the subliminal self,' the mystical phenomena associated with 'conversion,' and the

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yet more occult phenomena of hypnotic suggestion, give pause to too autocratic measures in regarding as hopelessly irreclaimable those classes of our fellow creatures whom we condemn in advance as criminal by nature.

If the same care were devoted to training the will,—that master faculty of the mind,—as is devoted to physical exercises or intellectual memorizing, I cannot help feeling that school life could be made more prophylactic than it is against criminal propensity or the easy lapsing into mere selfish indulgence. It is not pleasant to read in the last Report of the Chief Medical Officer to the Board of Education that recent inspection has "revealed a state of things much worse than was generally known to exist" of the "discreditable conditions" that prevail in some schools,—that "uncleanliness of person in school children constitutes a seriously adverse commentary on their training and education. It is impossible (he says) to consider any system of education as adequate which does not insure, as an early result, implanting in the child feelings of self-respect." A few months ago Mrs. Humphry Ward wrote in the "Times" (January 6, 1913): "I believe that many persons giving their best energies to primary education will bear me witness when I say that one of the heaviest anxieties now weighing upon them is concerned with what seems to be, at any rate, the increase of immorality and vice among children," and speaks of a terrible condition of things among certain strata of London children. Is there no connection between the hooliganism and lack of self-respect and self-restraint, which we deplore, and the quality of the training which children receive in the impressionable years from five to fourteen in our public elementary schools? Is all done that might be done even under limitations which in the name of religion we impose, to cultivate that *power over self,* which knowledge, though power it be, is not? Is it sufficient to leave such moral instruction and training, as it were, to chance, to a casual permeation of the curriculum? What can be

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done at any time is apt to be done not at all, and what is everybody's duty is nobody's duty.

To give point and purpose to the training of volition and to directing conative powers toward high ideals, the object and method alike must be clearly conceived and systematically carried out. Such end will be achieved not indeed by "disquisitions on the scientific classification of the moral virtues," but by imbuing our teachers with those qualities of head and heart which are essential to their high vocation and by conceding to self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control that place in the training of youth which has too long been usurped by too exclusive attention paid to merely physical and intellectual attainments. In bringing about this most necessary reform this Moral Instruction League will, I doubt not, continue to play a great and important part until indeed the time shall come when its efforts will be exhausted in fulfillment, and the place of volition in education shall be recognized as being that which in truth it is,—second to none.

LONDON, ENGLAND. W. J. COLLINS.

LORD HUGH CECIL'S "CONSERVATISM."

C. D. BROAD.

THE recent work on Conservatism by Lord Hugh Cecil has attracted less attention than it deserves. For really its publication may claim to be something of a literary and political event. Although the number of convinced Conservatives is, and has always been, as great as that of convinced Liberals, and although J. S. Mill's gibe about the "stupid party" has only a very small modicum of truth, it remains a fact that advanced politicians have always been much readier with the intellectual analysis and philosophic theory of their views than their opponents. We need only instance Bentham

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and Mill among English Radicals, and a writer like Marx among Socialists, and contrast them with the meagre list of authorities that Lord Hugh Cecil can quote.

Lord Hugh's book is divided into two unequal parts. The first deals with the various elements that have gone to make up modern Conservatism (the influence of Burke being considered worthy of a separate chapter), whilst the second tries to analyze and defend Conservatism as a political system.

We shall not spend much time over the first part. It is naturally mainly historical, and it does not call for any lengthy discussion. Lord Hugh finds three chief elements in modern Conservatism, *viz.,* Innate Conservatism, Toryism, and Imperialism. By innate conservatism is meant a psychological characteristic common to all men, though possessed in different degrees. It has two sides, one of much greater value than the other. The more worthy side is the rational consideration that social problems are so very complex that there is always a strong probability that some factor has been overlooked in any scheme of change which is defended on the ground that it will remove some admitted evil. The less respectable side is the dislike of novelty as such. We might call these two factors rational scepticism and mental inertia respectively, and it behooves us to say a word about each.

There is a point that Lord Hugh has overlooked in his respect for rational scepticism. Rational scepticism, as a motive for rejecting a scheme that offers to remove admitted evils, involves two applications of probability. The first is contained in the statement that social affairs are so complex that it is very improbable that all the effects of a given social change have been foreseen. But this is not enough to make it reasonable to reject the scheme. For this to be so, we must have some ground for judging further that the unforeseen effects are more likely to be bad than good. Now, in so far as these effects are *ex hypothesi* unforeseen, this judgment cannot rest

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on the known nature of the effects of this particular measure. Hence it can only rest on some general proposition, such as: It is more probable that the unforeseen effects of any social change will be bad than that they will be good. And there seems to be no reason to think that this proposition is true. Thus rational scepticism does not seem to be a defensible ground for rejecting a change which is held after careful consideration to be capable of removing an admitted evil without introducing greater ones; for there is no reason to suppose that the unforeseen effects are more likely to be bad than good.

Let us now turn to Toryism, the second element that Lord Hugh finds in modern Conservatism. By Toryism our author means the view that the State should be explicitly connected with some definite church. It is, of course, this part of Conservatism of which Lord Hugh and his family are such distinguished exponents. With the arguments on which he bases his Toryism we shall deal later, and we shall then see that it is ethically the most fundamental element of the three.

In general we should say that the defect of this part of the work is its failure to distinguish between the causes that actually make men Conservatives and the reasons that ought to do this. As an enumeration of causes it is incomplete, because it omits explicitly the important influences of supposed self-interest and of certain sectional prejudices. Self-interest makes many rich men Conservatives and many poor men Liberals or Socialists; sectional prejudices make many of the middle classes Conservatives and many nonconformists Liberals. It seems a mistake to mention some causes which are not reasons,—like mental inertia,—and to omit others like these. On the other hand, supposed reasons are mixed up with causes; for Lord Hugh (wrongly, in our opinion) thinks rational scepticism a valid reason as well as an actual cause. But, on the whole, we may say that the first section is intended mainly to discuss causes

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and the second one reasons. To the second then we now turn.

This section opens with a discussion of the relation between Religion and Politics which is of vital importance to what follows. Substitute the word ethics for religion and we agree with Lord Hugh that to be clear on this point is essential to the philosophy of any system of politics, and therefore to that of Conservatism. But it is not likely that our author would accept the substitution, and we must try to defend it.

In all political discussions we must assume agreement in ultimate judgments of value, and our hope of converting an opponent must lie in showing him either (1) that his general political theories contradict the ethical principles that we have in common, whilst ours are compatible with them, or (2) that his measures are not likely to lead to the results which we agree would be desirable if they could be reached. The fruitlessness and heat of political discussion spring largely from the confusion of matters of fact with matters of value.

Now Lord Hugh is perfectly clear on the necessity of an ethical agreement before there can be any profitable political discussion, and it is in connection with this ethical agreement that he introduces religion. He says that the Christian religion is common to the vast majority of Conservatives and their opponents, and its system of ethics is therefore the one which it is reasonable to take for granted. And, as we shall see, he draws a number of important conclusions from this supposed agreement. The objection however, is this: There is no Christian ethical system common to all Christians or even to all Anglicans. Whatever else the New Testament may be it is certainly not a systematic treatise on ethics, and it is perfectly notorious that different Christians who have written systematic treatises have produced different ethical systems. Locke and Butler, Paley and Kant, were all Christians; but, as everyone knows, their ethics differed greatly. Lord Hugh, for instance, says that self-

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interest is never a proper motive for a Christian, whilst some Christian writers have held that no other motive was possible for anyone.

The fact is that Christians agree with each other and with nearly all civilized men in recognizing certain virtues and duties; but then those duties sometimes conflict or reduce to tautologies, and the New Testament (not being a systematic treatise on ethics) does not tell us what to do under such circumstances. And Christians differ as much from each other as from civilized non-Christians in the solutions which they propose for such conflicts. The ethics which Lord Hugh himself assumes in this book are indeed those of the New Testament with each command standing in its own isolated particularity and no attempt at that systematic treatment which the constant conflicts of duties,—each apparently unconditionally binding,—have forced on ethical thinkers both Christian and non-Christian. We shall have ample opportunity for seeing this as the discussion proceeds.

We shall gain considerable insight into Lord Hugh's point of view if we consider his treatment of the claim made by certain Socialists that Socialism is peculiarly Christian. He very justly answers that the New Testament has extremely little to say about the State, and therefore cannot give any direct support to a system which is characterized by the enlargement of state action. And the fact that the New Testament often exalts the poor at the expense of the rich is certainly not a reason for attempting to abolish the poor. Here Lord Hugh seems to me to be unquestionably right. If wealth be morally dangerous and virtue be more important than anything else, it is surely mistaken kindness to enrich the poor. But any scheme of Socialism attempts to do this; for Socialism assumes that it is better to be rich than poor. But Lord Hugh does not carry his application of Christian ethics quite far enough. For the logical conclusion is that the ideal social reform would be one that would impoverish the rich without enriching the poor;

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and this has not as yet been suggested as a part of the Unionist programme. Surely this result is enough to show either that Lord Hugh is wrong about Christian ethics or that Christian ethics, so far from being a common possession of all parties, are incompatible with the belief on which all social reformers work.

Lord Hugh might answer: So much the worse for what is called social reform. But he does not do this, for he accepts the various schemes of his own party (and states his readiness to coöperate with the schemes of other parties) which have as their object the enrichment of the poor. But he insists that such schemes must not unduly impoverish the rich, for then they become un-Christian.

Surely this is a very difficult position to maintain. If you enrich the poor without impoverishing the rich, you place the poor in the serious moral danger in which the rich already stand without helping the rich out of their plight. And, since on this system of ethics virtue is immeasurably more important than happiness, the net result is almost certainly bad. On the other hand, you cannot, according to Lord Hugh, seriously impoverish the rich without committing injustice; and this is immoral and un-Christian. It would seem then that the Christian had far better avoid any reform for enriching the poor.

At any rate, the only permissible scheme of social reform would be to take from the rich as much as can be got without injustice,—whatever that may be,—and use it to remove the poor from the moral dangers in which they stand through their poverty. What is essential, however, is that the amount taken from the rich shall not be so large as either to do them an injustice or to enrich the poor so much as to introduce them to greater moral dangers through prosperity than those to which they were formerly exposed through adversity.

But even this scheme does nothing for the rich, who are, if we accept the New Testament, in a far more seri-

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ous state than the poor; and indeed it is doubtful whether we are not going beyond the New Testament in supposing that the poor are liable to any special moral dangers. It is, of course, perfectly obvious that they are so exposed, but if we are to leave the New Testament anywhere, it is difficult to see where precisely the process is to stop.

The upshot of this discussion seems to be as follows. The New Testament does not indeed support Socialism, not merely because it teaches no positive political doctrine nor because Socialism needs injustice to apply it, but because the New Testament is incompatible with almost any system of social reform. Social reformers of all parties agree in thinking the happiness due to prosperity of intrinsic value, whilst the New Testament thinks that nothing but virtue is intrinsically valuable. And social reformers agree in thinking that poverty is on the whole less favorable to virtue than prosperity, whilst the New Testament undoubtedly holds that wealth is hardly compatible with virtue and nowhere suggests that poverty is at all unfavorable to it. Thus, so far from it being possible to take the ethics of the New Testament as ground common to all politicians, it is scarcely possible for a politician consistently to hold them, and practically everyone in public life differs from them in an important judgment of value and an important judgment of fact.

Lord Hugh involves himself in grave difficulties about 'confiscation.' Although wealth is valueless to its possessor unless it is a means to his or others' virtue, it is never right to remove it against the owner's will, because this is to inflict an injury, which the New Testament forbids. But how is it an injury on his principles? No doubt it would inflict a pain, but then neither pleasure nor pain, but only virtue is valuable, and so the pain inflicted does not seem ethically relevant. The only solution of this difficulty is to say that, although pain and pleasure are intrinsically worthless, yet the bestowal of

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pleasure or pain on others is a virtue or a vice in the bestower and, as such, has positive or negative value respectively. We must then add to this the proposition that the infliction of a pain however small is ethically so bad that no amount of virtue produced elsewhere by the process that inflicts the pain can counterbalance it. We wonder how Lord Hugh would defend non-vindictive punishment on these lines.

Let us now turn from Lord Hugh's ethics to his views about Church Establishment. Lord Hugh bases his belief in the advantages of an established religion on the ground that everyone who takes part in the affairs of State,—no matter how humble his function,—ought to be reminded of the existence of God and of a supersensible world. And he thinks that the establishment of a definite religion serves to remind people of these facts when they perform their duties as citizens or officials.

Now why is it important that people should be reminded of the existence of God and a supersensible world? Either (1) because the proposition that God and a supersensible world exist is true, and the knowledge of truth is intrinsically valuable; or (2) because the belief in this proposition tends to make men better or happier. The first can hardly be the reason for a state establishment; since this proposition, if true, is no truer than an infinite number of others which no one suggests that the state need formally recognize. So that the importance of reminding people that God and a supersensible world exist must depend on the fact that an explicit belief in this proposition is likely to make them perform their civic duties better.

Now it is perfectly true that those persons who already believe in the existence of God and further believe that he punishes evil and is grieved by it will be less likely to do wrong at a time when this belief is brought to their minds than when it remains in the background. Of course, if they do not believe this already, the mere fact that they are reminded of the proposition

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is not likely to affect their actions. Still, as the vast majority of citizens do hold this view at present, we may agree that it is important that they should be reminded of it at all important junctures of their lives. But the State recognition of any definite religion seems an extraordinarily clumsy way of producing this very simple effect. It errs both by excess and by defect.

Any religion contains a great many more propositions than the one that there exists a being who is grieved by wickedness and is wise enough to detect and strong enough to punish it even where men fail. The recognition of this proposition by the State might be defended on the grounds that Lord Hugh gives; but a man is not less likely to vote against his conscience because he knows that the State condemns the doctrine of Transsubstantiation and believes that the Son is of one substance with the Father. So the State recognition of such propositions as these cannot be thus defended. And State recognition fails equally by defect. For the religious belief is not impressed by the State church at the moment when it is wanted for strengthening the weak in public spirit. When a man is in church he thinks little about politics, and when he is at the polling booth or in Parliament he thinks little about God. The whole effect which Lord Hugh so much desiderates and to bring about which he is prepared to tolerate so much irrelevant matter could be accomplished far more easily and thoroughly by posting up in polling booths and such places a notice reminding theistic voters of their belief that there exists a God who sees and can punish them.

We now come to the two most important chapters in the book. They are called "Property and Taxation" and "The State and the Individual." In discussing them we must bear in mind the difficulties which we saw earlier attach to New Testament ethics; but we must not expect extreme consistency in our author, as those ethics are too violently paradoxical to be applied consistently throughout by anyone. Lord Hugh defines property as material

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wealth which a person or a body of people owns. And a thing is owned by anyone just so far as he has a right to do as he likes with it whether other people approve of his use of it or not. The question then is: Ought anyone to own anything, and, if so, within what limits ought private ownership to be allowed? Ownership might, of course, be limited either as to the kinds of things with which a man may do as he likes or as to the bounds within which he may do as he likes with such things. Now Lord Hugh seems to hold that, if we could start afresh, it would be reasonable and moral to determine the limits of ownership solely by considerations of general welfare; but that private ownership, having once been established, can and must be defended in a quite different way. Since no one likes to have the limits of his free use of anything diminished, it would now be an injury to decrease them without some sufficient reason.

We do not think that Lord Hugh succeeds here in making the distinction that he wants between what would have been legitimate in the first beginnings of property and what is legitimate now that it has been established. The fact is that, on his principles, there would have been precisely the same ethical difficulty in starting a system of property on the basis of public welfare as there is now in altering existing proprietorial rights with that end in view. For it would be necessary at the beginning as now to take away from some people the free use of something that they had formerly enjoyed, and this would have been an injury in the sense that they would certainly have disliked it. If public welfare would have been a sufficient excuse for this injury then, why not now? Surely the real difference is that to take away property now involves the breach of a legitimate expectation of the continuance of powers formerly enjoyed, whilst before a State with laws existed there would have been no such legitimate expectation.

But what is a legitimate expectation in this connection? It means that we have a right to expect from other

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people or from the State treatment not worse than that which a reasonable person is logically justified in assuming from their past statements and actions to be probable. Such treatment may, of course, be very bad in itself, but this is not relevant at present. Thus a man who falls among thieves who are known to be wont to keep their word and is promised his freedom on the payment of a certain ransom has a legitimate expectation of losing a certain part of his property. This will no doubt be a wrong. But if they then refuse to let him go except on payment of a larger ransom, the wrong done will not be increased merely by the additional loss, but also by the fact that the treatment that he receives is worse than that which he was logically justified in thinking probable.

In a State in which property had been organized from the beginning on the basis of general welfare, it would not be legitimate to expect that one's powers of doing what one liked would always remain the same. On the contrary, we ought to expect that they would be varied from time to time so as to secure always under changing conditions the greatest general welfare. But property as it exists in civilized States has not been organized on that basis, and a man may legitimately expect greater stability in his proprietorial powers than he could in the theoretical society just mentioned.

It is very important to note that what may be legitimately expected is not the same in the same State at all times. Suppose, for instance, that, up to a certain time, the past practice of a State had justified the expectation that the rights of property would continue unimpaired, and that then a great and sudden diminution was made in them. This diminution would undoubtedly be a wrong done to the owners of property. But, in spite of this first diminution being a wrong, it does not follow that equal further diminutions would be equally great further wrongs. For it would no longer be legitimate for property owners to expect the unimpaired continu-

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ance of their powers, and therefore the further legislation would not disappoint legitimate expectations in the way in which the first act did so.

These two factors then,—the pain inflicted on property owners by their actual loss, and the additional injury done if that loss exceeds what it was reasonable for the owner to regard as probable,—must both be considered in any discussion on the legitimacy of diminishing private property in a settled State. And the latter factor, as we have seen, tends to decrease in importance as such diminutions go on, for it ceases to be reasonable to conclude from the past acts of the State that one's present proprietorial powers will always remain unimpaired.

When this fact is taken into account, it becomes increasingly difficult to accept Lord Hugh's sharp distinction between what would have been right when private property was first established and what is right now. Lord Hugh would have to fall back, we think, on one of two arguments against the gradual redistribution of private property to secure greater general welfare. (1) He might use the general ethical argument that it is never right to inflict pain on anyone to secure any benefit whatever. This is consistent with some of the ethical views mooted earlier in the book, but it is inconsistent with the opinion that it would have been morally justifiable to institute property in the beginning on the basis of general welfare. For it is certain that some people would have had to have their powers limited. Or (2) he might try to prove that the general laws of economics would prevent any distribution permanently producing greater general welfare than exists at present. The only attempt at this is a sketch of some of the difficulties of State socialism.

A great part of the chapter on Taxation is devoted to an able attempt to dispose of the alleged reasons for dealing differently with earned and with unearned incomes. We think this may fairly be considered the best part of the book. The argument is that the

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distinction implies that some property is obtained by people in proportion to their deserts, whilst other property is not. Lord Hugh replies that all property is distributed in accordance with economic laws which have nothing to do with ethical considerations, so that there is no necessary connection between any sort of income and the desert of the person who gets it. Moreover, Lord Hugh says, if it were possible to determine people's deserts it would be absurd to suppose that the State could do this effectively, and it would be a dangerous principle to tax people in proportion to their moral demerit. With the greater part of this we agree entirely. The ethical notion of desert is in itself thoroughly obscure, and it would be absurd to base a system of taxation on it. Nor is Lord Hugh beating the air with his arguments here, for there is a great deal of loose talk about the deserving poor and the undeserving rich on political platforms. At the same time we do not think that Lord Hugh has completely settled the question.

We have said that desert is an obscure ethical notion of little worth. By this we mean that the idea that there is a right reward for every person in proportion to his virtue is not one that survives analysis. Nevertheless it is easy and important to follow the steps by which people come to hold that a man who works for his living deserves more than one who does not. It is assumed that all labor is in itself unpleasant, that no one would work unless he were obliged. On the other hand, the results of work are often socially valuable. Thus the man who works does what he dislikes, and by so doing produces what is good for himself and for others. It is only a step from this to regarding the man who works as one who disinterestedly sacrifices his present desires for the good of others and for his own future. Such a man exhibits the virtues of benevolence and prudence. A landlord, on the other hand, makes no sacrifices in letting his land. There is nothing intrinsically unpleasant in receiving rent or interest. And there are no public advantages

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that spring directly from the fact that landlords exist and charge a rent for land. If nobody worked, everybody would starve, but if nobody charged rent or interest, nobody but landlords and capitalists would be a penny the worse. Hence if people ought to be rewarded in proportion to their virtue, it is argued that those who work ought to be more largely rewarded than landlords, since they have a greater claim in respect of self-sacrifice to public ends.

This, I think, would be the popular argument. It is not stated by Lord Hugh, and it will be worth while to examine it. It is a fallacy to argue that because the worker does what he dislikes and other people largely benefit, therefore he exhibits the virtue of benevolence or unselfishness. For this to be true it would be necessary to add that the worker's motive in doing what he dislikes is a desire for the good of others. And this is false. A man who works in a coal mine does what he dislikes because he wants money, just as a landlord lets his land because he wants money. So that at most the virtue of prudence alone can be attributed to him, and of course a landlord can exercise prudence in letting his land.

But there is another line of argument possible. It is true on the whole that the poorer a man is, the greater the increase of happiness produced by the same absolute increase of wealth; hence it may fairly be held that the removal of some part of their goods from the rich in proportion to their wealth and their distribution among the poor in proportion to their poverty would tend to result in a happier general state. And, as on the whole landlords and capitalists are wealthier than workmen, this would mean a removal of wealth from the former to the latter class.

But there are several points to be noted in connection with this. In the first place, all explicit connection between the origin of income and its taxation has been dropped. The landlord here is taxed not because his income comes from land, and the worker is rewarded not

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because he works. If workmen were on the whole rich and landlords poor, the former ought to be taxed for the benefit of the latter on this theory. Next it might be the case that the existing amount of wealth is not great enough much to improve the position of the poor even at great expense to the rich, or that the effect of such a redistribution would be so to decrease the production of wealth that the latter end of the society would be worse than the first. These, of course, are questions of fact for the economist to decide. Again, it is worth while to note that the psychological fact on which this system of taxation is based would make it stop far short of equality of income. As the poor grew richer, there would be a rapid approximation to a state in which the increase of happiness obtained by giving them more, did not balance the decreases in happiness entailed on the rich. Each increment of wealth to the original poor would give a smaller increase of happiness, and each decrement from the original rich would give a greater decrease in happiness.

Finally, there remains Lord Hugh's ethical argument against any such redistribution. This argument seems to rest on the distinction between perfect and imperfect obligations. Justice is a perfect obligation and benevolence is not; the State ought to force us to fulfill perfect obligations, but our performance of imperfect ones rests between ourselves and our God. Now the claims of the poor because of their need are not claims of justice, but on our benevolence. It is sinful of us as private individuals to neglect them, but the State has no right to force us to accede to them. This is illustrated by an appeal to the Parable of the Good Samaritan. What virtue, we are asked, would it have been in the Samaritan if he had robbed the priest and the Levite to help the victim? And what should we say of the victim if, on recovering, he had forcibly obtained money from the two? We may agree that the Samaritan would not have been benevolent nor have made the priest and the Levite benev-

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olent, and that the victim would have been a thief. But what of this?

Let us take the two suggestions in turn. We will grant that benevolence is a valuable state of mind even apart from its effects, and that it is essential that a gift should be voluntary for it to count as an instance of benevolence. Still at least one part of the worth of benevolence lies in its results. If we can get the results and the benevolence, well and good; but this is no reason for refusing to have the results if we cannot get the benevolence, provided that in obtaining them we do not do more harm than good. But, it will be answered, the latter is just the difficulty, and Lord Hugh means to suggest that the action of the State in making non-benevolent people give some of their money to the poor is like that of the Samaritan or the victim robbing the priest and the Levite.

Now what precisely is meant by saying that a State robs its citizens? To rob a person means to take away from him without his consent property that he is legally or morally entitled to keep. Now it is clear that a citizen is not legally entitled to any property but what the laws of his State allow him. Hence a State which takes away money by law from its citizens cannot be committing legal robbery. On the other hand, Lord Hugh admits that ethically these people ought to have given some of their money away; hence they cannot be considered morally entitled to that fraction which they ought to have given in charity. So that it is difficult to see that the State is morally a robber either when it removes this fraction. To maintain his position then, Lord Hugh must hold that it can never be right for anyone to take away from a person what it is wrong for the latter to keep, no matter how good the results. Frankly this seems to us to be absurd even with regard to private individuals and doubly so with regard to the State. How would Lord Hugh justify the removal of a revolver from a lunatic who had bought and paid for it?

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But we may agree that it is nearly always wrong for private individuals to attempt a redistribution of wealth by force, even with the best of motives, and yet deny this of the State. The reason why it is wrong for private individuals to do this is that security of life and property against capricious attack is so valuable as to outweigh the slight good that private individuals could produce by sporadic attempts at redistribution. Moreover, it is rarely possible for the State to discover people's real motives, and the majority of private individuals who try forcibly to redistribute property have certainly not the general good in view. Hence the only effectual way of keeping the latter in order is to suppress *all* forcible redistribution by private persons. It is clear that these arguments do not apply in the same way to the State provided it acts continuously and not too quickly.

There is more point, however, in the analogy of the victim himself making the attack. It is perfectly possible that the poorer classes who have the greatest voting power might make an unreasonable demand on the pockets of the rich and enforce it through the machinery of the State. But this has no bearing on the general question of whether it is right for the poor to take anything from the rich by legal methods. It seems to us that it is perfectly justifiable if and so far as the general welfare is increased by the process. That a temptation will arise to carry it further is regrettable but not directly relevant.

Let us now consider the present position of our argument. We started to discuss the view that workers deserve a greater reward than landlords, and we found that, if this means that the former are as such more virtuous than the latter, it is fallacious. On the other hand, we have concluded that it is ethically justifiable to tax the rich in proportion to their riches in order to relieve the poor in proportion to their poverty, provided it cannot be shown that a collateral effect of any such scheme must be so to decrease the available dividend as to allow of no

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effectual improvement. But nothing that we have said has justified a difference from Lord Hugh's opinion that no reason can be found for distinguishing incomes for purposes of taxation in accordance with their origin. To the further discussion of this last point we now turn.

Lord Hugh deals easily and effectually with the commonplaces on which the claim of the community to a large share in the increment in the value of land is generally based. If land owes its value to the wants of persons other than its owners, so does everything else. If it owes it to the supply being limited, nothing has economic value which exists in unlimited quantities. Indeed we do not know how any answer can be made to the objection (which Lord Hugh does not mention) that, if the increment in the value of urban land due to the activities of the townsfolk be owed to them by urban landlords, the decrement in the value of agricultural land due to the abandonment of agriculture is owed by the departing rustics to the rural landlords. Yet it seems hardly likely that nearly everyone should distinguish between earned and unearned income, and that so many people should think that the State has a special claim to some share in the latter if there were absolutely nothing in the distinction or the claim.

Putting aside all questions of desert, we can, as Lord Hugh admits, distinguish earned from unearned incomes. We will take his definitions. An earned income is one which a man gets by lending his exertions, and an unearned income is one which he gets by lending his possessions. Now does this difference provide a rational ground for treating the two sorts of income differently?

First of all we must notice that, although land and labor are both necessary to the production of value, yet the worker contributes in two ways whilst the landlord only contributes in one. The only contribution of the landlord is that he forgoes his right to keep his land idle. But the value of the land itself due to its physical properties or its situation is a quality of the land and not

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of the landlord. Now the worker is comparable both to the landlord and to the land. Like the landlord, he allows what he owns (*viz.*, his skill and strength) to be used; but he is unlike the landlord and like the land in that what is lent is a quality of himself. A worker in fact is like a live field that lets itself be ploughed and sown for a consideration. It follows from this that workers are essential to the production of value but landlords are not. If all workers disappeared, the economic factor of labor would vanish, but if all landlords disappeared, the economic factor of land would remain.

Now consider what results from this. In the first place, an artificial reduction in the rent of land will not in the end involve any reduction in the amount of wealth produced, for no landlord will refuse to let his land as long as he can get some profit by it. On the other hand, an artificial increase in wages or salaries will tend on the whole to an increased production of wealth. For in the first place, it will make for the bodily and mental efficiency of the workers and so increase the productivity of their labor. Moreover, the concomitant decrease in the rewards of landowning and increase in the rewards of labor will tend to make people desert the economically worthless occupation of receiving rent for the economically valuable one of exercising their natural abilities. But certain points must be noted.

(1) It might seem that the same arguments would apply to capital as to land. In a measure they do, but there is an important difference. The beauty of an artificial reduction of rent is that it does not decrease the supply of land offered, since everyone prefers less rent to no rent, and land cannot leave the country. But capital can leave the country and be invested abroad, and an artificial reduction of interest is liable to have this effect. (2) So far under the reward of labor both wages and salaries have been included. But it is clear that many salaries are so high that no increase in them would materially affect the efficiency of the persons who draw

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them. So it is expedient that most of the wealth taken from the landowners should be expended for the benefit of the poor, who are, of course, mainly handworkers. Yet, even with this qualification, there is a certain reason for treating persons in receipt of fairly large salaries more favorably than landowners of the same income. There is a presupposition that a man who can command a large salary is in some way particularly efficient; there is no such presupposition in the case of a man who can command a high rent. Now a salary may well be big enough to keep a man in complete efficiency, and yet too small for it to be prudent for him to have a large family. Yet it is just the people who can command such salaries who are on the whole eugenically desirable. Further, a salary depends on a man's health and dies with him, whilst rent does not. Hence a salary is not actually equivalent to the same income drawn from land or investments. (3) The money drawn from the landowners might be so injudiciously distributed among the workers that their increased efficiency is overbalanced by the decreased stimulus to work. But there is no need for such a bad distribution; and, in view of the poverty of most workers, the danger seems to us to have been greatly exaggerated. The earner of twenty-five shillings a week is not likely to relapse into idleness because he can ride cheaply to work in a municipal tramcar and can expect a pension at seventy.

So far our defense of the distinction between incomes from land and earned incomes has taken the line that the special taxation of the former tends to lessen the attractiveness of an economically worthless occupation without lessening the total production of wealth, whilst the judicious distribution of the money thus taken tends to increase the total productivity and the general welfare of the nation. There remains the question whether the community has any more special claim on the rent of land.

If it could be shown that the State as an organization

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renders a special service to landowners, it might seem fair that they should pay a special tax. The following argument may then seem plausible. A man's power to charge rent rests on the right guaranteed him by the State to prevent people from using his land unless he chooses. This power he could not himself enforce, and the State supports him if necessary with policemen and soldiers. It is, of course, perfectly true also that a man's power to charge wages or salary rests on the right guaranteed him by the State of not being forced to work by physical violence. But there remains a difference. Any man, if he chose, could effectually refuse to exert his powers by killing himself or resisting to the death those who wished to force him. But these means would be perfectly futile in the case of an owner of property. Thus the landlord or capitalist is in the end more dependent on the organized forces of the State for his rent or interest than is the worker for his wages or salary. It might seem fair therefore that property owners should pay more proportionally for the upkeep of those forces than the workers.

We think this argument is fallacious. Either private property in land makes for the general good or not. If so, it will be true that it is necessary for the general welfare that one class should benefit more from certain State institutions than do other classes. This is no reason why that class should be specially taxed, just as the fact that the poor mainly benefit from old age pensions is no reason why they should be specially taxed. The only justification for the special benefits is that they best subserve the general welfare, and the general welfare again must be the deciding factor in determining what class (if any) shall be specially taxed for those benefits. The State is not a shop where classes buy special benefits and pay for them proportionally in taxes; it is an institution for maximizing general welfare, where the amount taken from each class and the services rendered to it are alike determined by what will produce the best result on the

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whole. If, on the other hand, private property in land be not in the long run economically defensible, a wise State will gradually abolish it, and it might do this by differential taxation. But it must then defend its differentiation, not on some special claim for services rendered, but on its belief that this is the best way of abolishing a bad institution.

In fact, the only argument in favor of the view that each class ought to pay in taxation for the special benefits that it receives, is that a large poor class may vote for measures that benefit itself but at such loss to other classes that the net result is a present or ultimate decrease in the national welfare. This is perfectly possible. The rich often took too much from the poor when they had the power, and there is little reason to suppose that the poor will be more moderate when they are masters. But so far we have not met with any sensible solution of this difficulty. Certainly the suggestion of taxing the poor to provide for their own benefits is absurd. Unless the benefits greatly exceed the tax, they are not worth having; whilst if they greatly exceed the tax, the latter will fail in its object. Moreover, any tax at present must be accepted by the poor at the polls. If, then, it be feared that the poor will refuse to keep their legislative demands on the rich within proper limits, how can it be hoped that they will accept a tax on themselves with the object of compelling them to do this? We must leave this most serious difficulty, and, with it, the subject of property and taxation, to wiser heads than ours.

We will close the paper with a few words on Lord Hugh's views on foreign relations. It will be remembered that Imperialism is the third element in Modern Conservatism. Lord Hugh applauds Liberals for maintaining that 'reasons of State' are no reasons; but he holds that some of them have carried this valid opinion so far as to teach that it is never right for one State to treat another in a way in which it would be wrong for one individual to treat another. This opinion he consid-

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ers fallacious. The government in its dealings with other governments is in the position of a trustee to the citizens of its State, and it is not right for a trustee to be unselfish with other people's interests.

This theory is ingenious, but matters are not really so simple as it represents them to be. In the first place, in a democratic State the citizens are supposed to appoint their government and to call it to account from time to time. Thus it is better to compare a government to a person who has been given a power of attorney than to a trustee. And this is relevant to the ethical difficulty which we must now mention. If it be wrong to act selfishly, you cannot escape any blame by deputing somebody else to do your selfish acts for you. Hence the nation whose government tries to secure for it advantages regardless of what is best for humanity as a whole cannot escape its responsibility by saying that it has given its government a power of attorney and that the latter has only done its duty in that position. If this exonerates the government as private individuals, it only does so by condemning the citizens who authorized them to do what was morally wrong for the interests of their clients. We suppose that Lord Hugh would reply by referring to the difference between perfect and imperfect obligations. A trustee must never regard himself as authorized to ignore perfect obligations like justice on behalf of his client, but he not only may but must ignore imperfect ones like benevolence. But this does not really affect the question. There is no doubt that Lord Hugh holds that people ought to fulfill their own imperfect obligations as well as perfect ones. Hence they cannot free themselves by breaking imperfect obligations by proxy and pointing out that their representatives would have broken a perfect obligation to their clients if they had acted otherwise.

At this point we must bid farewell to Lord Hugh's book; but we hope that enough has been said to show that it abounds with interesting and ingenious if often very questionable matter.

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THE PRACTICAL TENDENCIES OF BERGSONISM.

ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY.

II.

IN the former part of this study we began an attempt to distinguish those elements in M. Bergson's teaching which suggest ethical consequences, and to observe how, by some of his disciples, though never quite explicitly by himself, those consequences have actually been drawn out. The general method of a Bergsonian ethics,—a method sanctioned by M. Bergson's own words,—would consist, as we have seen, in regarding the "intuition of pure duration" as not only the means to metaphysical insight, but also the highest and most valuable form of human experience. We found, however, that several different, and for the most part incongruous, accounts are given of the nature of this intuition; and that, consequently, as many types of ethical tendency may be expected to be generated, or at least reënforced, by Bergsonism, as there are distinct versions of the character of the intuitional experience. Four such versions we have already noted: two, and those more significant than any thus far considered, remain to be examined.

(5) The most celebrated and perhaps the most nearly novel teaching of Bergson,—next to the doctrine of the "indivisibility of duration," with which it is entirely incompatible,—is that of the "creative" character of the evolutionary process. This, though it has, in Bergson's most widely read book the appearance of being a scientific generalization based upon biological evidence, ultimately rests upon another,—yet nominally the same,—supposed intuition of that mysterious inner essence of our psychic existence to which this philosopher is forever trying to recall us. The conception of creative evo-

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lution depends upon an identification of all that actually undergoes evolution with life, of life with consciousness, and of consciousness with that experience of the ineffable qualitative uniqueness of each moment as it comes, which was first insisted upon by Bergson in the concluding chapters of his first book. "Deep-seated psychic states," we were there told, "are radically heterogeneous to one another, and it is impossible that any two of them should be quite alike, since they are two different moments of a life-story." It is for this reason that (I quote now from "Creative Evolution") "consciousness is essentially free, indeed, is freedom itself." For the life and action of the conscious being in the *present* is always, at least in some degree, unbound by the past. Doubtless the conventional law of causality is absolutely true; given the same conditions, you will always have the same effects. But in the case of consciousness the same conditions never are given twice over. Time is essentially "inventive."

This insight, to be sure, we are repeatedly told, is to be gained only by abandoning all the modes of thought which have reference to action; and it would therefore seem to have no pertinency to practical problems. Moreover, the original argument for the reality of this freedom implied that one moment of a conscious being's existence is no more free than another; so that "creation" is not an ideal but a fact, a power which we possess and need not choose. But we must for the time being try to forget both of these considerations. The secret of happiness in Bergsonism lies in knowing just when to ignore the parts of the doctrine which it is temporarily inopportune to remember. If, then, the idea of "time as inventive" be applied to the case of one who is choosing a course of action, it is evident that he is ever face to face with unprecedented situations; and that he can accordingly never rely wholly upon teachings drawn from past situations to guide him in the present. Some bold creative stroke must be attempted. And,—according to

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this account of the "intuition,"—it is in those crises of experience in which the will confronts the yet indeterminate future in full consciousness of the uniqueness of the present, and by its own act of freedom gives reality to some new and original form of being,—it is in such crises that we apprehend most intimately and profoundly the essential nature of life, and experience its highest worth. But the "intellect" is wholly alien to this creative function. For "the intellect is always seeking to reconstitute, and to reconstitute with materials already given. It, therefore, lets what is new in each moment of history escape. It does not admit the unforeseeable. It rejects all creation. . . . It will always neglect the element of novelty in the free act and always substitute for action itself an artificial imitation, a mere approximation to action, obtained by compounding the old with the old, the same with the same."

It is this conception (taken together with the general anti-intellectualism of Bergson) which constitutes the principal point of affinity between his doctrine and that social philosophy of revolutionary syndicalism which has been formulated chiefly by M. Georges Sorel. The relation is one rather of affinity than dependence. M. Sorel is a peculiarly original and idiosyncratic mind; if (in his syndicalist phase) he could be called a disciple of anyone, it would, I suppose, be rather of Marx than of Bergson. Syndicalist socialism, indeed, as an active working-class movement, M. Sorel appears to regard, for curiously Marxian reasons, as the parent rather than the child of Bergsonism. For one of the two legacies from the author of "Das Kapital" which he most cherishes is the economic interpretation of history; and he is insatiable in the application of this universal solvent to all classes of historic phenomena. Philosophic and scientific movements must, then, like all else, be regarded as consequences of industrial conditions or economic theories prevailing at the time of their origination. Thus Darwin's natural-selection hypothesis is the result of

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the glorification of unrestricted competition by the *laissez-faire* economics; the adoption of Lamarckianism by the American geologist Cope (one of our writers more famous in other countries than in his own) is a reflection in biological terms of "the life of a people in which every man who has a genuine determination to succeed finds favorable conditions for rising in the world." Bergson's philosophy too, then, must have its economic explanation; and the explanation is that it translates into rather queer pseudo-biological language "the revolutionary dispositions of to-day,"—which "are at once free and stable because they arise from the deep consciousness of persons who make no pretensions of raising themselves above the condition of the people. It is precisely of this freedom that the philosophy of M. Bergson treats."[1] In the opinion of the syndicalist writer, therefore, M. Bergson, while he is a "genius who comes to teach his contemporaries to put their ideas in order," is important rather as a sociologist *sans le savoir,* than as a metaphysician or biologist. His work would have gained immensely in clearness and directness if he had dealt with the evolution of human industry directly. His arguments are "terribly obscure" until you put them back into economic terms. But when his philosophy is taken as an interpretation of "the great social movements which demand a large liberty," it proves "brilliantly illuminating."

It is not, however, any more necessary to look upon the Bergsonian philosophy as a product of syndicalism than upon syndicalism as a product of the Bergsonian philosophy. The two, no doubt, are merely children of the same *Zeitgeist.* Some kinship in spirit, at all events, they undeniably manifest; and it is clear that M. Sorel gained from Bergson's writings much encouragement in certain tendencies to which he was already inclined.

[1] I quote from Sorel's series of articles on "L'évolution créatrice" in *Le Mouvement Socialiste,* 1907-8. The passage above, Vol. XXII, p. 270.

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With some of the elements of Bergsonism which we have hitherto noted here, M. Sorel assuredly has never felt any sympathy. In his ethical temper,—so far at least as the life of the individual is concerned,—he has always been essentially a rigorist; he can have little taste for M. Chide's god Proteus or M. Bazaillas's languishing æstheticism. The gospel of syndicalism, as preached by him, is eminently a Gospel of Work. The part of the industrial process in which he is interested is not distribution but production,—and production not as a mere means to consumption, but as an activity good in itself. His chief concern has been for the development in the working-class of a genuine *morale des producteurs.* "He has had," as M. Guy-Grand has said, "no other aim than to maintain or to arouse in the proletariat the feeling of right, of dignity, of the respect due to labor, to love, to the family." On the matter of sexual ethics he has uttered what to many French revolutionaries must appear a hard saying: "Society will become more just only in the measure in which it becomes more chaste. I think there is no truth more certain than this." It is Proudhon, among his socialistic predecessors, who is closest akin to Sorel in moral feeling.

No mere 'mobilism' then, but the conception of the freedom and discontinuity of those creative acts by which the world is made new: this it is which, first and foremost, the philosopher of syndicalism finds congenial in Bergson's teaching. He, too, so far as he is a Bergsonian philosopher, has endeavored to recapture through intuition the essence of *le moi profond,* "to look within and discover what it is that exists at the bottom of our consciousness"; and he too has assumed that by a return to this fundamental form of consciousness the supremely valuable mode of human experience is to be gained. And that one, out of Bergson's many, ways of describing the nature of intuition, which was adopted by Sorel, is summed up in the following passage of "Les données immédiates de la conscience":

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[We reach the deeper self] by apprehending our inner states as living things, incessantly in process of formation, as states refractory to all measurement. . . . But the moments in which we thus resume possession of ourselves are rare, and it is for this reason that we are but rarely free. Ordinarily we live outside ourselves, we perceive only the colorless phantom of our true Self; . . . we *are acted* rather than act ourselves. To act freely is to resume possession of oneself, to put oneself back into pure duration. . . . [To understand what this means we must] carry ourselves back in thought to those moments of our lives when we made some grave decision, moments of a unique kind, which will never be repeated, any more than the past phases of a nation's life will ever come back again. . . . If our action [in such a moment] was pronounced by us to be free, it was because the relation of this action to the state from which it issued could not be expressed by any law. There could here be no question of foreseeing the act beforehand, or of reasoning about the possibility of the contrary action, once the deed is done.[2]

To gain the saving intuition, then, means, for Sorel, to experience this sort of liberty; and we experience it "when we make an effort to create within ourselves a new man, by breaking the historical framework which shuts us in."

Such is the version of the Bergsonian intuition in which the philosopher of syndicalism found reënforcement of his conviction,—reached primarily, I am sure, on quite other grounds, grounds of political and economic experience,—that the hackneyed catch-word of many of the social democrats, and of the moderates of all schools, —"evolution, not revolution,"—needs to be exactly reversed. We must not try to build the society of the future out of the beggarly elements of old institutions. Only in a radical break with the past can there be salvation. For it is, on good Bergsonian principles, "an absurdity to propose to calculate the future by means of the supposed tendencies of the past." What the past has left of external, finished products which can be used as tools for future use, we do well, indeed, to conserve. Sorel here converts Bergson's favorite antithesis of matter and life into the economic contrast between machines

[2] Bergson, "Données immédiates," 7th ed., p. 178; cited in part by Sorel, "Réflexions sur la violence," 3d ed., p. 72.

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and products, on the one hand, and the process of production, on the other. Machinery, past inventions, including therein works of artistic genius,—these are dead, though by no means valueless. Materialized in definite form, they may be kept for the service to which they can be put. But the life of a people is not a ready-made thing, but a creative process; and what is at the heart of this process, its controlling factor (here comes in again the Marxian element) is the organization of economic production. This, then, and with it the entire social life and moral spirit of the people, must be wholly renewed. And in attempting this task of fresh creation, we must not try to infer what can be and what ought to be from what has been. Men must

> off-cast
> Their moorings from the habitable past,
> And venture chartless on the sea
> Of storm-engendering liberty.

It has already been made evident that the syndicalist theory is, in great part, an original and paradoxical synthesis of Marxian and Bergsonian ideas. This combination appears in one of its most curious phases in the form of a conjunction of the Marxian doctrine of the necessity for maintaining a proletarian class-consciousness and class-struggle, with the Bergsonian anti-intellectualism. The real enemies of the working-class, as portrayed by the syndicalist, are not so much the capitalists as the 'intellectuals'; the writers in *Le Mouvement Socialiste* seem, as a rule, to shrink with greater aversion from a professor than from a plutocrat. "My only originality," M. Sorel somewhat too modestly observes, "consists in having maintained that the proletariat can free itself without needing to have recourse to the *professionels bourgeois de l'intelligence.*" His great concern has been "to put the proletariat on guard against the invasion of the ideas and the *moeurs*" of the class which is its enemy, "to free the common people from the

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superstition du livre.'' For the 'producing class' is still relatively uncorrupted by intelligence; it retains much of that 'spontaneity,' that freshness and purity of instinct, that capacity for actually *making* things, and that incapacity for talking about them, which constitute the true values of existence. The fault with the *bourgeoisie* is less that it is greedy than that it is denaturalized by being intellectualized. Its whole habit of mind is profoundly vitiated by certain 'conventional lies' of modern culture, —lies which, for the most part, have hitherto been seriously opposed only by the religious defenders of supernaturalism, by such protestants against the ''illusion of rationalism'' as Pascal and Newman, with whom M. Sorel has from the first manifested a lively sympathy.[3] For three centuries the educated classes have been learning the cult of positive science; but ''this science, of the marvellous achievements of which the *bourgeoisie* is wont to boast, has no such certainty as those who live by the professional exploitation of science would have people suppose.'' The syndicalist, therefore, must devote himself to ''ruining the prestige of bourgeois culture,'' and to establishing a sort of spiritual quarantine about the common people to save them from the infection of academic ideas and ideals.

This, of course, constitutes the radical difference between the program of social democracy (whether orthodox or revisionist) and the program of syndicalism; it explains why, in its method, syndicalism substitutes 'direct' for political action, and why, in its aim, it substitutes a loose federation of local groups of workers for the highly organized bureaucracy of the Socialist State.

[3] It is interesting to observe that Sorel likes to dwell upon the affinities between these writers and Bergson. ''More than one point of connection,'' he remarks, ''might be established between Bergson and Pascal'' (''Les illusions du progrès,'' p. 51). ''No one can read Newman without being struck by the analogies between his thought and that of Bergson. Those who like to connect the history of ideas with ethnological considerations will not fail to notice that Newman was of Jewish descent'' (''Réflexions sur la violence,'' p. 45).

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Social democracy has always sought to benefit the oppressed classes by distributing to all more or less uniform slices of bourgeois culture, well-being, and leisure. Its method for bringing this about has been to segregate the leaders of the proletariat and send them to sit in parliament side by side with the leaders of bourgeois democracy. Not only has the method been a failure,—because those leaders through this association have always acquired bourgeois ideas, tastes, and ambitions, and eventually, in one fashion or another, have betrayed the cause they represented; but, even if this had not been the case, the end pursued would have been a bad one. Accordingly, M. Sorel,—himself a person eminently professorial in type,—has put forth many books, thick-fringed with foot notes, and crowded with remarkably various learning and ingenious argument, to preserve the proletariat from a debauching contact with culture.

It is the same purpose which explains Sorel's defense of 'violence.' The attempts of benevolent reformers to bring about social pacification, the slow but constant yielding of one position after another by the prosperous classes,—partly through fear, partly through a sentimental humanitarianism,—these are tendencies which seem to the syndicalist wholly ominous. They might conceivably end in an almost complete surrender by the propertied class of their present economic advantages; but that consummation, so realized, would be a disaster. For it would mean that, in the process, the two classes had been more and more brought together in coöperative effort, had little by little been merged in one another, under the softening influence of sympathy and good nature. But the effect of this would be that the distinctive virtues of the proletariat,—or at least the virtues potentially distinctive of a proletariat,—would be lost; the people would be corrupted and enervated by bourgeois vices and, what are worse, bourgeois ideals. The hidden treasure of moral force which the working-class unconsciously carries with it is the great hope of the future;

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and this would be melted away under the warmth of an era of good feeling. Violence, therefore,—by which Sorel chiefly means strikes,—must be resorted to, in order to check the tendency of the *bourgeoisie,* to kill the proletarian spirit by kindness:

> Not only can proletarian violence render certain the future revolution, but it also seems the only means now at the disposal of the European nations, brutalized by humanitarianism, for recovering their former energy. This violence forces capitalism to occupy itself exclusively with its material concerns and tends to restore to it those bellicose qualities which it formerly possessed. . . . The danger which threatens the future of the world may be escaped if the proletariat . . . succeeds, through violence, in consolidating once more the division of society into classes. . . . Such violence is perhaps not the most effective means for obtaining immediate material benefits; but it can save the world from barbarism.[4]

In such a class struggle the motive will not be, as it is in the minds of many social democrats, envy of the rich; it will simply be the determination of the proletariat to maintain its distinctive character and separate existence. To do this it needs a good enemy to fight; and, for the sake of all concerned, it must not allow its enemy, through a weak complaisance, to cease to act as an enemy should.

But the most original contribution of Sorel to the theory of syndicalist agitation is the doctrine of the necessity for providing the popular mind with a 'myth,' if it is to be stirred to revolutionary and creative action. This too is formulated in Bergsonian categories. For the first step in 'creation' consists in fashioning the image of "a wholly artificial world, projected into the future, and to be formed by movements which depend on us." "Thus," adds the syndicalist philosopher, "our [Bergsonian] liberty becomes perfectly intelligible." Now, in order that the masses of the people may become creatively impassioned, they must have put before them a vivid, concrete, pictorial, comparatively definite representation of a future event which touches them all profoundly and is entirely within their comprehension. Ex-

[4] "Réflexions sur la violence," pp. 120, 130.

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amples of the efficacy of such myths are to be seen in Jewish messianism and in the millennial expectations of the early Christians.[5] The 'social myth' which syndicalism offers to the masses of to-day is the project of a general strike. Only,—and here Bergsonian intuitionism comes opportunely to syndicalism's aid,—argument concerning the practicability of a general strike, or concerning its probable outcome, is rigorously forbidden. "When one places oneself on the ground of myths, one is beyond the reach of all refutation. The fact has led many to say that socialism is a sort of religion. And, in fact, it has long since been noted that religious convictions are independent of criticism. From this some have supposed that it is possible to draw the conclusion that all which professes to be above science is a religion. . . . But Bergson has shown us that it is not religion alone which occupies the region of the deeper consciousness; the revolutionary myths have their place there by the same title. The arguments of Yves Guyot against socialism, regarded as a religion, seem to me to rest upon an imperfect knowledge of the new psychology."[6] At times M. Sorel seems to mean by this appeal to the 'deeper consciousness' merely that the general strike will be one of those unprecedented creative acts, the possibilities and consequences of which can never be fully determined beforehand by considering merely the ways in which things have happened in the past. But he more particularly connects this detail of the syndicalistic scheme with another aspect of Bergson's philosophy, namely, with the doctrine of the "interpenetration and fusion" of the moments of real duration. It would indeed, Sorel observed, "be difficult to cite many other examples which could so perfectly exhibit the value of the doctrines of the celebrated professor." For in the state of mind of a working man dreaming of the general strike we have realized

[5] In early Christianity, M. Sorel has a peculiar interest. It (as he conceives it) served him for a model for much in the syndicalist propaganda.

[6] "Réflexions sur la violence," p. 49.

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that instantaneous co-presence and interpenetration of diverse elements which is the essence of 'duration.' It is a method of presenting the socialist ideal which has all the advantages that a "*total* knowledge, according to the teaching of Bergson, has, in contrast with analysis." It sums up and fuses in an indivisible moment of present consciousness all the dearest memories of the past of the working-class. For "strikes have engendered in the proletariat its noblest, its deepest, its most potent feelings; and so the idea of the general strike, bringing all these feelings together in one, gives to each its maximum of intensity. Appealing to the poignant memories of past individual conflicts, it infuses with an intense vitality all the details of the present complex of consciousness. We thus gain that intuition of socialism which language can never give us in an altogether clear form; and we gain it in an instantaneously perceived whole. It is the perfect knowledge of the Bergsonian philosophy."

Unhappily, however, for his myth, the founder of the syndicalist philosophy was not wholly rid of intellectuality; and it seems pretty apparent, between the lines, that he has seen as clearly as any old-school socialist that the first and most certain result of a real and persistent general strike would be that a great many people would starve, and that the proletariat would probably starve first. Consequently many passages imply that the social myth is merely a beneficent illusion, a vision of something which can never happen. Myths, he says, are not "descriptions of things, but expressions of volitions." They are not 'utopias'; for "a utopia is comparable to an observed reality," and a myth is not. The imaginary world which the myth pictures is "placed in a future which has no determinate date in chronology; such a world may be regarded as being outside of time; it therefore in fact corresponds to the noumenon,"—the supersensible, non-temporal realm of being which still lingered as a last residuum of Platonism in the philosophy

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of Kant. The expectations of the Jewish prophets and the early Christians, Sorel is fond of pointing out, were never, and could never have been, literally realized; the myths, the glowing pictures of that which was to be, which gave form to those expectations were none the less efficacious. Without its inextinguishable messianic anticipation, the Jewish race would scarcely have been that prodigy of history which it has been; without the belief that, before all who had heard the Master speak should taste of death, the tribes of the earth should see the Son of Man coming on the clouds of heaven with power and great glory, and sending forth his angels with a great sound of a trumpet to gather his elect from the four winds,—without this belief early Christianity could never have appealed as it did to the generation among whom it was first disseminated. Sorel neglects, however, to add that these hopes were not viewed as 'myths' by those who accepted them and were not preached by prophets who disbelieved their own prophecies. It appears dubious if Christian chiliasm would have greatly flourished if propagated by teachers who avowedly regarded their teaching merely as a useful fiction, and looked upon the tremendous descriptions of the Lord's reappearing as exciting images which probably would never be realized.

Such are the Bergsonian elements in the philosophy which lies behind the movement of revolutionary syndicalism, as it has been set forth by its first and most original representative. These ideas, however, apparently no longer make up the philosophy of M. Sorel himself. Though new editions of his syndicalist writings continue to appear, it would seem that he is no longer a syndicalist. He has turned from the myth of the general strike to an older myth of singularly different character, that of the restoration of the Bourbons to their ancient throne. M. Sorel, in a word, is said to have become, within the last year or two, a royalist, and to be

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now serving as the editor of a legitimist newspaper.[7] The transformation, while striking, is less surprising than it might appear, and, indeed, was indicated as a likely outcome before it occurred, by a writer who has made a special study of the history of syndicalism. Neo-royalism and syndicalism have, after all, some very important things in common; a deep distrust of reason, a contempt for *bourgeois* democracy, a peculiar hatred for the catchwords, the ideas, and the aspirations characteristic of the eighteenth century and its great revolution, a yearning for some millennial age which is to be reached by a violent overturning of the present order, rather than by a patient, gradual improvement and readjustment of our existing institutions. And Sorel, whose liking, even while a syndicalist, for such opponents of rationalism as Pascal and Newman I have already remarked, doubtless finds in his new position a more congenial atmosphere than before for his sympathy with certain features of Catholic Christianity. The peculiarity of anti-intellectualism is that you cannot be sure where it will bring you out. What it leads you away from,—the sober austerities and the hard, slow achievements of the life of reason,—you know. But it is a road which soon forks, and there is at the turning no plain guide-post to point in the one direction rather than the other; all the clearly decipherable guide-posts have been left behind in the place you came from. And the one branch if followed to its extreme brings you to a position diametrically opposite to that which lies at the end of the other. Turn to the left, and you will finally find yourself led to an anti-rationalistic, irresponsible and sentimental radicalism; turn to the right, and you will find a still broader highway to an equally irresponsible reactionism. A broader highway, I say; for on the whole, experience

[7] I have not seen M. Sorel's latest writings (he has apparently published no new book within the past year), and can report this only at second hand. *Cf.* the remarks of M. Ernest Dimnet, *Atlantic Monthly*, Jan., 1913, p. 27, and Mr. H. Chisholm in *The Britannica Year-Book*, 1913, p. 19.

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seems to show that the tendency of anti-intellectualist movements to issue in traditionalism, in a revival of what had seemed beaten causes, is in the long run even stronger than their tendency to issue in an impatient zeal for revolutionary innovations. This was certainly shown to be the case in the eventual working out of the anti-intellectualism, the contempt for the commonplace and stubborn Understanding, of the Romanticists of the early nineteenth century. Romanticism, of course, had many and diverse results, good and bad; but the historic consequence which can with most certainty be ascribed to that large and vague but immensely important movement of thought, is the reinvigoration of certain old institutions and old faiths which in the eighteenth century had seemed about to disappear. Friedrich Schlegel's is the typical spiritual career of the *Romantiker*; and it was a career which, beginning with a conception of the Romantic ideal as that of constant incompletion and endless Becoming, closed in medievalism, in a glorification of 'the ages of faith,' and in a devout acceptance of the unchanging dogmas of Mother Church. When a man appeals from the understanding to intuition in ethical and religious matters, he is very likely to find that, at the end, his intuitive insight strangely coincides with the beliefs of his grandfathers. And there are many signs, of late,—M. Sorel's progress from syndicalism to royalism is not the only one,—which go to show that the neo-romanticism of Bergson, while it has developed both a right and a left wing, inclines more strongly to the right than to the left. Even M. Chide, whose glorification of the god Proteus has already been mentioned, and who might naturally be supposed to represent the extreme left of Bergsonism, also sees in Bergson's anti-intellectualism a vindication of the great Catholic apologists,—Loyola, Pascal, Bossuet, even Joseph De Maistre,—nay, even Tertullian. "These theologians," he observes, "were marvellously penetrated long before M. Bergson by the fact of universal fluidity, of the strange solidarities which knit

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all creatures together, of the possibility at every moment of a deviation from laws which have in them nothing fixed, nothing necessary." And M. Sorel, even when he was an aggressive revolutionary in his social doctrines, intimated that the new philosophy, in substituting a sort of cosmic indeterminism for the Cartesian mechanistic universe, had vindicated Pascal, whose grievance against Cartesianism was that it excluded God from the world (at least through its implications) by excluding miracle, —which (the phrase is M. Sorel's) "is a material experience of the divine presence." So Mrs. Hermann concludes her chapter on Bergson with the remark that "to believe in creative evolution is to believe in miracles." M. Bergson might appear to have excluded this last interpretation in advance by making 'matter' subject to rigid laws and introducing indetermination and the possibility of incomprehensible new modes of action only into the realm of life and consciousness. But I do not think it can be said that he has with any clearness and consistency precluded such applications of his philosophy of nature as those which, in the sentences quoted, Chide and Sorel have given. For the supposed relations of 'life' and 'matter' are, at best, left, in large measure, in extreme obscurity; meanwhile, it seems clear that 'life' is the primary and prepotent reality, and that it can to an undefined degree break through that incrustation of material rigidity which it has, at the same time, a strange propensity to form.

At all events, the most marked effect of the deep influence which Bergson's doctrine has had upon many Frenchmen of the younger generation,—not only through his books, but still earlier through his teaching at *École Normale*,—has, in the opinion of many observers, been to create an intellectual atmosphere in which, not, indeed, a staid conservatism, but emotional reactionisms of all sorts naturally flourish. Certainly,—at least to the alien looker-on,—a new mood seems of late, and rather suddenly, to have become dominant in the French mind.

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And there is undeniable plausibility in the view of those who hold that the vogue of Bergsonism in France has been one of the real causes of this resurgence of the reactionary temper, of the contempt for 'analysis' and the impatience at steady-going constructive efforts in political and social reform, which seem to be the ruling fashions of the day.

We have, however, *à propos* of the general anti-intellectualism which has played a part both in Sorel's syndicalism and in his abandonment of it, been led to digress somewhat from the theme which is just now more properly our concern, namely, the ethical tendencies to which the conception of creative evolution gives rise. It is not alone in the syndicalist agitation that this conception has produced practically significant effects. In vaguer and simpler forms it is affecting many minds of our time and suggesting, though it cannot be said strictly to necessitate, certain moral attitudes congenial to it. A metaphysical proposition, being ostensibly a description of reality and not a prescription of an ideal, does not directly imply an ethics; it leaves the question what we *ought* to do, among the things which the nature of the universe permits us to do, logically untouched. But for all that, men naturally incline to derive, from a strikingly drawn picture of what the world really is and what is going on therein, intimations of what it is best worth while for them to be about. And the ethical consequence which many are likely to derive from the Bergsonian doctrine of creative evolution alone is doubtless a vague belief in the intrinsic desirability of constant but sequential change, a sort of generalized progressivism. Thus a writer in one of our popular magazines [8] has described this philosophy in good American slang as the "deadly enemy of the stand-pat intellect in all its forms"; and he adds: "If I were interested in keeping churches, constitutions and customs fixed so that they would not

[8] Mr. Walter Lippmann, in *The American Magazine*, 1912.

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change, I should regard Bergson as the most dangerous man in the world. The spread of his teaching will put all institutions on the defensive." It is, however, a somewhat humorous commentary on this picture of M. Bergson as the arch-iconoclast, that the most methodical attempt thus far made to elaborate an ethical theory and a sociology, not merely upon Bergsonian principles, but upon this particular Bergsonian principle of creative evolution,—M. Joseph Wilbois's "Devoir et Durée,"—culminates in a defense of ultramontanism. M. Wilbois modestly professes to have attempted merely to apply the doctrine of "Creative Evolution" to the problems of society, to write a sort of continuation of that work in which the *élan vital* is traced through its later developments into an *élan humain* and an *élan moral*; his 'meta-sociology' is thus simply "a generalization, or a carrying out in detail, of the plan of Bergson." But the execution of this plan, though it gives us, by the way, a number of sound and sensible remarks on questions of ethics and of moral education, brings us at last to the conclusions that "in social matters, free examination is worse than a crime, it is an error of method," since it substitutes the analytic process of the intellect for the immediacy of intuition; that the intuitive experience of the Christian life is mediated through a supernatural society which must be hierarchically organized; that "the sole depository of the divine action" in this society, "is he who lives by the very rhythm of the Church, that is to say its central organ," the Pope; and that the faithful do well to hold their intellects off even from historical inquiries about the origin and development of dogmas, so little has "this evolution of formulas and of interpretations of them in the artificial time of the historians in common with the life of a society such as the Church." The case of M. Wilbois is one more piece of evidence of the fact that the preponderant, though by no means the only, result of the influence of Bergsonism upon contemporary society has been to give new courage to obscur-

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antism in all its forms and all its degrees. But we have not yet noted that version of the Bergsonian intuition,—the sixth and last of those we are to consider,—which is perhaps the most aptly fitted of all to serve this end.

(6) When M. Bergson consents to explain in more concrete terms what is meant by the intuitively verified proposition that real time is 'indivisible,' he frequently construes it as signifying the obliteration of the usual distinction between past and present. If moments 'interpenetrate,' then what are called past moments are not only as real, but also as truly present, as that limited fraction of the past which, because of the exigencies of action, we artificially single out as 'the present.' "To regard the past as non-existent is an illusion,—an illusion useful, and even needful, for the life of action, but dangerous in the highest degree for speculation."[9] Thus in the deeper self to which the intuitive experience enables us to penetrate, all our past is conserved without loss. Consciousness, in its true nature, is memory, and *perfect* memory. If, now, the implications of this version of the intuition are carried out, it follows that reality is after all a highly 'conservative system' (somewhat in the physicist's sense). Though there is always a small increment of novelty, the old vastly and increasingly preponderates over the new; the volume of the cosmic snowball (to use one of Bergson's favorite figures) is not chiefly composed of fresh snow. Take from this doctrine the cue for an ethical teaching, and you will get a 'conservative system' in something other than the physicist's sense. The Bergsonian intuition, in short, suggests even more naturally the view that the ideals and institutions of the past are sacred and unalterable, than the view that they are obsolete and negligible. It sanctions a generalized traditionalism still more characteristically than a generalized progressivism.[10]

[9] "La perception du changement," 1911, p. 30.

[10] I say "still more characteristically," because the theory of the imperishability, in 'real duration,' of the past is the premise from which

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This is one of the aspects of Bergsonism which appear especially to appeal to M. Edouard LeRoy, one of Bergson's most interesting disciples and expositors. M. LeRoy is,—or at all events was, before the promulgation of the papal encyclical *Pascendi gregis*,—a lay Roman Catholic theologian of modernist sympathies. His principal publication, before his book on Bergson, was a volume of connected essays, "Dogme et critique" (1907), in which he endeavored to use the distinction between intellection and action as a basis for a reconciliation of the claims of reason and those of ecclesiastical authority.[11] Of a religion without authoritative dogmas imposed upon the acceptance of the faithful, M. LeRoy was apparently unable to conceive; but he was also unable to conceive how any external authority could make a man's intelligence "regard an argument as sound which he finds to be feeble, or a conception as meaningful which to him is devoid of sense." The solution of the difficulty, then, must consist in giving to the dogmas of the church an exclusively moral and practical significance. The church has authority over action; and its dogmas must be accepted as true so far as they are pertinent to action. But they need not be accepted as intellectually true. By means of this semi-pragmatistic distinction, M. LeRoy was able to give to the doctrines which he specifically dis-

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the doctrine of the creative freedom of each present moment is inferred. The new moment is novel, and therefore free, precisely because it contains all the past, and something more; it constitutes as a whole a *sum* which never before existed. (Here, again, we must carefully forget part of Bergson's doctrine.) If, on the contrary, any of the past lapsed, one could not be sure that the new moment was not a repetition of a sum of content which had already been realized. A constant accumulation without loss is the one type of process in which mere repetition is absolutely precluded. But the more proper inference from this account of 'duration' would seem to be, not that the new moment is wholly novel in its content, but merely that by it a small measure of novelty is added to an incomparably greater mass of unchangeable content coming from the past.

[11] This book has been condemned by the ecclesiastical censorship. The condemnation has been accepted by the author in such a manner that the incident (says the author of the article 'Modernism' in *The Catholic Encyclopædia*) involves "no reflection on the catholicity of M. LeRoy."

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cussed,—those of the personality of God, of the resurrection, and of the real presence in the Eucharist,—a status scarcely less dubious and illusive than that which M. Sorel's 'social myths' finally assume.

If (which is dubious) there is any possible view which is not Bergsonian, this would appear to be such a view. For it radically separates intellect and action, upon the familiar plan of water-tight compartments in the mind; while Bergson defines 'intellect' as existing solely for the sake of action. It is not, at any rate, the conception for which M. LeRoy finds encouragement in Bergson's philosophy. It is rather for a deference to tradition, for a conviction of the importance of maintaining unbroken one's "historic continuity" with the past. He writes:

> To live is, indeed, according to the new philosophy, to be always creating something new; but 'new,' be it understood, in the sense of an augmentation and progression in relation to what has gone before. Life, in a word . . . is an ascent upon the path of increasing spiritualization. Such, at least, is its deep aspiration, the primary tendency which first produced and still animates it. . . . Does not this undeniable fact, when once recognized, awaken in us the surmise of an immanent law directing all the effort of life . . . operating, no doubt, by no fatal and mechanical necessity, but at each moment defining itself better and marking a direction of progress? . . . And thus, according to the new philosophy, all the past survives forever in us, and through us issues in action. . . . The law immanent in life is, as it were, a call for an unending transcendence of one's present self. Before this future, which lies beyond present experience, whence shall we draw the strength to inspire us? Is there not room to ask whether there have not already appeared here and there in the course of history intuitions which illumine for us with a prophetic light the obscure road of the future? Here would be the point of insertion of the religious problem in the new philosophy.[12]

Of the philosophy of religion which M. LeRoy regards as properly following from this aspect of the philosophy of real duration he gives only a hint; but it would seem, from the passage quoted, to be one which would emphasize not merely the importance of continuity in moral and religious evolution, but also the value of tradition,

[12] Une philosophie nouvelle: Henri Bergson, 1912; English translation by V. Benson, 1913.

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and would readily find room for a doctrine of the irreversibility of already formulated dogmas. It would thus be a philosophy favorable to the general religious position which M. LeRoy had previously taken, and an especially suitable Bergsonian basis for the thorough-going ultramontanism of M. Wilbois.

Such appear to be the practical tendencies of 'the new philosophy' which have thus far manifested themselves.[13] To impute to M. Bergson himself all the consequences which his disciples have educed from his teaching would, of course, be unjust, especially in view of the fact that some of these disciples have not so much learned their ethical opinions from him as found in his philosophy a convenient armory of weapons for the defense of opinions already adopted. Yet for some part of these results M. Bergson clearly is responsible. He is responsible for the common assumption of these divergent doctrines, that the chief end of man is to experience the "intuition of real duration." He is responsible for defining that intuition in ways so obscure, so various and so contradictory that the most incongruous interpretations of its nature may equally claim the sanction of his words. He is responsible for the pervasive irrationalism which runs through all these interpretations. It is true that he has himself protested that it is not that he loves the intellect less but intuition more, that he has no practical hostility to the temper and methods of science. These protests give evidence of a creditable striving to attain philosophic catholicity and to be all things to all men. In their more extreme expressions they contradict, but they do not effectually alter, the prevailing tendency of his teaching; anti-intellectualism is, as we saw at the beginning of these studies, logically too deep-seated in his philosophy, and the craving

[13] Through lack of space I am prevented from discussing the curious account of the theological implications of his metaphysics which M. Bergson gives in his much talked about letters to Father de Tonquédec ("Études par des Pères de la Compagnie de Jesus," 130, p. 515.)

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for some mystically direct and ineffable access to the heart of things apparently is too irrepressible in his temperament, to be dispelled by a few constrained contradictions. He is one of those teachers,—teachers always assured of an enthusiastic welcome,—who offer, not a disciplinary regimen, but a wonder-working nostrum, to an eager and impatient generation

> Crying aloud for an opiate boon,
> To comfort the human want,
> From the bosom of magical skies.

It is, of course, true that the abstraction to which Bergson vaguely refers as 'the intellect,' is neither the whole of human life nor the sole source of human values. That it is not, is no new discovery; mankind, and even philosophers, did not need to await our age to learn that concepts are not identical with the things conceived nor thinking about life the same as living it. Among our contemporaries, it was not the author of "Creative Evolution" who gave vivacious expression to this truism in the remark that "reality is not an unearthly ballet of bloodless categories." It is, however, possible for most people to acknowledge all this without supposing that reason, or even the 'analytic understanding,' by their very natures falsify reality and are excluded from the type of human experience which is of highest worth. But both these implications are patent in the Bergsonian doctrine of the superiority of intuition. His anti-intellectualism (it is well to repeat) is wholly different in temper from that of pragmatism. This essentially sentimental intuitionism, with its depreciation of 'the life of action,' and the pragmatic voluntarism, are antipodal in spirit and in practical tendency.

Finally, it is the philosophy of M. Bergson himself and not merely that of his disciples, which must be considered responsible for that backward-turning habit of thought which so ill agrees with the conception of 'creative evolution.' That conception seems to me to have value both

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as a cosmological hypothesis and as the hint of a moral ideal and a religious interpretation of life. M. Bergson was in no sense the originator of it, but he has given it greatly increased currency. He has, however, combined it with another conception which robs it of nearly all value and meaning; namely, with the conception of the deepest insight and the greatest good as consisting in a "return to the immediate,"—in all those strange performances described by terms beginning with *re,*—to which his pages constantly invite us. In this (as in certain other respects which I have elsewhere pointed out) his doctrine is profoundly at war with itself; but the side of it which appears to me to be dominant and chiefly characteristic is its negative and retrogressive side. In the appealing name of 'creative evolution' we are practically invited to go back to the primitive, to lapse into a 'self' which is 'deeper' precisely because it is rudimentary and sub-rational, to return to the rock of the pit whence we were digged. But this is hardly the direction in which a genuinely temporalistic moralist should be expected to face. The 'immediate,'—at least the sort of immediate from which we have emerged,—should, to such a moralist, seem precisely the part of our life which it is most imperative for us to transcend. One of our English poets has understood far better than Bergson the relative place and value which a truly evolutionary and humanistic philosophy should assign to 'the immediate' and to 'the intellect.' To George Meredith, too, life is unceasing becoming, and men the children of an ever-travailing Mother; but to these her chosen she has given

> brain, her prize of gifts,
> Sky of the senses! on which height,
> Not disconnected, yet released,
> They see how spirit comes to light,
> Through conquest of the inner beast,
> Which Measure tames to movement sane . . .
> Never is earth misread by brain:
> That is the welling of her, there
> The mirror. . . .

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Her children of the laboring brain,
These are the champions of the race,
True parents, and the sole humane,
With understanding for their base.

ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY.
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ENGLISH DIVORCE LAW AND THE REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION.

HELEN BOSANQUET.

THAT English law in relation to Divorce stands in need of amendment is very generally admitted. It has grown up haphazard, in the interest of the ruling classes, and bears no relation to the needs of the people at large. Until 1857 a decree of divorce could only be obtained by a lengthy process, culminating in a private act of Parliament, and costing from £500 to £600. In 1857 the jurisdiction previously exercised by the Ecclesiastical Court was transferred, and is now exercised by the High Court of Justice in the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division. The causes for which divorce is granted are briefly: to the husband on the ground of adultery on the part of the wife; to the wife on the ground of aggravated adultery, or adultery coupled with cruelty or with desertion for two years and upwards on the part of the husband.

On three main points all members of the Commission which has recently reported were agreed. The first is, that the form of procedure necessary to obtain a divorce still tells very heavily,—almost prohibitively,—against the poor. Cases can be tried only before the High Court sitting in London, and that at a cost which makes it practically impossible for the great majority of people. The average minimum cost of an undefended case from London is stated to be about £40 to £45, and considerably higher if from the country; while the cost of an ordinary

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class of defended case varies from £70 to £500. It is open to those whose income is not above thirty-two shillings weekly to sue *in forma pauperis,* but the procedure is difficult and very few such cases are heard. The Commissioners came to the conclusion that beyond all doubt the present means of administering the law are such as to place it beyond the reach of the poor. It is clear that if divorce is allowed at all, a grave injustice is done by withholding it from the reach of those to whom, owing to their straitened circumstances, the need for relief may be the greatest. It ought not to be regarded as a luxury in which the rich may indulge, but which the poor must forego. Recommendations are therefore made in the Report for utilizing local courts with a simplified form of procedure.

The second important point upon which all the Commissioners were agreed is, that there should be equality of the sexes before the law. This has long been the case in Scottish law, where the wife can sue for a divorce on the ground of her husband's adultery, apart from any additional cruelty or desertion, and if successful, is at once entitled to the same share of his estate as if he were dead. In his evidence the Scottish Judge, Lord Salvesen, said: "I think our law conduces very much to the morality of husbands and to the peace of families." The great majority of witnesses were agreed in favor of equality, but there were some who took the view that an act of adultery on the part of the husband might be considered as more or less 'accidental.' On the other hand, the evidence was very strong that such 'accidental' acts might be fraught with most serious danger to the health of wife and children; and the Commissioners,—rightly as it seems to us,—considered that while they "do not overlook the arguments founded on physiological considerations, and the different consequences of immorality in one case or the other," these arguments are outweighed by other considerations. They recommend, therefore, that "whatever grounds are permitted to a

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husband for obtaining a divorce from his wife, the same grounds shall be available for a wife in a suit against her husband."

On one more point of first importance the Commissioners were agreed, and that is as to the harm done by the present system of reporting divorce cases in detail. In this matter they had to weigh the deterrent effects of publicity against the injury to public morality, and their recommendations seem well adapted to secure the desired ends. They are briefly: that the judge hearing a case should be expressly empowered to close the court for the whole or part of a case, or to order that portions of the proceedings should not be reported or published; that there should be no publication of a report of a case till after the case is finished; and that pictorial representation of parties concerned should be absolutely prohibited. There seems little doubt that if effect is given to these recommendations there will be a wholesome check to the morbid curiosity to which the daily press now panders.

We have now to deal with that part of the Report as to which the Commissioners were not agreed: the majority desiring to extend the grounds for which divorce might be granted; the minority desiring to restrict them to those already accepted. And, first, we must point out that in considering whether or no any new causes for divorce should be allowed, it is important to remember that in England, since 1895, a considerable amount of relief has been possible by way of "separation and maintenance orders." There is no doubt that the injustice of the Divorce Law in respect of the poor has been greatly alleviated by means of these orders, which serve as a protection against the worse forms of ill-treatment between man and wife. These orders may be granted by a magistrate in favor of a wife on the grounds of assault, desertion, persistent cruelty, or wilful neglect to provide maintenance on the part of the husband; and they may provide that the wife is no longer bound to cohabit with her husband, that she has legal custody of the children under

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sixteen, and that the husband shall pay for maintenance a sum not exceeding £2 per week. Further, either husband or wife may apply if the other is an habitual drunkard, and obtain a similar order, with the addition that the wife (if she is the offending party) may, with her own consent, be committed to an Inebriates' Home. Separation under these orders is permanent unless and until the parties concerned become reconciled; *i. e.,* they remain man and wife, debarred from contracting another marriage, but able when they will to resume the normal relations of man and wife together.

It is here that the parting of the ways between the two sections of the Commission begins. The majority recommend that the courts of summary jurisdiction should not have power to make orders for permanent separation, but only for two years; and that, if a permanent order should be necessary, the case should be referred to a superior court for a judicial separation or a divorce. As permanent judicial separation is subsequently condemned, this means that divorce is recommended for all cases where separation for more than two years would be granted.

In dealing with this point it would seem that the majority have hardly done justice to the evidence before them. On their own showing a very large proportion of the persons separated by such orders become reconciled afterwards. We are not told how many of these reconciliations took place after a period of two years; but we agree with the minority that "the decisive reason why the attempt to class separation orders with decrees for divorce and permanent judicial separation is misconceived is that the former are not in fact permanent at all. They come to an end *ipso facto* whenever the parties choose to reunite, and the evidence has made it overwhelmingly clear that these orders in most cases remain in force for a short time only."

The reason for which the majority desire to limit separation as above is, that they consider it conduces to im-

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morality, the parties concerned being driven to irregular unions because they are not free to marry again. The evidence on this point is very conflicting. Many witnesses think that separation orders lead to bad results. On the other hand, the clerks to justices throughout England and Wales, being asked whether there is reason to suppose that the orders lead to immorality, reply in the negative to the number of one hundred and four out of one hundred and forty-one. It is clear that the risk of irregular connections must be weighed against the risk of placing any obstacle in the way of reconciliations. The separation order is invaluable as a means of protection to the injured party; but that protection being granted, the opportunity should be left open as long as possible for the reunion which experience shows to be so frequent. The suggestion that the parties come together again largely because of the increased cost of living separately, carries with it the further implication that the respondent, upon whose application the divorce is to be considered, will not really be placed by it in a position to marry again, since he will still be responsible for the maintenance of his divorced wife. It is noteworthy that one of the signatories to the Report, Mrs. Tennant, is opposed to this leniency to the respondent; while another, Mr. J. A. Spender, would increase it by giving him or her the *right* to a decree of divorce after the lapse of three years from the decree of separation.

The above recommendations for making separation orders introductory to divorce involve the further proposals for extending the ground upon which divorce should be granted. It is here that we come to the most delicate and debatable part of the task laid upon the Commissioners. For the minority the matter was simple; guided by the one principle that marriage is indissoluble except in the case of adultery they had nothing to do but to reject any extension. But the majority laid down for themselves two principles which are much more difficult of application.

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In considering what law should be laid down in the best interests of the whole community, the State should be guided by two principles: (1) No law should be so harsh as to lead to its common disregard. (2) No law should be so lax as to lessen the regard for the sanctity of marriage (p. 95).

It appears to us that those who allow the vague fear of possible injury to morality to exclude all other considerations, act in conflict with the first principle. The alternative is to recognize human needs, that divorce is not a disease, but a remedy for a disease, that homes are not broken up by a court, but by causes to which we have already sufficiently referred, and that the law should be such as would give relief where serious causes intervene, which are generally or properly recognized as leading to the break-up of married life. If a reasonable law, based upon human needs, be adopted, we think that the standard of morality will be raised and regard for the sanctity of marriage increased (p. 96).

Guided by these considerations the majority proceed to consider what additional causes should be accepted as grounds for divorce. The first of these is *wilful desertion,* without the consent or against the will of the other party, and without reasonable ground, for a period of three years. "The main reason for introducing this cause as a ground of divorce is that wilful desertion, persisted in, breaks up a home even more than an act of adultery. . . . An unfortunate woman with a large family is left practically in the position of indigent widowhood until her husband dies, and even then she may not be able legally to prove his death." The instance is unfortunately chosen. The cases in which a poor woman with a large family is able to find another man to undertake her responsibilities (unless she has first provided for the children in charitable institutions) are few and far between; while maintenance can be enforced upon the deserting husband just as well under a separation order as under divorce. The economic argument is really beside the mark, and rightly so. Few women would desire a divorce for the sake of bettering their positions if there were not graver reasons behind.

Cruelty is already a ground for judicial separation; *i. e.,* the injured party can obtain protection. The majority consider that divorce is the proper remedy. Cruelty they would define as "such conduct by one mar-

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ried person to the other party to the marriage as makes it unsafe, having regard to the risk of life, limb, or health, bodily or mental, for the latter to continue to live with the former." Nothing is said about the cruelty of either parent to the children; it is conceivable that this might be construed as indirect cruelty to the other parent, but there are few mothers who would not prefer to suffer themselves rather than to see their children suffer.

In introducing *incurable insanity* as a ground for divorce, new ground is broken. The reason assigned for including this disease and not others is that "the incurably insane have usually to be removed from their own homes, and are confined and isolated in an asylum or recognized establishment, and anything approaching family life is impossible." The full recommendation is that the insanity which should form the ground of divorce should be certified as incurable, that the insane spouse should have been continuously confined for not less than five years, and should be, if a woman, not over fifty years, and if a man not over sixty years.

We think it necessary to note that this recommendation is in the face of strong evidence to the contrary. It is true that of twenty medical witnesses asked there was a majority in favor, twelve as against eight; but of the eleven who were specialists in mental disease only four were in favor and seven were against. On this point we quote from the Report of the minority:

> The great majority of experts on mental disease who gave evidence were very decidedly opposed to the proposal to make insanity a ground of divorce. This majority included four commissioners in lunacy, the Lord Chancellor's Visitor and a specialist of quite unique authority on this subject, Sir George Savage. His evidence is well summed up in his final answer: "There is no doubt of the individual hardship, and that I have felt. I entered upon it with a feeling, and I must say, rather in favor of the divorce, but the more I have considered the individual reports from these people, and the more I have considered my own forty years' experience, I cannot help thinking that there is not ground enough to justify the alteration." We cannot admit that evidence of this character should be brushed aside as it is in the majority report on the singular ground that witnesses such as commissioners in lunacy and medical officers in asylums "would

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object to any enactment which might prejudice in any way the welfare and comfort of those under their charge.'' That is extremely probable, but we may be permitted to add that they are also the best judges of what would be ''prejudicial to the comfort and welfare of those under their care.'' We are bound, therefore, to accept their verdict that the adoption of this proposal would retard the recovery of the curable, painfully aggravate the lot of many of the incurable, and even help to upset the balance of some who, without being insane, are liable to become so. Without at all underrating cases of individual hardship to the sane partners, we cannot recommend a remedy for them which would be thus crudely callous to all others consequences (p. 182).

The next recommendation is to raise Habitual Drunkenness, which is already a ground for a separation order, into a ground for divorce. It is noteworthy that this recommendation is coupled with conditions aimed at the reformation of the drunkard.

In our opinion, an order of separation, on the ground of habitual drunkenness, should still be possible, so that immediate relief may be afforded to the sober spouse; but such an order should be granted on definite conditions, and should be of a temporary character only. No separation order should be granted unless the applicant can satisfy a court of summary jurisdiction that such proper means as were at his or her command have been used to bring about the reform of the drunken spouse, and that the habitual drunkenness has not been brought about by the applicant. No separation order should be granted by such court for a longer period than two years. During the currency of such order, the court making the order should have the power to compel the inebriate to submit himself or herself to treatment or control on the lines recommended by the Departmental Committee on the Inebriates' Act in 1908. The means used by the court would range from a compulsory pledge of abstinence to guardianship or compulsory commital to an institution.

No court, we hope, would do anything so futile as to administer the pledge to a confirmed drunkard; so that in practice the means to be employed for reformation will be restricted to compulsory confinement in an institution. This would no doubt be desirable, but we fear it will seldom be resorted to, partly because of the reluctance of magistrates to proceed to such an extreme measure, and partly because of the difficulty of finding suitable accommodation for the offenders. If after three years there is no reasonable hope of a cure, then upon

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application the High Court is to be entitled to grant a decree of judicial separation or of divorce; if the case is not hopeless, the court is to have power to continue the order.

We note that Mrs. Tennant dissents from the recommendation that habitual drunkenness should be a cause of Divorce, on the ground that this trouble is one "in which the sober partner can and ought to help at the early stages especially, in a very great degree, and that there should be no incentive, in these stages, to abandon the victim to his or her declension."

Finally, it is recommended that *imprisonment under commuted death sentence* should be a ground for divorce, for the curious reason that but for the commutation of the sentence there would, in fact, have been a dissolution of the marriage tie; and that such imprisonment is for life, with reductions on account of good behavior, etc. A study of the figures given shows that these reductions are very considerable, and there seems no sufficient reason for differentiating between terms of imprisonment of this type and others. Here again the Commission have consulted expert evidence, only to brush it aside. A circular was addressed to twenty-seven persons with experience of convict prisons; of these three gave no opinion, seven were in favor of a long sentence being a ground of divorce, and seventeen were against it. It was attempted to discredit the opinion of the seventeen on the ground that eight of them were chaplains, but even this bold measure leaves a majority of expert evidence in the negative. In addition, "the evidence of the Lord Chief Justice was strongly adverse to making imprisonment, in any case, a ground of divorce." On the other hand, Mr. J. A. Spender, one of the signatories, would make all sentences of five years and upwards a ground of divorce. He gives no reason for this severe addition to the penalty already imposed upon the prisoner; the probable result would be to diminish the length of sentences.

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Such, then, is the main gist of the Reports. The reader is impressed throughout by the difficulty of the task which the majority set themselves in introducing a number of changes based upon no clearer ground than that of expediency in face of very conflicting opinions as to what in each case *is* expedient. But they intensified the inherent difficulty greatly by the almost cynical attitude which they adopted with reference to the marriage vows: "When two persons enter into the married relationship, they may reasonably be supposed to contemplate the continuance of that relationship during their joint lives with the objects to which we have already referred, and with the risks of the ordinary vicissitudes, changes, and troubles of life which everyone has to expect, and which fall within the reasonable meaning of the expression 'for better, for worse' " (p. 100). Such a construction of the solemn oath of fidelity, restricting it to "ordinary vicissitudes, changes, and troubles," is absolutely barred by the concluding words 'until death do us part.' As well might the soldier construe his oath as binding only so long as he was not exposed to serious danger. The marriage vows cannot be evaded by putting a false construction on them; the only question is, shall the parties concerned be allowed to break them, and, if so, under what conditions?

It is not, of course, necessary that this vow should be taken before entering into the married state; it can be omitted in civil marriage, and it is for the State to determine what construction it places upon the contract made under its laws. But for those who choose to take upon themselves the greater responsibility, it must be recognized that in asking to be freed from it, they are acknowledging their failure to keep their vows. It may be expedient that in certain cases they should be freed, but it is only confusing the issue to represent the vows as not extending to those cases. The fact remains, and no legislation can change it, that loyalty which is prepared to brave everything is on a different level from loyalty which

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is prepared to brave only the "ordinary vicissitudes, changes, and troubles of life"; and in legalizing dissolution and remarriage on grounds of expediency, a State is really legalizing a second order of marriage. Some may call it a higher order, some a lower; but it is no longer permanent marriage, and does not stand on the same footing morally as permanent marriage.

The attempt to devise a satisfactory form of temporary marriage introduces at once the difficulty of deciding what are to be sufficient causes of dissolution. There is, to use a hackneyed phrase, no finality about it. As we have seen, some of the causes accepted by the majority seem less weighty than others omitted by them; indeed they are not entirely agreed amongst themselves. This is not a fatal objection; but it does, we think, involve the necessity of periodical revision, as opinion changes as to what constitutes cruelty, drunkenness, and so on. The cruelty of to-day would have been almost disregarded a few generations ago; and we seem to be led to the conclusion that in proportion as we become more refined and sensitive we shall,—as a community,—become less faithful to our comrades and our responsibilities. The gentler will expel the sterner virtues, and we shall live more and more for the pleasure and convenience of the moment.

There is another consideration which seems to tend to the same conclusion. It is sometimes argued that marriage is only a contract like any other, and that like any other, therefore, it should be dissoluble if both parties desire it, or if its obligations are not fulfilled. But the analogy does not hold. The essence of marriage as an institution is that it binds pleasures with responsibilities, and so raises the merely sensuous into the spiritual. Further, in this particular contract it is nearly always the case that the most obvious pleasures come first, while the most difficult responsibilities outlast them,—at any rate in the case of the husband. (The most *obvious* pleasures, for the deepest joy of married life comes

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only to those who have tested its powers through prolonged fidelity.)

Now what the extreme advocate of divorce asks is, that having taken all the pleasure and profit to be got out of the contract, he should abandon its responsibilities. His plea is: "I cannot fulfill my pledge,—it is too difficult for me." Were this all, it would be met by separation, but he asks more. He says: "Let me try again; condone my failure, give me absolution from my vows, and another opportunity on the same terms." The difficulty in granting his request is clearly that what he is asking for *may* be,—not an opportunity for doing better, but only another opportunity for gratification without responsibility.

We are not going beyond the mark in saying that this is what some desire. Very respectable witnesses before the Commission thought that there should be "divorce by mutual consent"; that it would be an "admirable thing" if marriage could be put an end to by the consent of the parties; that "if a man cease to desire his wife, or if he desire another woman," he should be entitled to apply for divorce; that "nothing but love should hold two together in this most sacred of all bonds." It is hard to see how these views are consistent with a desire for marriage at all. The casual connections which are desired can be made at will; and why should the State be expected to recognize them only in order to dissolve them again whenever the wandering inclinations of the persons concerned fasten upon a new object? Marriage is an institution involving responsibilities which they clearly do not intend to accept; they had better therefore let it alone.

We recognize, however, that such cases are on a very different footing from those contemplated by the Commissioners. For the most part (though not in dealing with the respondents under separation orders), they have had in mind cases of great suffering and hardship, the endurance of which cannot in their view be expected from

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ordinary humanity. We do not consider it an argument against their recommendations that divorce would be thereby increased. There would be no reason for making the proposed changes, if no one were to avail themselves of the greater facilities. If there is a demand for a grade of marriage which is not permanent, it is arguable that it is better to recognize it, than to leave the way free for the promulgation of 'advanced' views under cover of 'hard cases.' But it is a wise saying that hard cases make bad law; and the legislator will have to move very carefully if he is not to cause more suffering than he relieves.

HELEN BOSANQUET.

OXSHOTT, ENGLAND.

THE ETHICS OF INDUSTRY.

J. DASHIELL STOOPS.

IN primitive society the moral elements of experience were as immediately present in carrying on the processes of labor and industry as they were in the processes of education and religion. That the Nazarites among the early Hebrews, of whom Samson was one, took a vow to sow no seed, to drink no wine, to build no houses, but to live in tents, shows that the methods of industry in the earlier nomadic period were inseparable from current moral and religious ideals. Later on, when the old nomadic life had given place to agriculture, this new economic process was just as essentially religious and moral as the old nomadic ideal. As a proof of this we need only refer to the fact that an ordinary citizen, Naboth by name, could hold his family estate, "the inheritance of his fathers," even against the desires of the king (I Kings 21 : 3). The primitive nomadic, and the later agricultural, method of life was therefore an inseparable aspect of a certain moral and religious view

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of life and of the world. And the more highly developed society shown in the ancient city, the best examples of which are the Greek and Roman city-states, shows us an ideal of conduct in which industrial processes were a part of the ruling moral and religious theory of life. The processes of nature, growth, birth, disease, death, the seasons, the wind, the tides were one and all manifestations of divine powers. There was accordingly no way of separating the religious and moral aspects of experience from the industrial processes.

But the separation of morality from industry came nevertheless. Development reveals differentiation, and the differentiation of morals from industry came about in a perfectly natural way. Greek philosophical materialism explained the processes of nature as due to material atoms acting according to purely mechanical laws. And, apart from this explicit materialism, the development of the scientific spirit led to the conception of the objective world of nature as an order governed by mechanical laws. A physical world controlled by 'mechanical' law came to be distinguished from the mental world of human experience; in this way the world of will-values, or the moral world, was clearly separated from the world of natural processes, or the industrial world. Growth, disease, the seasons, spring time and harvest were no longer regarded as the inexplicable will of spiritual beings, but as natural facts and processes subject to human control, the degree of this control depending on the extent of scientific knowledge. At a certain stage of development the priest was a conspicuous and central figure. But with the growth of science, the world was more and more regarded as the field of exact forces and laws. In this way there grew up a separation of the secular and the religious: a part of life was given to business, to money-making, to labor; another part was devoted to religion, to faith in personal values.

Another development helped to bring about the differentiation of the moral from the industrial world. This

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was a change in the meaning of religion. Primitive religion concerned itself with the actual given world of men and of nature regarded as a living thing. Religion concerned itself with nature as a living thing and with the most dynamic phases of human life. But the centuries preceding and following the Christian era saw a profound change in the religious ideal. Religion ceased to concern itself with the world. A new attitude developed,—the attitude of world-denial. Religion,—and as much of morality as the religious experience implies,—retreated from the actual given world of labor and industry; it ceased to concern itself with the old interests which made valuable and moral the present system of things. Religion ceased to concern itself with flocks and grain and fruitful showers and the seasons, with the world of industry, and began to deal with inner, personal, virtues and sins.

In the older days sin could not have been personal; it could not have been limited to the inner will, to the attitude of mind. In the narratives of Samson and Naboth sin and virtue had to do with the way in which daily life-earning occupations were carried on. But with the transition to an ethics and a religion of world-denial, the deepest conscience of the whole Græco-Roman world was taken out of the present life altogether. The Pythagoreans, the Orphic cult, the Cynics, the Stoics, the Essenes, were all tinged with the new ethics of world-denial, strong evidences of which are seen even in Plato. The effect of this new ethics on the world of business, industry, commerce, and agriculture, was that this world, which in the old view had been permeated with moral and religious significance, became a purely secular world. From the passing of the old Hebrew, Greek, and Roman religions, clear down through the Middle Ages, there obtained this contrast of the secular world and the world of moral and religious ideals.

This separation of the world of religion and morals as an inner world from the world of industry and material

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things, was, however, possible only in theory. As a matter of fact monasticism accepted the institution of industry, but interpreted it as a discipline of the soul. The Holy Roman Empire, inherited the institutions of the old world-order, among which was the institution of property; even the Church, with its ethics of world-denial, had its great landed estates. The feudal system continued the institutions of property and industry, derived from the old pre-Christian régime, down to modern times. In this system full political rights belonged only to owners of land. These land-owners were the nobles, who were set off from the rest of their fellows by special proprietary privileges.

Against this system of inherited landed rights there grew up the modern doctrine of freedom of contract. But this freedom of contract was at first applied in a limited fashion only to a privileged property-owning class; indeed it is thought by some that our own Revolutionary fathers, who framed the constitution, had primarily in mind the protection of property as the fundamental purpose of law. As an example of the working of this doctrine of individual freedom, we have the recent celebrated court ruling that a law which limits the hours of labor in the interest of health is unconstitutional, on the ground that it is contrary to the principle of individual freedom of contract. Freedom so conceived is an abstraction, not a reality, for where the alternative is starvation or overwork, how is the individual free to choose? The individual will divorced from the social aspects of experience is an abstraction, a fiction. If wages are insufficient to support a family, how can the constitution make the individual who is not an ascetic free to contract for his wages? If wholesale prostitution is directly connected with low wages, in what sense is the individual free to enter an industrial contract? If steam and electricity have concentrated the materials of production in a few hands, if, in other words, the laborer can have practically no property, in what sense is he free to acquire an

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interest in the product of his labor? If he has no provision against sickness or old age, in what sense is the workman free or in what sense is there an industrial contract?

The new doctrine of freedom of contract, like other forms of modern freedom, had to grow by degrees. The freedom of the intellect, which began in the Renaissance; the freedom of conscience, which began in the Reformation; the freedom of scientific investigation, whose foundations were so securely laid in the seventeenth century; the political freedom, which produced a revolution in government in England, in America, and in France, this new freedom was thought of for centuries as a highly abstract thing and, therefore, in each case, took on a form of protest against established institutions, and was, accordingly, known as Individualism. The same is true of the development of the idea of freedom of contract in the world of industry. This new idea of industrial freedom, like the idea of political freedom, was at first interpreted in a wholly negative fashion. It meant the right of each one to get all the wealth he could, in any way that did not seem legally to interfere with a like freedom in others. This individualistic doctrine is not positively destructive in an agricultural régime where land is easily available; but where free land is no longer open and where steam and electric power have concentrated the processes of industry in the hands of a capitalist class, the new doctrine of freedom becomes the instrument of industrial oppression.

The divorce between ethics and industry which grew up in the transition from the primitive to the civilized stage of development, to which we have previously alluded, is strangely enough being reënacted to-day. A purely secular view of industry is expressed in the phrase, 'business is business.' Steam and electricity and the limited liability corporation have fostered a complex industrial organization whose immediate object is no longer a social exchange of value, but a definite profit on capital. In this

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way industry has become commercialized; labor has become standardized into pieces and hours,—it has become impersonal. The product of labor has become abstracted from an interested will, producing a false and artificial dualism of experience. What incentive to genuine creative activity can exist where the producer has no sense of ownership whatever in his product? The two chief occupations of primitive man were hunting and war; emotional color and instinctive interest were inseparable from such activities. There was no sharp distinction between work and play; indeed primitive labor,—hunting and fishing,—is modern sport. Play activities are devoid of such effort and strain as are experienced in work. Play is associated with the instincts, and all really great work is related to one's fundamental instincts. Civilization means labor, sustained attention, strain; hence the origin of a type of theology which conceives of heaven as an eternal rest. The expulsion of man from the Eden of his early life comes to signify the curse of labor. If routine deprives the laborer of enjoyment and interest, is not some sort of psychological reaction unavoidable? Strain must be offset by recreation; the emotional loss in the daily routine must be made good; this means a limit to the hours of labor. If industry is to make primarily for life and only secondarily for profit, then the individual is free to contract for his labor only under conditions that are in harmony with his nature and its needs. And human nature demands a family, education, religion, recreation, physical health, sickness and old age pensions, etc.

To separate the world of industry from the world of moral values is to take from the world of work,—where the normal individual spends practically his life,—the only touch of idealism without which industry becomes vulgar. This is the necessary moral result of separating the outer or physical world from the inner or mental world; indeed this modern distinction between material and moral values, true and helpful if rightly used, in

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actual practice often stands in the way of moral, social, and political progress. No matter what the metaphysical truth as to the reality of the material world may be, from the standpoint of practical life, Fichte is right in defining it as the material through which we may work out our duties in the world. Material things are goods; they have their value only in relation to human needs and desires. Food, health, clothing, property, are moral matters as well as physical matters.

Specialization in the world of trades and professions is in its essence a division of labor, for experience proves that one can produce more effectively by giving his time and energy to some one process. Individuals differ in their physical and mental characteristics so that specialization allows the best expression of individuality. This would seem to point to specialization as a means of social service. But specialization means that, instead of each individual producing largely what he consumes, as in primitive society, each one is producing for financial profit. Competition is the heart of the process; and more recently collectivistic methods have enabled specially competent individuals to build up trusts and monopolies. This union of collectivistic methods and individualistic ideals is the despair of modern industrial ethics. Not only have we not succeeded in devising laws to prevent the growth of overwhelming monopolies, but we have not even succeeded in socializing our business ideals. Laws can only formulate public opinion. We are in need of an ethical awakening in business ideals such as we are now passing through in political ideals. We must outgrow our individualistic ideals in business and industry as we are fast outgrowing them in political theory. Specialization must come to mean social service as well as individual initiative. The social interpretation of religion will greatly aid in this development.

Specialization, from one point of view, means regularity of activity devoid of emotional interest. But such activity may mean that each individual is realizing the

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best that is in him. Civilized man must be a specialist; each can do best one line of work; this is self-expression. There is also a social phase of this matter, for social groups are formed according to interests held in common. Here is the basis of coöperation, which is a great gain. Furthermore, industrial education will enable the individual to discover his most efficient tendencies and capacities, and this will teach each one the related subjects so that there will be a social meaning in highly specialized work. From such a point of view specialization becomes a means of socialization as well as of differentiation. It is also possible for education to make the materials of the shop a means of teaching history, sociology, government, geology, geography, anthropology, art. Manual training can teach mathematics, domestic science can teach chemistry. Thus the narrowness of modern industrial specialization can be overcome, for wider areas of selfhood can be opened to view within the realm of one's daily occupation. This will give wider content to industry and new motive to education; it will give perspective to industry and interest to education, and will, accordingly, vitalize both industry and education.

Modern science has marvelously improved the technique of industry. It is said that the packing houses turn to profit every part of the pig but its squeal. This is as it should be; but there are other phases of industrial evolution, and they concern the laborer himself. The problems of drink, amusements, leisure hours, health, the family, industrial education, the instincts of coöperation and ownership, are only a few that might be mentioned. Are not these questions just as important in the solution of labor problems as those concerning the efficiency of machinery? The proprietor of the saloon or the dance hall is far ahead of the captain of industry in his knowledge of the psychology of the laborer, and his financial returns have not decreased on account of his applied psychology.

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Rauschenbusch is correct in saying that industry is our conspicuous unregenerate social institution. The spirit of our other important institutions is being rapidly transformed by a constructive social idealism: religion is fast outgrowing its classical individualistic form; the family is essentially a social institution; education has been thoroughly permeated with Christian idealism and the spirit of social service; the State is no longer an external force to compel obedience; even the individualistic theory of the State,—itself based on the notion of freedom,—is being rapidly outgrown in modern political theory. Industry alone is predominantly under the control of a ruthlessly competitive and immoral individualism. Our industrial theory and practice are in principle unchanged by the higher type of social ethics which comes from the teaching of Jesus. Profit for the individual in opposition to the social good is the immoral result of a false individualism. The individual must view his industrial life in the light of his relations to society. Industry can never be moral as long as it is individualistic; property, industry, land, taxes, the products of labor, must be viewed from the point of view of the community as well as from that of the individual. If, as Jane Addams points out, the community could organize and control its amusements and recreations, it would not only do away with the vicious aspects of commercialized amusements, but it would also give the community valuable experience in social control which might later secure gas, electricity, transportation, ice and pure milk, without the graft characteristic of private monopoly. When steel rails, defective because of haste in production, continue to cause death in railroad accidents; when the lives of workmen are lost because the introduction of a new invention will decrease profits; when cold-storage plants are used to raise the cost of food instead of lowering the cost, as they should do; when tariff-protected goods are sold abroad cheaper than at home; when a coal trust raises the price of coal while charity attempts to keep

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the poor from freezing; when public amusements are commercialized for private profit; when taxes on buildings keep the wage-earner from owning his home while vacant lots, whose enormous value is made by municipal growth, are held by individuals to reap the value which the community has created; when such things are the usual ways of business, is it any wonder that moral ideals seem rather hazy and vague? Is it any wonder that they are not so compelling in their influence on conduct as the more tangible percentage of business? In the light of such facts, do not our moral ideals seem rather empty and abstract?

Now this is not because we moderns are mostly hypocrites. It is because the crying moral defects of our age are of a social nature, because they concern our corporate life, while the moral and religious ideals that have ruled the West for two thousand years deal fundamentally with sins and virtues that are personal, private, individual. Some of the most conspicuous leaders in our industrial immoralities are equally conspicuous as representatives of the ethics and religion of the old individualistic type. These industrial sins are not sins of the heart and the will, sins of the inner life; they are not due to bad intentions and evil desires; they are due to the fact that an individualistic ethics has prevented us from regarding each self in his relations to his total social environment. If it is true that no individual can be understood except in and through his social relationships, then it is equally true that no individual can be moral save in and through these same social relationships.

According to the standards of the current individualistic type of morals, men like Washington, Jefferson, and Grant are definitely condemned; for the first swore outrageously, the second was skeptical of saving truth, and the third was reported to President Lincoln as intemperate in the use of whisky. Nevertheless our political ethics is so much more social than our industrial ethics that these three men stand out like beacon lights of pub-

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lic virtue! We condemn drunkenness far more than the manufacture of the whisky which leads to drunkenness; the one is clearly a private vice; the other is a questionable industrial process. Sexual vice is universally condemned, but the industrial conditions which grant young girls a wage of six or seven dollars per week and drive thousands to vice as a means of support are not so generally condemned. If one individual kills another individual, he is universally regarded as a murderer, but if a great corporation kills hundreds through defective steel rails, no one is seriously blamed.

When the Israelitish State passed into the hands of Babylon and Persia and Greece, the Hebrew prophet ceased to be the counsellor of kings. He hoped for divine interference because he had no control over the making of laws; hence the apocalypse of Daniel. When the early Christians found themselves in a similar condition in the Roman Empire, another apocalypse was put forth in the book of Revelations. We, on the other hand, are not under Babylon or the Roman Cæsars; our government is our own corporate will. Our public industrial and political order is no less an expression of our moral and religious life than the more individual phase of experience with which our traditional moral and religious life has concerned itself. This is not realized to-day because our moral ideals have been inherited from Judaism and early Christianity, which embody the ideals of a period when the industrial and political order, being in the power of an authority external to the moral will, was regarded as extraneous to the moral consciousness. The one order was within and was the result of moral choice; the other was from without and necessitated a wise yielding to force. But this individualistic type of ethics is now hopelessly inadequate because the laws of the State and of industry are no longer imposed upon us from without. They therefore must become the corporate expression of our moral life. In so far as industry and politics do not reflect our moral ideals, they will necessarily annul our

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personal and private morality,[1] for individual and public morality are but different aspects of one underlying moral life. The individual moral will does not function in a vacuum but only in a social medium.

Primitive social life and the old Hebrew, Greek, and Roman life, emphasized those virtues which were preeminently social in character. The religion, the family life, the state laws, the educational theory and practice of this period, worked harmoniously toward the building up of public life. China and Japan and India hold up before our view to-day this old social ideal as it existed in the West before the rise of the individualistic type of ethics which has ruled Western thought since the days of Socrates. We cannot go back to a type of ethics whose group ideals left no place for the development of the inner life of the individual. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the social foundations of conduct, because we have developed a sense of individuality of which ancient civilization was not aware. For two thousand years Western civilization has been developing and protecting the individual virtues. Socrates withstanding his city; Jeremiah preaching a spiritual, in the place of an hereditary Israel; St. Paul substituting the law of liberty for the law of his nation; Marcus Aurelius fighting as a Roman emperor, but telling us in his "Thoughts" that only the city of Zeus is real; Luther, Rousseau, Hume, Thomas Jefferson, William James, these are some of the names about which our greatest ethical battles have been fought; and every step gained is a precious possession of Western thought. Nevertheless, in the development of the individual, when reason and will lead to a newer sense of self, which fails to correlate itself with the deeper social aspects of experience, there results confusion, inefficiency, and maladjustment. And history teaches the same lesson in the moral evolution of the race.

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[1] This point is emphasized in Rauschenbusch's "Christianizing the Social Order."

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We have learned this lesson in the spheres of the family, of religion, and of education; many of us have learned it in the field of politics, but we have hardly faced the problem in the field of industry. The recent unprecedented moral awakening in the political field, however, has thrown the searchlight of moral vision over the field of industrial ethics also. One of two things must happen: either religion, the family, the school, and the State, will moralize our mammonized industry, or an immoral industry will demoralize them. Let us strive that in this family of institutions the majority of four to one shall rule!

J. Dashiell Stoops.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE VALUE AND DESTINY OF THE INDIVIDUAL. The Gifford Lectures for 1912, delivered in Edinburgh University. By Bernard Bosanquet, LL.D., D.C.L. London: Macmillan & Co., 1913. Pp. xviii, 331.

This volume is a continuation of "The Principle of Individuality and Value," which was reviewed in this JOURNAL in July, 1912. As in the case of that volume, it seems hardly necessary to give any summary of its contents. There is not only a very full analytical table of contents at the beginning and a serviceable index at the end, but also extensive abstracts of each of the lectures; and as the interest of the work lies mainly in the rich concrete material by which this outline is filled in, a mere synopsis of the line of argument would be practically worthless. It may be more to the purpose to try to give an account of the general aim of the undertaking. The present volume makes this a good deal clearer to me, and will probably do so to other readers as well, than it was when only the first series of lectures was accessible. The work is not to be taken primarily as a treatise on metaphysics, like "Appearance and Reality." The metaphysical position is to all intents assumed at the outset, and the object is rather to bring out the bearings of that position on the larger problems of human life. Dr. Bosanquet disclaims any attempt to furnish us with a Theodicée. He does not seek to justify the ways of God to man. One might almost say that what he gives us is rather an Anthropodicée,—a justification of the ways of man to God. In other words, he seeks to show how the main facts of human life lead to the practical recognition of the Absolute. His treatise might be regarded as an application of Goethe's maxim:

> Willst du ins Unendliche schreiten?
> Geh' nur im Endlichen nach allen Seiten.

And certainly he does carry this out very fully. His general contention is that all the larger aspects of human life can only be properly interpreted from the point of view of self-transcendence; and that the effort after such self-transcendence finds

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its only ultimate satisfaction in self-identification with the whole.

It is obvious that such a contention has the utmost interest from the point of view of ethics. What is commonly called idealistic ethics has generally insisted strongly, under the influence of Green, on the conception of self-realization. Dr. Bosanquet does not really object to this; but it is his aim rather to urge that the realization of the self involves the complete transcendence of its narrow individuality (which, of course, Green also held). It is from this point of view that all the leading problems of life are here dealt with; and the reader who has once grasped this fundamental conception will have little difficulty in following and appreciating its application in detail.

The problems that are dealt with in the present volume are, to a large extent, those that are commonly summed up by means of the terms, God, Freedom, and Immortality; but the way in which these conceptions are regarded is very different from that which might be expected by any reader who has not placed himself at the central point of view. The question about God, for instance, is not whether God exists, or how God should properly be conceived, but rather what is the part that the conception of God plays in the emancipation of man from his narrow self-centered existence. And it is in a similar way that the other problems are discussed. A few words on the treatment of each of these problems may perhaps be useful.

For the right understanding of Dr. Bosanquet's references to the conception of God, it is necessary to bear in mind that he distinguishes between God (as the object of religious devotion) and the Absolute, which many philosophers have identified with God (see p. 249). God is to be regarded as an imaginative presentation of the Absolute, and consequently as containing only a limited 'degree of Reality.' It may be doubted whether this is quite satisfactory. No doubt, in all religions the object of devotion may be said to be something through which a certain self-transcendence is achieved; and in this sense it is suggested that even a dog may be religious (p. 236). But in the lower forms of religion it can hardly be said that the object of worship is to be identified with the Absolute at all; whereas in the higher religions it tends to become increasingly so identified; so that it may be doubted whether it is ultimately possible to draw any distinction between them. No doubt, in

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all religions the emphasis falls on emotion and action, rather than on knowledge; and hence it may be said that its object is, in general, not adequately apprehended. But I think Dr. Bosanquet would allow that a purely intellectual apprehension of such an object (if that means an apprehension in which the element of value is omitted) would also be inadequate. If this is allowed, the question suggests itself whether the Absolute is such as to be fitted to be the object of religious devotion. Some would be inclined to urge that for this purpose personality and goodness must be ascribed to it. Now Dr. Bosanquet, though he describes the Absolute as a perfect individual, is inclined to deny goodness and to ascribe to it (as Herbert Spencer did, but with fuller explanations than Spencer gave) perfection as transcending personality. The distinction between goodness and perfection is somewhat finely drawn; though no doubt it can easily be argued that *moral* goodness, at least in the narrower acceptation of the term, could hardly be ascribed to the Absolute. The exact meaning of the transcendence of personality seems also to require fuller treatment than is here given to it. But I suppose this is one of those metaphysical points on which it would not be quite fair to expect a full discussion in a work that is not primarily metaphysical.

The treatment of freedom is subtle and, I am inclined to think, adequate. It is dealt with under the heading, "The Miracle of Will" (Lecture IV); and the main contention may be regarded as an expansion of the saying of Goethe: "Man alone can perform the impossible: he distinguishes, chooses, and judges." Dr. Bosanquet recognizes, however, that man does at some points come up against what is genuinely impossible; and then he can only realize his freedom by the supreme miracle of placing himself at the standpoint of the whole. I doubt whether there is any treatment of the subject of freedom which more happily maintains the balance between the recognition of the conditions by which man is limited and the assertion of the infinite element in his nature by which he is enabled to transcend these limits. The recognition of this infinite element, however, naturally leads on to the consideration of immortality.

Many readers may be apt to think his treatment of this subject unsatisfactory. There has been a great revival of the doctrine of 'personal immortality' in recent times; and some of

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the upholders of this doctrine will be apt to regard his attitude towards it as unsympathetic. Yet he does not ignore it or even altogether set it aside. The truth rather is that, from Dr. Bosanquet's point of view, it is of only subordinate interest. What he seeks to urge is that the true realization of man is not to be found in the continuance of his narrow individuality, but in its transcendence. How far such transcendence involves the continuity of the finite self is a secondary question. The main thing is rather to see that there are many ways in which what is best in the life of the individual may be regarded as having a certain eternity and as persisting in time far beyond the limits of his physical existence. All that Dr. Bosanquet says on this subject is put extremely well and carries full conviction. He notices the doctrine of reincarnation, which many regard as the only tenable form of personal immortality; but on the whole he seems inclined to set it aside on the ground of the impossibility of showing any real sense in which identity can be established when there is no consciousness of it (p. 269). I suppose the supporters of the theory will not feel such an objection to be fatal. It may be urged that, even in the case of the normal life of the individual, certain periods are apt to become very largely dissociated from others, while yet their essential continuity may afterwards be seen. An old man sometimes recovers experiences of his youth which in middle life had been forgotten or disregarded. Some of the more philosophical supporters of the doctrine of reincarnation have thought that the relation between successive embodiments might be conceived in a similar way. But Dr. Bosanquet's main point, as I understand him, is that the continuity of individual lives is not fundamentally important. He quotes with approval the saying of Nettleship, that death 'does not count.'

I may now refer to what appears to me to be the most serious defect in Dr. Bosanquet's general view of life. In the review of his previous volume, I noted that it seemed difficult to give any satisfactory account of progress from his point of view, and ventured to hope that in the succeeding volume this difficulty might be met. To a certain extent I think it is met. The conception of the finite self as continually seeking self-transcendence and finding it more and more, does certainly involve progress. But the recognition of the reality of such

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progress is frustrated by the conception of the unreality of time. Sometimes Dr. Bosanquet appears to doubt whether there is really any progress at all (see especially pp. 310 and 313). He emphasizes the fact that there is always loss as well as gain in any advance that is made, and seems almost inclined to believe that every stage of existence is intrinsically just as good as any other, except (surely a rather weighty *except*) in so far as it implies an increasing insight into the value of what has gone before. It seems to me that if this view were definitely pressed, it would be fatal to that strenuousness of human effort which Dr. Bosanquet so keenly appreciates and so fully illustrates in his own many-sided activities. It is no doubt true that there is usually loss as well as gain; but can it be seriously maintained that the two sides are generally equal? Is it not even true that what is lost tends in many cases to be recovered? Our modern civilizations, for instance, have no doubt lost many of the valuable features that belonged to the civilizations of Greece and other older nations. But are we not beginning to appreciate, and through appreciation to recover, some of these excellent features? Even in the individual life do we not know many people in middle life who have been able to recover something of the freshness and elasticity of youth? I am disposed even to demur a little to the rather gloomy view that Dr. Bosanquet is inclined to take of the loss that occurs in old age. Has he forgotten Rabbi Ben Ezra?

> Grow old along with me!
> The best is yet to be ——
> The last of life for which the first was made.

What of Cephalus in Plato's *Republic?* Or of such an old age as that of Goethe? Such cases are no doubt exceptional; but at least they suggest fine possibilities. But the truth is, I think, that Dr. Bosanquet has something almost like contempt for time. Reality, he thinks, must be timeless; and consequently we cannot recognize any real growth, any truly 'creative evolution.' Hence he objects (p. 326) to Edward Caird's conception of an 'ultimate triumph' of good. At best he will only allow of a 'relative triumph,' and even that somewhat grudgingly. It is difficult to see how this is to be reconciled with the 'perfection' of the universe, or with the fact that life presents itself to us as a constant struggle after better things. I do not see why

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he should seek to deprive the Cosmos of any of its features. It seems of course obvious enough, as he urges, that good implies evil as its correlative. All that he says on this subject is excellent; and perhaps no one has ever more impressively brought out 'the soul of goodness in things evil.' Good implies evil, as beauty implies ugliness; but does this fact make it impossible to think of a whole which is perfectly good or beautiful, the ugliness or evil being completely subordinated to the significance of the whole? And may it not be the case that such a whole can only be realized through a process of gradual growth? I should have thought that Dr. Bosanquet might have more explicitly adopted the view (which was, I believe, that of Caird) that there is but one reality,—the Absolute Life (*αὐτὸ ὁ ἐστι ζῶον*) working itself out through a time-process, and reaching an end in which its significance is made clear. Of course there are difficulties in such a view; but I should have thought that Dr. Bosanquet could have overcome them. It is surely necessary to maintain such a view if perfection is to be seriously affirmed at all.

He might very well retort, however, that this would have been to set forth such a Theodicée as he repudiates. Should we not be content with his more modest Anthropodicée? Well, I am doubtful whether 'in the end' (to use one of his favorite phrases) the two things can really be separated; but on the whole I am satisfied, and more than satisfied, with what he has given. His work is certainly a profound piece of philosophical discussion, of the most fascinating interest to all who care for the larger problems of life. It is, in every way, worthy of his great reputation, which it will rightly enhance. And I feel that this is a very inadequate review of it. I can only add,—*Read the book.* There is much more in it than I have been able to indicate. It is perhaps the ripest fruit of the idealistic development in England—at least from the point of view of the interpretation of human life.

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ETERNAL LIFE: A Study of Its Implications and Applications. By Baron Friedrich von Hügel. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1912. Pp. l, 443.

The reviewer of this important contribution to the philosophy of religion is, on a reduced scale, in a difficulty similar to that of the author when he endeavored to compress his theme into the compass of an article in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* (see preface). For to Baron von Hügel the subject of Eternal Life is hardly other than the whole of reality, its "white radiance" seen through time's "dome of many-colored glass." As he observes in the introduction, "We shall have to begin by roughly assuming and defining, and we hope to end by clearly exhibiting Eternal Life as an experience, requirement, force, conception, ideal, which is in endless degrees and ways latent in every specifically human life and act." The author's method and attitude towards experience may generally be described as transcendental in the Kantian sense, if we add to this a use of the category of spirit which goes beyond Hegel. Adopted by the religious philosopher, this method proceeds by postulating throughout the intellectual, emotional and volitional struggle to overcome the world, the constant presence of something other and more than thought, love, and will, something which works through these and which he recognizes as akin to him and yet more than his, something which he can never intellectually appropriate. Hence the greater obscurity of religion. "And finally life after all, at its deepest is a stretching out of faith and love to God, into the dark—Religion is a circle of experiences—which as man's first and last and deepest experience will indeed greatly exceed philosophy in richness, but fall short of it in direct clearness and articulation" (*Contemporary Survey*—Hegel).

We may infer that religion rejoices in the consciousness of this darkness, which to philosophy is repugnant. The spirit of this book is indeed opposed to any easy cutting of knots by a delimitation of spheres, assigning the well-lighted part to philosophy, the obscure to religion, to reason the philosophic interpretation, to intuition, faith, etc., the religious. It would be truer to say that the author's view of the thirst for the Infinite, implied in all human energies, radically affects his whole standpoint in philosophy, the skill with which he draws from

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Platonism, Hegelianism, modern spiritual idealism, whilst subordinating all to an outlook peculiarly his own.

In this general light might be considered his review of the efforts of humanity after the conception and practice of Eternal Life as expressed in philosophies, religious systems, and modern social movements, but only a few illustrations can be taken from the vast panorama which he unrolls before us. The meaning of the relation between 'Eternity' and 'Eternal Life' is one main problem of the book, and closely connected with this, the philosophy of time, since for man Eternal Life must have a quasi-durational form. The philosophic interest of the survey of non-Christian religions lies chiefly in the estimate of the contribution or failure of each to contribute to a positive notion of Eternity (*cf.* Buddhism in contrast with Mohammedanism). Historically the first source for the author's own philosophy of time is Plato's famous description of the "moving image of Eternity," but he seems to find a still more fruitful conception in Aristotle's ἐνέργεια ἀκινήσιας. In this Aristotle "has made a profound and permanent contribution to the experiences and problems involved in Eternal Life." Yet, partly (we may suggest) on account of the modern difficulty in comprehending the richness of the Greek view of the life of thought, Aristotle's ideal of the way to live in time the immortal life seems to Baron von Hügel "intolerably thin and shadowy." Very striking in relation to the notion of Eternity is the comparison of the two distinct conceptions of the 'Kingdom' traced by modern scholars in the New Testament. Thus the more eschatological view "intensely transcendent and dualistic," which prevails during the latter period of the teaching of the gospels, "carrying with it futurity, imminence, and suddenness, and generally implying the hope of everlastingness rather than consciousness of Eternity," seems to have less metaphysical value than the outlook of the earlier period "relatively immanental, monistic, ethical," with its insistence that the Kingdom is already present. We cannot do more than refer readers to the estimate of St. Paul's "immanental and non-temporal view" and of the Johannine presentation of "the earthly life of Jesus set in a frame and background of an Eternity extant, before, behind, and after this our earthly world of space and time." The treatment of St. Paul as of Plato illustrates the principle which perhaps must be the core of a

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religious philosophy, that the spiritual interpretation of life is the religious deepening of philosophic idealism.

In the review of the mediæval contribution we may especially note the comparison between the *ævum* of Thomas Aquinas, and the *durée* of M. Bergson. Ævum is intermediate between Time and Eternity, participating in each. It seems questionable whether Bergson's conception can be strictly brought into relation with that of any thinker for whom the Eternal is the real, and experiences of succession only real in so far as they participate in it. If the intolerable diversity of Bergson's process of ceaseless change and novelty is modified by his conception of the real endurance of the past, though unlighted for us except in the narrow sphere of practical necessity, yet he is far removed from all thinkers who in any sense foreshadow Baron von Hügel's view. For the fullest admission of the reality of time is in Bergson the background of the scheme in which the past endures.

It may here be added that when Bergson is later treated (in the contemporary survey), it again seems to us that in our author's hands that elusive thinker is forced to yield too much. His "aversion to genuine finalism" is regretfully referred to as a curable weakness. Yet would not his system be essentially destroyed by the insertion of a little teleology, a few more ideals, and some πού στῶ however slight, in the midst of the ceaseless flux of the life-force?

To return to the earlier modern period, we find that neither from Spinoza nor from Kant (as regards his results) is very much help towards the central problem of the book extracted. From Spinoza's abstract notion of Eternity, no individuality, no existence of persons in their own right can be deduced. Eternity is here "not a simultaneity of infinite self-consciousness, but ever more or less a simultaneous infinite spatial extension." Yet starting from these two thinkers, an impressive view of the instrumentality of exact science in the awakening of the soul is developed,—a view further elaborated with great force in the conclusion (Part III). Here the need of spatial experience for comprehension of the Eternal in the phenomenal sphere is insisted upon. Through mathematics and physics we have the discipline of a preliminary pantheism.

In the survey of more recent movements the author's method of examining all human phenomena *sub quadam specie æter-*

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nitatis is finely sustained, but we cannot linger over the noteworthy sections on Hegel, Schopenhauer, and neo-Hegelianism. The last-named development, in spite of the spiritual power of its English leaders, cannot, in his view, escape the religiously unsatisfying results of the identification of Thought and Reality. "Religion can never be concentrated into the sense that nothing really matters except as merely out of place, or only for a time." Even from the unpromising soils of Nietzsche's philosophy, Darwinism, and the labor movement of the present day, the author extracts ore for his purpose. The "Superman," for instance, is a pathetic "misapplication of our instinctive need of adoration," whilst the preoccupation with social problems even in its most limited "this-world" form, leads to Immanentism, and a strengthened insistence that spirit shall penetrate matter, or (as in the final summing up) material things are through their very obstructiveness the awakening of spirit. On the whole, the most philosophically interesting thread running through the book is perhaps the conception of the human experience of Eternal Life as "having its range between the pure simultaneity of God, and mere clock-time—its true form duration—an ever more or less overlapping succession capable of being concentrated into quasi-simultaneities." As we have tried to show, philosophies in an imposing roll from Plato to Bergson are put under contribution, and the sources of many movements revealed in support of this idea, which rests ultimately upon an original application of the category of spirit. We cannot pass by without noting, though we cannot here discuss the rejection of the theory of "spirit in the making" (p. 385). The manipulation of experience occasionally reminds us of the teaching of Professor Eucken, but we have here a much greater concreteness and definiteness in the idea of a spiritual life. "Time,—in the sense of duration,—is for us men not a barrier against Eternal Life, but the very stuff and means in and by which we vitally experience and apprehend that life."

The intense force with which this conviction is presented, in the style, often rich and brilliant, if somewhat ponderous, to which the author of "The Mystical Element of Religion" has accustomed us, has almost made of this paradox a truism when we finally close the book.

London, England. HILDA D. OAKELEY.

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THE MEANING OF CHRISTIANITY. By Frederick A. M. Spencer, M.A., Brasenose College, Oxford. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1912. Pp. 420.

On one side this book is to me decidedly sympathetic. Philosophically, it is an attempt at metaphysical interpretation of cosmic and human evolution; and in the working out I find remarkable coincidence with a hypothetical sketch which I have just lately finished. Not having the least disposition to say with St. Augustine, *Pereant qui ante nos nostra dixerunt,* I gladly point out this in advance of the hoped-for publication of my own essay. In some details my sketch is less and in some more determinate than the author's; but the fundamental coincidence, when we come down to the general statement, is that real evolution is conceived as "emergence into activity of hitherto latent qualities." And, granted a certain hypothesis differing from that which I had formerly adopted, I too have found myself led to speculate not only on reincarnations of permanent selves, but also on a final term to the whole evolution of the world. The antinomy between finite and infinite past series, from which I myself start, the author does not argue out, and I conjecture that he has reached his conclusion in a more intuitive way. This makes it the more remarkable that on the question of the origin and destiny of the world we should both have arrived at the same type of theory.

On the other side I have been tempted to say that the mode of presentation adopted amounts, in the case of a philosopher living in this era of the world, to a 'great refusal,'—a refusal of the freedom achieved by the modern mind to think without submitting to the test of conformity even to what may be held for the inner meaning of a creed and sacred book. To the taking up of suggestions from these I have no objection; we must all take our suggestions from somewhere if we are not to acquiesce in simple nescience: but more is implied in describing the result of meditating on the metaphysics of evolution as "the meaning of Christianity." It is best, however, to state the method and leave the reader to judge whether it is a true ideal of philosophic search. It comes out with special clearness in the following sentence: "Let us first try to grasp the general view contained in the gospels and main apostolic writings on the subject of immortality and the resurrection,

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which view we can afterwards correct and develop in accordance with our evolutionary eschatology" (p. 349).

Of course this may be the easiest means of gaining access to certain minds; and what Christianity will ultimately mean for any church depends no doubt on what the ruling powers can be persuaded by various practical considerations to allow that it may mean. In different churches the authorities differ. Mr. Spencer puts the question (p. 141): "If we cling both to Christianity and to belief in progress and enlightenment, how shall we escape confusion?" Pius X, following in the footsteps of Pius IX, would reply, "You can by no means escape confusion." And what an anathema would that authority (so far above merely intellectual 'authorities,' as some sneeringly say) pronounce on such candid utterances as these! "Of all gods since the world began the Christian God has been represented as in effect the most unjust, the most cruel" (p. 335). "Of all iniquities the doctrine of eternal punishment is the greatest. It is the vilest sin that has stained mankind" (p. 336). To me, I confess, the next sentences seem to express profound insight. "The callousness and feebleness of imagination necessary to this doctrine must be such as to allow much cruelty and injustice in the dealings of man with man. Hence the social order of a race among which eminent men have only recently entertained this belief is likely to involve much suffering and degradation to the poorer members of it. Indeed, the stage of moral progress at which belief in everlasting punishment becomes impossible must be far below the stage at which horrible social injustices and conditions seriously inimical to the proper development of human life become impossible. And so, when a people is only two or three generations removed from the date at which this insane theology was finally rejected, the philosopher will probably be right in thinking that he is living in the midst of a tangled mass of inhumanities, at which future ages will shudder" (pp. 338, 339). I should add, as perhaps the author would allow, that it is not the inward development of Christianity that within recent generations has changed the social view, but influences coming from the 'worldly,' or at any rate the merely 'mental' (as he expresses it), in distinction from the eminently 'spiritual' types in the Christian sense. And thus finally I am impelled to ask whether Christianity, which was the first religion to give elaborate organization to this belief,

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as it was the first to introduce systematic persecution for unbelief in its dogma, is not, as Sir Leslie Stephen said not without familiarity with modern liberal theology, too fundamentally damnatory and intolerant to be in the end transformable. A spiritual like an organic species may be modifiable to a certain point, but modifications beyond that point introduce another species.

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London, England.

AN INTERPRETATION OF RUDOLF EUCKEN'S PHILOSOPHY. By W. Tudor Jones, Ph.D. (Jena). London: Williams & Norgate, 1912. Pp. 250.

Mr. Jones's purpose in this volume is avowedly to give us an exposition rather than a criticism of Eucken's philosophy. The main body of the work consists of an attempt to give, "in a form which is as simple as the subject-matter allows, and which will not necessitate the reader unlearning anything when he comes to the author's most important works," the essentials of Eucken's teaching on religion and life, especially as this teaching is contained in "Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt" and "Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion." Man can never rest content with merely naturalistic views of life. There is always a capacity and a demand for a *more*, and the explanation of these facts is bound to lead us to a religious idealism. "Humanity, on the whole," as Mr. Jones puts it, "has climbed to a height to give some degree of meaning to the life of the day—a meaning superior to physical impressions, and which is able to see somewhat behind, around, and beyond itself." This is due to the spiritual life in man, but this spiritual life is not a possession delivered complete once and for all. One can only make the spiritual life one's own when it is acknowledged and used for further triumphs, because the spiritual life is a continual endeavor to achieve more and more in the development of the spiritual life. Eucken's philosophy is essentially a spiritual activism; but it is not a mere subjective activism, but an activism originated, guided, and inspired by overpersonal norms and values which are of fundamental cosmic significance. An interesting point upon which Mr. Jones lays some emphasis is the importance for philosophy which Eucken

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attaches to the study of language and history. In the past philosophers have not recognized the mischief produced by the neglect of these two studies. Eucken early saw the mistake of this, "and we are witnessing to-day the phenomenon of the indissoluble connection of language and history with philosophy. In fact, the new meanings given to language and history are meanings of things which happened in the culture and civilizations of individuals and of nations, and such a material casts light on the processes, meaning, and significance of the human mind and spirit." In the introduction Mr. Jones gives some account of the whole movement in Germany towards a religious idealism, as represented by writers like Rickert, Troeltsch, Windelband, and Dilthey. We get also in the chapters on "Universal Religion" and "Philosophy and Religion" an estimate of the relation of Eucken's philosophy to that of Bergson, pragmatism, absolute and immanent idealism, and the neo-Kantian movement. But probably the most interesting chapter in the whole book is that in which Mr. Jones writes of Eucken's personality and influence. Here he tells us of the impression which Eucken has made on his pupils (and not least upon Mr. Jones himself) and of Eucken's endeavors on behalf of the smaller nations of Europe. The book contains an appendix giving a complete list of Eucken's writings, together with those translations which have appeared in English.

E. H. Strange.

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Arthur James Balfour, as Philosopher and Thinker: A Collection of the More Important and Interesting Passages in His Non-Political Writings, Speeches, and Addresses (1879-1912). Selected and arranged by Wilfrid M. Short. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912. Pp. xii, 552.

"This volume," says Mr. Short in his preface, "is an attempt to present in a convenient form the more important and interesting non-political views to which Mr. Balfour has given expression in his published writings, speeches, and addresses, from the year (1879) in which he published his 'Defence of Philosophic Doubt,' to the present year (1912.)"

It is open to question whether the form is the most convenient that could have been chosen. Out of five hundred and

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forty-four pages, two hundred and twenty-two, or nearly half, consist of excerpts from Mr. Balfour's two main contributions to literature, "A Defence of Philosophic Doubt" and "Foundations of Belief." The method of the pastebrush and scissors cannot do justice to books of this type, in which the reasoning is continuous and often, of necessity, involved and difficult. Such books cannot be fully appreciated by readers who 'skip,' however judiciously.

But skipping, of course, may induce an appetite,—on this account doctors have been known to recommend it,—and it is to be hoped that the present volume will lead many readers to subsequent and profounder study of Mr. Balfour's philosophical writings.

The rest of the volume covers a wide range of miscellaneous topics, which do not easily lend themselves to classification. Here are a few, taken at random from the index,—Bacon, Beauty, the Bible, Cancer Research, The Civil Service, Decadence, Eugenics, Golf, Matrimony, Music, Polar Exploration, Political Economy, Psychical Research, Sir Walter Scott! In such an array few will find nothing to interest them, and many will find much. Even on the most trivial or well-worn subjects, Mr. Balfour seldom fails to write or speak suggestively. Furthermore, he is an acknowledged master of language, who often attains to great heights of eloquence. His appreciation of Bacon, for example, and some of his tributes, spoken in the House of Commons, to dead sovereigns and statesmen are worthy to be preserved in a permanent and accessible form, if only as choice examples of modern rhetoric. It is, indeed, the chief merit of this book that it does bring within one cover a large number of Mr. Balfour's non-political speeches, which otherwise might have slept on in the oblivion of newspaper files.

But this merit would have been the more conspicuous had the editor not attempted the impossible task of including "passages representing . . . the essence" of the two philosophical works already mentioned. Yet only a gentle criticism on this point is fitting in a reviewer, since it is the inclusion of the passages in question which chiefly renders the book appropriate for review in this JOURNAL.

It is impossible here to state fully, much less to discuss fully, Mr. Balfour's ethical position as revealed in this volume, but one or two central points may be noted. He accepts (or rather,

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in some degree, anticipates, for the passage in question was published in 1879) the distinction, fundamental in much modern ethics, but not yet universally accepted, between things which are good in themselves and things which are means to good.

"All imperatives, all propositions prescribing actions, have this in common that if they are to be of any cogency, the actions they prescribe must be to the individual by whom they are regarded as binding, either mediately or immediately, desirable. They must conduce, directly or indirectly, to something which he regards as of worth for itself alone. The number of things which are thus in themselves desirable is, of course, very great. . . . Now, it is evident that to every one of the ultimate propositions prescribing these ends, and for which, as the ends are ends in themselves, no further reason can be given, there will belong a system of dependent propositions, the reasons for which are that the actions they prescribe conduce to the ultimate end or end in itself" (p. 339).

"The important duties of the moralist," Mr. Balfour continues, "arise from the confused state in which the greater part of mankind are with regard to their ethical first principles. The two questions each man has to ask himself are: What do I hold to be the ultimate aims of action? and, If there is more than one such end, how do I estimate them in case of conflict? . . . Since these two questions can be answered, not by ratiocination, but only by simple inspection, the art of the moralist will consist in placing before the inquirer various problems in ethics free from the misleading particulars which surround them in practice" (p. 342).

Mr. Balfour, however, is not an 'intuitionist,' either in the sense of Sidgwick or in that of Mr. G. E. Moore. For he refers (p. 231) to "various attempts to construct 'intuitive' systems of morals which shall owe nothing to historical development and psychological causation," and proceeds, "I cannot believe that this is philosophically to be defended." It is clear enough to what schools of thought he is referring, though it may be argued that he does not state their position fairly.

In his discussion of the appropriate spheres of "authority and reason," Mr. Balfour returns to the same question. "If the right and the duty of private judgment be universal, it must be both the privilege and the business of every man to subject the maxims of current morality to a critical examination"

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(p. 3); and he goes on, with a wealth of elegant irony, to "picture the condition of a society in which the successive generations would thus in turn devote their energies to an impartial criticism of the 'traditional' view," and to conclude that "our ancestors were not to be pitied because," by contrast with ourselves, "they reasoned little and believed much." But this argument would seem to be beside the point. The right to private judgment in ethical matters is claimed in respect of 'ends-in-themselves,' and questions concerning these, as Mr. Balfour himself points out, "can be answered, not by ratiocination, but only by simple inspection."

In his criticism of Naturalism Mr. Balfour observes (p. 230-31): "It is enough for my present purpose to establish that we cannot plausibly assume a truthward tendency in the belief-forming processes, a growing approximation to verity in their results, unless we are prepared to go further, and to rest that hypothesis itself on a theistic and spiritual foundation." This passage raises controversies too large for discussion here. But it may be argued that the hypothesis of a theistic foundation creates greater difficulties than it dissolves, and further that the development, as it were, of the moral eye, whose function it is to be sensitive to good and evil, is in no way hampered, even if it be in no way helped, by the working of natural selection in other spheres.

We may note one further point out of many. Mr. Balfour expresses the view (p. 255) that, since "the brief fortunes of our race occupy but a fragment of the range in time and space which is open to our investigations, if it is only in relation to them that morality has a meaning, our practical ideal must inevitably be petty, compared with the sweep of our intellectual vision," and we are thus deprived by the growth of modern science of "an ethical end adequate to our highest aspirations." This view is still held no doubt by some, and was probably even more seductive when astronomical discovery was proceeding more rapidly than now, and along more sensational lines. But for others, even if there be no future life for man, the eternal life of a blind mass of matter, however large, shrivels into insignificance beside one short human life full of high endeavour, nay even beside one fleeting hour of human love. This question, also, is one of instinctive feeling, to be decided "not by ratiocination, but only by simple inspection."

London, England. HUGH DALTON.

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HISTORICAL STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY. By Émile Boutroux. Authorized translation by F. Rothwell. London: Macmillan & Co., 1912. Pp. ix, 336.

It is not quite clear why the essays of which this volume is composed should have been thought important enough to be translated into English at the present moment. As a volume the work is by no means new, having appeared in French as long ago as 1897, and being made up of material which was not fresh even then. Of its constituent essays, that on Socrates was originally published in the *Compte Rendu* of the French Academy of Moral Sciences for 1883; the accounts of Aristotle and Kant are reprints of articles which appeared in the *Grande Encyclopédie* in 1886 and 1895 respectively. The study of Jacob Boehme is from the *Compte Rendu* of the Academy for 1868, and the slight essay on Descartes is made up of two articles extracted from the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* for 1894 and 1896. It is usually undesirable to reprint old encyclopædia and magazine work of this kind. From the nature of the case encyclopædia articles are usually devoid of originality, and M. Boutroux's are no exception to the common rule. I shall hardly be thought called upon to examine work done so long ago with the detail which would be proper in dealing with an entirely new contribution to the history of philosophy. I may remark, however, that M. Boutroux's treatment of the Socratic problem is vitiated throughout by an elementary fallacy of equivocation. His thesis, one hardly likely to find approval today, is that Plato and Aristophanes may be disregarded as witnesses to the character of Socrates, since each is, in his own way, an imaginative artist; we must give the preference to Xenophon, because, of all those who speak of Socrates from their personal knowledge, Xenophon is the only 'professional historian.' Now, in what sense, and under what limitations, can we reasonably infer that of two writers who describe the same man, the one who is a professional historian is likely to give the truer account. Obviously, we must suppose (1) that the 'professional historian' is what we now mean by that phrase, a man who has acquired by devotion to historical studies the spirit of detachment and freedom from unconscious bias, that power to see men and things in their actual relations which distinguishes the historian from the apologist, and has also

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learned to handle his 'documents' in a sound critical way; (2) that, where he professes to be relating matters which have come under his own observation, the range of his observation should be as wide at least as that of the other writer who is not a 'professional historian.' He must have known their common hero as well and as intimately as the other; (3) he must have been equally well fitted by his own natural gifts and training to get a sympathetic insight into the real character and aims of the common subject; (4) his narrative, so far as it depends on personal impressions, must have been composed, or based on materials composed, soon enough after the facts to prevent fallacies of memory, and where it rests on the testimony of others, he ought to have ground for believing that he has availed himself of the evidence of as many first-hand witnesses as possible, and set himself to discriminate between the degrees of their trustworthiness. None of these conditions are fulfilled by Xenophon as a writer of Socratic discourses. In the first place, history was not his profession, but the recreation of his years of retirement. His profession was that of the soldier of fortune; his leisure was occupied with amateur literary composition on an encyclopædic range of subjects, historical narrative, rural economy, finance, sport, cavalry tactics, political essay writing, fiction. Of all his multitudinous productions only one has any claim to be called a history in the proper sense of the word, the *Hellenicá*. And the *Hellenicá* itself, as is now generally admitted, is history deliberately composed for apologetic purposes. The narrative, both in what it does say and still more in what it does not, is meant as an elaborate glorification of Spartan policy. Hence, from the fact that Xenophon found time to write a partisan continuation of Thucydides we have no right to infer that his avowedly 'apologetic' account of Socrates is likely to be particularly 'historical.' As to the second point, as Professor Burnet has shown, Xenophon's personal acquaintance with Socrates must have ended when, as a young man not yet thirty, he joined the expedition of Cyrus. Moreover, how much reliance can be placed on his assertions that he personally 'heard' the discourses he reports is shown by the two significant facts that he professes to have been present at the banquet described in his *Symposium*, and also to have heard a conversation in which Socrates described the battle of Cunaxa in language which would suggest that he had read the

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account of it in a 'presentation copy' of the *Anabasis*. In both cases the known chronology shows that Xenophon's assertion of his own presence is a mere literary device. The same may be true of many, if not all, of the conversations related, as if from personal reminiscence, in the *Memorabilia*. In fact M. Boutroux makes the mistake of separating the *Memorabilia* from the rest of Xenophon's 'Socratic discourses,' and judging of its accuracy as a record of the writer's own experiences, apart from any examination of the light thrown by these other discourses on Xenophon's literary methods, and in this respect shows himself no stickler for the methods of a 'professional historian.' As regards the last point, it is demonstrated that Xenophon used at least the *Apology* and *Phaedo*, if not the *Theaetetus* and even the *Sophistes*, as documents for his Socratic works. This is important for more than one reason. It shows that the Socratic writings of Xenophon are further removed from the events he records than the *Phaedo* at least in point of time. It proves also that Xenophon himself did not regard as imaginative fiction works of which he made a not always over-happy use in compiling his own account. And, in fact, the supposed contradictions between Xenophon and Plato are mostly non-existent. Xenophon, *e. g.*, does not deny that Socrates had a personal knowledge of the higher mathematics and astronomy; all that he says is that, though acquainted with these matters himself, Socrates recommended his young friends to turn their attention to more practical subjects,—as no doubt he did in a good many cases. So he does not say that Socrates never held the views which he is represented in the *Phaedo* as discussing with his Pythagorean friends; he simply keeps silence about the matter. If one reads Xenophon aright, there is nothing in his whole account of Socrates inconsistent with the view that all that Plato says of him is true to the letter. Only in that case, there must have been a great deal to tell about Socrates which was either unknown to Xenophon or rejected by him from his Socratic writings as unsuited to their apologetic purpose. The more one reads these writings, the more, I think, one is drawn to the belief that Xenophon only took to their composition late in life because the vogue for Socratic discourses (which Aristotle, it will be remembered, regards as a distinct type of literature) had been created by other *viri Socratici*, notably Plato, and as an amateur in all forms

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of *belles lettres,* he wished to shine in the newly created *genre.* The *Memorabilia* and the rest are just one group of λόγοι Σωκρατικοὶ among others; everything points to their comparative lateness and dependence as compared with the *Phaedo* and *Symposium* and *Gorgias* of Plato, while their dullness and mediocrity of thought is no particular ground for thinking them specially faithful to fact. Aristotle evidently did not regard them as of any special historical value, since he draws no single statement of any significance about Socrates from them, and, indeed, cannot be *proved* to have made any use of them whatsoever.

The encyclopædia articles on Aristotle and Kant are favorable specimens of their kind, though their chief merit, the grace and brevity with which they are written, is not preserved in the translation. The former contains some curious statements which the author might well have expunged from the English version. It is certainly not true that Aristotle was 'the author' of the doctrine that the earth is spherical. As we find the very word σφαῖρα a 'ball,' applied to the earth in the myth of the *Phaedo,* with the loud approval of Simmias, a Theban Pythagorean, we may take it as certain that the discovery was known at any rate to the Pythagorean disciples of Philolaus, and presumably to Philolaus himself, years before Aristotle was born.[1] And I do not understand how any one who has read the *Timaeus* could make the blunder of ascribing the famous doctrine of the 'spheres' of the heavenly bodies to Plato. Whether Plato approved of the purely mathematical analysis of Eudoxus, which represented the apparent paths of the planets as resoluble into combinations of movements of rotation, there is, so far as I know, no direct evidence to show; it is certain that there is no place in his astronomy for the 'fifth body' and the physically real 'spheres' of Aristotle. Eusebius has preserved for us the merciless assault of the Platonist Atticus on this very theory as a proof of Aristotle's disregard of facts and general incompetence in physics. Also in the exposition of Aristotle himself much has been adopted which belongs to later exegetes rather than to the original doc-

[1] I note however that in the translation it is merely said that A. "maintained the doctrine." Is this an author's correction, or the translators deliberate correction of his author, or merely a fortunate piece of careless rendering?

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trine. To take only two points, the subdivision of 'practical philosophy' into ethics, economics, and politics is quite un-Aristotelian, and so is the introduction of 'poetics,' as a third main division of philosophy, by the side of 'theory' and 'practice.' And the account on page 93 of the 'heads of predicables' is based not on Aristotle, but on Porphyry, as we see from the omission of 'definition' and the inclusion of 'species' into the list.

I must now say a few words about the work of the translator. It is seen at its best in the essays on modern philosophy, where Mr. Rothwell is probably most at home with the subject-matter. In the essays on Socrates and Aristotle more than one passage has been infected with errors from which the original is free, owing apparently to the translator's unfamiliarity with persons, places, dates, and doctrines, referred to by his original. There are, however, certain awkward standing mistranslations which pervade the book, such as the constantly recurrent 'dimension' for *grandeur*, magnitude, and the perplexing 'extent' instead of 'extension,' as the standing rendering of *étendue*. Nor does Mr. Rothwell ever seem secure from errors of construction when he has to deal with a longish or idiomatically expressed sentence. I subjoin some examples in illustration.

P. 3: "Though we may somewhere find a logical concatenation of facts along with the facts themselves, still it is in doctrines and systems that philosophy finds its realization." This is a singularly dark saying. The original is clear enough. "*If* a logical concatenation of facts is offered to us along with the facts themselves *anywhere*, it is in the doctrines and systems in which philosophy *has* realized itself." The 'though' and 'still' imparted into the sentence by the translator, and the misrendering of the tense of *s'est réalisée* entirely destroy M. Boutroux's point, which is that the history of philosophy cannot be reduced to a mere chronicle because of all histories it is the one in which our data themselves most obviously consist of logically connected, not merely temporally conjoined, facts. P. 11: "An old Hegelian like Zeller" is at least an ambiguous expression of doubtful courtesy; *ancien hégélien*, 'former Hegelian,' is at once unambiguous and courteous. P. 20 (the paragraph deals with the source of Socrates's conception of ἐπιστήμη): "Nor is it (*i. e.*, the Socratic view) the reaction of subjectivism against objectivism, a reaction which was *evidently* determined by the excess of objectivism itself." The French

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of the last clause runs *qui aurait été determinée, i. e.,* which would,—*on the view which is being unfavorably criticized by M. Boutroux,*—have been determined. Mr. Rothwell is apparently ignorant of this use of the French conditional, and thus makes his author state as a fact what he actually gives as the hypothesis of an opponent. Translate: "a reaction *supposedly* determined by" etc. At page 24 we have a singular example of the dangers of neglect of the minutiæ of idiomatic sentence-construction. "Is it imagined, as Aristotle says later on, that, according to Socrates's meaning, in teaching a man the trade of a shoemaker it is sufficient to place in his hands a collection of ready-made shoes?" Of course Aristotle never suggests that Socrates held any view of the kind, nor does M. Boutroux ascribe any such suggestion to him. *His* words are "*Croit-on, comme le dira plus tard Aristote, dans le sens de Socrate, qu'il suffise,*" etc. "Does anyone imagine, as Aristotle was one day to say in the spirit of Socrates, that it is enough," etc. The translator, by transferring the clause about Socrates into the dependent interrogative sentence, changes M. Boutroux's correct remark that Aristotle's well-known criticism of the earlier teachers of rhetoric is quite in the Socratic spirit into an imaginary and absurd criticism of Aristotle on Socrates himself.

Page 28: I may remark once for all that it is unfortunate that the translator should have kept throughout the two essays on Greek philosophy the standing rendering of *physiologue, physiologie,* by 'physiologist,' 'physiology' where M. Boutroux is clearly using the terms in their original Greek sense. 'Physicist,' 'physics' are the real equivalents in English. P. 29: To look at things 'from such a bias' is a correct enough phrase in French, but not in English, in which 'bias' always carries along with it the implication of prejudiced and unreasonable one-sidedness. P. 46 gives me an opportunity to plead that the colloquialism 'doctor,' in the sense of 'physician' ought to be banished from correctly written English. P. 68: "Here indeed is the center of Socrates's doctrine, the principle mobile of his thought." *Le mobile* in the sense of the 'mainspring' of a machine is familiar enough in French; it is certainly not good current literary English.

In the article on Aristotle, Mr. Rothwell is at his worst as a translator. P. 74: Why, when the correct English forms of 'Diogenes Laertius' and other names of biographical writers are

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given, do we hear of 'Denys' of Halicarnassus? Does Mr. Rothwell not know that Denys is French for Dionysius? It is significant that Atarneus, the home of Aristotle from 347/6-345/4, and the birthplace of his friend Hermeias, never gets its name correctly spelled. On p. 76 it figures as 'Atarnea,' while at 152, in a translation from M. Boutroux's French version of Aristotle's verses on the death of Hermeias, we hear of 'Atarnes' son,'—the word being apparently mistaken for the name of the father of Hermeias. I should also like to know why Aulus Gellius on p. 77 gets his name double-barrelled. The French, it is true, for reasons best known to themselves, call him Aulu-Gelle, but then they also talk about Tite-Live, and Jésus-Christ. On the same page we read that Aristotle opened his school 'at Lycæum' (*sic*). I am afraid this means that Mr. Rothwell does not know what the 'Lyceum' was. At p. 91 the translator says of the 'constitutions' examined in the πολιτεία that they were classified according as they resembled democracies, oligarchies, aristocracies, or tyrannies. The meaning is obscure. M. Boutroux says quite clearly that "they were classified, according to their points of resemblance, as democracies, oligarchies," etc. On the same page we read that the second part of the Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία describes the constitution of Athens as it was "about the time of the Crown trial.' (French, *procès de la Couronne.*) Such a rendering as 'the Crown trial' will hardly convey the right meaning to an English reader, to whom the phrase is familiar in a very different sense from that intended by M. Boutroux. It looks a little as if the translator himself were not quite clear about the allusion.

Page 93: I do not understand what the translator means by calling the category of ἐχειν 'possession.' It is the common rubric under which fall all ἐξεις or 'states.' The term is originally medical for the 'general condition' of a patient, and comes, of course, from the intransitive use of ἐχειν in such phrases as καλῶς ἐχειν. The stock rendering 'habit,'—*cf.* 'habit of body,'—gives the sense pretty nearly; 'possession' is nonsense. P. 96: "The characteristics belonging to animals devoid of gall, *in this particular condition of being* devoid of gall" is a fine example of verbiage. The French for the words *I have underlined* is simply *en tant que,* and a simple *quà* would have given the sense more clearly than Mr. Rothwell's awkward five-worded expression. On p. 98 I meet the novel word 'finity,' which, on

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reference to the original, appears to be a printer's error for 'fixity.' On the next page there is a worse fault; a sentence so carelessly arranged as to suggest ignorance of one of Aristotle's fundamental doctrines: "Proper principles cannot be proved like common ones." I do not know what Mr. Rothwell meant by this, but in correct English it carries the implication that 'common' principles *can* be proved. Aristotle held, as we know, that they cannot, and M. Boutroux writes accordingly, "Proper principles (*i. e.*, the ἴδια ἀξιώματα of a science) like common ones, cannot be proved."

On p. 102 I find more than one error. *Le hasard* in French means τύχη, chance; the English hazard usually means either risk, danger, or a certain old-fashioned game at cards. Hence 'hazard' is an unfortunate word to employ as a technical term for what Aristotle calls τύχη. The sentence, "There is no science of hazard as such, the meeting *with the* two genera," is further made unmeaning by a mistranslated preposition and wrongly retained article. It should be, "There is no science of chance, the meeting *of* two genera." Further down comes something worse. "The thing is to discover whether a concept is anything else than a collective idea, or a static or dynamic unity valid for an indefinite series of . . . facts." It is impossible to extract from these words a clear statement of the alternative theories of the concept between which we are to make our choice. The correct rendering is simple: "the question is here to know whether a concept is *only* a collective idea, or whether it is a unity," etc. On the next page we learn that Aristotle's metaphysics "has been set up as opposed to Platonic philosophy." We should naturally take this to mean that certain persons other than Aristotle have 'set up' his doctrine as a rival to Plato's, the implication being that there was no such conscious rivalry in Aristotle's own mind. The original, however, means precisely that there was. Aristotle's metaphysics *s'est constituée, was constructed* in opposition to the philosophy of Plato. P. 109 affords a bad instance of careless proof-reading. "The soul is form with regard to the body, matter the intelligence," where after 'matter' the words 'with regard to' have been omitted. P. 108, a misplaced comma has spoiled the sense of the statement that "slaves . . . whose actions are regulated often, nevertheless act on their own account." The comma must, of course, come after 'regulated,' not after 'often.'

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P. 111 gives one out of several mistranslations of the reflexive and emphatic *soi-même*. "What is desired and thought moves without oneself moving." Read, of course, "without being itself moved." A similar and rather comical example of the same kind of blunder occurs later on in the same page. "God . . . to whom the world is as though it did not exist, intervenes in no single detail of *his own* events." *Ses événements* means, of course, the events in the world, *its* events; 'God's own events' would be unintelligible. The standing blunder about the meaning of *grandeur* produces, perhaps, its most unfortunate effect in a sentence of p. 115, where we are told that 'continuousness' (presumably, what is meant is 'the continuum') is divisible *ad infinitum*, though in dimensions that are themselves continuous, not, as Zeno supposed, in indivisible points." To make sense, we must replace the unmeaning 'dimensions' by the correct translation 'magnitudes,' and the twice repeated 'in' by 'into.' What Mr. Rothwell took the sentence to mean I cannot conjecture. On p. 117, where the translator is rendering a remark to the effect that rotation round an axis is the only motion possible to Aristotle's spherical universe with no vacuum outside it, he makes a curious interpolation and informs us that the spherical form is the only one which enables the whole to move "without *causing* a vacuum outside itself"(!). How can *any* 'motion of the whole' *cause* a void outside itself? Aristotle's point is not that *e. g.*, a rectilinear motion of the 'whole' would *cause* such a void, but that it *presupposes* such an existing void as a pre-condition.

At p. 120 we have an unlucky mistranslation which arises from ignorance of the facts about ancient philosophy. M. Boutroux quotes a statement which comes from Simplicius, who in turn alleges Porphyry as his authority. Simplicius, he says, *rapporte d'après Porphyre*. This appears in the translation as "Simplicius, so Porphyry tells us." Plainly Mr. Rothwell did not know that Porphyry lived a good two hundred years before Simplicius. On p. 121-22 *les astres* is wrongly rendered by 'constellations.' It was the individual stars, not these aggregates of them, which Aristotle regarded as animated and divine. P. 133 makes a bad blunder through mere carelessness. After a brief account of the way in which, according to Aristotle, sensation forms the basis of imagination and memory, M. Boutroux goes on to say that looked at from the practical point

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of view the pleasures and pains attendant on sensation admit of a development on parallel lines (*parallèle au précédent*). (He means that they similarly form a basis for desire and temper.) Mr. Rothwell makes the statement unintelligible by translating "development along the lines just mentioned." At p. 139 a rather too emphatic statement of the Frenchman is exaggerated into wild extravagance by his translator. Socrates, says M. Boutroux, according to Aristotle, forgot, when he called virtue a science, that the real problem is not to know the rules of morality (*il ne s'agit pas de la connaissance des règles*), but to realize them in action. Even this statement ought to have been qualified, since what Aristotle really says is that Socrates forgot that virtue is not *mere* knowing. But Mr. Rothwell goes further and, by slipping in an exclusive phrase, makes Aristotle blame Socrates for not seeing that in morals "we have nothing (!) to do with the knowledge of moral rules, but only (!) with their realization." How *can* we realize a rule if no one knows in the least what the rule is? As a curiosity I note that throughout the short section (pp. 140-41) dealing with Aristotle's theory of the family, *la femme,* which ought, of course, to be rendered 'woman,' is always represented by 'the wife.' *E. g.,* "the wife is less perfect than man." P. 149 we are told that one of the uses of art is to produce 'distraction.' There are, no doubt, some forms of so-called art (*e. g.,* the productions of the post-impressionists) which do drive most of us to distraction. Still Aristotle hardly reckoned this among the legitimate functions of art, and it is not what M. Boutroux means by *délassement.* He means 'relaxation,' 'recreation' after the fatigue of business. Incidentally I may observe that "Esthetics' is a false spelling and as ugly as false. On p. 156 'Decearchus of Messena' is highly objectionable. The *e* in the first syllable of Dicæarchus is presumably a misprint, but why is he docked of his dipthong in the second syllable, and if the name of his country is to have the Doric *a* in one syllable, why not in the other? Let us have either Messana or Messene, but not a cross between the two. I think Nicolaus of Damascus also should have his *u,* unless we are also to talk about Menelas and Philolas in place of Menelaus and Philolaus. It is not obvious why the list of ancient interpreters of Aristotle should have been deprived of the notes as to their dates given in the French. The dates for the mediæval Peripatetics are preserved, but in-

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accurately given. Amaury of Chartres and David of Dinant belong to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, as M. Boutroux says, not to the thirteenth and fourteenth, as Mr. Rothwell prints. It is odd that Mr. Rothwell should fancy that the service rendered to the translation of Aristotle by the later Middle Ages consisted in replacing the 'indirect translations,' through Arabic and Syriac intermediaries by versions made "directly from the Latin"(!). The versions were, of course, into Latin and from Greek. An odd effect of the transference of an idiomatic phrase into a language to which it is foreign occurs at pp. 161-62: "It appeared as though the Aristotelian doctrine *would have definitively lived,* when Leibniz triumphantly restored it," etc. Of course, by *eût définitivement vécu* M. Boutroux means *vixerat,* "had ended its life for good." I do not know whether the translator understood the idiom, but chose to be literal at the cost of giving an entirely false turn to the meaning. A reader dependent on his version would certainly take the sense to be that it might have been expected that Leibniz's return to Aristotle would have thenceforth given Aristotelianism a new lease of life. But what M. Boutroux means is that it looked as though Aristotelianism was dead and done for when Leibniz recalled attention to its merits.

After having spoken so frankly of the deficiencies of Mr. Rothwell's translation of the essay on Aristotle, I am glad to be able to give a general commendation to that of the following study of Boehme. If I am bound to regard the former as untrustworthy for the student who cannot read French and superfluous for the student who can, I can recommend the latter as an excellent short account of a remarkable and painfully obscure thinker. But M. Boutroux's remark that Boehme is generally recognized, as he was recognized by Hegel, as a powerful thinker, ought not to have been twisted into the statement that "along with Hegel, he is recognized as a man of powerful mind." There has been some awkward mistake in either the printing or the translating at p. 180. "The divine operation whose end is the blossoming and dominion the rule of the personality," is a mysterious rendering of M. Boutroux's words, *"l'opération divine qui a pour terme l'épanouissement et le règne de la personnalité."* The meaning plainly is simply "that divine working whose end is the blossoming and reign of personality." I suspect that 'dominion' and 'rule' represent

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two versions of the same word *règne,* and that the unidiomatic 'the' before 'personality' is retained from uncertainty as to the precise difference between French and English in the use of the article with abstract nouns. However got at, Mr. Rothwell's rendering is clearly wrong in suggesting that the sentence contains a double statement about (1) the end and (2) the dominion of the 'divine working.' The 'blossoming and reign' of personality is meant to express a single concept. And again, though I do not know Boehme's terminology well enough to be certain, I suspect that (p. 195) the soul, at the mercy of two conflicting impulses, is said rather to be "*on* the wheel" than "placed before" it. (The French *au rouet* is ambiguous.) At p. 200 I could wish that *s'incarner* had not been translated 'to incarnate.' In good English one may say that a person or a principle is or becomes incarnate, but there is no intransitive verb 'to incarnate.' Pp. 248 (in the essay on Descartes), the rendering of *la science du corps* by 'science of the body' is a very unhappy case of the improper retention of an article where our idiom requires us to dispense with it. 'The science of the body' would suggest in English human anatomy and physiology, whereas what is meant in this passage, as the context shows, is 'the science of body,' *i. e.,* mechanics.

I regret that considerations of space forbid me to say anything on the *Grande Encyclopédie* article on Kant. I trust my comments on the execution of Mr. Rothwell's translation will not be thought superfluous. If translation is to be pursued as a serious art, worth the labor of genuine scholars, we must at all costs keep the standard high. A true translation should not merely give the sense of an author's statements accurately, it should express them in language so idiomatic that it cannot be detected from its style as a translation at all. Even without demanding so high a standard, one may at least insist that, since translations are superfluous for students who can consult the originals, a reasonably good translation ought to be free from any actual misrepresentation of the meaning of the original. Any downright error in rendering *may* be a source of stumbling to the merely English reader who is forced to take the version as his sole means of getting at the meaning of a foreign writer. It is also an injustice to the translated that he should be made to utter misstatements which are not really his own. And there is no language from which more defective translations are made

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into English than French. I suppose this is just because there is so deceptive an appearance of similarity between the vocabularies and constructions of the two languages that it is easier for a man to fancy himself able to translate from French accurately than to make a like mistake about a classical language or even about German.

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THE NOTEBOOKS OF SAMUEL BUTLER. Selections arranged and edited by Henry Festing Jones. London: A. C. Fifield, 1912. Pp. xii, 438.

In 1871 George Meredith, in his capacity of reader to the publishers Chapman & Hall, rejected a book by an anonymous author, called "Erewhon." Yet "Erewhon" was to become almost famous in Samuel Butler's lifetime; it actually brought him a small profit, whereas he lost money on all his other books; and Butler's position is now secure among the few men of letters who have left their imprint on our age. There is in this fact, as there was in the whole of his curious career, something of the surprising quality of a really good joke. It is almost incredible, so essentially does he seem a voice of the present day, that Samuel Butler (1835-1902) was born in the reign of William IV. He was a grandson of his namesake, the headmaster of Shrewsbury School. After taking a first class in the classical tripos at Cambridge, he prepared for ordination in London, living among the poor and doing parish work. This led him to doubt the efficacy of infant baptism, so that he refused to take orders and emigrated to New Zealand, whence he returned to London at the age of twenty-nine, and, exchanging his sheep run for the art school, commenced painter. One of his pictures is in the national collections. He had already written on Darwinism and on the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus, but his first important work was that fascinating satire "Erewhon," with its mixture of gravity, imagination, and paradox. This was followed by "The Fair Haven," an elaborate piece of irony purporting to be a defense of "the miraculous element in our Lord's ministry." During the rest of his life, which was passed tranquilly in London, with annual holidays in Italy, he wrote to please himself and a few friends; if he won no general rec-

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ognition, he got much fun from defying the public and the literary and scientific pundits. He trod heavily on the toes of the scientists in three biological works, attacking Charles Darwin, and advocating the view that heredity is the same thing as memory. Another scandal was his discovery that "The Odyssey" was written at Trapani in Sicily, and that Homer was a woman. He also put forward a theory of Shakspere's Sonnets. Among the hobbies on which he wrote were various questions of Italian art, and the music of Handel. "Erewhon Revisited" is a continuation and improvement of "Erewhon," and his posthumous book, "The Way of All Flesh," which is largely autobiographical, is, for wit and bitterness, one of the best novels in the language. He kept copious notebooks,—it is no use, he said, putting a pinch of salt on the tails of our thoughts; they must be shot down at once,—which he was always posting up and decanting into his books. These notes have now been edited and arranged with pious care by his friend Mr. Jones, for whose work, by the way, no praise can be too high: the index is the best thing of the kind the present writer has ever seen. Any one who dips into the notebooks will at once see why it is important that a page of this JOURNAL should be consecrated to Samuel Butler.

For, by a fantastic stroke of fate, the temper of Butler's mind, while it made him an isolated crank in his own generation, preëminently fits him to be the guide, philosopher, and friend of every *âme bien née* in the present day. The reason is that, as a literary figure, he represents all that is best and soundest in modern tendencies, and at the same time leads a revolt against our prevailing vices of flabbiness, pretentiousness, and hypocrisy. It is not a question of the merit of his actual theories, but rather of the spirit that animated them, and of the perfection of his style. He is a great writer because his style fits his attitude towards life as its skin fits an animal; never, since the eighteenth century, was such consummate ease and simplicity, such point, such nervous energy. Nonsense is not avoided; he was the originator of the fantastic vein since worked by Bernard Shaw: yet every word is a deadly hit against some piece or other of current humbug. What he chiefly preached in life and morals was the supreme virtue of compromise,—that compromise which is, after all, the basis on which are erected all our schemes of wealth and power. He was fond of saying

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that the whole duty of man lies in contriving to serve both God and mammon at once, and that humor is the only way of doing this with dignity. Now the serving of God and mammon at once is, however we may veil it, the grand discovery of our sober, disillusioned age, which has outgrown the cruder enthusiasms of Ruskin or of Carlyle. If Butler himself violated this canon of commonsense by his quixotic attacks on reputations which he thought inflated, the trait is an endearing one and has left us a legacy of first rate satire. In ethics, his doctrine of compromise made him an out-and-out hedonist: to be a child of grace you must avoid saintliness and priggishness, and turn naturally towards happiness. He makes the language of Christianity, a religion otherwise uncongenial to him, serve his purpose, by emphasizing that side of it which is a protest against hypocrisy. In philosophy, his detestation of the temper that is always defining and getting everything clear-cut, his sense that if you only go deep enough, you always come to a contradiction in terms, made him, though he was one of the clearest and precisest of writers, all unknowingly the father of Pragmatism. All definitions, he held, ultimately refer to human convenience, and the following passage (p. 302) would have delighted William James: "Obvious convenience often takes a long time before it is fully recognized and acted upon, but there will be a *nisus* towards it as long and as widely spread as the desire of men to be saved trouble. If truth is not trouble-saving in the long run, it is not truth: truth is only that which is most largely and permanently trouble-saving."

SYDNEY WATERLOW.

London, England.

ÉTUDES DE MORALE. Par. F. Rauh. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1911. Pp. xxv, 505.

This book has been compiled from courses of lectures given by the late M. Rauh at the École Normale and the Sorbonne by nine of his former pupils, MM. H. Daudin, M. David, G. Davy, H. Franck, R. Hertz, R. Hubert, J. Laporte, R. Le Senne, and H. Wallon. These gentlemen are to be congratulated on the able manner in which they have performed their task, which has evidently been one of considerable difficulty; and M. Wallon, who contributes the preface, is quite justified in the claim that

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he makes for this volume that "*il constitue bien un livre, un ensemble dont les parties se répondent et se complètent.*"

In the preface, M. Wallon gives us a clear and succinct account of M. Rauh's general philosophical position. The fundamental aspects of M. Rauh's way of regarding reality are his antisubstantialism and his activism. There is not, according to him, any static unchanging reality; a thing is what it does, and what it does ever changes. Thus M. Rauh's conception of science is, as he himself remarks in a passage quoted by M. Wallon, in agreement with that of M. Poincaré and his school. We must conceive science "*comme une suite de tentatives qui successivement réussissent et échouent, comme une vie qui évolue, avec tous les tours, les retours et les détours de la vie.*" Another quotation is even more important as expressing the point of view which underlies all M. Rauh's treatment of moral problems: "*Une méthodologie scientifique, dit Rauh, c'est en somme la psychologie d'un savant,—telle est l'idée de M. Le Roy. Une méthodologie morale c'est la psychologie de l'homme intelligent, libéré de toute théorie.*" For underlying all M. Rauh's teaching there is one clear purpose, to render those to whom he is addressing himself "*hommes intelligents, libérés de toute théorie.*" And he seeks to do this in two ways, first, by criticizing preconceptions; secondly, by giving an account of the moral forces at work in France at the present day (for in addressing Frenchmen, M. Rauh very rightly confines himself in the main to the form in which moral problems present themselves to the French) to enable his auditors to make a free and unbiased judgment as to the best course to pursue.

The book opens with a statement of the conclusions to which it is intended to lead, which are, that there exists a moral certainty, analogous to scientific certainty, and that moral science is an experimental science, and is distinct from every other science.

The first part is an argument for the independence of moral science. M. Rauh passes in review the various attempts to deduce ethical propositions from other truths, metaphysical or scientific, and shows that in every case the conclusion is fallacious and results from taking some proposition of a general import in a limited and specific sense. He thus reaches this definition of morality: "*La morale n'est autre que l'idée générale d'une confrontation des valeurs et du choix qui en resulte.*" The choice, however, must be reasonable and "*être raisonnable*

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ce n'est pas énoncer des vérités universelles, mais situer sa pensée dans l'horizon intellectuel qui nous est présent.'' The right procedure in morals, then, is analogous to the procedure of the scientist who seeks, by means of hypotheses, to grasp that portion of reality with which he is at the moment concerned.

The next two sections are essays in the method of procedure thus suggested and deal respectively with ''La Patrie'' and ''La Justice.'' In both the treatment opens with the criticism and rejection of conceptions derived from more general truths. Having thus freed the mind of his auditors ''of all theory,'' he enables them to fulfill his criterion of rationality by giving a critical account of the trend of opinion, and, in the case of Justice, of the development of modern Capitalism and its relations with Labor. *''La solution dépend de la conscience de chacun.''* In the last section M. Rauh discusses the relations of moral certainty and reality with other certainties and realities. The most interesting point is his claim to take up a position intermediate between pure relativism and absolute realism. There are, he urges, as many reals as there are points of view. And it is from the moral point of view that we determine the relative values of the others.

To sum up, this book seems to me to have many good points. The criticisms of the many attempts to deduce morals from other truths is clear and concise. And whenever M. Rauh is dealing with a practical question, his tone is at once elevated and eminently sensible. The great defect of the book, it seems to me, is the failure to recognize the absolute independence of ethical truths, not only of other truths, but of our judgments of value. It is interesting in this respect to compare ''Études de Morale'' with Mr. Moore's ''Principia Ethica.'' Both M. Rauh and Mr. Moore show that it is fallacious to attempt to deduce ethical propositions from propositions of a non-ethical import. But Mr. Moore first proves that in ethical propositions a unique predicate good is affirmed or denied. M. Rauh, on the other hand, deduces the independence of ethical propositions from the fallacies involved in the attempts to deduce them. And this way of proceeding can never prove his point; for though all previous attempts to deduce morals be fallacious, it does not follow that a successful attempt is impossible.

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SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS. By Charles A. Ellwood, Ph.D., Professor of Sociology in the University of Missouri. New York and London: D. A. Appleton & Co., 1912. Pp. 417.

This is one of the most stimulating treatises on sociology with which we are familiar. The psychological aspects are bound to be the most fundamental as they are the most interesting phases of the social life. A treatment of social institutions in a purely formal way has little interest for this generation which is so much concerned with genetic developments and dynamic possibilities.

While the author's treatment of these phases is particularly illuminating, there are, it seems to us, fundamental weaknesses both in his theoretical contributions and in his illustrative material. First and foremost of these is his definition of society as constituted by *psychically interdependent* individuals: "We may tentatively define a society, in the concrete sense, as any group of individuals having more or less conscious reciprocal relations to each other; or, more briefly, *any* group of *psychically interacting individuals*" (pp. 12-15); a social law being "*a statement of the habitual way in which individuals, or groups of individuals, interact*" (p. 79). This might suggest to our minds a group composed of an enraged murderer and his terror-stricken victim, or the prisoners and their keeper, as between whom there will probably be abundant psychological interaction and pyschological interdependence. You will find it intensified in a group of several men in which each is attempting to shoot down some other and escape with his own life. But these situations seem to be the very reverse of what we mean by society. The author must include in his conception that kind of psychic interaction and interdependence which in its *ensemble* expresses an organic unity in the sense of teleological coördination of the component parts, a purposeful, harmonizing activity. A 'social' or 'sociable' fellow is one who readily adopts the temporary purposes of the group, in which he for the time being finds himself; an anti-social force or enemy is the thing or tendency which seeks to overthrow the group's purposes. In short, society involves at every turn this teleological element to which individual will is subordinate, or there is no society. While the author is certainly aware of the necessity of the coördinat-

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ing element, and has, indeed, devoted a chapter to the consideration of that phase of society, it is only here and there (see especially pp. 146 and IX) that he expresses it clearly.

As regards his use of ethnological data by way of supporting a view or illustrating a point, there are many causes for complaint. It is not clear that "descriptions of the life of present savage and barbarous peoples" (p. 49) will give us the course of social evolution prior to history, seeing that the ethnologists themselves cannot infer the course of development in the various savage cultures themselves. Nor will it give the "earlier stages of the evolution of the family" (p. 50, but see pp. 87, 88). It is equally difficult to comprehend what the asserted, important bearing of physical anthropology "upon sociology, especially upon the question of social origins" (p. 56) can be. The supposition that "definitely organized government in human society, according to anthropological evidence, seems to have arisen mainly through military necessities" (p. 183), is wholly fanciful, not to say fantastic. Many warlike tribes had scarcely any definitely organized government, while others, such as the Australians, with practically no inter-tribal warfare, had evolved very complex governments. To attribute the "work of the megalithic builders of the second stone age" (they are assigned now to the bronze age or by some to the late neolithic) to "the instinct of workmanship and the love of making things of all sorts" (p. 232), is sufficiently problematic in view of the great variety of motives that governs primitive man's productions as well as our own. Anthropology fails to furnish evidence that racial antipathy rests on an instinctive basis (p. 238), but indicates, if anything, that it is due merely to wide-reaching cultural differences, understandable only in the whole complex of psychological motives and through a historical perspective. There is even more objection to speaking of belief in the immortality of the soul and of belief in God as instinctive and to be "found among practically all peoples" (p. 239). Dr. Frazer's forthcoming work will doubtless furnish sufficient evidence to the contrary. Must even optimism be called "an instinctive mental attitude, since it is found in children and the lowest races no matter how hard their conditions of life may be" (p. 238)? Of course, in a sense, a spontaneous tendency to make the best of present circumstances is a necessary condition of survival. Again, we are not convinced that "anthro-

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pological and ethnological researches show" that "invention and discovery have from the beginning . . . played a very large part in the development of human social life" (p. 267). On the contrary, they seem to play an almost negligible part in primitive society, to be almost non-existent. Anthropology demands some qualification to the statement that "the only rational explanation of the *Couvade* is that in the transition from the low stage of metronymic culture to the patronymic stage [matrilineal to patrilineal?] the *Couvade* spontaneously resulted" (p. 307). There are other rational and, despite Tylor's incisive argument, perhaps preferable explanations. Pages of indisputable evidence could be offered to show the error in supposing that "public opinion is not found, to any extent, in savage and barbarous societies, because social tradition takes its place" (p. 334).

Objection might, indeed, be taken to many of the facts adduced and inferences drawn (as, for example, when the ability of the genius to produce inventions and discoveries is attributed to "*superior brain power,*" p. 268). Here, as in most of the sociological treatises offered us, a more incisive, critical treatment of some one or more limited forms of society, or of limited aspects treated comparatively, seems the great unattained *desideratum*. Only by such an incisive satisfactory treatment will the sociologists lay secure, permanent foundation stones for a trustworthy superstructure of scientific methods and inductions. At present they seem,—too ambitiously,—to attempt a construction of the outlines of the whole in one grand architectonic effort that does not always adequately account for the limitations imposed by the very nature of the material with which they must build.

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